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THE  
**HARVARD  
THEOLOGICAL REVIEW**

VOLUME X



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The *Harvard Theological Review* has been partially endowed by a bequest of the late Miss Mildred Everett, "for the establishment and maintenance of an undenominational theological review, to be edited under the direction of the Faculty of the Divinity School of Harvard University. . . . I make this provision in order to carry out a plan suggested by my late father, the Rev. Charles Carroll Everett." During the continuance of *The New World*, Dr. Everett was on its editorial board, and many of his essays, now collected in the volume entitled *Essays, Theological and Literary*, appeared first in its pages. Sharing his belief in the value of such a theological review, and in devotion to his honored memory, the Faculty of the Harvard Divinity School, of which he was a member from 1869, and its Dean from 1878 until his death in 1900, has accepted the trust, and will strive to make the *Review* a worthy memorial of his comprehensive thought and catholic spirit.

The *Review* is edited by a committee of the Faculty of the Harvard Divinity School consisting of Professors William W. Fenn, Kirsopp Lake, Frederic Palmer, and James H. Ropes.

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Volume X

Number 1

CONTENTS FOR JANUARY, 1917

QUIETISM . . . . .	<i>Rufus M. Jones</i>	1
"GOOD WILL TOWARD MEN" . . . . .	<i>James Hardy Ropes</i>	52
SIMON ZELOTES . . . . .	<i>Kirsopp Lake</i>	57
THE FOUNDING OF THE CHURCH . . . . .	<i>Ambrose W. Vernon</i>	64
REVIEWS AND NOTICES . . . . .		84

Volume X

Number 2

CONTENTS FOR APRIL, 1917

THE DEVELOPMENT OF CHRISTIAN INSTITUTIONS AND BELIEFS . . . . .	<i>Alfred Fawkes</i>	107
ENGLISH OPINION OF LUTHER . . . . .	<i>Preserved Smith</i>	129
THE GENESIS OF ST. AUGUSTINE'S IDEA OF ORIGINAL SIN . . . . .	<i>Ernesto Bonaiuti</i>	159
PREACHING AND WORSHIP . . . . .	<i>Frederic Palmer</i>	176
REVIEWS AND NOTICES . . . . .		195

Volume X

Number 3

CONTENTS FOR JULY, 1917

CLASSIC AND ROMANTIC TRENDS IN PLATO . . . . .	<i>J. Loewenberg</i>	215
A POSSIBLE CASE OF LUKAN AUTHORSHIP . . . . .	<i>Henry J. Cadbury</i>	237
THE EVER MEMORABLE MR. JOHN HALES . . . . .	<i>Nancy E. Scott</i>	245
KANT'S MORAL THEOLOGY . . . . .	<i>Johnston Estep Waller</i>	272
REVIEWS AND NOTICES . . . . .		296

Volume X

Number 4

CONTENTS FOR OCTOBER, 1917

ZIONISM . . . . .	<i>Kemper Fullerton</i>	313
AMERICAN, ENGLISH, AND DUTCH THEOLOGICAL EDUCATION . . . . .	<i>Kirsopp Lake</i>	336
PROFESSOR C. C. TORREY ON THE ACTS . . . . .	<i>F. J. Foakes-Jackson</i>	352
THE ANONYMOUS HYMNS OF SAMUEL LONGFELLOW . . . . .	<i>Henry Wilder Foote</i>	362
REVIEWS AND NOTICES . . . . .		369

## INDEX OF AUTHORS

BONAIUTI, ERNESTO . . . . .	The Genesis of St. Augustine's Idea of Original Sin . . . . .	159
CADBURY, HENRY J. . . . .		
	A Possible Case of Lukan Authorship . .	237
FAWKES, ALFRED . . . . .		
	The Development of Christian Institutions and Beliefs . . . . .	107
FOAKES-JACKSON, F. J. . . . .		
	Professor C. C. Torrey on the Acts . . .	352
FOOTE, HENRY WILDER . . . . .		
	The Anonymous Hymns of Samuel Long- fellow . . . . .	362
FULLERTON, KEMPER . . . . .		
	Zionism . . . . .	313
JONES, RUFUS M. . . . .		
	Quietism . . . . .	1
LAKE, KIRSOPP . . . . .		
	Simon Zelotes . . . . .	57
	American, English, and Dutch Theological Education . . . . .	336
LOEWENBERG, J. . . . .		
	Classic and Romantic Trends in Plato . .	215
PALMER, FREDERIC . . . . .		
	Preaching and Worship . . . . .	176
ROPES, JAMES HARDY . . . . .		
	"Good Will Toward Men" . . . . .	52
SCOTT, NANCY E. . . . .		
	The Ever Memorable Mr. John Hales . .	245
SMITH, PRESERVED . . . . .		
	English Opinion of Luther . . . . .	129
VERNON, AMBROSE W. . . . .		
	The Founding of the Church . . . . .	64
WALTER, JOHNSTON ESTEP . . .		
	Kant's Moral Theology . . . . .	272

# HARVARD THEOLOGICAL REVIEW

VOLUME X

JANUARY, 1917

NUMBER 1

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## QUIETISM

RUFUS M. JONES

HAVERFORD COLLEGE

It has been too much the custom to treat Quietism as a sporadic type of religion, as a sort of capricious "sport," to use a familiar botanical term, expressing itself in two or three famous, but solitary and isolated, mystics on the continent of Europe, and to assume that later evidences of Quietism must be traced back to the teachings of these few rare expounders of it. I am convinced, on the contrary, that these select individuals were only luminous examples of a profound religious tendency, which, in varying form of expression, swept over the entire western world in the latter part of the seventeenth and the early part of the eighteenth centuries, flooded into the consciousness of all who were intensely religious, and left an "unimaginable touch" even on the rank and file of believers. It was a deep and widespread movement, confined to no one country and it was limited to no one branch of the Christian Church. It burst forth in sun-dered places and spread like a new Pentecost, through kindled personalities and through quick and powerful books of genius.

Quietism was the most acute and intense stage of European mysticism. It was not a wholly new type of inward religion. It was rather a result of the normal ripening, the irresistible maturing, of experiences, ideas,

and principles that had been profoundly working for a very long period in the religious consciousness of Europe—a fact which partly explains its seemingly spontaneous appearance in a number of widely separated localities. It was an intense and glowing faith in the direct invasion of God into the sphere of human personality—a faith rising in many cases to the level of indubitable experience—but a faith, at the same time, indissolubly bound up with a fundamental conception of man's total depravity and spiritual bankruptcy. It must be understood at the outset that Quietism does not spell lethargy and inaction; it does not mean folded hands and a little more sleep; it is not a religion for lotus-eaters. The Quietist may and often did, swing out into a course of action that would make the rationally centred Christian quail with fear and slink to cover. It is not a question of action or of non-action; it is a question of *the right way to initiate action*. The Quietist holds a peculiar view in reference to the kind of spring, incentive, or "motor-cue" that can inaugurate a spiritual act. For him all acts that are motived by human consciousness, all aims designed, arranged, and planned by reason and the will of man, bear the mark and brand of the "creature" and are below the sphere of the spiritual. All thoughts and strivings that originate in mere man are spiritually barren and unfruitful. There are two levels or storeys to the universe. One level is the realm of "nature," which has passed through a moral catastrophe that broke its inherent connection with the divine and so left it godless and ruined. The other level is the "supernatural" realm where God is throned in power and splendor as spiritual Ruler. Nothing spiritual can originate on the level of "nature"; it can come only from "yonder." The main problems of religion, on this theory, are problems concerning the way in which the chasm is spanned between these two divided, sundered realms.

Quietism has its own peculiar answer to this urgent question. It had its birth and its nurture in the absolute despair of human nature which Protestant theology and the Counter-Reformation had greatly intensified. It flourished on an extreme form of the doctrine of the ruin and fall of man—an utter miserabilism of the “creature.” The trail of the old Adam lies over all that man does or thinks. The taint of the “creature” spoils all that springs from this source and fountain. Nothing divine, nothing that has religious value, can originate in man as man. The true and essential preparation therefore for spiritual ministry or for any action in the truth and life, seemed to the Quietist to be the repose of all one’s own powers, the absence of all efforts of self-direction, of all strain and striving, the annihilation of all confidence in one’s own capacities, the complete quiet of the “creature.” Then out of this silence of all flesh, out of this calm of contemplation, in which the mind thinks and desires and wills nothing—this pure repose—divine movings will spontaneously come, the extraordinary grace of openings will be made, an inner burst of revelation will be granted, the sure direction of divine pointings will be given, a spiritual fecundity will be graciously vouchsafed. Passivity and emptiness are thus only conditions of divine moving; they are only stages on the way to action. And the Quietist may become, without any violation of his principle, a hundred-horse-power man of deeds.

What I have been calling the state of “passivity” and “emptiness” needs further comment and elucidation. “Passivity,” of the effective sort, might better be called concentration or absorption. It is a state of inner life in which all the powers and functions of consciousness are brought into complete focal unity, so that all dualisms of self and other vanish, all tendencies to scatter disappear, all vagrant suggestions and inhibitions are absent.

The soul is unified, intensified, fused, penetrated, and *stands absolutely on attention*. The Quietist believed that this state was reached by a single act, a mighty act, and when once this state was reached, the soul became a living centre of receptivity. We speak here of quietude, repose, passivity; but it would appear that at no other time and under no other conditions is there such intense spiritual *action*. There is such complete concentration, such unmixed absorption, such undivided inner unity, that the mind takes no note of its own processes and does not reflect upon its intent or content. Von Hügel very aptly says that the absence of the direct consciousness of the self and of what is happening within is a characteristic of the deepest and most creative moments, and this is true whether the action is confined to the inward or outward sphere. "The degree of mind or will-force," he says, "operating in Nelson at Trafalgar and in Napoleon at Waterloo, or again in St. Ignatius of Antioch in the Amphitheatre, and in Savonarola at the stake, was evidently in the precisely contrary ratio to their direct consciousness of it or of themselves at all."<sup>1</sup>

The primary aspirations and the profoundest travail of soul of those who set forth on this spiritual pilgrimage are for the crucifixion of self and the death of the "creature," and the goal of the pilgrimage is the attainment of a state of *pure* repose and contemplation in which God flows in and takes the place of the crucified me, becomes the only inward reality, and inaugurates whatever action is acceptable to His perfect and holy will. The highest spiritual state, on whatever path the soul is travelling, is to the Quietist always "pure," i.e. it is a state uncontaminated by any definite mental content. "Pure love," which is love in its consummation, is a love that loves nothing finite or particular. All selfishness is purged away and it seeks no return. It loves for

<sup>1</sup> The Mystical Element of Religion, Vol. II, p. 133.

the sake of love alone. "Pure faith," which is faith at the *n*th degree, is a concentrated, unalloyed, and intense assent or swing of soul to God without the content and filling of any definite ideas or beliefs or expectations. "Pure prayer," which is prayer at its real efficacious level, is an absorbed and unitive state, in which not only all selfish thoughts and desires are obliterated but all thoughts and desires of every description are banished. The soul and God have met, and all of self is hushed as His presence flows in and bathes the soul with the fountains of Life.

This extreme form of religious mysticism, which culminated in the teachings of Molinos, Guyon, and Fénelon, was already current, even in England, before Madame Guyon was born, and it was a waxing influence for more than half a century. It is clearly described in Jeremy Taylor's *Life of Christ*, which was first published in 1649. "Beyond this [type of meditation] I have described," he writes, "there is a degree of meditation so exalted that it changes the very name, and is called contemplation. It is in the unitive way of religion, that is, it consists in unions and adherences to God; it is a prayer of quietness and silence, a meditation extraordinary, a *discourse without variety*, a vision and intuition of divine excellences, an immediate entry into an orb of light, and a resolution of all our faculties into sweetness, affections, and starings upon the divine beauty."<sup>2</sup> His further description of the way to this state of pure contemplation is a very happy attempt to express that which passes expression—that which, as he says, is "not to be discoursed of but felt." "When persons have been long softened with the continual droppings of religion, and their spirits made timorous [i.e. sensitive] and apt for impression by the assiduity of prayer and perpetual alarms of death and the continual dyings of mortification;

<sup>2</sup> Taylor's *Life of Christ* (Edition of 1850, London), Vol. II, p. 139.

the fancy [i.e. creative imagination], which is a very great instrument of devotion, is kept continually warm, and in a disposition and aptitude to take fire *and to flame out into great ascents.*”<sup>3</sup>

Another famous Englishman of the sixteenth century, who taught and practised interior or wordless prayer, was John Hales—often called “the ever-memorable Mr. John Hales of Eton” (b. 1584). In his *Golden Remains* he says of prayer:

“Nay, one thing I know more, that the prayer which is the most forcible transcends and far exceeds all power of words. For St. Paul, speaking unto us of the most effectual kind of prayer, calls it sighs and groans that cannot be expressed. Nothing cries so loud in the ears of God as the sighing of a contrite and earnest heart.

... It requires not the voice but the mind; not the stretching of the hands but the intention of the heart; not any outward shape or carriage of the body but the inward behavior of the understanding. How then can it slacken your worldly business and occasions to mix them with sighs and groans, which are the most effectual prayer?”

This is not yet fully developed Quietism, and the characteristic terminology and the sacred phrases of the later exponents are not yet coined. But the quietistic tendency is here obvious, and the set of the current is strongly indicated. The great continental movement itself—the apotheosis of Quietism—which we must now study in some detail, was only the fearless and unrestrained expansion and fulfilment of what was implicit in the mysticism of the preceding century, especially in the mysticism of the Counter-Reformation in Roman Catholic countries. As a matter of fact, Quietism was implicit not only in the mysticism of the Counter-Reformation but in all Christian mysticism which shows a strong Neoplatonic strain. It is quite easy to find it in St. Augustine; indeed, his doctrine of grace and his view of man furnish the very ground and basis for fully developed

<sup>3</sup> Taylor’s *Life of Christ* (Edition of 1850, London), Vol. II, p. 140.

**Quietism.** Thomas à Kempis, in his *Imitation of Christ*, is a master expert both in the language of Quietism and in the thing itself. The influence of this book in England was beyond question one of the direct sources of English Quietism in the seventeenth century. The other St. Thomas—Thomas Aquinas—who laid, deep and solid, the foundations for so many phases of spiritual thought, has much to say both of the unitive, concentrated consciousness of inner quiet and also of that perfect love which “clings to God for His own sake,” with “no thought of any good thing that may accrue from it.”

The great names in the directly influential mystical movement of the Counter-Reformation are St. Ignatius Loyola (1491–1556), who is known in history as the founder of the Society of Jesus, or Jesuits, rather than as the great mystic which he was; St. Teresa (1515–1582), the greatest of the group; St. John of the Cross (1542–1591); St. Francis de Sales (1567–1622); St. Jeanne Françoise de Chantal (1572–1642); and St. Vincent de Paul (1576–1660).

“Stout Cortes,” fighting his way over barren stretches of ocean, through strange jungles inhabited by fierce beasts and fiercer men, to a new and seemingly limitless ocean on which he gazed, “silent, upon a peak in Darien,” was not stouter of heart or bolder of spirit than were these contemporaries of his who explored the uncharted and unfathomable seas within themselves and tracked their way through still stranger jungles in the human heart to the shoreless Sea whose tides seemed to surge into their channels.

This movement constitutes, without question, one of the most important chapters in religious history. Here one may see the human spirit on its most steep and difficult pilgrimage, its most dizzy and daring ascents, braving darkness and loneliness and silence and cross on its secret way to God. Like Abraham, these children

of faith went out, not knowing whither they went, risking absolutely everything in time and eternity on their quest, which was total absorption in God, the annihilation of self, the substitution of divine action for action directed by human will, and the attainment of a perfect and selfless love.

No other experts in the mystical way of any epoch have given us more keen and exhaustive analyses of the steps, the stages, the processes, of the deadly war with self, of the total eclipse of all that is "me" or "mine," of the dark night of the soul, than these great spiritual geniuses of the sixteenth century have given in their books; nor have heroic souls ever been less daunted by suffering and crucifixion than were these tremendous lovers of the suffering Christ.

They were more sane and robust and well-balanced than their successors, the Quietists in the seventeenth century; but the latter movement was undoubtedly the offspring of the earlier one, and though marked by a changed emphasis and a new emotional tone, Quietism drew its terminology, its stock of ideas, its methods, its practices, and the model of its characteristic experiences from the great mystics of the Counter-Reformation, especially from Teresa, John of the Cross, and Francis de Sales. Before the word "Quietism" came into use and before ecclesiastics on the watch-tower perceived the rising storm, these earlier mystical writers had been "building all inward," and had been exalting the "empty," "motionless" inner state, the will that "wills nothing," the "one single act," which brings "irresistible grace" into operation within the soul.

Sporadic groups of persons, claiming divine illumination and making use of silence and passive orison to promote the union of the soul with God, appeared through the first half of the seventeenth century both in Spain and Italy and, as we have seen, in England. The

Spanish mystic, Juan Falconi (1596-1638), a member of the Order of "Our Lady of Mercy," a passionately devout soul, saturated with the teachings of the mystics, was one of the early exponents of Quietism who deeply influenced the movement in Spain, Italy, and France. An important letter on silent interior prayer was written by him in 1628. It was printed in Spain in 1657, and was shortly after translated into Italian and very widely circulated in Italy, and a little later was put into French and read throughout France.<sup>4</sup> Falconi thinks but little of "*sensible* divine operations," i.e. operations which give a definite content to the mind. He urges his reader to rise above these lower stages and settle herself into the presence of God by an interior act of faith which abandons everything of self, for time and for eternity. "Dwell in silence. Think of nothing, however good, however sublime it may be. Dwell only in pure faith in God and in utter resignation to his holy will."<sup>5</sup> In the prayer of interior silence in which the soul is absolutely abandoned to the will of God and in which it knows not what it does, it finds itself advancing and being established in faith without knowing how. The great virtues form in the soul and grow there by interior operations that are beyond knowledge. The soul is prospering best when it has no definite and limiting ideas of God present in consciousness, and it should not disturb itself with thinking whether it shall put its virtues into practice or not. This concern belongs in a lower stage of the spiritual life. All effort, all interior exercise, all sensible operations, all dependence on mental faculties, only disturb the real divine operation.<sup>6</sup> "Sink yourself into naked, obscure [i.e. "pure"] faith in God and let yourself be annihilated in this divine abyss."<sup>7</sup>

By the middle of the century a sect known as the

<sup>4</sup> It was printed at the end of Madame Guyon's *Moyen Court* of 1690, and is in the first volume of her *Opuscules Spirituels* (1704).

<sup>5</sup> Op. cit., p. 101.

<sup>6</sup> Ibid. p. 105-106.

<sup>7</sup> Ibid. p. 108.

Society of the Pelagini, from its founder Giacomo Filippo di Santa Pelagia, a layman of Milan, became widespread in Northern Italy. The members of these little societies met together for silent mental prayer, which they considered essential to salvation. They believed that they had found the only true way to God, and that having found the efficacy of the inner way they could safely dispense with the services of the ordained priests and with the requirements of the Church. Bishop Burnet of England, who was himself a man possessed of deep inward religious life and who followed with the keenest interest the stages of the quietistic drama on the continent, wrote from Italy that the Quietists were observed to be "more strict in their lives" and "more retired and serious in their mental devotions" than other Christians, though, he adds, "they were not so assiduous at mass nor so earnest to procure masses to be said for their friends," and he makes the further comment that "the trade of those that live by these things was sensibly sunk."<sup>8</sup> The Inquisition set its forces in motion to annihilate the "heresy," but it continued to spread in secret and subterranean ways through the cities of northern Italy for almost a quarter of a century, and a very large number of persons became accustomed to and fascinated with the practice of silence.

This practice of silence and the full significance of quietistic tendencies came impressively to public attention in the seventies through the teachings and writings of a remarkable spiritual expert named Miguel de Molinos. He was born in Spain about 1627, received the degree of doctor of theology at Coimbra, and came to Rome sometime about 1665. He was deeply versed in mystical literature, profoundly influenced by the writings of Teresa, John of the Cross, and Francis de Sales, and already in this early stage dedicated to his

<sup>8</sup> Burnet's Three Letters Concerning the Present State of Italy, 1688.

peculiar mission of inculcating the way of silence. He very soon became the most noted and widely sought religious guide in Italy, and he found himself the centre of a great spiritual revival, which was due not merely to his personal qualities but rather to the fact that he gave powerful expression to a tendency already well under way around him. Pope Innocent XI—the Pope of Browning's "*The Ring and the Book*"—was intimately attached to him and gave him apartments in the papal palace. Persons of the highest rank and "honorable women not a few" sought for his spiritual direction.<sup>9</sup> Bishop Burnet, in his *Letters from Italy*, says, "It is believed he hath above 20,000 followers in Naples alone." His popularity was extraordinary even before he published his famous *Guida Spirituale* ("Spiritual Guide"), which appeared in Rome in 1675, and which went through twenty editions in many languages during the next six years. This book came from the press with the approbation of five distinguished theologians of the time, representing the Orders of the Franciscans, Trinitarians, Jesuits, Carmelites, and Capuchins, four of them being also censors of the Inquisition.

We must turn now to the little book itself to see what Italian Quietism, as expressed by its most famous exponent, really was. Molinos declares in his preface that God is always communicating new light by continuous revelation to mankind. His infinite wisdom is never exhausted, human souls continually need fresh instruction, and so there will be new spiritual books to the end of the world. And in this endless list of new spiritual books his book is one which he believes God has inspired and called for.

In the introduction, Molinos describes the two principal states or stages of spiritual life, the first of which many

<sup>9</sup> It is said that twenty thousand letters of consultation were found in his apartments on the day of his arrest.

attain; the second only few, because the way is very strait. The first stage is *meditation*, the second, *contemplation*. In meditation reason is operative, the attention is fixed upon the central truths of Christianity, the mind is busy with the mysteries of faith, the will grapples with doubts, and all the faculties of the inner self are employed in the effort to make faith and truth triumph over doubt and error. Contemplation is on a wholly different level. It does not begin until sense and intellect are left behind; until the soul has retired into its centre; until there is complete absence of thought, ideas, truths, images, all focussing of consciousness on distinct and particular objects; until effort and struggle of will have absolutely ceased and the soul enters perfect repose and peace, desiring nothing, seeking nothing, fearing nothing, resting calm and secure in pure faith, unselfish love, and wordless prayer. The soul is now full of joy, but knows not why; burns with love, but comprehends not how it loves.<sup>10</sup> There is but one castle to which the soul can flee for escape from the storm and din and warfare and defeats of the world and where it can triumph over all enemies that beset it, and that is the inner castle, the interior fortress of peace, which no assaults can disturb.<sup>11</sup>

He calls for a retreat from the world, a resignation, an indifference, an *ataraxy*, that in stoic temper far outdoes the boldest of the ancient Stoics. The soul must learn to do without any form of sensuous enjoyment whatever, without any tokens of divine favor or of divine love, without any raptures or ecstasies or visions, without the slightest sign that its passion and sufferings are appreciated:

<sup>10</sup> The Spiritual Guide; Introduction, Observation II.

<sup>11</sup> Ibid. Chap. I. There is a very interesting passage in John Woolman's Journal, in which precisely the same view of prayer is expressed: "The place of prayer is a precious habitation. . . . I saw this habitation to be safe—to be inwardly quiet, when there were great stirrings and commotions in the world." Journal (Whittier's Edition), p. 236.

“Thou wilt experience not only that the creatures will forsake thee and those from whom thou hadst hoped most, but even the brooks of thy faculties will dry up so that thou canst not think—not even so much as to conceive a good thought of God. Heaven will seem to thee to be of brass and thou shalt receive no light from above.<sup>12</sup> . . . The soul must learn to walk in dark and desert paths, dead to passions, dead to desires, dead to reflections, accustomed to dryness and aridity of spirit, enduring crucifixion and annihilation of self-love and self-will without wincing or even asking why, ‘until no news makes it afraid and no success makes it glad.’ The soul must attain an annihilation of its own judgment, its own will, its own works, its inclinations, desires, thoughts, so that it finds itself dead to its own will, desire, endeavor, understanding, and thought; willing as if it did not will; desiring as if it did not desire; understanding as if it did not understand; thinking as if it did not think; without inclining to anything; embracing equally contempts and honors, benefits and corrections.”<sup>13</sup>

There are two kinds of prayer; the one tender, delightful, joy-bringing, and full of sensuous comfort; the other obscure, dry, desolate, without response or joy. The first is for children, the second is for strong men. There are also two degrees of silence; the one a silence of words and requests; the other an absolute silence of thoughts and of all self-activity. It is only in this second stage of prayer and of silence that the Holy Spirit operates unhindered. It is only when there is total nakedness of self, complete death of self-activity, that the divine Presence is infused and works without disturbance or disquiet. Molinos insists, in the very words which Madame de Chantal had already used, that God will have all things done by the operation of His own activity, and that therefore the quieter *I* keep the better all things succeed.<sup>14</sup> As love mounts, self falls, so that perfect love is utter annihilation of self, which is the only true miracle of sainthood.<sup>15</sup>

Strange as it may seem to a generation accustomed to

<sup>12</sup> The Spiritual Guide, Part I, Chap. VIII.

<sup>13</sup> Ibid. Part II, Chap. XIX.

<sup>14</sup> Ibid. Part I, Chap. XIII.

<sup>15</sup> Ibid. Part II, Chap. VII.

hedonistic theories of life, this passionate stoic message, this call to retreat to a depth of silence below the silence of words, this gospel of unrestrained self-crucifixion, came to men's ears with a mysterious fascination and spoke to their condition like a new revelation. But its very success was its defeat. So long as it remained an abstract theory it did not much matter, but when it was translated into life and *marched* in practice, its dangerous import, from the point of view of the Church, was obvious. Its disciples—and they were very numerous—discontinued the use of the rosary and even vocal prayer, gave up confession, discounted the value of all external performances and exterior acts, and plainly showed a tendency to get on without the aid of priests or of the vast and expensive machinery of the Church. If God could be met in the silence of the interior retreat, what function is left for a priest, and if salvation was a matter of self-annihilation, how can the Church promote it? Was not this proclamation of the inner way to God, then, a preparation for a Protestantism in the south, as Luther's proclamation of salvation by faith had been for the north? Some of these Quietists, even the most spiritual and devoted ones, believed and taught that one single act of concentrated interior faith, one undivided assent of soul to the will of God, with no reservations and with no desires for self, one supreme act of pure devotion and prayer, would bring grace into operation in the soul so superlatively and effectively that it would continue through all the rest of time and eternity, like that water which the Samaritan woman sought, that she might not need henceforth to draw more. The guardians of orthodoxy saw the danger and determined to stamp out the movement, though the sympathetic heart of the Pope was with the new piety and with the man who had revived an intenser faith.

The story of the crusade for the extirpation of Italian

Quietism and the details of the process of hushing Molinos in the absolute silence of the Inquisition's solitary cell cannot be told here. The work was done by that force which "strikes once and strikes no more," and the danger of a new reformation by mysticism in Italian and Spanish countries was passed! Among the charges levelled against Molinos, including sixty-eight errors in doctrine, there were still graver charges of immoral practice. He was said by his inquisitors to have confessed to the view that it was possible for a soul in union with God to perform bodily acts of an apparently immoral nature, but yet without the consent of the spirit and so without *any* moral taint. He was further said to have confessed that he himself had committed improper acts, not suitable for repetition, but that as they were acts of his body, to which his higher faculties in union with God did not consent, they were not sinful acts.

These confessions rest solely on the assertion of inquisitors who were bent on making a case and who had at their command methods of torture which often wrung answers from the lips of their victims, though the words were denied as soon as the quivering flesh was released. The actual truth in this matter can never be settled, though I am inclined to distrust the moral charges against Molinos. But there can be no doubt that this extreme tendency of his to centre religion in an experience above distinctions was then and always must be a dangerous tendency. The moment "distinctions" are transcended on a level beyond good and evil, whether by Molinos or by Nietzsche, the very basis of morality has vanished, because the very life of morality rests upon a clear vision of distinction between higher and lower ethical issues, and upon a positive focussing of moral purpose and a definite choice of ends. No way of retreat to an inner citadel of peace, where the problems of the complicated world are transcended and where all acts become "in-

different," can be a way of genuine spiritual victory, and when the inner peace is won by the method of retreat, the lower instincts and passions, left without the guidance and direction of a sanctified intelligence, are only too likely to come into operation.

This stoical Quietism of Molinos, which looks so hard and stern toward the self, which seems in fact one long Golgotha of self-crucifixion, turns out psychologically to be a way beset with moral dangers and a way, after all, that misses the slow formation of a robust and virile sainthood. His panegyric on "Nothingness" is impressive in its note of simplicity and humility of spirit, but taken literally it cuts the central nerve of the spiritual life. "Look at Nothing, will Nothing, endeavor after Nothing; and then in everything thy soul will live reposed with quiet." "Plunge into Nothing, and there thou shalt find a holy Sanctuary against any tempest whatsoever."<sup>16</sup>

The merciless attack on Molinos led the Church on, by a natural logic, to a break with mysticism as a way of salvation and to a far greater emphasis upon the necessity of using the sacred channels of grace under the direction of the authoritative hierarchy. The persons who were attached to Molinos, or who were devoted to interior prayer, were hunted down throughout Spain and Italy, and the newer books that taught this inner way to God were as far as possible suppressed, including the writings of Juan Falconi. Among those who were caught in the great drag-net of the Argus-eyed inquisition was a blind mystic of Marseilles who was one of the early interpreters of Quietism in France, plainly a product of the Spanish-Italian movement. This was Francois Malaval, a refined and beautiful spirit and a man of true literary power. He was born in 1627 and lost his sight while still a child in the cradle, but by the assistance of

<sup>16</sup> The Spiritual Guide, Part II, Chap. XX.

readers he received a classical education, and became possessed of an extensive acquaintance with mystical literature. Cut off from the beauty of the external creation, he set himself more and more to the task of exploring the inner world. After the prevailing manner of his time, he became fascinated with the quiet of the central depth within. He was a voluminous writer, though much which he wrote failed to get into print, but an extensive account of what he believed to be the true spiritual way was published in 1670 with the title, *La Pratique de la vraie theologie mystique*.

It is full of passages of fine psychological and spiritual insight, but its main message is an extreme form of Quietism. The soul must pass beyond visions and ecstasies, beyond words and sights, beyond thoughts and desires, beyond meditations even of Jesus Christ and His truth, and attain a pure, unitive state of consciousness, a pure love which is satisfied with loving, a hush of all voices, outer and inner, in which the soul penetrates beyond surface and husk, and flows into indistinguishable union with God. This book was put on the Index in 1688 and Malaval retracted the errors that were proscribed in his teaching, but even his letter of retraction was put on the Index as dangerous reading for the faithful. His book was, however, widely read in France and received Bossuet's condemnation in 1695, but in spite of this attack was republished in two volumes in 1709.

Another early interpreter of Quietism in France was Desmarests Saint-Sorlin, whose teachings are fiercely attacked and refuted in Nicole's rare book *Les Visionnaires* of 1667. This broadside of Nicole's against the "new heresies" plainly reveals the fact of a large quietistic movement in France and indicates the existence of groups of persons who claimed inward enlightenment, divine inspiration, and freedom to interpret the Scriptures in accordance with their inward Light, and who by the

way of interior silence expected to come into extraordinary union with God.<sup>17</sup>

One of the most famous, and certainly one of the most interesting, of the minor prophets of Quietism was the Flemish mystic, Antoinette Bourignon. She was born in Lille in 1616, a precocious child in intellect and in religious insight, though physically deformed and marked throughout her youth by strange moods. She inflicted ascetic tortures upon herself, had unspeakable raptures, enjoyed visions, heard voices, and finally received a "call" to "restore to the world the gospel-spirit," and she was told that she was created to guide men into a life like the first Christians and to make righteousness shine forth.<sup>18</sup>

The capricious and serio-comic incidents that make up the strange story of her formative years cannot be detailed in this brief sketch of her career. It would be difficult to find a more peculiar "saint," or a more bizarre "prophetess," or a more absurd claimant to the gift of infallible inspiration, and yet with all her oddities she was at her best and highest a wonderful instrument of spiritual revelation. She exercised extraordinary influence not only over the simple-minded and childlike, but also over persons of solid scholarship and rare gifts, the most noted of whom was the great educational genius, Comenius, who said of her: "Oh holy maid! Would that I might see her and speak with her once more! My science and knowledge and the books which I have written are the fruit of human argument and reason; but she has gained all her wisdom directly by the working of God's Holy Spirit."<sup>19</sup> Of others who appreciated

<sup>17</sup> Fénelon, in a letter of March 18, 1702, speaks of "many books on pure love" in general circulation. Heinrich Heppe in his *Geschichte der quietistischen Mystik* (Berlin, 1875) gives a large amount of valuable material for the study of the less well-known Quietists.

<sup>18</sup> *Sa Vie Extérieure par elle-même*, and *Sa Vie Continuée par Pierre Poiret* give much interesting biographical material.

<sup>19</sup> Quoted from A. R. MacEwen's *Antoinette Bourignon* (London, 1910), p. 75.

her spiritual guidance and felt her power the most significant were Jean de Labadie and Pierre Poiret. Like her greater Quietist sister, Madame Guyon, she believed that God had endowed her with "a principle of fecundity" and had commissioned her to do a great work of "spiritual maternity" in the world and to bring forth through suffering and the agony of birth-pains many "spiritual children."

Antoinette claims not to have learned from books, to be ignorant of human science, and to have "received" inwardly by inspiration, or rather by dictation, all that she knows, but her writings show large familiarity with the great and lesser mystics and she was evidently quick to select and absorb any suggestion or truth which fitted her body of ideas. She was apparently independent of the later Spanish movement and she is therefore an interesting parallel development of experiences and ideas, initiated primarily by the common influence of the master mystics of earlier times. She distinctly held the Augustinian conception of grace which comes immediately from God and which does everything for man's salvation when once he discovers that he has "nothing of his own." When all the faculties of the soul "lie still," the soul can receive "the pure light of the Holy Spirit." "Resignation" is the magic word. It means absence of all desires, abolition of preference, total dependence on God's disposing will, freedom from creaturely affections, and a merely passive and receptive attitude. "Resignation consists," she wrote, "in a cessation from all things, that we may receive God only. There needs no more than *to cease* and *to receive*; for all our cares and vexations or activities for things of this life are hindrances which stifle the operations which God would cause in our soul. We must be quiet and rest, that we may suffer the Holy Spirit to act alone."<sup>20</sup>

<sup>20</sup> MacEwen, op. cit., p. 108.

She was a voluminous writer — far too voluminous — her collected writings making nineteen volumes (Amsterdam, 1679–1684). Her writings began to appear in English as early as 1671, and for more than a quarter of a century this strange Quietist carried on her work of “spiritual maternity” among a people whom she never saw. Her opponents thought she was a Quaker; the Scottish Assembly required all schoolmasters, tutors, and chaplains to sign a confession of faith disowning “the dangerous errors of Bourignonism”; but still she went on winning “spiritual children” and spreading the mood of repose and disseminating quietistic ideas.<sup>21</sup>

Before turning to the classical French interpreters of the movement, it will be instructive to examine its characteristic popular features as they appear in the experiences and ideas of two simple-minded and unlearned exponents of it. The mystics who have supplied us with material for the study of mysticism have been almost entirely mystics with a literary gift. Those who had no skill for psychological analysis and no biographical power to present their inward life may have influenced their little local circles while they lived but they have now no place in the line of torch-bearers, and we are too apt to assume that there were no mystics except those who wrote journals and books. As a matter of fact, the literary mystics form only a tiny fraction of those who had the great experiences, those whose eyes saw, whose ears heard, and whose hands handled.

Armelle Nicolas, a poor French servant girl of Brittany, who could neither read nor write, furnishes a remarkable illustration of the unexpected breaking forth of this type of religion in an untaught person, and it is only by

<sup>21</sup> The most important of her “englished” writings are: *The Light of the World* (London, 1696); *Treatise of Solid Virtue* (1699); *Light Risen in Darkness* (1703); and *The Renovation of the Spirit* (1707).

accident that we know her story.<sup>22</sup> Armelle was born in 1606. As a child she tended her mother's sheep in the fields, and at a very early age she was "inclined to silence and solitude." She had in these early years "infusions of sweetness and tenderness," moments of divine invasion, when God seemed present instructing her in the way of life, and from the very first she was profoundly touched by the suffering love of Christ and by a desire to bear His cross herself. Then came, as happens with all who travel the road of Quietism, a dark period of "stunning trials," both in the outer and inner sphere. Not only did the world fail her, but God seemed to retire and leave her to herself in grievous and insupportable anguish, facing the possible loss of everlasting happiness. Finally, one day in the fields, when all hope seemed gone, the love of God flowed round her, embraced her soul, filled her with unutterable joy, and created in her a passion to live henceforth to God alone. She set herself to the work of annihilating the creature, of killing self, and of eliminating everything in her nature which hindered God from acting in His own way through her. Pain, disease, suffering, came upon her in abundant measure, but she discovered that "it is better to suffer for love than to enjoy love," and she learned that she could continue in silent union with God as completely while working or suffering as she could formerly while partaking of the holy communion, which seemed at that time indispensable to her. Her ordinary meals became glorified by the real presence and "each morsel she ate seemed dipped in Christ's precious blood." In the bustles and hurries and hard labors of her daily pursuits she often felt the divine Light flood in and the holy presence touch her. Very often she seemed to feel another Hand guide her

<sup>22</sup> The story of her experiences was written by a religious sister, in two duodecimo volumes of 550 and 350 pages. An admirable summary of this work was made for the use of Friends by James Gough and published in Bristol in 1772.

hand, and she sometimes learned more in one day than men of the world could have taught her in a year.<sup>23</sup> "I am," she said, "never less alone than when I seem most alone." Silence seemed to her the most precious and efficacious way to union with God. The soul must cease its converse with all that is of the creature, must give up its eagerness for the news of this world, and learn to *centre itself within* in absolute quiet. So amply did this poor, simple girl partake of and practise the divine presence that the Sister, who tells her story, declares that there was something so divine and heavenly in her countenance and carriage that many used to say that, if they had no belief in God before, beholding the face of Armelle would have been enough to convince them that there is a God.

Nicholas Herman of Lorraine, a lay-brother of the Barefooted Carmelites and popularly known as "Brother Lawrence," is my other illustration of Quietism among the unlearned. He was born about 1610, served in the great world first as a soldier and then as a footman, and afterwards served in the little world of the brotherhood as kitchen-servant. He shows far more direct contact with the great exponents of Quietism than does Armelle Nicolas and he uses the technical terminology to a much greater extent than she does.<sup>24</sup> The existing material for a study of Brother Lawrence consists of sixteen short *Letters* by himself, a short collection of *Spiritual Maxims* embodying his views, four *Conversations*, probably written down by M. Beaufort and a brief *Life*, apparently

<sup>23</sup> This is a common expression of the mystics and indicates her acquaintance directly or indirectly with mystical writings. Brother Lawrence uses the more common phrase to express his experience. He says, "By faith I learn more of God, and in a little time, than I could do in the schools in many a long year."

<sup>24</sup> It is certain that Fénelon and Brother Lawrence knew each other. In the little sketch of Brother Lawrence (written probably by M. Beaufort, Grand Vicar to Cardinal de Noailles) reference is made to a visit which Fénelon made to Brother Lawrence during the latter's illness. Brother Lawrence also frequently refers in his letters to books which teach the method of prayer and the way to practise the presence of God, and he tells of other Brothers who have attained higher experiences than he has.

from the same hand. There is in everything that has come from Brother Lawrence a naïve simplicity that is perfectly charming and one feels that he not only talks happily about practising the presence of God but that he really practises it. "The practice of the presence of God" means for him the attainment of a state of "indifference" toward all finite things, a retreat into the inmost centre of the soul, an experience of absolute repose and tranquillity of spirit, and then a consciousness of the actual presence of God flowing through all his being and giving him inspiration, power, and guidance in all his activities, even those that are most commonplace.

He began his preparation for this great experience, which eventually became a habit, by highly resolving *to give the all for the all*<sup>25</sup> by learning to do everything, even the turning of a griddle-cake, *purely for the love of God*, by forming the habit of calm silent repose and abandon, of caring only for God and nothing for matters that affected merely himself, and by acting on the faith that God is always present where the soul, created for Him, is emptied of other things and passionately eager to receive Him. Like all mystics of this school, he had periods of dryness and insensibility to pass through, when there was no *sign* of any presence given to him and when he had to practise his faith and wait for the divine tides to return, but through such experiences he cultivated his spirit of resignation and deepened the spiritual roots by which he lived, and in the course of time, like other Quietists, he ceased to be concerned about his "feelings," lost interest in the fluctuating states of his subjective "temperature," worried no longer about his salvation, gave up his desire for introspection, and lived in the unbroken practice of the divine presence. He found it

<sup>25</sup> First Letter. This is a well-known phrase in the writings both of Madame Guyon and of Fénelon.

unnecessary to be in a church or in the performance of religious ceremonies in order to be with God, for he discovered that he could make a sanctuary of his heart and have an intense and active union with God in his menial toil. Prayer became for him undisturbed and silent repose in God, dynamic and active, but marked by perfect *simplicity* and *pure* love.

So this good brother lived his eighty years, thoroughly human, rough, and awkward by nature, but made graceful and lovely by the work of God upon him, and slowly habituating his spirit, by faith and hope and love, to a perpetual practice of God's presence in his simple round of life; and "without any pain or struggle, without losing in the slightest the use of any of his faculties, he passed away in the embrace of his Lord," to be forever in the near presence of Him who had been the Life of his life. Many of his phrases are no doubt pregnant with the moral dangers that appear in such prolific measure in the fully developed stage of Quietism, but the simplicity and sanity and the joyous spirit of Brother Lawrence kept him in fine balance, prevented him from going all the way with his logic, and enabled him to live among the brotherhood with a shining face, with "a spaciousness of mind quite beyond the ordinary," and with his moral activities heightened rather than hampered by his quietistic views.

In France this movement found its most extraordinary expression — its prophetess, in fact — in Jeanne-Marie Bouvier de la Mothe Guyon, to whom we must now turn. She was born in the little town of Montargis, within easy reach of Paris, the 13th of April, 1648. She hovered between life and death for the first five weeks after her birth and continued frail and delicate and subject to recurrent illnesses throughout her infancy. The Bouvier de la Mothes were famous for their deep piety, "counting," Madame Guyon says, "almost as

many saints in the family tree as there were persons!"<sup>26</sup> and the frail little girl found herself born into an atmosphere of holy aspirations. At four years of age she loved to go to church, to dress as a nun, and to hear people talk about God, and she soon developed a passion for martyrdom. The first great religious upheaval of her life came to her when she was twelve years old through the chance visit to her home of a cousin, the Abbé de Toissy, who was on his way to Cochin-China as a missionary. She did not see him herself, but the mere story of the holiness and spiritual power of this missionary moved her so deeply that she wept the rest of the day and through the night, and this event was the occasion of her dedication to religion. She now discovered the writings of Francis de Sales and Madame de Chantal and by their help she learned to pray in silence, and in this stage of youthful imitation she endeavored to repeat the vows and the experiences of her model saint, Madame de Chantal.

Her nature was unusually intense, and in the period of adolescence a passion of love was born in her and swept through her entire being, but with all this wealth of love to bestow she found nobody on earth to love. A marriage was arranged for her by her father when she was fifteen, and this mystical, romantic child, made for love, was given to a dry and gouty gentleman twenty years older than herself, and sent to live in a home, dominated by a coarse, narrow-minded, cruel mother-in-law. The story of her sufferings in this dreary prison-home is a pitiful chapter, relieved, however, by the triumph of her spirit over the rude environment and by the way she used the daily crosses in the world about her to crucify herself and to refine her soul. Finding nothing around her to love, her love mounted like a burn-

<sup>26</sup> Autobiography of Madame Guyon, translated by Thomas Taylor Allen (London, 1898), Part I, Chap. II.

ing flame toward God—"I found in you, O my God, reasons for suffering which I have never found in the creature, and I saw with complaisance that this unreasonable and crucifying conduct was necessary for me."<sup>27</sup>

In her passionate search for a real and efficacious way to God, she found a succession of spiritual helpers, which shows how widespread in the France of this period were persons of mystical insight and experience. The first of her guides in the mystical way was the Duchess de Bethune-Charost, the daughter of Fouquet and an intimate friend of the Duke and Duchess of Beauvilliers, and the Duke and Duchess of Chevreuse, who formed an inner spiritual circle in the court of Louis XIV. "I saw in her," Madame Guyon writes of this lady, "something that showed a very great presence of God, and I remarked in her what I had never yet seen in any one. I endeavored, through my head and thoughts, to give myself a continual presence of God. I gave myself much trouble and made no advance. I wished to have by an effort what I could not acquire save in ceasing all effort."<sup>28</sup> The elder woman out of her experience tried to lead the younger one into the interior way and to instruct her in the use of silent prayer, but the latter was not yet quite prepared for the lesson nor was the teacher quite prepared to give it.

The return of her missionary cousin from Cochin-China, at this stage of her development, had a marked influence upon her life. She found that he prayed "in utter simplicity," that is to say, he prayed without words and without any definite thoughts or requests in his mind. His whole being was concentrated in worship, and the power of the divine attraction closed his mouth and hushed all processes of thought. She saw in him too

<sup>27</sup> Autobiography, Part II, Chap. VII.

<sup>28</sup> Ibid. Part II, Chap. VIII.

a union of puritan sternness toward the vanities of the world with radiant joy in God. Her friend, Geneviève Granger — a spiritual mother — who understood by a native instinct the experience and the language of the mystical missionary, helped her to gain a clearer insight. Thus God, seeing her “toiling with her rowing,” kept sending her favorable winds to assist her on her course. By what seemed the secret force of God’s own action, a Franciscan friar, a man with much of St. Francis’ own spirit, came to complete the conquest of her soul. She told him about her spiritual difficulties and failures. Instantly he said, “The trouble is that you are seeking outside for what you have within yourself. Seek God in your own heart and you will find him.” “I felt in that moment,” she writes, “a very deep wound, a wound so sweet and delicious that I desired never to be healed of it.” A simple turning of attention, under the guidance of this man, worked the miracle of her discovery:

“I no longer had any trouble to find God. From that moment I was given an experience of His presence in my central depth. I was all of a sudden so changed that I was no longer recognizable either by myself or others. I no longer found my old faults or my dislikes. All appeared to me consumed like straw in a great fire. Nothing was now more easy for me than to pray. Hours of prayer were to me no more than moments. I was unable not to pray. My prayer from this moment was without forms, ideas and images [i.e. of any definite thoughts]. It was not a prayer of the head; it was a prayer of enjoyment and possession in the will, *a profound concentration without act or speech*. All distinctions were lost to give room for more expansion, without motives or reasons for loving. That sovereign of the powers — the will — swallowed up the two others [intellect and desire] and took from them every distinct object to unite them the better in it.”<sup>29</sup>

Thus at the age of twenty, in the year 1668, Madame Guyon arrived, by what seemed to her a miraculous leap, at the first definite stage of her mystical journey. Like

<sup>29</sup> Autobiography, Part I, Chap. VIII. I have greatly condensed the account.

her spiritual teachers, the great mystics of the sixteenth century, she was impressed with the inferiority of visions, revelations, ecstasies, specific graces, distinct utterances, and sensible delights. The depth and centre of her soul seemed to her flooded, "by a continual influx," with the divine presence, without form or thought or image. Her faith, which absorbed her and conquered everything else, was "naked" and "pure," that is, it focussed upon no concrete facts or events or details. It mounted above distinctions to "a Light general, indistinct, undifferentiated, which appears darkness to the natural self on which it shines." Her prayer became a prayer of repose, of joy, and of possession. "I was plunged in a river of peace," says she; "I knew it was God who thus possessed all my soul, but I did not *think* on it, as a wife seated by her husband knows it is he who embraces her without saying to herself, 'It is he.'"<sup>30</sup>

Her passionate love which had before found no object now rose upward "like an interior conflagration and secret fire." At last she had discovered what the soul was created for—a profound and tranquil and absorbing love of God. "I loved Him, and I burned with His fire, because I loved Him in such a way that I could love only Him." With this awakening of love came also eagerness for suffering and positive joy in crosses.

"I said, O my Love, I wish to suffer for you; do not shorten my pains, for it would only be to shorten my pleasures. . . . Crosses which before this I had borne through resignation now became my delight. . . . I was not surprised at all that the martyrs gave their lives for Jesus Christ. I deemed them so happy, I envied their good fortune, and it was martyrdom for me that I could not suffer martyrdom!"

Like Dante, she discovered how it is that souls do not desire to get out of the pain and fire by which God is purifying them. Such souls "remain in peace quite

<sup>30</sup> Autobiography, Chap. XI.

passive in their sufferings, without wishing to shorten them.” Any process, however hard and painful, was welcome as a messenger of love, if only she could make it a way of annihilating “self,” and of abolishing everything that was merely her “own.” Senses, desires, intellect, will—all these were doomed to annihilation, but they proved to have a strange and subtle way of coming back in new guise.<sup>31</sup>

The period of this “first stage” lasted about six years—from 1668 to 1674. It was followed by another period—a terrible ordeal—of dryness and barrenness of soul, of stripping and despoiling of all that gave grace and beauty to life. She lost all sense of the divine presence of God, though in her first state it had seemed a permanent possession. She lost all power of prayer and “felt entirely void of God.” All joy in things, either outward or inward, vanished; She was overwhelmed with a feeling of unworthiness and with an appalling sense of desolation. The entire basis and essence of her nature now appeared to her impure and sinful and “lost.”

“Whenever I was alone,” she writes, “I shed torrents of tears, and I said with equal dryness and desolation, ‘Is it possible that I have received so many graces from God only to lose them; that I have loved Him with so much ardor only to hate Him eternally; that His benefits have served as matter for my ingratitude? His fidelity, shall it only be requited by my infidelity? Has my heart been so long filled with Him alone, only in order to be the more empty of Him; and has it been emptied of all created objects, only to be more strongly filled with them? On the other hand, I could not find pleasure in conversation, which I sought as if in spite of myself. I had within me an executioner, who tormented me without relaxation. I felt within me a pain that I could never make understood save by those who have experienced it.’”<sup>32</sup>

Everything of self-nature, everything that belonged to “the creature,” or that bore the mark and brand of her

<sup>31</sup> This account of “the first stage” of her spiritual life is based on Chapters IX-XII of the *Autobiography*.

<sup>32</sup> *Autobiography*, Chap. XXI.

“ownership,” seemed base and despicable and hopeless. She was banished from her own “central depth,” and, like Noah’s dove, could find rest and peace nowhere. The wrath of God seemed to envelop her and often made her actually crouch on the floor. “The killing pain,” she wrote to Fénelon some years later, “which one feels when one loses the definite consciousness of the divine presence shows that one has not yet become perfectly *indifferent* and that one is still tied to *gifts* of God.”<sup>22</sup> During this time of inward desolation and death she was passing through a series of outward events and happenings such as few persons of flesh and blood could have gone through and lived. She endured a continual slow fire of martyrdom from her mother-in-law, aided by a maid who used the most ingenious ways of annoying her. She lost by death her father, her husband, and her daughter. She saw her son turn against her and become more lost to her spirit than he would have been if he had died. Smallpox of a most virulent sort destroyed her beauty and all but took her life. Throughout these hard years she was the victim of one form of disease after another and often seemed at the very verge of dissolution. And yet none of these painful events satisfied her passion for suffering, and she added, of her own accord, strange bodily austerities and bizarre forms of torture to complete the crucifixion of the self.

Her “resurrection” from this state of death and despair came suddenly on July 22nd, 1680, and she found herself raised to a new life. “On this day I was as if in perfect life. I found myself as much elevated above nature as I had before been captive under its load. . . . What I possessed was so simple, so immense, that I cannot express it. It was then, O my God, that I found again in you ineffably all that I had lost. My trouble and pain

<sup>22</sup> M. Masson: Fénelon et Madame Guyon. Documents nouveaux et inédits (Paris, 1907), Lettre XIV.

were changed into a peace which I can only call God-peace."<sup>34</sup> The human instrument of this new crisis in Madame Guyon's spiritual experience was Father François La Combe, a native of Thonon, a Barnabite monk and at this period the superior of the Barnabites in his native town, whose life was henceforth to be strangely linked in destiny with hers. He was a man of quite ordinary mental powers and decidedly psychopathic. He had been sensual in his youth and had a period of perverted moral judgment, but he experienced a religious transformation, was profoundly influenced by the mystics whom he had read, and though not over wise and discreet, he became intensely devout.<sup>35</sup> Madame Guyon had already, at an earlier period, been impressed by his devout life and spiritual insight, and now he seemed divinely chosen to explain to her with authority that her state of despair, dryness, and desolation, through which she had just passed, was nevertheless a state of *grace*, and to show her that this was only a necessary round in the ascending spiritual ladder to bring her to the culmination of her mystical experience.

The third and final stage, upon which she now entered, and which was to continue to the end of her life, was, she believed, a state of continuous, perpetual union with God. According to her own account, her "own-self" was dead, her own individual self-consciousness was annulled, and "own-will" and "own-desire" were obliterated. A *God-me*, as she believed, took the place of her old *self-me*, so that her soul "lived in God as we live in the air without being conscious of the air." An entirely new kind of consciousness, a new type of will, seemed to have come into being through a resurrection-life.

"It was as if everything had disappeared from within me, and a greater power had taken its place. I had indeed experienced in the

<sup>34</sup> Autobiography, Chap. XXVIII.

<sup>35</sup> The story of his life is briefly told in Jean Philipaux, *Relation de l'origine, du progrès, et de la condamnation du Quietisme* (1732), pp. 1-32.

times preceding my trouble that a more powerful than I conducted me and made me act. I had not then, it seems to me, a will except to submit myself with acquiescence to all he did in me and through me; but here it was no longer the same. I had no more a will to submit; it had, as it were, disappeared, or rather passed into another will. It seemed to me that this powerful and strong One did all that pleased him; and I no more found that soul which he formerly conducted by his crook and his staff with an extreme love. He appeared to me alone, and *as if this soul had given place to him, or, rather had passed into him, henceforth to become only one same thing with him.*<sup>36</sup>

She felt a sense of "infinite freedom," such as no one knows whose will is his own. Her soul rested in a state of absolute quiet.

"Nothing could interrupt me. Tempests made not the smallest alteration in my mind or heart. My central depth was in peace, liberty, largeness indestructible. If I sometimes suffered in my senses owing to continual upsets, *that* did not penetrate; they were only waves breaking on a rock. The central depth was so lost in the will of God that it could neither will nor not will."<sup>37</sup>

There was no strain, no tension, no worry; her soul was in complete *abandon*. She no longer felt any leaning, inclination, or tendency — "my will was empty of all human inclination." Formerly in the first state, God seemed within her; now she seemed rather within Him, submerged in the divine Sea itself, pure, vast, immense. Her intellect, which at first appeared to be lost in a strange stupidity, was

"restored with inconceivable addition.<sup>38</sup> I found there was nothing for which it was not able. . . . I experienced something of the state the apostles were in after having received the Holy Spirit. I knew, I understood, I comprehended, I was capable of everything, and I did not know where I had acquired this intellect, this knowledge, this intelligence, this power, this facility, nor whence it had come to me."<sup>39</sup>

<sup>36</sup> Autobiography, Part I, Chap. XXVIII.

<sup>37</sup> Ibid. Part II, Chap. VIII.

<sup>38</sup> See experience of T. Story: "He called for my life and I offered it at His footstool; but He gave it me as a prey with unspeakable addition, etc." Story's Journal (1747), p. 20.

<sup>39</sup> Autobiography, Part II, Chap. III.

In this third stage she was subject to extraordinary automatisms; in fact, to such an extent that she felt herself "moved from within" to all the decisions and courses which she took, and thought of herself as only "a passive divine instrument." Ideas, which she believed of divine origin, rose spontaneously out of her "empty consciousness," without any preparation and without any control of will. An interior Light seemed to flood her mind and move her to speak or write or act "beyond her knowing." *Spiritual Torrents*, her most original book, was written at Thonon automatically, by a movement which she could not resist.

"I set myself to write without knowing how, and I found it came to me with a strange impetuosity. What surprised me most was that it flowed from my central depth, and did not pass through my head. I was not yet accustomed to this manner of writing, yet I wrote an entire treatise on the whole interior way, under a comparison of streams and rivers. . . . Before writing, I did not know what I was going to write. As I wrote I found myself relieved."<sup>40</sup>

The most striking feature of this third stage was her consciousness of apostolic mission. It was impressed upon her, revealed to her, that she was a prepared instrument for the propagation of the Spirit, a recipient of special grace in order that she might be the apostle of a church of the Spirit.

"I became aware," she writes, "of a gift of God, which had been communicated to me without my understanding it, namely, the discernment of spirits and the giving to each what was suitable for him. I felt myself suddenly clothed with an apostolic state, and I discerned the state of the souls of the persons who spoke to me, and that with such facility that they were astonished and said one to the other that I gave to each that of which he had need. . . . I felt that what I said came from the fountain-head, and that I was merely the instrument of Him who made me speak."<sup>41</sup>

<sup>40</sup> Autobiography, Part II, Chap. XI. She gives extraordinary instances of business sagacity, which she believes was divinely supplied.

<sup>41</sup> Ibid. Part II, Chap. XVII.

In her own graphic phrases, she was endowed with "spiritual fecundity," "spiritual maternity." "I was," she says, with extraordinary boldness, "a participator in all the divine mysteries and I was associated in divine maternity in Jesus Christ. It was this maternity which caused me most suffering, for," she explains, "I can bring forth spiritual children only on the cross." She seemed, in this work of spiritual maternity, to be aware of all the inner conditions of her spiritual children, to be travailing in pain for their birth, and to be enduring all the purgatorial sufferings attaching to their sin or their unfaithfulness, and on occasions it seemed to her as though she was brought into such depths of divine experience that she became a channel, or "canal," through which divine grace, or the fountain of living water, flowed into the souls of those for whom she was travailing, so that "they experienced in themselves an inconceivable plenitude of grace and a greater gift of prayer."<sup>42</sup> This "greater gift of prayer" seemed to her the supreme mark of spiritual attainment, and above all other callings she felt divinely called to the mission of perfecting persons to pray in silence and to receive grace without the mediation of speech or thought. As the soul advances to this highest state, it is able, she declares, to remain in absolute silence before God, while the Word of God operates in the central depth by ineffable speech above all articulation.<sup>43</sup> True prayer is thus a divinely initiated prayer, a prayer which God moves and directs in the soul.

There can, I think, be no doubt that Madame Guyon, in her period of "spiritual fecundity," regarded herself as "sent" to form and construct "an interior church" within the Church and to be the instrument of a far-reaching spiritual reformation.

"It seems to me," she wrote in an extraordinary passage which was suppressed from her *Autobiography*, "that God has chosen me

<sup>42</sup> *Autobiography*, Part II, Chap. XVIII.

<sup>43</sup> *Ibid.* Part II, Chap. XX.

in this age to destroy human reason and to make the wisdom of God prevail on the ruins of human wisdom and of reason. He will establish the cords of His reign through me. His spirit shall be spread over all flesh and my sons and my daughters shall prophesy. It is I, it is I, who shall sing, out of my feebleness and humility, the song of the Lamb. . . . I shall become the corner stone of the interior Church.”<sup>44</sup>

Father La Combe in a letter of August 20th, 1695, written from his prison, tells her that “the little church in this place” is prospering—he had said in a former letter that the Kingdom of God was being established there—and that she, Madame Guyon, is loved and honored by those who compose this interior group and who are in spiritual union with her.<sup>45</sup>

Her period of “spiritual maternity” falls into three temporal divisions. The first division is the La Combe period, the second the Fénelon period, and the third the prison-period of quiet and obscurity. Father La Combe did not write his *Orationis mentalis analysis* (Analysis of Mental Prayer) until 1686, after Madame Guyon had expounded her views, and it would appear that he learned his doctrine of Quietism from her rather than that she learned hers from him.<sup>46</sup> She is throughout the period of their intercourse the dominant personality, though she was always more or less under the hypnotic power of suggestions from him. He could cure her of the most terrible pain or of a racking cough by a single word. They felt themselves completely united in interior life, so that the spirit of the one flowed freely into the spirit of the other, an experience which they called “correspondence,” and they professed to be aware of each other’s states even when widely separated by space. Through-

<sup>44</sup> This strange extract from her Autobiography is printed in Masson’s Fénelon et Mme. Guyon, pp. 1-12. It is more boldly prophetic and apocalyptic than my brief quotation would indicate.

<sup>45</sup> Letter XC in “La Correspondance sur l’affaire du Quietisme” in *Les Œuvres de Fénelon*.

<sup>46</sup> He very positively declared that he had no contact with Molinos, either directly or indirectly, nor had he read Molinos’ writings.

out this period, Madame Guyon exhibited striking symptoms of pathological condition and her own accounts very plainly show multiform types of well-known hysterical phenomena. She devoutly believed that she was divinely guided in the most minute details of her movements and her actions, and she saw a marvellous Providence in all the complicated affairs and difficulties that beset her, but the modern reader cannot fail to be impressed by the caprice and unwisdom and indiscretion of much that she did and of much that she brought upon herself in the period of her wanderings and her sufferings and her perpetual "persecutions." But notwithstanding this painful element of mental disorder, which is always in evidence in her life, there is a wonderful and almost amazing spiritual power equally in evidence. She had beyond question in some way found an *immensely expanded interior life, some new dimension of soul.*

It was during this period that she wrote her two most influential books: *Les Torrents Spirituels* (Spiritual Torrents) and *Le Moyen court et très facile de faire Oraison* (The short and easy Method of Prayer).<sup>47</sup> These two little books exhibit rare psychological insight and spiritual grasp. They show unusual literary style and power and they are the classics of seventeenth-century Quietism, though they reveal at the same time the weaknesses and the extravagance of the movement. It is a primary idea of Madame Guyon that there is a "central depth" in the soul, which has come from God and which exhibits "a perpetual proclivity" to return to Him, like the push of the stream back to its source in the sea.<sup>48</sup> All souls would return to their native Source, if they did not encounter the obstacle of sin, and therefore the main problem of life is the healing of the wounds of

<sup>47</sup> These two Treatises are published in her *Opuscules Spirituels* (Cologne, 1704), 2 Vols. She was a very voluminous writer and her complete works fill 40 volumes: *Oeuvres Complètes* (Paris, 1789-1791).

<sup>48</sup> See *Torrents*, Chap. I, Secs. 1-3, and IV, Secs. 1-8.

sin. There is, in her opinion, no solution short of the complete annihilation of the individual self in which sin inheres, the absolute spoiling of every particular thing to which the soul clings in its sundered selfhood. The soul must die to everything which it loves for self-sake, even to its desire for states of grace, gifts of the Spirit, supernatural communications, and salvation itself. The soul must get beyond the state of enduring crosses and sufferings because it wants God to see its devotion and its love, and it must learn to love and suffer and be crucified without knowing or asking whether He sees its devotion or whether He cares.<sup>49</sup> The soul must *let itself go* without thinking or willing or desiring. It must even get beyond doing virtuous actions, and reach a height where the *distinction* of actions is annulled.<sup>50</sup> But the soul loses its own powers and capacities only to receive an immense capacity, like that of the river when it reaches the sea. It no longer possesses, it is possessed. It has lost "the nothing" for "the All." It is perfect with the perfection of God, rich with His riches, and it loves with His love. It is one and the same thing with its Source. The divine life becomes entirely natural to it. It moves with the divine moving, acts as He acts through it, and its interior prayer is action.<sup>51</sup>

*Le Moyen court* is a powerful presentation of interior prayer as the heart of religion and of the life of union with God. Here again Madame Guyon has much to say of "the soul's inmost centre," of the profound interior depth of man, of "the native energies" of the soul. Here again also she shows an uncompromising stoical sternness toward everything that is man's "own" nature, everything that is individual, everything that is of the "creature." There must be a withdrawal from any dependence on the round of external forms and practices,

<sup>49</sup> Torrents, Chap. V, Sec. 19.

<sup>50</sup> Ibid. Chap. IX, 7-8.

<sup>51</sup> Ibid. Chap. IV, 2; Chap. IX, 1-8.

from outward attractions and occupations, from all self-satisfaction and self-exertion, from the strain and effort of thought, from the worry and fret of activity, from everything that differentiates into the particular or focusses on the concrete. Peace is attained only when the mind comes back to its primal *simplicity* and leaves all that is distinct and sensible. It is when the mariners rest from the toil of their rowing and let the wind drive their vessel that they reach their desired haven.<sup>52</sup> Pure faith, burning love that seeks no return, an interior silence, in which the soul retreats from everything that can be named or thought and sinks into its central depth, is the way to possess God, who is always present and always at home in this central depth as soon as one reaches it. This silence infused with the presence of God, this prayer which is the energy and fire of love, this hushed enjoyment of God with no straining for gifts or returns, produces a marvellous expansion of life and gives a plenitude of power for spiritual service, for it is now the Spirit Himself, the eternal word of God, that prays and moves and acts within. The soul that has attained this inward peace is not inactive or idle, rather all its powers and its multifarious interests, drawn into a centred unity, are directed by a divine moving principle which can accomplish more in a moment than can be accomplished by a whole life spent in the reiterated acts of self-exertion.

Father La Combe was arrested in the autumn of 1687, committed to the Bastille, and his religious views searchingly examined. He was sent as a prisoner to the island of Oleron and later to the castle of Lourdes. During the early stages of his imprisonment he continued his "interior correspondence" with Madame Guyon and an occasional letter passed between them. His mind, however, gradually gave way under his imprisonment, and confessions which in this mental condition he made of

<sup>52</sup> Moyen court, Chap. XXII.

improper relations with Madame Guyon may well be ignored.<sup>53</sup>

Madame Guyon herself was arrested in January, 1688, and confined in the Convent of St. Marie de la rue St. Antoine. Through the solicitations of Madame de Miramion, who had been much impressed by her piety, Madame de Maintenon became interested in the prisoner and succeeded in securing her liberation after an imprisonment of eight months. She made a very favorable impression on Madame de Maintenon and soon became a powerful influence in the inner spiritual circle of the court, though Louis XIV warned his enthusiastic wife that the lady's "sublime experiences" were "nothing but reveries."<sup>54</sup> It was at this time that Madame Guyon first met with Fénelon, whose future career and destiny were to be profoundly influenced by the crossing of their paths.

François de la Mothe-Fénelon, then Abbé, chaplain and spiritual director, soon to be tutor of the King's grandson and later Archbishop of Cambrai, was thirty-seven years old. He was a fascinating man, gifted with genius, possessed of grace, glowing with enthusiasm, fervent with religious passion, impressionable and credulous, a master of literary style, and eager for the deepest religious experience attainable. An idealist in everything and especially in religion, he was ready to recognize a saint as soon as he saw one in this wicked world, and he was soon convinced that this remarkable woman, with her depths of suffering, was an actual living saint. At the first meeting, however, which took place in the country house of the Duchess of Bethune, the "correspondence" was somewhat one-sided. He did not *fuse* quickly, but rather failed to feel the spell of her spiritual power and

<sup>53</sup> Accusations against the morals of Madame Guyon were very carefully investigated and no sufficient ground was found for thinking that her character was immorally tainted.

<sup>54</sup> Bausset's Life of Fénelon (London, 1810), Vol. I, p. 101.

seemed distinctly cold. There was no question, on the other hand, of the instant effect of the meeting upon her. She saw at once *that this was he!* She had seen him eight years before in a dream and God had given him to her then.<sup>55</sup>

"It seemed to me," she wrote, "that our Lord united him in a most intimate way with me. . . . I felt inwardly, however, that this first interview did not satisfy him and that I was not appreciated (qu'il ne me goutait pas). I experienced, on my part, an indescribable drawing to pour my heart into his, but I found from him no correspondence, which made me greatly suffer. . . . After the second meeting the correspondence was more satisfactory but not yet quite free. . . . I suffered eight whole days, after which I found myself united to him without hindrance, and since then our union has gone on increasing in a pure and ineffable manner."<sup>56</sup>

It must be understood that this "ineffable union" is what Madame Guyon calls "spiritual filiation," and this instance of it is the most striking example of her ministrations in "spiritual maternity." She cries in ecstasy, "O my son, you are my well beloved, in whom alone I am pleased," and she declares that there is no limit to her maternal tenderness for him. "I soon found," she continues, "that with an inexpressible joy I could pour my heart into his without seeing him or without talking with him. I felt that there was an almost continual flooding in of God into my soul and a flowing of my soul into his."<sup>57</sup> It is difficult for a modern reader to study this passionate document, which was omitted from her *Autobiography*, or to read the extraordinary group of letters which passed between Madame Guyon and Fénelon during this eventful year, without feeling that there was something more here than "mystical plenitudes" and "ineffable spiritual correspondence." It goes without saying that their intimate relation was free of moral stain. To Fénelon she was a saint, and she

<sup>55</sup> See Fragment of Autobiography, in Masson, op. cit., pp. 8-9.

<sup>56</sup> Masson, op. cit., pp. 3-4.

<sup>57</sup> Ibid. pp. 5-7.

was invested by him with all the authority of a divinely guided prophetess. She always remained to him pure and holy. It was his loyalty to this faith that made him refuse to join in the condemnation of her and that involved his break with the court and the closing of his career. But in her there was unmistakably a neurotic element, which appears in Protean forms in her experiences and in her actions. She revelled in the unrestrained figurative imagery of the "Song of Songs." She was made for love and was restless in her hunger for it, and it must be said too that though she may not have had a distinct consciousness of it, she really enjoyed a glorious conquest. One can pretty plainly see the subtle conquest proceeding in these letters,<sup>58</sup> though the words used are "maternity" and "filiation." There are a great number of passages referring to the union of their souls and of their joy in each other. "There are moments," Madame Guyon writes to him, "when your soul is so near mine that I find no separation between."<sup>59</sup> And again, "My heart is always joined to yours."<sup>60</sup> Fénelon says, "I do not know what you do for others, but I know that you do much for me. I should be overjoyed if I could sit in silence with you;" and she answers, "I find you in God and God in you. The closer I am united to God, the more I find you in Him."<sup>61</sup> "My heart pours itself into yours without difficulty."<sup>62</sup>

Madame Guyon, it must be said, was deeply impressed with the feeling that Fénelon was destined to be a spiritual star of the first magnitude and that God had "great designs" for the restoration of the Church through him,<sup>63</sup> and, further, she carried in her spirit a profound conviction that she was "the canal of communication" through whom the Spirit of God was to flow and by whom He

<sup>58</sup> Letter LII.

<sup>59</sup> Ibid.

<sup>60</sup> Ibid. LIII.

<sup>61</sup> Letters XLII and XLIII.

<sup>62</sup> Letter II.

<sup>63</sup> See Biog. Fragment and Letters XXXI and CVIII.

was to prepare His "chosen vessel." "My soul is like a fountain," she tells him, "which pours itself abundantly into the hearts of those who are given to me, until it makes them equal to itself in divine plenitude,"<sup>64</sup> and she says, again and again, that in a special and unusual way she is "a canal" between God and his soul or a suffering sacrifice for his purification. "I consent to be an eternal victim which burns before Him without ceasing for you. I hope you will know one day, either in time or in eternity, what God does by me for you. You will then see a measure of grace and of love that will ravish you."<sup>65</sup>

The supreme mission to which she feels called is the cultivation in him of "pure faith," "pure love," union with God in silent prayer, and the absolute annihilation of "own-self."

"You must accustom yourself to walk by pure faith, which means to walk without *knowing* and without sensible feeling.<sup>66</sup> . . . Do not listen to your reason, or to the reason of your friends, but follow without hesitation the inclination the Saviour gives you.<sup>67</sup> . . . The soul must cease to walk by its own steps and enter the quiet of the Lord.<sup>68</sup> . . . The soul must let itself be *nakedly guided*. . . . Go forward blindly and cease to trust the guidance of reason, even enlightened reason."<sup>69</sup>

Pure love counts no cost, seeks no return, desires nothing, finds perfect joy in self-giving, is indifferent even concerning its salvation or its damnation, ceases to ask about its own perfection, but obeys, gives, sacrifices, loses itself without asking any questions. Pure love loses all thought of any good that belongs to the creature, any thought even of eternity.<sup>70</sup> The soul must be like a feather that moves with the breath of the spirit, or like an arm of a balance in perfect equilibrium and turned by the slightest touch, and without the constraint of preference.<sup>71</sup> "God never says: This is

<sup>64</sup> Letter XXIII.

<sup>65</sup> Ibid. XXIX.

<sup>66</sup> Ibid. XVI.

<sup>67</sup> Ibid. XXIV.

<sup>68</sup> Ibid. XXXV.

<sup>69</sup> Ibid. XLI.

<sup>70</sup> Ibid. III.

<sup>71</sup> Ibid. XXXV and XXXVIII.

enough of disinterestedness. The more one gives to God, the more He asks.” The prayer of silence and of union with God is, she explains, a state of perfect *simplicity*. The mind is not occupied with any sensible image or any distinct idea. “All the faculties, all the powers of the mind, must be reduced to a simple unity,”<sup>72</sup> which means a cessation from everything, not only from external things, which are the least of our distractions, but from all action of the mind. “There must not remain one stone upon another that is not cast down. But after this temple built with hands is destroyed, God will raise up another, not built with hands.”<sup>73</sup> The soul that attains this perfect simplicity is beyond the need of means and mediums—“such a soul could live in joy, even though everything were destroyed and all the services of religion were denied it, for it would lack nothing essential.”<sup>74</sup>

For the attainment of this exalted state—“the eternal Sabbath quiet of the soul”—absolutely everything of “self” must perish and go to the wall—“you first die to everything without reservation.”<sup>75</sup> One must go the entire way of self-loss and come to the state of complete abandonment of all that belongs to or attaches to the *me*. God wills to destroy all tendency to self-ownership. There must be no love other than for God, no willing except in parallelism with His will, no desiring except as He awakens it.<sup>76</sup> “God,” Madame Guyon writes, “is so completely the Soul of my soul, the Life of my life, that I have no other soul, no other life, but Him.”<sup>77</sup> And Fénelon tells her that he too is ready to go out, not knowing, not desiring to know, whither or how: “I feel the hand of God breaking all the branches on which my spirit seeks to cling, and plunging me into the dark abyss of pure abandonment.”<sup>78</sup>

<sup>72</sup> Letter VII.

<sup>73</sup> Ibid. XXI.

<sup>74</sup> Ibid. XI.

<sup>76</sup> Ibid. XX.

<sup>75</sup> Ibid. III.

<sup>77</sup> Ibid. L.

<sup>78</sup> Ibid. XLVII.

Throughout this intense correspondence, Fénelon appears for the most part cautious and self-restrained. He wrote to Madame Guyon: "Take care that you do not go too fast, and that you do not take your own impulses for divine moving. Do not neglect necessary precaution."<sup>79</sup> He was plainly impressed by Madame Guyon's spiritual experience and by her knowledge of interior states. He looked upon her as an adept who, out of her abundance, was giving him light and guidance, and he afterwards employed many expressions and ideas from her letters to him, but he never quite cut his cables and let go of reason and judgment, and he never felt comfortable about the rigor of her extreme demands. Much which she wrote did not appeal to his taste, and he did not even read her *Autobiography*—that "temperature chart" of her inner life, as Viscount St. Cyres has called it,<sup>80</sup> though she strongly urged him to do so.

In 1693-4 the impending storm broke, and all intercourse between Fénelon and the great prophetess came forever to an end, though Fénelon's faith in her inspiration and his loyalty to the central truth of her message involved him in a conflict which shook all France and which drove him into permanent banishment from the court. Madame Guyon herself, after being examined for six months by Bossuet, was imprisoned in Vincennes, in Vaugirard, and in the Bastille. She was liberated from her final prison in the Bastille in 1703 and passed her remaining years in a quiet retreat at Blois, dying in 1717. Our last glimpse of her shows her patient, resigned, full of faith and love and forgiveness, believing still that her inner being was joined to God and that God was preparing "a little church of saints" through the method of simple faith and interior prayer.<sup>81</sup>

<sup>79</sup> Letter CXIV.

<sup>80</sup> Viscount St. Cyres' François Fénelon (London, 1901), p. 129.

<sup>81</sup> See Delacroix, Étude sur le mysticisme (Paris, 1908), p. 196.

We cannot follow in detail the stormy controversy which ensued between Bossuet and Fénelon, at that period the two most distinguished churchmen in France. The "new mysticism" seemed to Bossuet to supersede or even to abolish organized established Christianity. He sweepingly condemned *pure faith* ("la foi confuse") i.e. faith which was without content and which focussed upon no object, either outer or inner, and which the Quietists were putting in the place of the definite ideas of Christianity and the positive articles of Christian doctrine. He wholly disapproved of "disinterested love," which loves without request or expectation, which is willing to forego even salvation and which substitutes a permanent inner state of beatitude for specific desires. He, further, condemned the substitution of orison—silent prayer operated in the soul by God—for the definite acts and efforts and practices approved by the Church.<sup>82</sup> There were other reasons, of a less sincere and noble sort, actuating the great churchman in his battle royal against Quietism, but there can be no doubt that, unmystical as he was in temperament and hostile as he was to enthusiasm, he honestly conceived Quietism to be a dangerous substitute for real Christianity.

Fénelon might easily have allowed the storm to rage against the prophetess of the movement and he might have escaped its fury, if he had joined in signing her condemnation. This he would not do. He told Madame de Maintenon, who was never again to be his friend, and others in high places, that he found it impossible to condemn a person whom he believed to be both innocent and holy. He bravely wrote:

"I ought to be better acquainted with the real sentiments of Madame Guyon than all these who have examined her to condemn her; for to me she has disclosed herself with more confidence than she did to them. I have rigorously scrutinized her, and I have gone

<sup>82</sup> Bossuet's *États d'Oraison*.

too far to recede from her now," though, he frankly adds, "I never had any predilection either for her or for her writings. . . . It seemed to me that she was naturally prone to exaggeration and without sufficient precaution."<sup>83</sup>

The full violence of the gathering storm burst when Fénelon — then Archbishop of Cambrai — published his *Maxims of the Saints of the Inner Life*.<sup>84</sup> The modern reader finds it difficult to comprehend the immense stir which this little book created in those far-off days of war and diplomacy and fashion, but for a time nobody talked of anything else. The king ordered Fénelon to leave Versailles, and all the influence of this most Christian king was brought into play to secure in the Vatican the condemnation of the "Maxims."

It must, however, be admitted that the "Maxims" was an unwise book for the occasion and an extreme expression of quietistic mysticism for any age, though it is possible for the present-day reader to realize that Fénelon was aiming at a lofty and genuine type of inward religion. The deep and ineradicable difficulty with this entire formulation of the spiritual life is its inability to get out of the dark region of negation into the real world of concrete experience and moral action. "Pure contemplation," he says, "is negative. It is not occupied with any sensible image nor with any distinct idea of God."<sup>85</sup> Sanctification is the attainment of the state of holy indifference, of absolute non-desire.<sup>86</sup> The highest state of prayer is absolute passivity, complete repose, in which thinking, feeling, willing, are obliterated. The apex of human life is reached in a state of perfect *simplicity*, when the mind is focussed upon no object, when the will aims at no goal and when the soul does not like one thing better than another thing, but is as a

<sup>83</sup> Letter CII in "Correspondance sur l'affaire du Quietisme." *Œuvres de Fénelon*, Tome IX. See also Bausset's *Life of Fénelon*, Vol. I, pp. 134-147.

<sup>84</sup> *Explication des Maxims des Saints sur la Vie intérieure* (1697).

<sup>85</sup> *Maxims*, Chap. XXVII.

<sup>86</sup> *Ibid.* Chaps. V and VI.

feather blown by the wind of grace. Love is then first pure love when it loves no particular thing or object, when it loves for the sheer sake of loving and asks for no return.

Beneath all this numbing negation and glorifying of the abstract, there throbs, however, everywhere through the book the real passion of this exalted soul for union of heart with God, for a re-living of the Christ-Life and for positive coöperation with the Spirit, inwardly experienced. He was earnestly endeavoring to wash selfishness and self-seeking out of religion, to show how to avoid the eager strain and over-busy activity that characterize Christian people, and to emphasize the truth that God would become the supreme factor of our lives if we could only learn how to keep ourselves in the currents of His Life instead of across them.

The extraordinary insight of Fénelon, however, and the rare sanity of his spiritual counsel appear at their best in his *Spiritual Letters*. His power of psychological analysis of states and conditions, and his frank way of telling the distinguished women who consulted him, the laws of physical and spiritual health, are remarkable for that age and would be for any age. "No peace is to be looked for," he tells one of his correspondents, "so long as we are at the mercy of greedy, insatiable longings, trying to satisfy that 'me' of ours which is touchy over everything that concerns it"—so long as we nurse "a sickly self-love which cannot be touched without screaming."<sup>87</sup> There must be, he insists, a relentless and deadly war with this cruel enemy of our peace, our own *self*. There must be no softness, no truce, until this enemy is annihilated. "The more absolute the self-renunciation, the deeper the peace."<sup>88</sup>

He is very keen to detect the signs of morbid temperament and the illusions which haunt a soul that is a prey

<sup>87</sup> Letter XXVIII.

<sup>88</sup> Ibid.

to over-fine scruples. "You are too skillful in tormenting yourself about nothing," he tells one of his consultants. "You dry up the sources of prayer under the pretext of hunting out infinitesimal faults. You distract and perplex yourself with your self-investigations. You indulge in anxious search after trifling faults which you magnify in your imagination."<sup>89</sup> To such souls he prescribes relaxation of strain and striving, the healing rest of silent prayer, the realization of the continual presence of God, and absolute confidence in the love of God: "Trust to love; it takes all, but it gives all."<sup>90</sup> He finds his letter-writers too restless and active in their religious life, too eager for the attainment of inner states, and too anxious for a religious reputation. The wise advice is, "Try to soothe yourself in silence before God, as the mother soothes the child that is sobbing on her knees."<sup>91</sup> Get absorbed in the love of God, follow your heart in its deepest leadings, and you will be less eager to please men and so will really please them more.<sup>92</sup>

He is always telling his correspondents, who want to get out of the world in order to lead the saintly life, that this expectation is a delusion. Saintliness is not to be sought in some world apart from pain and care and annoyances; it is to be found, if anywhere, in the midst of daily duties, in this world where we must eat and drink and clothe ourselves, where we must get on with imperfect neighbors, and be subject to disappointments and defeats. God is everywhere within reach. One can practise His presence even while eating or dressing, and Love is more eager to bestow itself than we are to receive it. "God is often hidden behind disturbing conditions." "He is beside us amid daily annoyances."<sup>93</sup> He counsels another correspondent to stop useless reflections on the past,

<sup>89</sup> Letter XXXVII.

<sup>90</sup> Ibid. XXXV.

<sup>91</sup> Ibid. XV.

<sup>92</sup> Ibid. XXXI.

<sup>93</sup> Ibid. VI.

whether of regret or of complacency, to avoid unprofitable brooding, and to form, by act of will, the habit of practising the presence of God in the midst of necessary occupations.<sup>94</sup>

What he advised his friends he practised in his own life, first during the strain and agony of separation from his old circle of friends, of bitter attack and of condemnation by the official Church, later during the heavy burdens of administering the complicated affairs of a difficult diocese, and finally in the supreme sorrow of his life, over the death of his beloved pupil, the Duke of Burgundy, grandson of the king, who seemed to Fénelon the one hope of the France of the future.

Fénelon exhibited a strange mingling of the man of the world and the saint, the rational thinker and the Quietist absorbed in God, the ambitious churchman and the lover of the crucifying cross of Christ, the persecutor of heretics and the gentle apostle of soul-freedom, the ingenious casuist and the sincere spirit who would not at any cost desert the woman who had convinced him that she was a holy person. He is one of the noblest illustrations in the seventeenth century of the impossibility of successfully solving the problem of spiritual life on the assumption that human nature—the natural man—is absolutely corrupt and depraved, and that God can triumph in the soul only when the human powers have been annihilated, the assumption that God is all only when man is nothing. Fénelon himself has put this condition in striking fashion: “As the sacristan at the end of the service snuffs out the altar candles one after another, so must grace put out our natural life, and as his extinguisher, ill-applied, leaves behind it a guttering spark that melts the wax, so will it be with us if one single spark of natural life remains.”<sup>95</sup> That condition underlies all the vagaries and mistakes of Quietism, and it presents, wherever it

<sup>94</sup> Letter CXXXIII.

<sup>95</sup> Spiritual Letter, No. CCIII.

appears, an *impasse* in the way of the spiritual life. If ever two souls have passionately tried to go that hard road, have ever attained the enduring, stoical-christian temper, have ever been ready to crucify "the me," and have ever been eager to have God all and themselves nothing, it was these two French Quietists of the seventeenth century—Madame Guyon and François Fénelon; but nothing is more clear than that they succeeded in so far as they retained and ennobled their concrete personalities and their interesting individual characteristics, and that they failed in so far as they suppressed and annihilated themselves and arrived at abstract love, non-desire, and no-willing.

The entire movement—certainly one of the most extraordinary Odysseys of the inner world ever undertaken by man—was a bold venture of the soul to find a direct way from the failure and ruin of the finite self to complete recovery through union with the Infinite. Whether consciously or unconsciously, it was an attempt to do away with priests and mediators, to find salvation in its purest and loftiest degree without a single external help, to prove that the only realities in the universe that count are God and the soul, and that they are so near that they can become one. Most of the great Quietists reviewed here were Roman Catholics, but, perhaps without knowing it, they were at heart as much protestant as Luther. They were striving, often through most intense suffering, to put the key to all spiritual attainments into the hand of the individual and to inaugurate by a new and living way the invisible church of the Spirit. It is a strange story, a Pilgrim's Progress toward a real city of God, but a story full of bafflement and tragedy as well as of noble, high-spirited endeavor.

The main actors themselves, with all their sincerity and honesty of purpose, were sometimes lacking in plain, ordinary wisdom. They blundered. But it must be

admitted that it was a very difficult world of men and women for such a quest as theirs, and it was easy in that world of society to blunder. They were hampered too, seriously hampered by the limitations of their psychological theories and by their theological ideas which came to them out of the past. They had to work with views which they thought were true. They took for granted that man was a capital ruin, that the "creature" was devoid of any good. It was therefore their problem to find a way to bridge an unbridgeable chasm. How could grace operate in this human realm of utter depravity? The Church answered, Through the miracle of the sacraments. They answered, The soul can by one act of concentration withdraw from everything that is of the "creature," can centre down below all thoughts, desires, and feelings and come back to its pure origin in God. It can live henceforth in such a union with God that He acts in all the soul's actions, He loves in all its love, He is the Life of all its life. What they could not succeed in doing, however, was to make this "discovery" of theirs *work* here in this practical world. It was so far in to the "centre" of meeting, it was so deep down below all consciousness and the experience was so completely negative and devoid of content, that the individual could bring back nothing in its hands to show for its solitary journey. Quietism needed the warm and tender objective realities of the Gospel as filling for its abstract and empty fervor. It lacked some concrete way of turning its moments of fecundity into the permanent stuff of moral character and ethical endeavor. It was a noble *mood*, but it was too rare and abstract to be translated into real human life.

## “GOOD WILL TOWARD MEN” (Luke 2 14)

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Professor Adolf von Harnack in the *Sitzungsberichte* of the Berlin Academy for December 9, 1915 (pages 854-875) has discussed afresh in his characteristically interesting and instructive fashion the textual criticism and meaning of the angels' song in Luke 2 14. After a full exposition of the evidence and an investigation of the rare word *εὐδοκία*, he decides for the following text:

Δόξα ἐν ὑψίστοις θεῷ καὶ ἐπὶ γῆς  
Εἰρήνη ἀνθρώποις εὐδοκίας,

which he translates:

“Glory in the highest to God and on earth  
Peace to men of (His) gracious will.”

This form of the Greek text is in the second line substantially that on which the English Revised Version rests (“men in whom he is well pleased”); but Harnack, following Origen,<sup>1</sup> connects *εὐδοκίας* not with *ἀνθρώποις* but, by a somewhat harsh hyperbaton, with *εἰρήνη*, and interprets: “Peace is now given to men—no ordinary peace but *the peace of His gracious will*.”

Harnack's argument, which contains much valuable discussion on various aspects of the verse, need not be here repeated. But two of the points which he makes, and in regard to which his reasoning is convincing, deserve notice; for although at first sight they might appear to occupy but a modest place among his results,

<sup>1</sup> Hom. 13 in Luc.; cf. Hort, “New Testament in Greek; Appendix,” p. 53; for the authentic Greek see Thenn in *Zeitschrift für wissenschaftliche Theologie*, 1891, p. 486.

in reality they seem to offer the key to the serious textual problem of the passage, and so lead to a translation and interpretation quite different from Harnack's. They may be stated thus:

(1) With the reading *εὐδοκίας*, the song is a distich, of which the first line must be taken to include the words *ἐπὶ γῆς* and the second to begin with *εἰρήνη*.

(2) *ἀνθρώποις εὐδοκίας* is a phrase wholly unexampled and in itself full of difficulty. For *εὐδοκία* means "God's gracious will." It refers to His purpose, His choice, not to His approval or satisfaction with man's performance; and it looks to the future, to grace, to the hope of a needy world, not to the past, to man's merit, or even to the inherent worth of human nature.

In spite of the latter of these two observations, Harnack, as already indicated, holds fast to the reading *εὐδοκίας* instead of *εὐδοκία*, and overcomes the difficulties in the manner explained above, by connecting this word with *εἰρήνη* and not with *ἀνθρώποις* at all. Now the resulting phrase *εἰρήνη εὐδοκίας* is not quite so unexampled as the other, but the order of words which it requires us to assume is so strange that this exegesis is highly unacceptable and to most will seem impossible.

Since then *εὐδοκίας*, however construed, leads us into the gravest difficulty, we are bound to reconsider the question of text. What is the evidence for this reading in preference to *εὐδοκία*? The bearing of the facts has been somewhat altered by new discovery since Dr. Hort wrote.

(a) *εὐδοκίας* is the reading of B\*~~N~~\*AD (C is lacking), Origen, and possibly Irenaeus, together with the whole body of Latin witnesses, and the Sahidic and Gothic.

(b) *εὐδοκία* is the reading of all other certain Greek witnesses, including apparently Theodotus as cited by Clement of Alexandria (*Excerpta ex Theodoto*, 31, 1; cf. 74, 1f.). It is further supported by all Syriac witnesses,

including Tatian's Diatessaron (as quoted in the Armenian Ephraim), Syr. Sin. (Syr. Cur. is lacking), Aphraates, and Ephraim, and by the Bohairic with some other versions.

It seems unquestionable that both readings were in existence in the second century. Other things being equal, the agreement of B, other Alexandrian witnesses, D, and the whole Latin text, might on general principles be held to outweigh in favor of *εὐδοκίας* the combined testimony of the Syriac, older and later, and of the younger Greek text, which doubtless had its earlier history in the same locality as the Syriac translations. But are other things equal? Are we left to external evidence?

Transcriptionally, *εὐδοκίας* is not a "hard" reading such as would have led an ancient editor to attempt an improvement. It is only hard for modern critical exegesis or for a scholar like Origen. Superficially everything is in order, as the consistent tradition of all Latin translations conclusively shows. Neither does *εὐδοκία*, on the other hand, seem to be a "hard" reading. Yet there is one important difference between the two, often overlooked, which is here significant. Given *εὐδοκία*, it is of course necessary to connect *ἐπὶ γῆς* with *εἰρήνη*, not with the preceding words. But, as Harnack shows, this connection with *εἰρήνη*, in itself considered, without regard to the construing of the following words, would be the less natural of the two possible connections. A Greek reader who did not already have in his mind the concluding words of the verse, would be almost sure, as he read, to get the sense, "Glory to God in heaven (*ἐν ψυχούσι*) and on earth." He would proceed, "Peace among men." Then, when he reached *εὐδοκία* (if he found that reading in his text), he would be compelled either to go back and change his exegesis, or, going ahead, to improve his text. From this point of view, *εὐδοκία* is

seen to be distinctly the “harder,” and therefore preferable, reading. That seems a sufficient motive for the change to *εὐδοκίας*, and it is the kind of motive of which an ancient editor would have felt the force. If *ἐν ψιστοῖς καὶ ἐπὶ γῆς* went together, *εὐδοκία* was impossible. The change to the genitive was a solution lying ready at hand.

We recognize here “the work of careful and leisurely hands,” displaying “a delicate philological tact which unavoidably lends it at first sight a deceptive appearance of originality.” In other words *εὐδοκίας* is the reading of an early revision of Hort’s “Alexandrian” type, which in this case has influenced even Codex B, but from which the old text of Antioch was free.

But the improvement had an unforeseen consequence, which from another side betrays it as a textual corruption. With *εὐδοκία*, the verse is a tristich, and is easily translatable into three lines of formal poetry in either Hebrew or Aramaic. With *εὐδοκίας* it has become an irregular distich, far less adapted for retranslation into a Semitic tongue. Now that Luke i and ii are a translation from a Semitic original is supported by many lines of evidence, while the contrary explanation—that Luke’s Hebraisms are due to familiarity with the Greek Old Testament—seems to be forbidden by the not infrequent cases in which unmistakable influence from an Old Testament passage combines with independence of the LXX. This has been well argued by C. C. Torrey, “The Translations Made from the Original Aramaic Gospels,” in the *Studies in the History of Religions* presented to C. H. Toy, 1912. In such a document it is a sound canon that the more Semitic reading (here *εὐδοκία*) is to be preferred to the more Hellenistic.

We may then say that the proof of the antiquity of the reading *εὐδοκία* from Clement of Alexandria, the Diatessaron, and Syr. Sin., has neutralized the external

evidence on which Westcott and Hort relied, and that internal evidence speaks decidedly for the text:

Δόξα ἐν ὑψίστοις θεῷ,  
Καὶ ἐπὶ γῆς εἰρήνη.  
[Ἐν] ἀνθρώποις εὐδοκία.

The absence of *kai* with the last line is no blemish; for the first two lines are parallel and require to be connected, while the third bears its own distinct relation to the pair. It gives indeed the glad reason on which rests the preceding exultant paeon: God's gracious will has at last been given effect for mankind; *therefore* ampler Glory is now ascribed to God in heaven, and Salvation is the happy lot of earth.

## SIMON ZELOTES

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Simon Zelotes or Simon the Cananæan is one of the Twelve of whom it is customary to say that we know nothing except that his name shows that he had once belonged to the Sect of the Zealots or Cananæans, the "physical-force men" of the Jews, and that he had afterwards, seeing the error of his ways, adopted the pacific teachings of Jesus.

It is therefore somewhat of a shock to discover from Josephus that, if his evidence be correct, the use of the name Zealot to describe a Jewish sect or party cannot be earlier than A.D. 66. For this reason it seems opportune to bring together the facts dealing with the Zealots and cognate contemporary movements, and in their light to ask once more what is the meaning of "Simon the Zealot."

The usual assumptions<sup>1</sup> with regard to the Zealots are that they were the followers of Judas the Gaulonite of Gamala, also called Judas of Galilee, who founded in A.D. 6 what Josephus calls the "Fourth Philosophy" of the Jews. This philosophy insisted on the repudiation of any king but God, and in some modern books it is represented as having strong Messianic hopes.<sup>2</sup> It is also maintained that the Zealots are the same as the Sicarii or at least that the Sicarii are a branch of the

<sup>1</sup> Typical, for instance, is the statement in the *Encyclopædia Biblica*, on Zealot: "It is applied distinctively to a sect whose tenets are virtually identical with those of the Assassins, of whom they are indeed the forerunners." It can only be said of such statements that they reflect Schürer, not Josephus.

<sup>2</sup> It is sometimes held that The Assumption of Moses belongs to this school, but the evidence is slight. Moreover the figure of Taxo is by no means clearly Messianic, even if Burkitt's ingenious suggestion that Taxo(k) is gematria for Eleazar, be rejected.

Zealots, and it is often held that there was an almost unbroken succession of leaders of the Zealots, from Hezekiah, who preceded Judas and according to Schürer was his father, down to the fall of Jerusalem.

Hardly any of these assumptions is well-founded. With regard to Judas Josephus<sup>3</sup> states that he tried to rebel at the time of the census of Quirinus with the support of a Pharisee named Zadok, after Joazar the son of Boethus, the high priest, had induced the people to submit to the enrolment. It is then that he goes on to say that Judas founded the "Fourth Philosophy," which agreed in all respects with the Pharisees except that it allowed only God to be acknowledged as king and advocated deeds rather than words.

All of this statement is entirely probable in itself. The taxation of Quirinus was a two-fold insult to Jewish prejudice: first, because of the repugnance which was felt to the idea of numbering the people; and secondly, because of the belief that the taxes payable by the Jews in the Holy Land were God's peculiar property. It is therefore quite likely that Judas had Pharisaic support. It is also quite likely that a form of thought was started by him and that it continued down to the fall of Jerusalem. It is even probable that much in the New Testament can best be understood as propaganda against this form of thought. But this does not prove that the Fourth Philosophy was identical either with the Zealots or with the Sicarii, and it certainly does not show that the movement of Judas was Messianic.

The clearest way of establishing the facts is to notice what Josephus really does say about the Zealots and Sicarii.

The Sicarii arose, according to Josephus,<sup>4</sup> in the time of Felix. They were so called because they mingled in

<sup>3</sup> *Antiq.* XVIII, 1, 6.

<sup>4</sup> *B. J.* II, 13.

the crowd on festivals with a knife (*sica*) concealed in their clothes and assassinated their opponents. They killed first Jonathan the High Priest and afterwards so many more that a reign of terror ensued. In the same passage Josephus mentions two other movements, but clearly separates them from that of the Sicarii. The first was that of a band who claimed divine inspiration and led men out into the wilderness, "pretending God would there show them signs of liberty." Felix, however, thought that this was the beginning of a revolt, sent out cavalry against them, and cut them to pieces. Another rising was similarly dealt with by Felix, when an Egyptian false prophet collected 30,000 men, whom he led round from the wilderness to the Mount of Olives. It is very remarkable, especially in view of the well-known problem presented by the incident of Theudas, that in Acts 21 37 these three risings in the time of Felix are combined into a single incident.<sup>5</sup> Josephus, however, clearly distinguishes them, though he mentions them together.

The later history of the Sicarii is that they formed an organized band which had its headquarters in the fortress of Masada near the Dead Sea under the leadership of Eleazar, a kinsman of Judas. This held out until after the fall of Jerusalem, and was finally taken by Fabius Silva, after the garrison had killed first their wives and children and afterwards themselves. Only two women and five children survived.

Those of the Sicarii who had not been besieged in Masada escaped to Egypt. Some went to Alexandria and tried to renew their opposition to Rome, but they were finally handed over by the Jews to the Romans. Others went to Cyrene; and one of them named Jonathan led out a number of the poorer class into the desert,

<sup>5</sup> Οὐκ ἀρα σὺ εἰ δὲ Αἰγύπτιος δὲ πρὸ τούτων τῶν ἡμερῶν ἀναστατώσας καὶ ἔκαγαγὼν εἰς τὴν ἔρημον τοὺς τετρακισχιλίους ἄνδρας τῶν σικαρίων;

promising them signs and wonders, but the richer Jews informed Catullus the governor, who dispersed Jonathan's followers. He revenged himself by laying information against the richer Jews, and he and Catullus joined in a campaign of blackmail in which Josephus was involved. When, however, the matter came to the emperor, the plot was discovered, Catullus disgraced, and Jonathan burned.<sup>6</sup>

The Sicarii left an interesting trace of their memory in the Mishna<sup>7</sup> in the law of *Sicaricon*, which was concerned with the settlement of the difficulty caused by property sold by the Sicarii and afterwards claimed by the original owner. It was clearly extended by analogy to other instances of a similar nature, but it is doubtful whether it originally refers to the time of Vespasian or of Hadrian.

The first use of the word "Zealot" in Josephus as the name of a party in Jerusalem is in *Bellum Judaicum* IV, 3, 9. After this he uses it frequently, and always in the same sense. It is the name arrogated to themselves by the followers of the famous John of Gischala, who had escaped with some of his followers when his home, the last place in Galilee to be taken, was captured by Titus. John came to Jerusalem with his followers and started a popular movement against the high-priestly families. He succeeded in procuring the election of an obscure person, named Phanneas, as high priest. It is quite clear from Josephus that the name "Zealot" (for he uses it as a technical designation) applies to John's following and to no other—a party equally opposed to the Sicarii, to the priests, and to yet another of the factions which existed in Jerusalem after 66, namely that of Simon ben Giora, who had once belonged to the Sicarii but had left them because they would not undertake operations

<sup>6</sup> B. J. VII, 8, 1-10, 1.

<sup>7</sup> *Gittin* V, 7.

at a distance from Masada. Ultimately he became captain of a large body of men and was welcomed into Jerusalem by the priestly party headed by Matthias in order to combat the Zealots.

It should be added that there is no reason for connecting the Zealots or even the Sicarii with any Messianic movement. It is true, no doubt, that many Jews were expecting the coming of the Kingdom of Heaven in a catastrophic form, but this view did not necessarily imply a belief in a Messiah and certainly not a belief in an already present Messiah. The first Jew who is known to have proclaimed himself the Messiah is Bar Cochba (A.D. 135). The belief that a leader was the Messiah must be distinguished from the view that he was an inspired person of supernatural power. Claims of the latter kind were far more frequent. Familiar instances are the Egyptian in the time of Felix,<sup>8</sup> the Cyrenæan movement of Jonathan,<sup>9</sup> or the still earlier movement in Samaria suppressed by Pilate<sup>10</sup>; but all these instances represent "false prophets" not "false Christs."

It is also desirable to protest that there is no justification at all for connecting either the Zealots or even the "Fourth Philosophy" of Judas with the brigand Hezekiah. This Hezekiah is mentioned in *Bellum Judaicum* I, 10, 4. He is called an ἀρχιληστής and his capture was one of Herod the Great's first exploits. His son, Judas, is mentioned in *Bellum Judaicum* II, 4, 1, as starting an insurrection after the death of Herod. But Josephus clearly distinguishes him from Judas the Gaulonite, for he says that Judas ben Hezekiah aimed at monarchy, while he is explicit in emphasizing that the other Judas refused to recognize any king but God. The founder of the Fourth Philosophy, however regrettable the results

<sup>8</sup> B. J. II, 13, 5.

<sup>9</sup> B. J. VII, 11, 1.

<sup>10</sup> Antiq. XVIII, 4, 1.

of his teachings, may have been a fanatic, but was certainly neither a brigand nor an aspirant to a throne. Schürer's statement that Judas ben Hezekiah is the same as Judas of Galilee seems therefore quite indefensible.

Finally, a word must be said about a remarkable statement in the Jewish Encyclopædia, in which the writer on the word "Zealot" assumes that Zealot, or rather Cananæan, was the regular name of an order among the Jews who used physical force. The writer states that Clermont-Ganneau in 1871 discovered an inscription in the Temple, authorizing the Cananæans to kill any foreigners in the sacred parts of the building. All these statements seem to be misleading. The word "Cananæan" in the Talmud is applied generally to those who manifest religious zeal, and there is no more evidence in the Talmud of their existence as an order or sect than there is in Josephus. Moreover, the inscription found by Clermont-Ganneau is in Greek and does not mention the Cananæans at all.<sup>11</sup>

Why is it that these facts have been so far overlooked that the name of Zealot has been given to the Fourth Philosophy? Partly because the word translated Zealot is not an uncommon one and represents patriotic virtue. It is used, for instance, in 2 Maccabees 4:2 and in Josephus<sup>12</sup> of the patriots in the days of the Maccabees. It is therefore easy to treat the word in the same way as, for instance, *Chasid* has been treated, and to find a reference to the party of the Zealots every time that a man is praised for being zealous. But there is no real suggestion that in any of these passages it is more than an honorable adjective. Far more important is the influence of the name of Simon the Zealot. It is obvious that the view that Simon was called a

<sup>11</sup> The part in question is μηδενα αλλογενη εισπορευεσθαι εντος του περι το ιερον τρυφακτου και περιβολου ος δ' αν ληφθη εαντω αιτιος εσται δια το εξακολουθειν θανατον.

<sup>12</sup> Antiq. XII, 6, 2.

Zealot because he belonged to the party of John of Gischala is not in accord with the traditional view of the Twelve, and therefore the theory arose that there was a party called Zealots before the last days of Jerusalem, and this was identified with the Fourth Philosophy described by Josephus.

Recognizing the facts as they are, the name of Simon the Zealot offers an interesting problem, which can be solved in more than one way. It is possible that we have all been wrong in translating the Greek of Luke, or explaining the transliterated Aramaic of Matthew, as "Simon the Zealot." Probably it should be "Simon the Zealous"; or in other words that there is no reference at all to any political party but merely to the personal nature of Simon. Another possibility is that the Evangelists made a mistake and really thought that the word which they found in their source referred to the political party of which they had heard, or possibly had read about in the pages of Josephus. A third and more imaginative but less probable hypothesis is that Simon did in point of fact join the party of the Zealots in the last days of Jerusalem.

## THE FOUNDING OF THE CHURCH

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The church has come to have an enduring place not only in history but in thought. At least since the writing of *The City of God* it has decided some of the most vital questions confronting us because of a peculiar sanctity attached to it. It is not therefore out of place to demand from time to time that it show us its credentials. The present essay is an attempt to discover if there is anything peculiarly sacred about the manner of its founding that would justify us in ascribing unique spiritual authority to it.

And the surprising fact which we discover is, that we cannot discover any actual founding of the church whatever. We cannot be sure that the church was founded in any accurate sense of that term; it is probably more in accord with the facts to say that the movement which eventually became known as the church grew. Creation by fiat seems as mythical in this sphere as in more material realms. It seems as if there were a church almost before its members knew it.

In endeavoring to show that the founding of the church is obscure and to discover some reasons for such obscurity, we shall be obliged to see if we can trace the rise of the idea of the church in the minds of the early friends and disciples of Jesus. Of course ideas and words are never quite conterminous. A word never covers an idea. If a word is laid on top of an idea, the idea peeps out all around it. Yet at the same time before an idea can clothe itself with a word it is in a pre-natal state and cannot be said to be properly born. And so, it seems to me, our first, but not our only, duty in attempting to

come upon the birth-hour of the Christian church, is to discover, if we may, when the word "church" was first applied either by its friends or its foes or its members to the group of people who were held together by common devotion to Jesus of Nazareth, whom they recognized as the Christ.

Strictly speaking, there is only one thing to say: that we do not know when this word was first applied. But because we cannot know precisely, we are not excused from finding out all that we can know; because our sources are not all that we would wish them to be, there is no good reason for refusing to find out from them all that they have to tell us. We must therefore examine those early chapters of the Acts of the Apostles which contain virtually all that has even the faintest suggestion of being first-hand information about the earliest months and years in and about Jerusalem after the death of Jesus.

There are so few things that are certain about the authorship of the historical books of the New Testament that it is refreshing to come upon one of the few in connection with this book of the Acts. There can be no doubt that it was written by the same hand as that which wrote the Third Gospel. In the preface to that Gospel, the author virtually tells us that he has consulted various sources for information. The structure and language of the Acts lead us to the supposition that when he came to write the Acts he followed the practice he had used in writing the Gospel. Students of the book have fathered many theories concerning its structure, but they have had most to say about two sources which many of them have believed to underlie this work. One of these is the familiar "We" source, so called because of the sudden and unexplained appearance of the first personal pronoun in some of the later travels of Paul; the other has been even more vaguely denominated and it has been sup-

posed to underlie the first, say, twelve chapters of the book, which are devoted to giving us a picture of the beginnings of the church in Jerusalem. Harnack, who has recently made a valiant attempt to identify the author of the "We" passages with the author of the entire work, still admits Luke's use of probably written sources for the first portion of the book. The book itself cannot have been written of course before the last event therein narrated—the arrival of Paul in Rome. By that time, as the letters of Paul testify, the word "church" was applied as a matter of course to the local Christian communities. The author of the Acts, a Pauline admirer, would, therefore, be accustomed to use the word "church" for the various groups of Christian disciples of whom he was writing and in particular for the church at Jerusalem, which Paul so peculiarly revered. Under these circumstances, we must attribute either to a phenomenal intuition or to his sources the astonishing fact that until "the persecution against the church that was in Jerusalem" arose on the outburst and martyrdom of Stephen, we have only one single instance of the use of the word "church" for the Christian circle.

We hear of the filling out of the apostolate, of the descent of the spirit in the upper room, of the large addition to the Christian company through the inspired speech of Peter, of the first startling miracle performed by him and John, of the imprisonment of the apostles and their courage and release, of the growth of the "multitude which believed" and of their brotherly life, and though it seems to us the most natural thing in the world to speak of these events as the beginnings of the church, that notable word is not once employed. We are further instructed concerning the deceit and death of Ananias and Sapphira, of the renewed imprisonment and release of the apostles, of the strife between the Hellenists and the Hebrews, of the appointment of seven men to see that they were

treated equally in the distribution of food, of the character and genius of Stephen, of his epoch-making speech in the temple, of the rage of his hearers and of his martyrdom; and though we should expect the word "church" in every paragraph, it occurs but once as a designation of the disciples. And its occurrence is neither in connection with any of the pivotal events of these stirring days, nor in the heart of any of the narratives, nor in those wonderful speeches of Peter and Stephen, so full of verisimilitude and breathing the spirit of the most primitive Christian theology; we find it in what I think may, under these circumstances, be confidently regarded as one of those seams with which an author is accustomed to join together independent narratives. Just at the close of the story of the death of Ananias and Sapphira, and before the transition to the healing ministry of Peter and the imprisonment of the apostles, we read these words: "And great fear came upon the whole church and upon all who heard these things." This is the solitary use of that classic word in The Book of the Acts until the time of Stephen. Instead of this word "church," which we should have used constantly and which all our teachers use constantly in the retelling of these brilliant narratives, we find other words, much less pretentious, to us much less characteristic—"believers," "brethren," "their own company," and "disciples." Of these the word "disciples" seems to be the technical word or to be becoming the technical word for this untechnical group of people who were expecting their Lord from heaven. It might have remained such, had not, as we read, "the disciples been called Christians first at Antioch." Indeed until, in the last part of the eleventh chapter, after the conversion of both Paul and Cornelius has been recorded, we get to Antioch, whither certain men of Cyprus and Cyrene fled on the death of Stephen and where they preached the Lord Jesus to Greeks as

well as Jews, the word "church" is used only in the seams of the narrative. Even in those seams, it occurs but four times and save for the obviously editorial sentence, "So the church had peace," it does not occur at all in that portion of the early chapters of Acts which on altogether other grounds Harnack assigns to the ancient Jerusalemic source (behind which he places Philip as guarantor).

This peculiar state of affairs must not be dismissed from our minds until we have inquired whether it may have any historical significance for our inquiry concerning the origin of the church.

I have said that the word "church" was never used in the heart of the early narratives or in the course of the early speeches to describe the disciples of Jesus. But once in the midst of Stephen's speech we find these words: "This is he [that Moses] . . . which was in the church in the wilderness with the angel that spake to him in the mount Sinai." The word "church," though apparently not applied to the Christian groups in the earliest times, was applied by a prominent member of those groups to the Israelitish nation quite as a matter of course. That this is no mere accident is abundantly proved by reference to the Septuagint. Here we find the word "ecclesia," "church," used 71 times to translate "kahal" or its derivatives. It is also used 23 times in those parts of the Septuagint for which we have no Hebrew original. It is always employed as the equivalent of our word "assembly" or "company." It is the word usually employed to denote the assembly of Israel, in what we should call the ecclesiastical or exclusive sense. When, for example, we read that "an Ammonite and a Moabite shall not enter into the assembly of God forever," the word for "assembly" is the word "ecclesia." When it is said that "the transgressor shall be cut off from the assembly of my people," it is again the word "ecclesia"

that is used. I think therefore Harnack is on the whole right in saying (*Ausbreitung*, page 292): "In the Septuagint 'ecclesia' is the word by which 'kahal' is translated, the most sacred word for the entire nation, whereas 'synagogue' is used to translate 'edhah,' a more secular word."

It therefore seems proper to suppose that the reason why the early Christians did not employ the word "church" to designate their own gatherings is because they used it to designate the assembly of the Jews to which they still regarded themselves as belonging. And that the author of the Acts preserved this interesting fact in his sources may be due to his knowledge of the Septuagint from which his Old Testament citations are taken.

While the fact that the early disciples of Jesus still regarded themselves as "Hebrows of the Hebrews" is well-known of course to scholars, though not always duly appreciated even by them, it is widely ignored by most of us. This ignorance of ours makes it still difficult for us to do justice to the position and the emotions of that mother "church" in Jerusalem. It is, however, written clearly on the records that the early Christians "were daily in the temple praising God," that the apostles "went up to the temple at the hour of prayer," after they had seen the risen Lord just as they had before, that Solomon's porch was their place of assembly, and that they preached in the temple—and probably in the synagogues—as those who felt themselves there at home.

The old Latin prologue to Mark's Gospel asserts that Mark, after having become a Christian, cut off his thumb so that he should not be eligible for the priesthood. This tradition confirms the letter and the spirit of the early chapters of Acts, and indicates that to the Jews faith in Jesus as Christ did not disqualify a man for ritual service in the holy place so surely as the lack of a thumb. Nothing was further from the minds of the disciples than

to cut themselves off from the church or assembly of the Jews. Why should they take such a step? They alone among their people had been permitted to recognize the Messiah. Soon their leader was to descend from heaven to restore the kingdom to Israel and to choose from their group those who were to reign over the tribes of the nation. Would such a confident hope lead them to make less or more of those laws which had been given to prepare the way of the Lord and which they had kept in company with him? He was crucified not for denouncing the Jews but for claiming to be the Jews' prince. They had not separated from their church when they were baptized by John; thereby they had been only more surely admitted into membership of the coming kingdom of the Messiah. And when either at Pentecost or at the time of the earthquake they had been baptized with the Holy Ghost, they were not thereby separated from their people; they were merely given the power to bring that kingdom in. More than ever they recognized themselves as necessary to the redemption and to the exaltation of the Jewish nation. It was they who were to enable their countrymen to repent so that their sins might be blotted out and in consequence the Lord might be sent from heaven. Hence they called themselves "believers" as distinguished from their unbelieving countrymen, "disciples" as distinguished from crucifiers and mockers of their Messiah, and "brethren" as their Lord had indeed already called them; but the thought of cutting themselves off from the church of the Jews, the assembly of the people of God, did not occur to them for a long time. And until it so occurred to them, the church of Jesus Christ, in any accurate sense of the words, as distinguished from the church of the Jewish people, could not have been founded.

When we ask ourselves, therefore, regarding the founding of the Christian church, we ask ourselves to discover

the point of time or the point of consciousness when the Christian disciples regarded themselves not as a part of the Jewish nation but as a substitute for the Jewish nation, not as belonging to the people of God but as constituting the people of God.

And here it may be well to repeat the statement which was made at the outset and which I hope has become already better established. We cannot come upon any one moment of history when the church was founded; we cannot tell whether the church was founded; it is probably more in accord with the facts to say that it grew. For our sources do not record any final and explicit break of the disciples with the Jewish nation, though I think they do record such a change of their relations with the Jewish church at one particular point and perhaps also at one particular place that we may say that then the church consciousness, absent before, had arisen.

As we set sail upon our voyage of discovery, I am obliged to report that nearly all the works on church history have glided rather vaguely and ambiguously over the foundation of the Christian Church. They have not only failed to report the founding of the church whose history they undertake to narrate, but they seem to have been oblivious of their own failure.

And now, beginning our search for that moment when the early disciples regarded themselves as the holy group which had been substituted in the favor of God for the ancient people of Israel, we find five events which chiefly call for our scrutiny. It may also be said that these five events seem to stand out more or less vaguely to the church historians as somehow or other marking the beginning of the church.

The first of these events occurred while our Lord was yet upon the earth, going himself habitually into the synagogue on the Sabbath and regarding the temple as his Father's house. It is that solemn moment that

is set aside for us all from other moments of time, when at Caesarea Philippi, on a brief retirement from the confines of Palestine, Simon Peter recognized Jesus of Nazareth as the Messiah. Now there can be no question that that moment marked the definite recognition of the supreme authority of Jesus Christ, and that it helped to give to the words spoken on the mount and by the sea, to the parables of the publican and the prodigal and the ministering Samaritan, the carrying power through which they swept through—and swept out—the world. But does that recognition of Jesus as the Messiah amount to the laying of the corner stone of the Christian Church? There is no such thought in the earliest of the Gospels which report the event. Only in the Gospel of Matthew do we find an interpolation in the older account which might be construed in that sense. There we read that Jesus blessed Peter for recognizing him as the Messiah, and added, "Thou art Peter, and upon this rock will I build my church, and the gates of hell shall not prevail against it."

It is to this passage that those resort who like to call Jesus "the Founder of the Church." But there are three reasons which render it impossible to believe that we have here to do with such an event. In the first place, the verb is in the future rather than in the present tense. If Jesus is to be regarded as the personal Founder of the church, it must be at some future and undiscoverable moment. In the second place, the words, if spoken by Jesus, would almost inevitably have been treasured with his most sacred utterances. It is well-nigh inconceivable that Mark would have omitted them as too unimportant to mention, or that they would have found—as seems the case—no place in the Logia, the earliest collection of Jesus' sayings. The fact that the word "church" is never put into Jesus' mouth in the New Testament except here and in another passage in this same Gospel of

Matthew is very significant. And the second passage bears even more unmistakable marks of a late origin. There Jesus is represented as saying, "If a brother sin against thee and thou tell it to the church, and he refuse to hear the church, let him be unto thee as the Gentile and the publican." Not only the word "church" but the words "Gentile" and "publican" seem utterly out of place on Jesus' lips, in the significance in which they are used. Moreover the conception of Jesus' band of disciples as a disciplinary organization seems quite unhistorical. If Jesus used the words at all, the church to which he alluded was the Jewish Church and not the Christian one. And in the third place, we are confident that the recognition of Jesus as the Messiah does not mark the founding of the Christian Church because after that recognition Jesus went with his disciples into the temple and purified its courts, and partook of the feast of the passover with his disciples, as though they were all still members of the Jewish Church. In it, indeed, he had peculiar power, but to it he and they alike belonged. The break with the Jews had not yet come.

Weizsäcker and Bacon are at one in regarding Peter rather than Jesus as the Founder of the church. They regard him as such, however, not because of his recognition of Jesus at Caesarea Philippi as the Messiah, but because he was the first to whom Christ was revealed in resurrection glory. "He appeared to Peter"—this phrase out of the 15th of 1st Corinthians seems to them to point to a greater vision of Peter than any he had while Jesus walked by his side; and in virtue of which he became the founder of the Christian Church. Yet they hesitate to say definitely that the appearance of Jesus to Peter marked the founding of the church; the event was too personal for that, and, as personal, it has quite disappeared from the narrative of the Acts. McGiffert, who inclines to the belief that Peter was the

"second founder of the church" (*Apostolic Age*, page 48) does, however, single out another definite moment—of great importance in Christian history—for our attention in seeking for the origin of the church. "That Christianity has had a history," he writes (*Apostolic Age*, page 42), "is due to the fact that these disciples did not go back disheartened to their old pursuits and live on as if they had never known Jesus, but that on the contrary, filled with the belief that their Master still lived and conscious of holding a commission from him, they banded themselves together with the resolve of completing his work and preparing their countrymen for his return. Their resolve, put into execution when they left Galilee and returned to Jerusalem, marks the real starting-point in the history of the church." If indeed they came to any such clear-cut resolve, the moment of that resolve plays an important part in the gathering together of Christian believers, but that gathering would have regarded itself not as a church but as a favored group within the Jewish Church. Preuschen, who also emphasizes the place of Peter among the Christian disciples, seems better to express the facts when he says, "Peter gathered a company of like-minded people, but without giving up communion with the Jewish people and the Jewish faith."<sup>1</sup>

The Day of Pentecost is the third great moment in the history of Christianity which has been hit upon for the founding of the Christian Church, which seems so curiously to baffle our search. Of all these moments it seems most widely chosen for this great honor. "While the apostles and disciples," writes Philip Schaff, "about one hundred and twenty in number, no doubt mostly Galileans, were assembled before the morning devotions of the festal day and were waiting in prayer for the

<sup>1</sup> *Handbuch der Kirchengeschichte*, p. 37. Das Altertum, bearbeitet von Erwin Preuschen.

fulfilment of the promise, the exalted Saviour sent from his heavenly throne the Holy Spirit upon them and founded his church upon earth. The church of the new covenant was ushered into existence with startling signs which filled the spectators with wonder and fear" (*History of the Christian Church*, I, page 228). And George P. Fisher, not quite so certainly, writes (*History of the Christian Church*, page 19), "With the day of Pentecost the career of the 'Church Militant' fairly begins." And Wilhelm Möller, still more cautiously, says (*Lehrbuch der Kirchengeschichte*, Vol. I, page 50), "The Spirit, proceeding from the Ascended One, not the earthly manifestation of Jesus nor his teaching in itself, is the really church-founding [element], yet even this [is to be taken] in the sense that the separation of this particular fellowship from the general religious-national fellowship of the Jewish people was first the result of a gradual process."

But the result of that outpouring of the spirit—whether it took place, as most scholars believe, on the Day of Pentecost, or as Harnack believes, in connection with an earthquake, during which Peter and John were released from prison—was not the founding of a church but the preaching to brethren of an already established church by those who were thus spiritually endowed from on high. So far was Peter, who was the spokesman of those thus filled with the spirit, from thinking that a new church had been founded and that he had been cut off from his people, that he appealed to his fellow Jewish Church members to hear the prophet of whom Moses had testified, saying, "Every soul that heareth not that prophet shall be cut off from among the people." Peter evidently expected that the Lord was about to purify that ancient church, which had been almost "since the world began." It is impossible therefore to think that the Day of Pentecost marks the moment when the disciples believed themselves to supplant the children of Israel as the

chosen people of God. They were reformers, not revolutionists.

The fourth event, of sufficient importance to call for a brief mention, is the choice of seven men by the early believers to see to it that equitable division of food and necessaries of life was made between the Jewish and Hellenistic widows among the disciples in Jerusalem. It is hard for us not to use the word "church" in this connection, but it does not appear to have entered into the mind of the author of the Acts; "When the number of the disciples was multiplying," is the sentence with which he introduces the narrative. This incident was enhanced in its importance for a long time by the almost universal belief among church historians that it marked the institution of the diaconate, thereby regarded as the earliest body of which they had positive information in the early church. A more careful reading of the account, however, has brought to light that these seven men were chosen for a temporary and definite task, and that they are never once named deacons in the book which narrates their selection by the disciples. Their selection thereupon does not betray any church-consciousness.

There is left for our final scrutiny an event that is connected with one of these seven men who were chosen to oversee the distribution of food among the widows of the disciples in Jerusalem. Stephen had engaged in serious and keen dispute with the members of one of the synagogues in Jerusalem. It is not altogether clear what that dispute was about. But so fundamental was it in character that his opponents summoned him before the council and the high priest called upon him for his defence. Nothing can be clearer than that Stephen was recognized as a Jew in regular standing, and that he recognized the high-priest as the chief power in the church to which he felt that he belonged and concerning which indeed by that very title he spoke in the defence that he made before

the council. To him the church was still the Jewish church, the people of God. In his defence, he seems to have laid emphasis on two quite diverse points—the blindness of heart that had always characterized Israel, and the temporary character of all buildings made with hands, whether synagogue, tabernacle, or even temple. The report of his speech is too fragmentary for us to be certain concerning his thought. That he mentioned Jesus is clear, but precisely what he said about him we cannot tell. It seems, however, overwhelmingly probable that he set him higher than Moses both before God and in the church of the Jewish people. At the close of his defence the council and the witnesses stoned him to death. Thus they separated him from the people of God, from the church, in the manner prescribed in the law. The disciples were aware that he had been stoned for the convictions which many of them shared. It may be that the closest friends of Jesus did not agree with Stephen in what he may have said about the temporary character of Jewish institutions, for we read that the apostles remained at Jerusalem during the persecution which now broke out there upon the disciples. But a great number of the most loyal Christians were compelled to flee from the sacred city, under a virtual sentence of excommunication from the church to which they had up to that time given most devoted adhesion. The authorities of the church of God had denied their right to partake of the worship of the temple and of the privileges and promises of the fathers. What was to be done? In the Book of Acts we read: "They therefore that were scattered abroad upon the tribulation that arose about Stephen travelled as far as Phoenicia and Cyprus and Antioch, speaking the word to none save only to the Jews. But there were some of them, men of Cyprus and Cyrene"—of the very synagogue to which Stephen seems to have been attached—"who, when they were

come to Antioch, spake unto the Greeks also, preaching the Lord Jesus. And it came to pass that even for a whole year they were gathered together in the church, and that the disciples were called Christians first at Antioch."

The fact that in this short passage, which I have curtailed in citing, the infrequent word "church" occurs twice, has some significance, particularly as it occurs in the heart of the narrative; but the striking thing is that the disciples were no longer Jews either in their own eyes or in the eyes of outsiders. They were a new company, made up of Jews and Greeks, a new religious group, whose main characteristics were developed from their allegiance to a Christ, whatever that term may have meant to those who first dubbed them by the immortal nickname "Christian." But we can tell what it meant to the disciples. To all of them, whether Greeks or Jews, Jesus was the Christ. Certainly here has arisen the consciousness of being a peculiar people of God, of having a standing with the Messiah, which the Jews as such no longer shared with them. Throughout the book of the Acts we find a continual sense of the turning from the Jews, who rejected their own Christ, to the Gentiles, who accepted the Jewish Christ and yet no longer the Jewish Christ. For, as the Fourth Gospel has it, he had come "unto his own and his own had received him not. But as many as received him, to them gave he the right to become children of God, who were born not of blood but of God." Jesus soon ceased to be the prince of the Jewish nation and became "the Head of all things to the church, which is the fulness of Him that filleth all in all." The church was the kingdom of God; in it Jesus reigned; to it he brought his gifts. It was the saints in Corinth and Rome and Ephesus that were to judge the angels. They were in time past no people, but they had become the people of God. When this feeling arose, the word "church," heretofore used to denote assemblies which con-

sidered themselves sacred, whether of Diana in Ephesus or of the people of Jehovah, was naturally applied to the Christian disciples. It was applied at first perhaps to all Christian disciples in their capacity of people of God, but it soon became common to call each local Christian assembly by that name.

I do not wish to be understood as locating the origin of the church by detecting the presence or absence of any single word. The word "church" had never come in the Septuagint to have a strictly sacred meaning. For example, there occurs in the Psalms the phrase, "the assembly of evil doers," where the word which is translated by "assembly" in English is translated by "ecclesia" in Greek. We must by no means decide the origin of the church by the mere use of the Greek word for it. And yet I feel that, roughly speaking, the growth of the idea "church" among the disciples may be said to coincide with the use of the word "ecclesia" to designate their gatherings. And I find very great significance in Epiphanius' declaration — which seems to bewilder some of the historians — that the Jewish Christians rejected the word "church" as a designation for their gatherings in favor of the word "synagogue." They could not bring themselves to give their enduring allegiance to anything but the Jewish Church nor to find in Jesus anything but the Jewish Messiah, whom they were fortunate enough to recognize. I feel that Weizsäcker is right in affirming that the Christians in general would not call themselves a synagogue, because they believed themselves to be in possession of the kingdom of God and to constitute the church of God. "The church of God" appears to be the first name rather than "the church of Christ," because it was "the people of God" and not "the people of Christ" for which it was substituted (cf. Gal. 1 22, Acts 20 28, 1 Thess. 1 1, *Apostolisches Zeitalter*, pages 39-40).

But it is not the use of the word "church" upon which I would place the chief emphasis. It is used but 23 times in the entire book of the Acts, that is to say, infrequently even after the founding of the church in Antioch. It is true that while it is little used, and not used at all in most of the early chapters of the Acts where we should have constantly expected it, it is used constantly in the letters of Paul. But as I have said, we must not depend upon the use of a word to point us to the moment when the thing the word denotes arose. Our idea of the founding of the church depends in large degree upon the connotation of the word "church" for us. It seems to me that by the word "church" the early Christians meant the peculiar people of God. In Sohm's masterly *Kirchenrecht* the church is defined as "a gathering of the New Testament Covenant people before and with God." That they were His peculiar covenant people seems to have dawned upon them in Antioch, or going to Antioch, where they were first set off from the rest of the world as Christians at about the time when that nickname was first fastened upon them. Therefore it seems to me correct to say that the church—in the sense in which its first members understood it—was founded neither by the Lord (save as all things were believed to be under His control) nor by Peter, neither at Caesarea Philippi nor at the Day of Pentecost, but when, after the excommunication of Stephen, the disciples found themselves banished from the church of the Jews and yet not without God or hope in the world. It was founded in part by those who upon that persecution went everywhere preaching the word—and making a people out of those who had never been a people—and partly also by the council of the Jews who stoned Stephen as he was calling upon God and saying, "Lord Jesus, receive my spirit!"

If this be true, or in the direction of the truth, the

exact moment of the founding of the church cannot be marked off accurately, nor is it important so to mark it off. The church was an outgrowth of historical development and came into being through the opposition of the foes of Jesus to the claim of his friends to a place in the church of the Jews to which he and they had alike belonged and which was unspeakably precious to them all. Stephen and those who stoned him must be regarded as the most likely founders of the Christian Church.

These beginnings of the Christian Church justify two considerations. In the first place, neither Jesus nor his earliest disciples were separatists. They did not separate. They were separated by the authorities from the church to which they belonged. The love of Jesus for the Jewish Church, for its temple and its synagogues, is apt in our time to be obscured. He began his public career at Nazareth by employing the opportunity open to Jewish teachers in the synagogue. Among the events which brought about his death, his startling cleansing of the temple occupies a prominent place. To him the Jewish temple was a house of prayer for all nations, a place where all men were to find access to their God, as children in a Father's house, a place wide enough for him and inexpressibly sacred to him. He realized that the Jewish people needed a new conception of the mercy and loving-kindness of their God. But there was nothing further from his mind than the proclamation of a new God or the establishment of a new family. He appealed constantly to the Scriptures as an authority against the newer traditions of his time. He had no wish to separate from the Ten Commandments and from the twenty-third Psalm. He had only come to fulfil the expectations of men whom he regarded as the very spokesmen of God. One of the great problems of New Testament study is the degree to which he opened the

Kingdom of Heaven to any save Jewish believers. The God he revered was the God of his fathers; it was of that God that he believed himself the Son. We cannot of course conceive that he believed Jews only to have a duty toward God, but, unless our sources utterly deceive us, he believed that the highest duty men could have was toward the God of the Jews. A Bible without the New Testament is to us an absurdity; a Bible without the Old Testament would have been to him a blasphemy; perhaps we ought to say that any other Bible than the Old Testament was for him unthinkable. Be that as it may, Jesus was anything but a dogmatist; he was not beginning religious history *de novo*; the majestic utterances of the Jewish prophets were to him a revelation of the eternal God. Inclusion and reverence were the marks of his religious temper; the fanaticism and narrowness of come-outers seem completely foreign to his spirit; he came to expand and not to contract the boundaries of the family of God. I am sure that he would regard any holy fellowship as incomplete which did not include the sublime ethical monotheists from whom he sprang. What he would have us remember is that he died not by the Jews but for them.

And the second consideration is this: the spirit of Jesus was much more important to our Lord than the church of Jesus. With the one he would have identified himself; of the other he knew nothing. If we must choose between the spirit of Jesus without a church and the church of Jesus without his spirit, we will choose the former. Undue attention to the organization of the church and to its useful ceremonies has blurred, distorted, almost erased, the spirit of Jesus, which was before the church and is independent of it. There can be no doubt that history has justified by the stern law of necessity the gathering and the maintenance of the Christian Church. It embraces for us, as for the fellow-

believers of Stephen and of Paul, all people who believe on God through Jesus, His well-beloved Son, and who through that belief stand in a peculiar relation of intimacy with Him. But no more with us than with Jesus is the church the object of our spiritual allegiance; our supreme devotion must, like his, be reserved for God and men. And the ultimate purpose of our lives must be not to build up a strong church but to open the human heart through all possible means to the divine spirit of Jesus.

## BOOK REVIEWS

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WILLIAM WORDSWORTH. HIS LIFE, WORKS, AND INFLUENCE. GEORGE  
MCLEAN HARPER. Charles Scribner's Sons. 1916. 2 Vols. Vol. I,  
pp. xvi, 441; Vol. II, pp. 451. \$6.50.

This is a solid, engaging, and much-needed book, of a type commoner in England than in America, commoner in France than in either. It shows a German acquaintance with the enormous biographic material, a material probably more extensive than illustrates the life of any other English poet. But Professor Harper has such easy mastery of his sources, such ability to tell a story, such charm of style, and such attractiveness in his own personality, as to make it difficult to break off reading at the close of any chapter. Here we follow Wordsworth with eager interest through all his eighty years, attending him not merely from month to month, but from week to week, and at important periods from day to day. We watch the development of a human being much as if we were meeting him in the pages of a modern novel. Through letters he talks with us, his biographer supplying delightful comment. It is a piece of learned and imaginative portraiture which will form a veritable epoch in Wordsworth study.

Yet it will arouse opposition too, for it is a revolutionary book, setting aside the accredited sage of Rydal Mount and finding the true man and poet at Hawkshead, Blois, Alfoxden, and Dove Cottage. Half its pages are given to the years before 1800 which have only a subordinate place in the official biographies. The Memoirs of Bishop Wordsworth, Professor Knight, Frederic Myers, and their many followers have established a tradition of Wordsworth as an exalted, calm, ascetic, and holy being, pretty far removed from ordinary humanity. This mythical figure Professor Harper would recast. A changed scale of values is set up, a different emphasis given to old facts, and sundry important new ones are introduced. Wordsworth's remark, for example, that he wrote few love poems because he could not trust his passionate temperament has often been taken as merely another instance of his lack of humor. It looks more plausible when we read in his sister's letters of the illegitimate child left in France. While there seems to me some exaggeration in

Professor Harper's reaction against the conventional Wordsworth, I see that critical reconstruction was necessary and count it fortunate that it has been undertaken by a sober scholar who reverences and revitalizes the poet with whom since childhood he has lived in grateful intimacy.

Professor Harper regards democracy as the central principle of Wordsworth's creed and insists that in proportion as he followed this, or let it become obscure, he gained or lost power. In this I agree with him. In Wordsworth's early years he accepted a kind of democracy of nature, and never ceased to teach that the quiet eye can draw its harvest as well from common things that round us lie as from selected scenery. When on visiting Revolutionary France he at length awoke to an interest in man and society, he found the ideals of equality striven for there already familiar to him who had grown up among the freehold farmers of Cumberland. Accordingly, undertaking to exhibit in verse the workings of our elementary emotions, he naturally took his subjects from among the poor, the young, and the unlearned; and this not because he valued the peculiarities of these classes, but rather because through their very lack of peculiarities he thought them most representative of mankind in general. It was the same democratic thought which made it difficult for Jesus to imagine a rich man entering the Kingdom of Heaven. And might we not even conceive Wordsworth's famous warfare on poetic diction as but an attempt to carry democracy over into the field of language? Among words there are no fixed orders of nobility. All are good in proportion as they mean what they say. Vulgarity arises from pretence and emptiness. Plain words usually have the fullest meaning. Yet Wordsworth does not adopt a word merely because he finds it in common speech. His theory provides for selection, and in his practice he lets the "simple child" use "nay" for no, "the youth from Georgia's Shore" say that "the morning doth appear." No poet better or more frequently can charge a line with a shining word. Lucy's bones are "Rolled round in earth's diurnal course"; joy is "in widest commonalty spread"; the butterfly is "historian of my infancy"; and Myers has well remarked on Margaret's lost son, who sleeps "an incommunicable sleep." Such departures from usual speech are no acceptance of "poetic diction." They are functional, as poetic diction never is. Such words precisely fit their place. In bringing about the ease, naturalness, and conversational tone which distinguishes the poetry and oratory of today from that of a century ago, Wordsworth has had a considerable share.

Rightly then does Professor Harper lay stress on these democratic elements in the life and work of Wordsworth. Does he insist on them too exclusively? In his biographic poem, *The Prelude*, Wordsworth has made them fairly prominent. But this is not enough for Professor Harper. *The Prelude*, though written between 1798 and 1805, was not published until Wordsworth's death. Professor Harper believes — with some probability — that in the intervening years it was frequently altered. With less evidence he assumes that it originally had a more radical tone than appears at present. Émile Legouis, accepting it as it stands, finds in it a lucid account of its author's development. Professor Harper is convinced of a radicalism more extreme than it reports. He believes that Wordsworth felt in France the influence not merely of Rousseau but of the Encyclopedists. Their sceptical tendencies Professor Harper approves. Locke and Hume put English philosophy on the right road, and Wordsworth was fortunate in being guided along it from 1793 to 1798 by the great Godwin. Three times a brief remark of Coleridge is quoted, that Wordsworth "is a republican and at least half an atheist." Unhappily he grew timid and fell away from Godwinism during the struggle of England with Napoleon. He came to respect the institutions of his country, though in his championship of the Church Professor Harper thinks there was never much piety. He valued it chiefly as an engine of order. Wordsworth, in short, as Professor Harper sees him, goes over into blind Toryism. He loses touch with nature and the common man. He plays with superstitions, lives in comfort, is an officer of the government, and associates with the great. While his technical excellence increases, his poetic power fades; for he has abandoned "science" and democracy. He is in "a moral decline."

These judgments, while containing truth, appear to me harsh, unimaginative, and damaged by partisan bias. They neglect the complexities and half shades which usually enter into a great man's beliefs. No doubt it is difficult for a convinced empiricist to judge an idealist fairly. But there is a breadth and statesmanlike quality in Professor Harper which continually persuades me that he might be more subtle if he tried. Perhaps he has been irritated by early constraint. Toryism is not nice stuff for most Americans. But some Tories are not immoral, and sympathetically to examine the grounds of their strange belief is a part of the duty of a biographer.

All agree that the poetry of Wordsworth's later years is inferior to that of his earlier. But many causes worked toward this be-

sides Toryism and immorality. By the middle of his life Coleridge was lost, his brother John dead, family cares increasing, the excitement of pioneer work dulled, and the stock of natural imagery accumulated during his sensitive youth exhausted. How plaintive is his frequent lament that advancing age is substituting reason for the sensuous thrill of childhood! Wordsworth grew old early. Few poets hold imaginative fervor more than twenty-five years. Wordsworth did not, except in his sententious sonnets. But Toryism was quite as much the result of his decay as its cause. So Professor Harper often perceives, and from time to time mentions each of the contributory influences here named. But these make but a slight impression on his collective judgment. Wordsworth, he holds, reprehensibly abandoned the Godwinian type of democracy, and of course power soon departed. But did he abandon it? Did he indeed ever adopt it?

I believe Godwin's influence on Wordsworth has been greatly over-estimated, not merely by Professor Harper but by several previous biographers. *Political Justice*, published in 1793, was a popular book for the following ten years. Undoubtedly Wordsworth read it and found most of its teaching pretty familiar through what he had already heard in France. Godwin himself he knew, as a leading literary figure of London. But he never quotes his doctrines, even when in a letter his name is mentioned. Godwinism does not affect his verse, unless in its horror of war. Some passages in the later *Prelude* denounce "Reason" and "Analysis," and regret that the writer once played with matters so dangerous. But there is nothing to show that these abominable practices were suggested by Godwin, and Wordsworth returns to his hallowed "imagination" while still retaining the friendly acquaintance with Godwin intact. Coleridge certainly was for a time a disciple of the great agnostic; and at the height of his discipleship, in 1796, when he had recently become acquainted with Wordsworth, wrote to Thelwall, a forward member of the school, his hopes of a recruit — Wordsworth "is at least half an atheist." In lack of other evidence, to use this sanguine sentence as a cool estimate of Wordsworth's religious attitude is uncritical. Few writers have gone through greater changes than Wordsworth, yet few leave on their readers a deeper impression of unity. Wordsworth certainly approached religion by a path of his own. He knew and loved nature long before he loved man. His thoughts of God accordingly — ardent thoughts ever — reflect more of Him with whom nature is instinct than Him of whom history and philosophy speak. Only we must remember how near akin in Words-

worth's thoughts are the provinces of man and nature, and how spiritually nature is always conceived.

As regards Wordsworth's abandoning the principles of the Revolution, it is what most serious men of his day did. Those principles were seen to lead to bloody intolerance, anarchism, the invasion of republican Switzerland, and finally enthusiasm for an aristocratic conqueror. Wordsworth sympathized with England's struggle against Napoleon in the same way as today a former admirer of Germany sees the cause of civilization bound up with the overthrow of the Kaiser. No doubt in becoming a Tory Wordsworth was as extreme as was everywhere his habit, but he did not altogether abandon the love of liberty. Tory-democrats are not unknown in our time. In later middle life Wordsworth called himself "half a Chartist." His sonnets to Liberty are soul-stirring poems, written in large part after he ceased to be a Republican. Long after that change he lived among the peasantry, and never lost interest in the common man. I do not approve of his conservatism, especially his opposition to Catholic and Jewish emancipation and to the extension of higher education. But it is safer to trace these mistaken courses to the point where they connect with the very strength of Wordsworth's character than it is to refer them in a lump to moral decline.

Wordsworth was endowed with a double temperament. On the one hand, from early years he delighted in observing plain facts, in watching the multiplicity of things, the marks of individual character, the varied exhibit of the world's moving show. But no less strong, on the other hand, was his delight in seizing the underlying bonds which bring multiplicity to unity. His passion for finding law, harmony, beauty, order—always profound—is probably what has most impressed his readers. One of the many services of Professor Harper's book is that it brings the other, the miscellaneous, side into due prominence. Up to middle life the two remained in suitable equipoise. In *The Prelude* Wordsworth repeatedly tells us how the combination of them seen in Nature gave him a sense at once of nature's grandeur and freedom. When he first saw London he was struck with its chaotic multifariousness, was amused with it, and for the time content. Not until his second residence there did he discover an underlying unity, and so could grant the city a moral character. His experience of the French Revolution took an opposite turn. As he received its first impact, he was struck with the throb of hopeful aspiration throughout an entire people. Each was ready to sacrifice for the good of all. But as time went on, selfish-

ness supplanted patriotism; men clamored for rights of their own while refusing them to others. The principles of individuality and order parted company, and Wordsworth — how could that moral and aging man do otherwise? — threw in his lot with the latter.

Having thus sadly discerned that individuality may be a principle as well of evil as of good, Wordsworth is less disposed than formerly to furnish each person with a stock of knowledge and then leave him to direct his life for himself. Happiness does not come in that way. To most of us instinctive action and a wise passiveness — always favorite agencies with Wordsworth — bring more of it than conscious knowledge. Legislation even, clumsy and external as it is, contributes little. The collective wisdom of the past, custom, institutions, and selected men as interpreters of these august matters, are our best guides. Too much education, stimulating as it does the desire of each to realize his own novel ideals, is less helpful than the priest and poet, who lead us to idealize the realities about us. An easy creed for old age! Is it that advancing years bring timidity or wisdom?

I have developed here my divergencies from Professor Harper rather than my agreements and large indebtedness. A book is good as it forces us to rethink its subject and to adjust our minds to its fresh material. Such a stimulating book is this, and I bring it my tribute of grateful criticism. In scope, seriousness, and minute knowledge, it takes rank with Masson's Milton, Elwin's Pope, and Dowden's Shelley, having besides its own special distinction. Its rich scholarship never clogs its literary ease. In every chapter one lingers over passages of penetrative insight and felicitous expression. Professor Harper agrees with Matthew Arnold in counting Wordsworth the most significant force in English poetry since Milton. Most readers of this book will accept that judgment.

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THE DRAMA OF THE SPIRITUAL LIFE. A STUDY OF RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE AND IDEALS. ANNIE LYMAN SEARS. The Macmillan Co. 1915. Pp. xxvi, 495. \$3.00.

There are many approaches to the study of religion in our day. Some take the historical way, and study the rise and development of religion in a given race or in the race as a whole; others pursue the psychological way and investigate the nature of religious experience and the motives which explain its rise and the needs it fulfills. Still others are interested in its philosophical problems. The author of

this volume has not strictly followed either of these approaches. She takes now one way and again another. She is more interested in the problems of religion. She avails herself of the data presented by the students of the history and the psychology of religion, but her main interest is in the empirical nature of religion and the peculiar problems it presents for life and thought. She has been impressed with the paradoxes of religion, the strange oppositions and conflicting phases of religious experience, and she attempts a study of these for theoretical and practical purposes. She desires to determine the essential nature and spirit of religion, to correct current one-sided views, and to aid persons to live by and for a whole religion. She has a profound conviction of the greatness of religion and its imperative need in our day, if men would be true to their natures and would be saved to the things of the spirit.

Religion is grounded in the ideality of man's nature. His differentiation from the animal made possible and actual his religious experience. It lifted him above the sensuous; it made possible release from immediate necessity; it raised him above the spatial and temporal; it created an ideal world, and in this ideal world man's greatest creative activity is seen in his religion. Other needs and motives had their part in the development of religion, but the ideality of man's nature is the real fountain-head of religious experience. This makes religion an experience that is due fundamentally to man's rational nature. However much the emotional and the volitional factors enter into the life of religion, greater than either or both is the rational element.

If religion thus owes its rise to the ideality of man, the characteristic nature of religious experience reveals itself in oppositions, conflicts, even contradictions. The universal form of religious experience is the "triadic relation." There is the ideal of something good, divine, and eternal; there is also the keen sense of imperfection, incompleteness, and restlessness, and then there is a process or way of salvation, which, in redemptive religious experience, gives the sense of satisfaction, fruition, salvation. This is the fundamental form of religious experience; but there are certain other "oppositions" or "conflicts," which fall under this general scheme. These are the oppositions inherent in the very forms or types of religious experience itself; such as the mystical as opposed to the ethical, and the individual as opposed to the social. Then too there is another series of oppositions as to the source of the religious life, such as grace as opposed to merit, or necessity as opposed to freedom, or the inner as opposed to the outer. Once more, with reference to the form of

the spiritual life there is another series of oppositions, such as temporal and eternal, dynamic and static, and the many and the one.

These oppositions appear at times to be irreconcilable; they are taken by some to be contradictory; they are, however, not so in their true nature. They are only so, when the *one series* of elements is made the sole factor. If all are seen as parts of a whole, factors in a living teleological process, then each is seen to require the other for its fulfilment. They are different values in a perfect whole of experience.

It is in the discussion of these series of oppositions that the book has its original character and derives its special value. The author pursues these oppositions as they manifest themselves in religious experience in all ages and in many lands, and shows their analogue in the other experiences of life, and thus makes the religious experience a part of the total experience of human life. Likewise she shows how philosophy, ancient and modern, Eastern and Western, has been confronted with this oppositional character of our experience. In the philosophical portion of the discussion the contemporary tendencies have full recognition, though the author holds quite firmly and whole-heartedly to idealism, especially in its Roycean form; for all these oppositions are finally reconciled in unique selves, each fulfilling his meaning, each living his life in an ideal community and in relation with the Infinite and Eternal Self, the great Unifier of all selves.

It is this recognition of the ultimate spiritual reality that makes her dissatisfied with the many modern attempts to give the world a "religion without God," and in nothing are her critical powers and religious earnestness seen to better advantage. The same may also be said of her criticism of our over-practical emphasis in religion. The religion of efficiency is far from being the religion of the spirit.

This ideality of religion on the one hand and these manifold oppositions on the other, she finds abundantly evidenced in the literature of life and religion. Here is another special feature of her book. The material here gathered is richer in content, wider in range, and more varied in character than has yet been gathered by any other writer. She is more critical in her selection than James or Mrs. Burr, and more catholic in her range than Stratton. All workers in this field of study will greatly benefit from her wide reading. A perusal of this literature will justify her emphasis on the spiritual, ethical, individual, and social nature of religion, and save one from current crude notions of religion and counterfeit substitutes for the real thing.

Good as the book is, it cannot pass without criticism. And the first criticism concerns her use of the material. Not a little of the material is used two and three times, and now and again on opposite pages, as in quotations from Marcus Aurelius and Thomas Hardy and St. Augustine; material which belongs in one section is misplaced, as in case of some prayers under class III; in general it may be said that she gets lost in her materials, as in her long discussion on Romanticism, and the one and the many, and the section on the development of the religion of Israel and of primitive religion; also in her discussion of grace, which runs off into exegetical and doctrinal questions. This makes for weariness of mind. She has a suspicion of this herself, judging from the number of times she has to "return" to her subject.

Then again with reference to her scheme, her formula. It is not a little surprising that in a time when philosophical systems are at a discount, and theological plans of salvation are thrown upon the scrap-heap, we should have presented to us formulas within formulas of the process of salvation. Thus we have a "triadic" form of religious experience, and then a "series of oppositions," and then again formal logic lends its "serial and cyclic processes," and finally the perfect form is found in "rhythm," which is at once psychophysical, æsthetic, and cosmic. It is very well, if we can get a formula large enough and flexible enough for all our experience and material, but this scheme fails to do this, for it often requires the compression, transposition, repetition of the same material. This makes for confusion in the mind of the reader as well as in the mind of the author. Her own suspicion is expressed more than once that life is richer than formula.

Once more, her thought with reference to ultimate reality of the object experienced in religion is not quite clear. It wavers, it oscillates between the subjective and objective, the ideal and the real. On one page, she appears to believe in the ultimate reality of the object of religion, even to its personal nature and its highest interpretation in the terms of love, and in certain footnotes she is quite explicit on this matter. And yet in other places, the subjective meaning is intended, and great objective spiritual concepts like grace and prayer and salvation are so humanized in their meaning and reference that the divine reference is either minimized or ignored. If there were more clearness and steadiness of thought on these fundamental matters, the book would gain much in value. Perhaps the original difficulty comes from the fact that the author does not see that religion takes its rise, not from man's conceiving an ideal,

but from man's conviction that he is in touch and connection with ultimate spiritual reality. It is from such an experience that religion takes its rise and religious ideals are created. In the drama of the spiritual life the Divine Reality plays the leading rôle.

To careless reading or transcription such errors as these are due: the quotation from St. Paul on page 19, where "spirit of God," should be "spirit of Christ"; the verse, "If ye love not your brethren," etc., is quoted on page 347 as if it were spoken by Jesus. *Ereigniss* is misspelled on page 222. In the quotation from Shelly, "pane" takes place of "dome"; Professor Starbuck's book on "*The Psychology of Religion*" is twice given a wrong title; the Hindu prayer is not found on page 261, as stated on page 298, nor Augustine's prayer, as stated on page 318; there are also several sentences where the meaning is not in accord with the context, and the word "aesthetic" is sometimes used in the ordinary sense and at other times as meaning mystical.

DANIEL EVANS.

ANDOVER THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY.

THE FREUDIAN WISH, AND ITS PLACE IN ETHICS. EDWIN B. HOLT.  
Henry Holt & Co. 1915. Pp. 208. \$1.25.

The author of this interesting volume is well known as an able advocate of the empirical, "realistic," objective method of studying the world and life, and as a consistent opponent of the subjective, introspective, *a priori* method; which he thinks open to the serious criticism of encouraging vague and misleading speculation and to have contributed little of real value for ethics or for human conduct. There will be many persons who, like the reviewer, will fail to recognize the stamp of permanence and all-sufficiency, of freedom from bias or from "wish," in the mode of looking at the truth advocated by Dr. Holt, any more than in that which he repudiates, and yet will find in this stimulating book, as in *The Concept of Consciousness* by the same author, a number of theses that should command admiration and attention. That the author's attitude is frankly materialistic will be accepted as an asset of value by some readers, and must be forgotten for the moment by the rest, if they would learn the lessons that the essay has to teach.

As in his former book Dr. Holt set himself the task of describing the emergence of consciousness among the progressive integrations of the unfolding series of "natural" phenomena, and of emphasizing, let us say, the more obviously objective aspect of the man—nature

(not man + nature) situation, so here he studies, in analogous fashion, the problem of "behavior," in its relation to morals, ethics, and religion on the one hand, and to the motor reflex on the other. Throughout the argument the string that ties the body and the acts of man to the body and the acts of "nature" is kept ever taut, so that the reader's thought shall never be allowed to wander very far away from the physical mechanisms that are taken as the earliest prototype of those organic processes which eventually figure as mental in the highest sense. As in all such demonstrations, a somewhat painful jolt is felt as one passes from nature (as here conceived) to even the simpler living organisms with their relatively complex processes of reaction and of choice. But this gap is bridgeable perhaps by the life of the organisms known as "tropisms," and its existence affords in any event no stronger case against the materialistic argument than is furnished by the difficulty of conceiving of a universe built on the plan of strict relativity, which natural science finds amply sufficient for its special needs and would gladly regard as sufficient for all purposes.

One is then led rapidly through the ascending series of organic reactions, in such a skilful fashion as to be almost persuaded that the principle of "integration," growing ever more elaborate though still mechanistic in its nature, is really able to account for all that man most prizes in the form of love, intelligence, imagination, and will. Indeed, no one can doubt that the transition from man to nature is of such a sort as to show the essential identity of the two; the only question is, Of what nature is the motive influence of both? Is it non-creative and one of a series of mutually convertible forces? Or is it — although so slender, shadowy, and invisible — an indispensable, irresistible, all-pervading, and really creative energy, of which the mind is the best example?

It is easy for any one who knows the sincere objectivity of Freud's work and is familiar with its keenness, honesty, and fearlessness, to see why the evidence he adduces appeals so strongly to the author of this volume; and those who, like the reviewer, are in warm sympathy with the psychoanalytic movement, have good reason to be grateful for the brilliant exposition here given of the "wish" and wish-conflicts, as constituting the essential element in human life. It is, on the other hand, a matter of doubtful justification to identify wishing with striving; that is, to interpret the wish only in terms of its outcome in accomplishment or as an attitude looking toward accomplishment. In doing this Dr. Holt seems to deprive life's conflicts of a great portion of their warmth and richness, and throws

aside the Freudian conception of the wish, in the interest of a scheme that seems to the reviewer needlessly narrow and artificial.

"Matter" subject to "law" can only "do"; it cannot "feel." And so, as the universe must be monistic, and as the most obvious features of it — so the author thinks — are "law" and "matter," therefore all feelings and emotions, and preëminently all wishes, must, in the last analysis, be classified as "motor attitudes," an assignment which to the ardent wisher seems anything but natural. But if the wish is thus limited in scope on the one side, it is accorded the widest possible scope upon the other. Construe its nature as one may, Dr. Holt is doubtless right in asserting that the wish, as described by Freud, is the proper unit of psychology, and that "the problem of good conduct . . . ought to receive some clarification . . . from a science that studies the mind and the will in their actual operation." He is certainly right also in asserting that the "wish," whatever else it may be, is closely related to the will. "Wishes conflict when they would lead the body into opposed lines of conduct. . . . And of two opposed attitudes only one can be carried into effect; the other is suppressed."

It would be difficult to make more clear than Dr. Holt has done the relation of these two sorts of wishes and the significance for education, and eventually for ethics, of learning how to come to terms with one's repressed motives. The literature of psychoanalysis has grown to be a large one, but the outline which is given in this book, while not in all respects such as Freud would probably endorse as adequate, is eminently illuminating and instructive. It is true also that to gain a dynamic conception of the wish, rather than to leave it as simply identical with sensation, is a real advantage.

Under the heading of "The Wish in Ethics," reasons are brought forward for preferring an ethics based on experience and having roots that extend back as far as one cares to go into biologic life, to systems of ethics "which posit an *abstract* sanction for right conduct" but "never discover *what 'right' is.*" The ethics of this latter sort Dr. Holt refers to, somewhat sardonically, as ethics "*von oben herab*"; whereas the kind that he prefers, and considers to be the only system which stands in real touch with experience, and so the only one which is genuine and trustworthy, is that "*von unten hinauf*." But this judgment, although it has a real meaning, can claim no more solid basis of comprehensiveness than can the philosophic argument of the book itself.

It would be easy to write a volume in discussing, both adversely

and in praise, the many points, a few of which have been here alluded to, that are brought forward in this brilliant essay. But it must suffice to say that every student of human nature should read it for himself. The writers who have endeavored to construct a systematic theory of life and conduct based on the introspective method have often laid themselves open to very stringent criticism; and the world owes a great deal to the empiricists and the "behaviorists" for contributions of a lasting value. The representatives of both parties have still, however, much to learn, each from the other.

JAMES J. PUTNAM.

BOSTON.

**THEISM AND HUMANISM.** THE GIFFORD LECTURES for 1914. A. J. BALFOUR. Hodder & Stoughton. 1915. Pp. 274. \$1.75.

Mr. Balfour's purpose and method are well stated in two sentences of the concluding chapter: "My desire has been to show that all we think best in human culture, whether associated with beauty, goodness, or knowledge, requires God for its support, that Humanism without Theism loses more than half its value" (p. 248): "The root principle which, by its constant recurrence in slightly different forms, binds together like an operatic *leit-motif* the most diverse material, is that if we would maintain the value of our highest beliefs and emotions, we must find for them a congruous origin. Beauty must be more than an accident. The source of morality must be moral. The source of knowledge must be rational" (pp. 249-50).

Fundamental to the whole discussion is the distinction drawn between the causal and the cognitive series of beliefs, that is, between beliefs which are more or less deeply rooted in the very being of man as part of the nature of things, and hence have intuitive probability rising towards inevitability, and others which are the outcome of an intellectual process and have only logical validity. It is not to be deemed the mere cynicism of a man versed in public affairs to hold that in the last analysis all our beliefs are reducible to the causal series — "Scratch an argument, and you find a cause" (p. 61) — for science itself inclines to a similar deterministic declaration and thus gives rise to the central question of the book: If our beliefs are grounded in the nature of things and are therefore presumably coherent with it, how must that nature be conceived — in terms of Theism or Naturalism?

This radical inquiry, however, is not at the front in the earlier chapters which deal with ethics and aesthetics, and becomes insistent only in the discussion of knowledge. It is shown that the sense

of the beautiful cannot be accounted for by selection alone, since it has little or no survival value. And even if its highest forms have some vital significance, these æsthetic feelings would be injuriously affected if it were held that art is mechanical with no artist behind it, that nature is charged with no message of intrinsic meaning, and that history is only the record of a futile and irrational process. *Æsthetics*, that is, demands Theism as congruous context, and must inevitably languish in a mechanical setting. In the case of Ethics, it may indeed be shown that earlier forms had survival value, but the opposite seems to be true of the later. Loyalty, for example, as a sentiment, is essential for social existence, but the higher moral ideals to which it progressively attaches itself often dictate conduct which leads to individual catastrophe and at least temporary social calamity, and so is logically indefensible on the naturalistic view of the world. The ethical principles acknowledged by the best individuals and the most highly developed communities are compatible with Theism alone and can survive in no other intellectual environment.

Thus the way is prepared for the thorough-going treatment of Knowledge. Here it is pointed out that the very fundamental postulates of science are quite incapable of verification by the method which alone science pronounces admissible. Neither the existence of an external world, which science ingenuously takes for granted, nor the principles of universal causation and conservation, can be empirically demonstrated. How can universal laws be derived from particular instances? Yet these beliefs are inevitable, and Mr. Balfour affirms their truth, but insists that they require us to believe in a rational instead of a mechanical universe—in Theism. Thus the purpose of the book is fulfilled by making explicit the necessary implications of the ideals of Truth, Goodness, and Beauty.

The argument is not novel, but it has never been presented so clearly and cogently. As might be expected in the treatment of so wide and diversified a range of topics, there are points of detail where one or another reader will demur or deny; but taken as a whole, the book urges an argument for Theism which means more than any other to men sharing present ideas and cherishing present values. It is an appeal to Humanists to consider their ways, the worth of which is unhesitatingly declared, and see what is involved in devotion to them. To show that Theism is a necessary implication of Humanism is a worthy undertaking which has been successfully and strikingly carried out.

W. W. FENN.

THE RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE OF SAINT PAUL. PERCY GARDNER, Litt.D.  
G. P. Putnam's Sons. 1911. Pp. xvi, 263.

This book is based upon a careful reading of the Pauline Epistles in the light of the religious beliefs and practices of the Apostle's time. Professor Gardner of Oxford is an accomplished classical scholar and a representative of Anglican liberalism. His critical position, as he himself tells us, is in general that of Jülicher. He treats Ephesians as Pauline, though not without reservation; he uses the Book of Acts with caution; and the Pastoral Epistles are not taken into account. Unlike some recent German critics, the author emphasizes the significance of Paul's conversion near Damascus as being in truth a sudden change in the direction of his life, and as marking the beginning of the liberty which he enjoyed as a Christian. Dr. Gardner also holds that the Apostle's personal inspiration is a reality; for "some men seem capable of receiving impulses from an underlying life, as the iron rod is adapted to receive the lightning" (pp. 51 f.).

The most important and interesting part of the book is the discussion of the influence of the Greek and Oriental mysteries upon Paul's presentation of the gospel. The author holds that they exerted a profound and lasting influence upon Christianity, and that it was Paul who opened the gates and let this flood of mysticism rush into the Christian Church. "The best points in the Mysteries were absorbed by Christianity," and "the worse passed into magic" (p. 67). There can indeed be no doubt, in the light of modern investigation, that many religious beliefs and practices which were entirely foreign to Judaism and the teaching of Jesus were adopted by the Christian Church from its Graeco-Roman environment, and that Catholicism in its various forms is the product of this process of adoption and assimilation. For example, baptism was at first only a rite symbolizing repentance and forgiveness, and the Lord's Supper was a very simple religious meal observed by the disciples in memory of their Master. But the Mysteries, which were sacramental as well as soteriological religions, had their sacraments of purification and communion; and in the Pauline churches, which were confined to Gentile soil, baptism and the Lord's Supper were regarded as sacraments in the strict sense of the word. Dr. Gardner maintains, however, at least in the case of baptism, that there was no idea of any magical efficacy in the sacrament present to the Apostle's mind (pp. 107, 110, and 212). Was this transformation of the two primitive Christian institutions justifiable, and should the sacramental interpretation of them be retained? One may of

course answer in the affirmative; for, as the author points out, the question of origin is different from the question of value. But those whose criterion is the mind of Christ, and who desire to see his religious experience reduplicated in his followers, will return to the earlier, non-sacramental view of both baptism and the Lord's Supper.

Paul's great and most distinctive contribution to the Christian Church, according to Professor Gardner, was his doctrine of salvation by faith, which "took its rise from personal spiritual experience" (p. 206). "His mystery of salvation by faith" was "not only the mainspring of his own life," but it has also been "the source of the best life of the Christian Church from that day to this. He felt in his own heart the power and influence of the spiritual force which was dawning on the world. . . . And because it was a reality and not a mere imagination, it inspired and thrilled" the great Apostle, and it has enthroned him "for all time as the Second Founder of Christianity" (pp. 262 f.).

On page 73, where the reference is to 1 Cor. 15:51, it is said that "at the coming of Christ some shall arise from sleep, and some shall be changed." This is a most inaccurate statement of what Paul expected to occur at the *parousia*. On page 92 Dr. Gardner must mean Hosea rather than Amos. On page 128, doubtless through inadvertence, the adjective "divine" is used of the Messiah whom the Jews were expecting. They did not ascribe divinity to the Messiah. On page 134 the statement that at the advent of the Lord "the material puts on immateriality" seems to the present writer to imply a complete misunderstanding of Paul's thought at this point. Many scholars will find the author's interpretation of Rom. 3:21-26 on pages 193 ff. unsatisfactory. Finally, an index of the subjects discussed in the work would have made it much more useful for reference.

Professor Gardner has written a very readable and suggestive book. Some of the views which he expresses require further study before they can be confidently accepted or rejected, but in the main his interpretation of Paulinism is sound.

WILLIAM H. P. HATCH.

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FICHTES RELIGIONSPHILOSOPHIE IM RAHMEN DER PHILOSOPHISCHEN  
GESAMMTENTWICKLUNG FICHTES. EMANUEL HIRSCH. Vandenhoeck &  
Ruprecht, Göttingen. 1915. Pp. 130.

This brochure seems to be a Doctor's thesis, which seeks to release Fichte's thoughts on religion from his general philosophy. The author, with German thoroughness, has searched out every idea and word in Fichte's collected works, and endeavored to exhibit his religious beliefs in their unity and continuity as well as in their interrelation with Fichte's changing systematic construction.

Dr. Hirsch finds that it was an independent speculative development which conducted Fichte's thought to its religio-philosophical counsel respecting a blessed life. He urges that we may apprehend this development in its full peculiarity if, leaving on one side all confusing and contingent particulars, we confine attention to its cardinal "moments." Fichte's principle and starting-point is the evidence, the certainty, which the ego wins in and of itself through the deed (*Tat*) of moral conviction. On this basis, on which firmly stands his speculation, he undertakes to comprehend the whole world out of the pure ego, which realizes self-certainty even against contradiction. This undertaking fails. Because self-affirmation of the ego is strictly apprehended as moral, it involves the affirmation of communion; and on this rock of fellowship-thoughts the syntheses break which have been construed on the grounds of the philosophy of the pure ego. Whoever affirms communion affirms God.

It is the self-affirmation of the moral ego which has ultimately led to the affirmation of God. Fichte's philosophy is philosophy of the ego; not, however, of the ego which realizes its self-certainty in the face of *Anstoss*, but of the ego which, surrendering itself to God, has realized the life and existence of God, and therefore can completely understand and possess itself only in case it understands the evidence accompanying life as that of the divine life itself. Thus our author thinks that the Fichtean speculative system of pure moralism can be maintained in opposition to annihilation which threatens it from the thought of communion, only by becoming a speculative doctrine of God. This, he says, is the secret of the philosophical development of Fichte.

The imposing unity and consistency of this development is due to the fact that it remained uninfluenced by all non-ethical and non-speculative interests, especially by all interests of a religious kind. As a speculative philosopher, Fichte did not presuppose belief in God, did not in fact really seek it; he found it. His conviction grew that only thought itself could free us from the needs and

extremities which thought had engendered. Dr. Hirsch thinks that the immanent self-criticism of every purely ethical *Weltanschauung* has been consummated in Fichte's philosophical development. The systematic value of this self-criticism is all the greater by virtue of its having taken place within the sphere of ethical idealism. The refutation of ethical idealism by appealing to the fact of universal sinfulness, was remote from Fichte, who never acknowledged that this fact was inevitable. But our author contends that he who cannot ignore the fact of universal sinfulness must evaluate the religious position which Fichte achieved, as untenable.

Dr. Hirsch has scrutinized Fichte's works in a painstaking manner. He has gathered the data exhaustively, and much that he says is illuminating. But—so it seems to this reviewer—his critical approach is faulty. All modern thought inherited an uncriticised *a priori* basis of experience; that is, an experience-less basis of experience. There has been a progressive reduction of this basis through our modern centuries. We have at length accepted frankly the task of demonstrating the complete experiential origin of the *a priori* element, by whatever name it be called. Now, what of the traditional *a priori* element did Fichte retain? What peculiar form did it take in his system? What contribution did he make to the historic transition to an exclusively experiential basis of experience, and what in this line did he bequeath as task to those who came after him? These questions indicate the method of treating the subject from the point of view of modern philosophical criticism. But Hirsch is a German; and it seems that, whether in philosophical system or in social structure, the German is definitively committed to an *a priori*, that is, an absolute of some kind.

GEORGE BURMAN FOSTER.

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO.

THE PROBLEM OF KNOWLEDGE. DOUGLAS CLYDE MACINTOSH, Ph.D.  
The Macmillan Co. 1915. Pp. xviii, 503. \$2.50.

"The method of idealistic epistemology is like that of the quack physician; it first administers a drug which makes the patient's ailment chronic, thus making its own further services permanently indispensable." Even the idealists will have to admit some plausibility in this charge of Professor Macintosh in his very important book. For when the idealistic philosopher has introduced the neophyte into his wonderland, or put him through Alice's looking-

glass, many problems which were difficult enough before in the waking world become insoluble without his guidance. But the neo-realist is not found very much more satisfactory than the idealist in his interpretation of Being, and the dualist is lost in hopeless agnosticism. Critical monism is the term applied by Dr. Macintosh to his own theory of knowledge, and he makes out a very strong case for it.

The greatest question of epistemology for the last century has been, What kind of stuff is reality made of, and in what way or ways, if at all, do we human beings have experience of or acquaintance with it? Dr. Macintosh begins with the dualism which found its most famous expounder in Kant. There is the phenomenal world of things as they appear to our senses, or more strictly the world of our sensations and ideas, and the noumenal world of things-in-themselves, the true world of reality which lies back of the appearances. But there is no point of coincidence between these two worlds, and we are shut up to the knowledge of the world of our senses and can know nothing whatever about the ultimate reality. But if this is true, says our author, then we have no evidence of the existence of things-in-themselves, and it is dogmatism to assume that there are such things. One after another he considers the forms of dualism proposed by a long list of avowed agnostics, and by dualists who did not fully acknowledge agnosticism but are logically involved in it.

Professor Macintosh holds that the reasoning which leads to the Kantian agnosticism might be fairly illustrated in this syllogism: "What I suppose to be experience of independent reality is included within what I experience. But mere sense-impressions, which I do not know to be valid of independent reality, are also included in what I experience. Therefore what I suppose to be experience of independent reality is mere sense-impression, which I do not know to be valid of independent reality." A slight inspection will reveal the fallacy of "undistributed middle." This conclusion, however supported, that we never know "independent reality" in sense-experience, is, according to the author, the great error in Kant's system.

About a third of the book is then concerned with the fifty-seven or more varieties of idealism, or "*idea-ism*" as it might better be called to distinguish it from the view held by all moral persons that there are "ideals" which have valid authority over every personal life, a doctrine from which these systems of idealistic theories of knowledge or reality have gained much of their prestige and with which they have been often confused. "Idealistic absolute epistemo-

logical monism," the forms of which are now discussed, is defined as the view that "the real object and the perceived object are, at the moment of perception, numerically one, and the real object cannot exist at other moments, independently of any perception." Some types of idealism, however, identify the real as an abstraction from the immediately given, rather than the immediate datum of consciousness. We need not here dwell on the author's brief but satisfactory discussion of mystical idealism and logical idealism, the former especially familiar in the philosophy of India and the teachings of Christian mystics and the latter presented by Plato.

The third elemental type of idealism is the psychological — and from it many of our modern philosophical troubles flow. This is defined as "the interpretation of the physical object, under the influence of an erroneous suggestion arising in connection with the psychological point of view, as being essentially *idea*, in the psychological sense of that word, i.e. as being simply a part of consciousness, a content of conscious life which depends upon consciousness for its existence." Dr. Macintosh exposes the fallacy of this position by stating its defence in various forms, one of which, similar to the argument for dualism, involves the undistributed middle, as follows: "The unreal objectively is subjective (related to a subject); similarly all of which one is conscious is subjective (related to a subject); therefore all of which one is conscious is unreal objectively (mere idea)." Professor Perry's characterization of the argument as involving the fallacy of the ego-centric predicament, is approved. Limitations of space forbid even mention of the many interesting and popular forms of psychological idealism with which Professor Macintosh deals at length. As none of them is able to avoid this initial fallacy or to neutralize it by the addition of other ingenious fallacies, they must all be considered unsatisfactory. Chapter IX on "The Disintegration of Idealism" suggests the fate which the author sees already overtaking this doctrine.

Realism in present epistemology is the view "that the real object and the perceived object are at the moment of perception numerically one and that the real object may exist at other moments apart from perception." The author distinguishes two kinds, dogmatic and critical. The "new realists" of today defend the former kind, in which it is held "that 'secondary' or sense-qualities are *independent* of relation to a sensing subject," while his own, the "critical" view is that secondary qualities are *dependent* upon relation to the subject for their existence. A number of the neo-realists go from the rejection of the activity of consciousness in the creation of the secondary

qualities of objects, to a rejection of consciousness altogether as having any real existence, or to the position that it is a relation between physical objects.

In his own careful and convincing statement of his critical realism, Dr. Macintosh adds to the primary and secondary qualities distinguished by Locke, tertiary qualities. Primary qualities of physical objects he holds to be those discovered through sense-activity but not produced by it. Secondary qualities are discovered in the object only because produced and put there by the subject of sense-activity. Tertiary qualities (principally values) are placed in the object not by sense but by purposive though purely psychical activity of the subject.

In discussing the ways and means of knowing, the author holds that all cognition is perceptual, although with conceptual elements active in the perception. He says that our *a priori* knowledge—that which led to Kant's dualism and the chaos of later idealism—is all derived from *experience* either of the individual or the race.

Part II of this great book is taken up with the problem of mediate knowledge, discussing first the problem of truth (in which intellectualism, anti-intellectualism, pragmatism, and Bergson's intuitionism are all carefully examined), and the problem of proof.

Professor Macintosh's theories may be summed up in the term "critical monism," as he is in epistemology a "critical realistic monist," in morphology and genetic logic a "critical perceptual monist" and a "critical empirical monist," in logical theory a "critical pragmatic monist," and in methodology a "critical empirical monist." The great attraction about the positions which he takes, to the average student, will be his consistent clinging as closely to the common-sense views of reality and experience as it is possible for a scientist and philosopher to do. For this great service, many who will never read his book, because they will not study far enough into the technical subjects which he discusses to be able to appreciate it, will still owe him a great debt of gratitude, for he has at least made the enlightened common-sense view of the world respectable. No philosopher or student of the technical subjects discussed in this book can afford to be ignorant of it. The student of theology and religion will be interested at least in its conclusions, from which we may expect the anticipated companion volume on *The Problem of Religious Knowledge* to proceed.

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OUR KNOWLEDGE OF CHRIST. LUCIUS HOPKINS MILLER. Henry Holt & Co. 1914. Pp. xiv, 166. \$1.00.

This little volume is valuable as a diagnosis and as suggesting a remedy. It is symptomatic of a state of mind which is calling forth numerous books and essays indicating wide-spread discontent with the traditional treatment of Jesus Christ. It has a ministry in that it briefly and in somewhat sketchy fashion indicates the lines of the reconstructed thought. Professor Miller undertakes to outline briefly the Sources, the Life, the Teachings of Jesus, and the resultant Conceptions of Him. The spirit of the discussions is modern and wise; and the book will take its place among a considerable output of literature seeking to orient to the modern mind the christological problem. It is essentially a historical study; and throughout the author has in mind the scientific conscience with its aversion to the miraculous and the supernatural. He seeks to indicate the principles by which the modern solutions must be sought.

A brief quotation from the Preface will help to introduce the author and his suggestive book. "I wish to emphasize that I am not particularly interested in pressing a new point of view upon any who honestly and intelligently hold to the age-old formulae and derive comfort and power from them. The religious life is the main thing for us all. But many of us have been obliged to readjust our views for the very sake of that Christian faith we long for and need. Many others have turned their backs upon the Church, and even upon all religion, because they have not been helped to a new view which would have shown them that such desertion is unnecessary, harmful, and wrong." The book is irenic and constructive in spirit.

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107

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## THE DEVELOPMENT OF CHRISTIAN INSTITUTIONS AND BELIEFS

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I. The development of religious institutions and beliefs may be logical or real.

1. Logical development is the explication of the content of a notion. Nothing new is added; it is like the opening of a closed hand. Such a development is consistent with the static, or mediaeval, conception of the world, and is not unknown to the older theologians. In this sense of the word many of them would admit a development—e.g. of the Papacy, of Transubstantiation, of Sacramental Confession, of the devotion to the Blessed Virgin—from the less formally complete teaching and practice of an earlier age. But there is no process, they would maintain, in the notion; the change is not in the notion but in us. This proviso is essential. The full powers of the modern Papacy, we are taught, were conferred by Christ on Peter; and the Syllabus of 1907, in condemning the proposition that the apostle was ignorant that this was so, appears to reject the principle even of logical development—of which it would be truer to say that it is tolerated than that it is approved of,

by the official Church. Pius X carried this identity of dogma back into the legendary age of the Old Testament, attributing a knowledge of the Immaculate Conception of the Virgin—defined in 1854—to the Hebrew patriarchs. Noah, he says, contemplates this mystery in the ark; Moses meditated upon it before the bush that burned in Horeb; David when he danced before the ark of the covenant. This is the language of a formal Encyclical (February, 1904), not the devout play of a pious imagination sporting over the sacred text.

2. Real development supposes a change not only in us but in the notion. The notion does not stand, a world of objective truth, motionless while the stream of life passes. No; bank and stream are alike in motion; all things flow. And the unity of the process is a unity of origin and direction, not of content; the waters are many, but they have one source and one goal.

What the Church takes to be logical are in fact, with few exceptions, real developments: the Mass or Eucharist, from the breaking of bread; Baptism, from the primitive immersion, which at once symbolized and coincided with spiritual regeneration; the decorous offices of our modern churches from the tumultuous assemblies described in the first Epistle to the Corinthians—"will they not say that you are mad?" Some of these developments are legitimate, some illegitimate; some temporary, some permanent; some technical, some part and parcel of a larger life-movement, such as—to take ethical examples—the abolition of slavery, the growth of humanitarianism, or feminism. Their germs are to be found in the New Testament; but they are found in a rudimentary shape, their emergence from which was dependent on a general replacement of lower by higher ideas.

It is obvious that the Eleatic unity postulated by Catholicism—I use the word in the European sense—has

no room for such developments. Hence the attitude of the Roman Catholic Church to progress. It cannot, human nature being what it is, exclude it. But it admits it reluctantly, under protest, in as small doses as possible—and in hope of better days, when the concessions, extorted under pressure of necessity, may be withdrawn. The opposing forces are, or used to be, spoken of as the Pope and the Revolution; in 1860 Newman preached a famous sermon under this name. The Heraclitean flux calls, not indeed for the Pope, but for a certain ideal balance. "We may compare Parmenides and Heraclitus to two lofty and precipitous peaks on either side of an Alpine pass. Each commands a wide prospect, interrupted only on the side of its opposite neighbour. And the fertilizing stream of European thought originates with neither of them singly, but has its source midway between."<sup>1</sup>

II. Some years before his death Father Tyrrell, on re-reading Newman's *Essay on the Development of Christian Doctrine*, wrote to a friend, "I came to the conclusion that it is a bad book." By bad he meant sophistical and misleading; which no doubt it is. But it is also uniquely suggestive. We may apply to the writer Harnack's criticism of Rudolf Sohm—that he has arrived *ex errore per veritatem ad errorem*. But, to be just, we must finish the sentence: "There are few books from which so much knowledge of early Church history may be gained." For this is true, as of Sohm's *Kirchenrecht*, so of Newman's ingenious and paradoxical work.<sup>2</sup>

I am not sure that Tyrrell would now have insisted so strongly on the misleading tendencies of the *Essay on Development*. It is misleading; but it has to a great extent ceased to mislead. A certain number of people still become Catholics, hyphenated or un-hyphenated.

<sup>1</sup> The Greek Philosophers, A. W. Benn, p. 25.

<sup>2</sup> Dogmengeschichte, A. Harnack, I, 39.

They do so for many reasons—political, temperamental æsthetic; one only excepted—belief in Catholic doctrine; so that the Cardinal's theological argument does not touch them directly, while its drift, its affinities, and its large suggestiveness, are calculated to lead them by other paths to another goal.

At the time of its publication (1845) the book was a storm-centre. At Rome indeed it was known by hearsay only; since, as Newman's biographer informs us, "no theologian in the city read English with any fluency."<sup>3</sup> But the American bishops denounced it as "half Catholicism, half infidelity." Mr. Gladstone wrote to Manning, then an Anglican, that "it placed Christianity on the edge of a precipice, from which a bold and strong hand would throw it over";<sup>4</sup> while Bishop Thirlwall, with characteristic acumen, pointed out the underlying *petitio principii*—the assumption of the infallibility of the Roman Church; and insisted both on the fallacy of the reasoning—the features of Romanism on which it laid stress being developments indeed, but illegitimate developments or corruptions—and on the dangers to which this reasoning opened the way. There is no abuse or social evil which might not, he says, be defended on the ground that it had arisen gradually out of earlier conditions to which little or no exception could be taken; and of the *Essay* as a whole, "The singular combination of the extremes of scepticism and credulity which it exhibits to a degree almost without precedent will not recommend it to those who value either freedom of thought or earnestness of faith."<sup>5</sup>

Newman did not invent the theory of Development. But he formulated it with the skill of a great dialectician and the art of a great man of letters; he gave it currency,

<sup>3</sup> Life of John Henry Cardinal Newman, W. Ward, I, 159.

<sup>4</sup> Life of Cardinal Manning, E. S. Purcell, I, 315.

<sup>5</sup> Charge of the Bishop of St. Davids, 1848.

and the prestige of his name. The Essay disposed once for all of the *Semper Eadem* conception of Christianity then common to Catholics and Protestants. "You are not primitive," was the charge brought against Rome by Anglican and Puritan alike. Newman was too well informed and too astute to deny it. He met it by an effective *tu quoque*: "Neither are you." But, however effective as an answer to the appeal from Trent to Nicæa and Ephesus, the argument fell flat when the appeal was carried back from all three—from Pope and Church and Council—to Christ, while it led by a fatal sequence of ideas to that larger conception of Development as a law of life, for which religion at any given point is a stage in a process and provisional: "Behold, the feet of them which have buried thy husband are at the door, and shall carry thee out." It is impossible to suppose that so acute a mind as Newman's was blind to these applications of his theory; or to the results to which, when thus applied, it led. But it was no business of his to indicate them. He used it for a particular purpose; and with a certain recklessness—for indeed it was like striking a match in a powder magazine—he did not look beyond this end.

III. The Reformation strengthened the controversial element in religion at the expense of the scientific. The Protestant was in need of a breakwater against the flood of superstition which had overrun the Church; and in the Bible, the inspired record of an earlier stage of revelation, with which mediæval religion was irreconcilable, he found one. The Catholic was in search of a short and easy method of silencing the innovators who threatened the destruction of Christianity as he understood it; the Vincentian maxim, *quod semper, quod ubique, quod ab omnibus*, lay ready to his hand. History was fatal to each disputant; a world in movement refused to be measured by fixed standards. It was not true that

"the Bible, and the Bible only, was the religion of Protestants"; it was not true that the Catholicism of Trent was identical with that of Nicæa, or that either was identical with the Christianity of the first age. Newman started with an admission of this divergence; he replaced the authorized and accustomed, "You change; therefore you are in error," by the revised, "Here below to live is to change, and to be perfect is to have changed often."<sup>6</sup> This, though he was not a Modernist, made him the father of Modernism, and explains the condemnation of his distinctive positions, though their source is not named, in the *Syllabus of Pius X.*

It is not surprising that not a few Protestants should be disposed, on the face of it, to go with the Pope—who has more disciples than we might suppose outside his own communion. For the Papacy represents, amongst other things, that fixed determination not to think, which is characteristic of the intellectually unregenerate in—and outside—all the Churches, and which cuts them off so effectually from the things of mind and the movement of spirit. It is not that they do not know, or even that they do not want to know. Either might be pardoned. But they go further; they want, and are resolved, not to know. The difficulty presented by the Development theory is one to which the answer is, *Solvitur ambulando*. For Christianity *has* developed. It is only by a large admission of this development that the institutions and beliefs of any modern Church can be defended; the starting-point of the apologist is that "from the beginning it was not so." The process is unceasing; it grows while men sleep. But there are times when it is catastrophic. In the second century, in the sixteenth, and again in the eighteenth, Christianity was reconstructed almost out of recognition. *Nec tamen consumebatur*; the bush burned with fire, but was not consumed.

<sup>6</sup> *Development*, p. 10.

IV. The first of these reconstructions presents itself to us today under the form of eschatology, and in an ethical as much as, perhaps even more than, in a theological shape. It was a saying of Father Tyrrell's that Christian ethics needed criticism as urgently as Christian dogma; and the situation has developed quickly. We are faced by the ethical problem which he foresaw. The criticism of institutions and beliefs has been settled, and settled in one sense. I do not mean that this sense has been universally accepted. It has not. But, with those who count, the question has passed out of the province of discussion. Its general acceptance is a matter of time—shorter or longer; perhaps longer; but the decision will not be revised. The criticism of ethics is still in the making. It has to be thought out and to justify itself, to find its proper methods and form.

V. One thing, however, the eschatologists have taught us: that it is hopeless to attempt to understand primitive Christianity till we have ceased to look at it from the standpoint of the Christianity of our own day. If we think we find the tenets or practices of any modern Church, our own included, among the first Christians, we deceive ourselves: they belong to earlier strata, which, with their fauna and flora, have long since disappeared. Primitive Christianity had three main features: (1) Enthusiasm, (2) the belief in the Parousia, (3) the opposition between Palestinian and Pauline religion—"my Gospel," as St. Paul calls it, and that of "them that were of repute."

(1) Enthusiasm has, for good or for evil, become foreign to us. The Church of Rome exploits it; the Church of England patronizes it; the Free Churches coquet with it—at a safe distance. But any such attitude is an absolute disqualification for the understanding of early Christianity, for the early Christians were enthusiasts to a man. They spoke with tongues; they worked and

experienced wonders; they prophesied; they saw visions and dreamed dreams. "No one," says Jowett, perhaps not without a touch of irony, "No one can read the ninth chapter of the First or the eleventh and twelfth chapters of the Second Epistle to the Corinthians, without feeling how different the Apostle St. Paul must have been from good men among ourselves."<sup>7</sup>

(2) The belief in the literal and immediate Coming of Christ is the key to the Church of the First Age. It accounts for its distinctive features, and explains the absence of much that, looking back from later standpoints, we expect to find in it but do not find. Conceive a community animated by it; what a revolution in feeling, thought, and conduct, would follow! For us life as a whole rests on the assumption that our environment is, relatively at least, permanent; that today will be succeeded by tomorrow, tomorrow by the day after, and so on indefinitely. The removal of this assumption could not but withdraw men from the ordinary duties of life. The ethical outlook would be revolutionized—not always in the interest of ethics. Renan's *Abbesse de Jouarre* shows that the shadow of the impending end does not necessarily act either as a sedative to passion or as a deterrent from its indulgence; it makes one man a fanatic, another a debauchee. But in either case those who live in it live for the moment. The Christians of the first days did so. They withdrew from public life—*infructuosi in negotio*, was the reproach directed against them; they made no provision for the future. The late organization of the Church, the fluidity of her standards, teaching, and observance for more than a century, the gap between the literature of the Apostolic and that of the post-Apostolic age—these things which are so unaccountable and so perplexing to us are the natural consequence of the attitude of intense expectation in which they lived.

<sup>7</sup> St. Paul's Epistles, I, 174.

The questions discussed among us today—the nature of the Church, the origin of the sacraments and the ministry, the manner in which Christ entered into and left this world—would have had no meaning for them. Those of them even who had known Christ after the flesh knew Him so no longer. What great importance was to be attached even to the most sacred events of this world, if it was so soon to be lost in another? Why make provision for the Church of the future—her government, her worship, her theology—when the Church of the present was—today it might be—to greet her returning Lord?

(3) With regard to Palestinian and Pauline Christianity, we are coming to see that the reaction against Tübingen has been carried very much too far. "Baur's outline of the process through which the nascent faith attained to full self-consciousness as a world-religion required correction rather than disproof," says Professor Bacon; while "for the clearer definition both of the task and the methods of criticism reached by the concentration of attention upon the contrast between the Petrine and the Pauline conception of 'the Gospel,' we owe a lasting debt to the Tübingen school."<sup>8</sup> It is a safe maxim never to take a reaction without a large, a very large, discount; reactions invariably overshoot the mark. Had Palestinianism prevailed, Christianity would have degenerated into a sect under "a caliphate in the family of Jesus," overweighted with Jewish particularism and crushed under the burden of the Law.

VI. Such was primitive Christianity. It was short-lived; before the middle of the second century it had disappeared. And it had disappeared so completely that we cannot now even imagine it—a charismatic religion, for which a tribal theology is an open question and the end of all things imminent. The picture of the Day of

<sup>8</sup>The Making of the New Testament, pp. 41-43.

the Lord in 1 Thessalonians 4:14-17 is prophecy, and literal, not symbolic. We do not think, we have ceased even to dream, in this way. Nor is this the paradox that Newman in a famous passage—"Strange antitype indeed to the early fortunes of Israel!"—conceives it.<sup>9</sup> For the most important events came about silently, unbidden, and unforbidden, in virtue of the natural process of change incident to human life and intercourse. When the brotherhood became a World-Church, an action and reaction set in which transformed it; the change without followed upon and reflected the change within. The wonder would have been had it *not* been so. Reconstruction was a condition of continuance; primitive Christianity perished, says Harnack, that Christianity might survive.

But the reconstruction was radical. Christianity ceased to be what it had been; and became what it had not been. Few even today realize the extent to which this was so. Formerly fewer still were in a position to do so. The Reformers of the sixteenth century appealed against the mediæval Church to the Fathers. The tribunal was vague and uncertain. On points of detail the appeal was often—though by no means invariably—successful; full-fledged mediævalism was a development, and one of slow growth. But these early authors spoke in various and inconsistent accents. The unanimous *consensus patrum*, whether invoked by Bellarmine or Bull, was non-existent; the writings appealed to were "a great and wide sea, wherein are things creeping innumerable, both small and great beasts." They served, no doubt, often enough to embarrass a Catholic controversialist; he was caught in the net that he laid. But it is foolish to try to establish a Scriptural, reasonable, and reformed Christianity upon them; to accept the first eight, or six, or four Councils is to find oneself deep in the mire. For by the end of the second century the

<sup>9</sup> *Historical Sketches*, I, 418.

premises of mediævalism had established themselves in Christendom, and it is a mistake to think that the earlier stages of the system were the least mischievous. A writer whose knowledge of the patristic period is exceptional argues that “if particular points be had in view, it may be affirmed that Popery is a practicable form and a corrected expression of the Christianity of the Nicene age.”<sup>10</sup>

VII. For one function of the Papacy in history—it is not, of course, its only function—has been that of restraining. In this, as in so many other respects, it has shown itself “the ghost of the deceased Roman Empire”; “He who now letteth will let until he be taken out of the way.” Rome has never been, and is not now, a school either of piety or of learning. It has been indifferent to both. Seldom has it looked away from what has been at once its aim and its achievement—the building up of the universal Papal monarchy. It has used theology and religion as means, and secondary means, to this end. When the Popes have persecuted, it has been in the interests not of orthodoxy but of their own absolutism; when they have encouraged fanaticism, it has not been with the desire, however misdirected, of promoting religion, but because they could not afford to alienate the support of the vulgar, who insisted upon being, and were, deceived. They have never wanted saints to put in the foreground—a Francis of Assisi, a Xavier, a Curé d’Ars. But the men behind the scenes, who pulled the wires on which these parade-figures danced, were not saints but astute and unscrupulous politicians, bent on securing secular ends by any and every means. Popular superstition runs ahead of authority and of dogma. The attitude of Rome, even under Pius IX, to the famous shrine of Lourdes was characteristic. It was that rather of Pilate than of Caiaphas; it opposed the novel

<sup>10</sup> Ancient Christianity, 1840, I, 63.

and equivocal devotion, though it did not oppose it very resolutely or for very long. And the growth of miracle among the Catholic populations of the South is so prolific that ecclesiastical authority finds itself compelled to prune it rigorously; for one case in which it escapes suppression in nine it is successfully suppressed. It was in this sense that the earlier Popes acted. Their action followed up, embodied, and legalized certain opinions and practices which were already prevalent in an undefined form. But it rarely pushed on in advance of popular feeling and usage; on the contrary it followed in the wake of ancient superstitions, and expressed the inherited prejudices of the community in enactments which were often of a corrective and qualifying kind.

VIII. The Nicene age saw the rise of the hierarchy, of sacramentalism, of asceticism, of saint-worship, of miracle-mongering. Such were the results of the diffusion of Christianity, of the various cultural levels of its adherents, of contact with secular civilization; the gold became dim. For the cosmopolitan culture of the time was in a state of decadence, not to say decomposition. A turbid flood of Oriental mysticism had overrun the exhausted soil of Græco-Roman philosophy; thaumaturgy did duty for science, theosophy for speculation, asceticism for ethics. At its best the patristic period was a Silver Age; at its worst it was one of very base metal. The interminable Trinitarian and Christological controversies of the fourth century, when we have read into them all that we can—and much that we cannot—leave an impression of aridity; and the later Scholasticism, “lies between us at our present station in the world and the immediate diffusion of the truth from heaven as ‘the morning spread upon the mountains’—an atmosphere of mist through which the early beams of Divine Light have been diffused.”<sup>11</sup> Not without many a

<sup>11</sup> Bishop Hampden, *Bampton Lectures*, 1832, p. 8.

strange refraction. The light was not broken only, but distorted; outlines were blurred, proportion was destroyed, perspective lost.

No later construction of Christianity can compare either in extent or in significance with that which took place when the New Testament community developed into the Church of the Fathers; nor can any that is conceivable in the future take so radical a shape. The word "pathological" should be avoided; the change was brought about by the circumstances and requirements of the time. This was at once its sufficient reason, and—for though it was not the best, it was probably the best possible, given the situation—its justification. And if so fundamental and momentous a change could take place in the morning of Christianity, when it stood fresh from its Founder's hand, is it possible to limit the reconstructions of later days on the ground that they are reconstructions? The question is not, Are they reconstructions? but, Are they reconstructions imposed upon us by the necessities and in the interests of the community? by veracity? by charity? by prudence? For "against such there is no law." The authority for this position goes back to the first and greatest of Christian mystics—the author of the Fourth Gospel, the 14th, 15th and 16th chapters of which are conclusive. No religious founder ever left so much to be done by his followers as Christ. Psychology confirms it; "ideas do not enter the world of reality unharmed." History demonstrates it; Christianity has changed, is changing, and will continue to change. It is, says Rothe, *das Allveränderlichste; das ist sein besonderer Ruhm.*

IX. The Reformation swept away much that for its generation was of the very heart of Christendom—the extension of the Incarnation in the Mass; the forgiveness of sins in sacramental confession; the eternal feminine presented by the cultus of the Blessed Virgin. "O

God, the heathen are come into thine inheritance!" was the cry of piety. To this day simple Catholics find it difficult to regard Protestantism as Christianity at all. Yet the change from mediaeval to Reformation Christianity was as inevitable as, and less difficult to justify than, that from primitive to Nicene. The new wine burst the old bottles. The clergy were no longer either better or wiser than the laity. The invention of printing had brought the Bible to the people, and the contrast between biblical and ecclesiastical religion was palpable; the Renaissance had brought to light the forgotten values of the classical world. Times of stress and strain, take what shape they will, are unfavorable to piety, which is a tender plant and loves the shade. But they are not to be envied who can read the Acts of the Reformation martyrs—Bradford, Taylor, Cranmer—unmoved; or who do not instinctively class a George Herbert, a John Bunyan, and a Samuel Rutherford with the worthies of Catholic Christendom. The saints, wherever found, have one language, which men of goodwill, being "taught of God," recognize; "We do hear them speak in our tongues the wonderful works of God." I remember hearing the late excellent Father Maturin speak with characteristic candor and generosity of the intellectual and religious possibilities of a position with which his personal convictions forbade him to associate himself—that of Liberal and Evangelical Protestantism. When a man's eye is single, his sight is clear.

X. The Illumination carried things a stage further. The movement is so closely associated with that of the French Encyclopædist—*their* intolerance of convention; *their* hatred of tyranny, civil and religious; *their* philosophic ardor; *their* corrosive wit—that the extent to which it influenced the Churches is forgotten. But it was great. The age was one of Reason. Nature, Man, God—all were reasonable; in religion, as in speculation,

the appeal was to the light within. For this light was of divine kindling; "The spirit of man is the candle of the Lord." Reason therefore "is the Divine Governor of the universe," said Whichcote; "to go against reason is to go against God."

In 1785 Paley dedicated his *Principles of Moral and Political Philosophy* to the then Bishop of Carlisle:

"Your Lordship's researches [he says] have never lost sight of one purpose; namely, to recover the simplicity of the Gospel from beneath that load of unauthorized additions, which the ignorance of some ages and the learning of others, the superstition of weak and the craft of designing men, have (unhappily for its interest) heaped upon it. And this purpose, I am convinced, was dictated by the purest motive; by a firm and, I think, a just opinion, that whatever renders religion more rational, renders it more credible; that he who, by a diligent and faithful examination of the original records, dismisses from the system one article which contradicts the apprehension, the experience, or the reasoning of mankind, does more towards recommending the belief, and with the belief the influence of Christianity, to the understandings and consciences of serious enquirers, and through them to universal reception and authority, than can be effected by a thousand contenders for creeds and ordinances of human establishment.

When the doctrine of Transubstantiation [he continues] had taken possession of the Christian world, it was not without the industry of learned men that it came at length to be discovered that no such doctrine was contained in the New Testament. But had those excellent persons done nothing more by their discovery than abolished an innocent superstition or changed some directions in the ceremonial of public worship, they had merited little of that veneration with which the gratitude of the Protestant Churches remembers their services. What they did for mankind was this: they exonerated Christianity of a weight which sunk it. If indolence or timidity had checked these exertions, or suppressed the fruit and publication of these enquiries, is it too much to affirm that infidelity would at this day have been universal? At a time when some men appear not to perceive any good, and others to suspect an evil tendency, in that spirit of examination and research which is gone forth in Christian countries, this testimony is become due."

Thus Paley. Today another spirit animates English Churchmen. I can think of only one living bishop who could be addressed, without irony, in such words. It is to be regretted, it is greatly to be regretted, that this is so. Vision and tradition vary in inverse proportion. And, "where there is no vision, the people perish"; the blind lead the blind. No gifts, however excellent, of another order can avert the inevitable results of such leadership.

"La plus sage des politiques, la plus généreuse sollicitude pour les classes populaires n'assurerait pas chez nous l'avenir du catholicisme, si le catholicisme, qui, étant une religion, est d'abord une foi, se présentait sous les apparences d'une doctrine et d'une discipline opposées au libre essor de l'esprit humain, déjà minées par la science, isolées et isolantes au milieu du monde qui veut vivre, s'instruire et progresser en tout."<sup>12</sup>

XI. In our own time the question of Development has again become one of the first importance. For "we see not our tokens." The old stars are set; the new are not yet risen. We are

"Wandering between two worlds—one dead,  
The other powerless to be born."

Neither the Bible nor the Church present themselves to us in the traditional perspective. And the historical sanctities of Christendom are faded; the outlines of its sacred figures are confused. More important still, the point of view has shifted. Not more surely did Copernicus give a new orientation to science, or Kant to speculation, than criticism does to religious knowledge. As long ago as 1857 Archbishop Temple wrote, "Our theology has been cast in a scholastic mould, i.e. based on logic. We are in need of and we are gradually being forced into a theology based on psychology. The transi-

<sup>12</sup> Autour d'un petit livre, A. Loisy, p. xxxv.

tion, I fear, will not be without pain; but nothing can prevent it. To make the study of divinity real and not in some degree unsettling, seems to me simply impossible.”<sup>13</sup> The last two generations present us with a commentary on these prophetic words. People do not now ask, “Is Christ of one substance with the Father?” or, “Is it part of the notion of Christ that He is so?”; but “How did men come to believe that He was of one substance with the Father?”; “How did they come to think in this way?”; though it must be remembered that the logical, or metaphysical, element in thought is not got rid of by being seen in a changed perspective. *Expellas furca; tamen usque recurret.* For mind is part of the universe, akin to, and ultimately in accord with, the system of things.

The “original or birth-sin” of theology is that, instead of constructing its conceptions out of its facts, it constructs its facts in accordance with its conceptions; by a *tour de force*, and with unhappy results. For it becomes the victim of a perverse and misapplied logic; and false to its nature, it becomes a principle of exclusion, not a law of love. It anathematizes the Western because he admits, and the Eastern because he rejects, the *Filioque*. It unchurches the Quaker, because he is unbaptized; the Anglican, because he is separated from the Papacy; the Presbyterian, because he is not episcopally ordained. It insists on a theory of inspiration of which Scripture knows nothing; on an ecclesiasticism with which it is inconsistent; on a Christology abstract, arbitrary, and imported from without into the text. For there are three distinct Christologies in the New Testament: that of the Synoptics, in which a still earlier stage is indicated; that of St. Paul; and that of St. John; while the formulated dogma of the Councils is the product of

<sup>13</sup> Memoirs of Archbishop Temple, II, 517.

reflection on testimony and data which could be, and history shows were, interpreted in more than one sense. To think in this way is to be exposed to grave confusion. It is dangerous, e.g., to argue that because Christ was God, He *must* have done this or *could not* have done that. This is to lay a trap for consciences; we do not know. For "no man hath seen God at any time"; we have "neither heard His voice, nor seen His form." The path of experience is safer. Christ did, taught, suffered as it is written; *therefore* His being God is not inconsistent with these things. The mysterious events which took place concerning Him before the Gospel history, properly so called, opened and after it closed, have recently become matter of discussion. It was inevitable, the state of knowledge being what it is, that this should be so, and complaints are useless. But the ground is holy. Fra Angelico painted the Son and the Mother on his knees. "Il serait bien," says Renan, "que la critique fit de même, et ne bravât les rayons de certaines figures, devant lesquelles se sont inclinés les siècles, qu'après les avoir adorées."<sup>14</sup> But one thing we must neither think nor say; it is this—that because Christ was God, it follows either that He was born, as other men are not born, out of the course of nature, or that the wonder of the First Easter took place as an event in place and time. It does not follow, and it is suicidal to say so; these questions must be argued on other grounds. What is essential in Christ is neither speculative subtlety nor historical detail, but the divine mediation. "There is one Mediator between God and man, Himself man, Christ Jesus; who gave Himself a ransom for all."<sup>15</sup>

XII. The Liberal Churchman is made at times to feel himself "an alien unto his mother's children"; "fat bulls of Bashan close him in on every side." He belongs, he is told, to "the Sterile Party"; he is "a literary clergy-

<sup>14</sup> *Les histoires critiques de Jésus*, 133.

<sup>15</sup> 1 Timothy 2 5.

man, with an interest in theology"—surely this is better than being an illiterate clergyman, with no interest in theology? he is "not constructive"—people who do not know what construction is are always insisting on this; or, "what he says is true, but he is not in a position to say it"; he is "out of place among the clergy, or in the Church." What a conception of religion such a view implies! One has heard of the French *catholiques athées*. Religion, says Crabbe, "often fears her friends." But when he looks round, he may take courage. In his lifetime Calvinism, that black shadow upon English religion, has disappeared. Who now, with St. Augustine, regards the virtues of the antique world as "splendid vices"? or supposes, with our thirteenth Article, that works done before justification "have the nature of sin"? A once popular religious writer described the lost as abandoned "to the inventive fury of an omnipotent and infuriated God." Who would not now put down such sentiments as insane and blasphemous? So eminent a man as Newman writes of the fierce tribesmen of Israel who extirpated Amalek root and branch, slaughtering in cold blood man and woman, infant and suckling, "Doubtless, as they slew those who suffered for the sins of their fathers, their thoughts turned first to the sin of Adam, and next to that unseen state where all inequalities are righted."<sup>16</sup> Today, in the humblest conventicle, such words would rouse deserved indignation and contempt. We resent the pious hubristics of the *Church Times*; not always perhaps without reason. It is not a very amiable or a very cultivated organ; in moments of irritation one is tempted to apply to it Dryden's criticism of Elkanah Settle, a minor dramatist of the Restoration: "His style is boisterous and his prose incorrigibly lewd." But the tyranny of the *Record* was, in its day, as oppressive and very much more powerful. And the

<sup>16</sup> Plain and Parochial Sermons, III, 187.

movement whose dregs the *Church Times* represents is a declining movement. The Dean of St. Paul's tells us that it "must soon begin to break up, owing to certain internal contradictions which the enthusiasm of its adherents has hitherto masked or ignored."<sup>17</sup> It has, however, rendered an important service to English religion, though this service does not consist in the revival of mediæval belief and ceremonial with which it is associated. Rather it will be found in the accentuation of the community-element in the assent of faith. We do not come to Christianity from without or as isolated and individual units; if we did, I do not know what our judgment on it would be. But we approach it as heirs of a Christian civilization, as citizens of a Christian nation, as members of a world-wide Christian community or Church. This sense of community is to us what the proof from miracles or prophecy was to a former generation. Protestantism tends to lose sight of it—to the injury of religion; Catholicism tends to emphasize it—to its gain.

XIII. A few years ago the Free Church of Scotland gave us a memorable lesson in the development inherent in and inseparable from a living Christian community. The real question at issue in the prolonged litigation which began in the Scottish Courts in 1900 and ended in the House of Lords in 1904 was, what constitutes a Church? To the contention of the minority, known as the "Wee Frees," that the identity of a Church consisted in the identity of its doctrine—they protested, consistently enough, against the Declaratory Act adopted in 1891 by the General Assembly—the representatives of what is now the United Free Church answered that this was not so; that a Church had power "to legislate upon, and so to change doctrine"; that it "might adopt a new Confession of Faith." The one limit was its own notion.

<sup>17</sup> *The Churchman*, February, 1912.

To change, it must be the Church; and it would cease to be so did it repudiate the two conditions necessary to its own conception—"the Headship of Christ, and His word as its only rule."<sup>18</sup> If this were not so, if the unity of the Church consisted in creed-content, not in persistence and permanence of direction, we should still be teaching the imminence of the Second Advent; the Millennium; the powerlessness of the Church to remit sin after baptism; the damnation of the unbaptized; verbal inspiration; the duty of persecution; a penal, arbitrary, and endless hell. Static religion is "seeming wise" and seeming pious; we must "launch out into the deep."

"But [says a great Scottish Churchman] this assertion of freedom is not of the kind that fosters arrogance; rather it is akin to reverence and godly fear. We have much to hold fast. We are conscious, by God's grace, of our possession of a great body of doctrine, which through the word and also through the providence of God in the history of the Churches, through the fidelity of martyrs and fathers, through the great return to Scripture of the Reformation, through many particular conflicts and revivals, became clear and dear to our fathers, and has become so also to us. We value the life and the traditions we inherit, though we refuse, and we need to refuse, to place them in the room of our living Head or of His word. We own some benignant purpose of God in the genealogy of Church life in which He has cast our lot, and in the peculiar influences which are derived to us from past history. We are not insensible to this; we are not tired of it; but it must not run into idolatry. We desire to draw from our history, for ourselves and those who come after us, all the good it has carried with it. We are not ashamed of our fathers. But they taught us that one is our Head, even Christ, and that this holds not only for the individual Christian, but for the Church, for that peculiar society which He created and has promised to sustain."<sup>19</sup>

These weighty words of Principal Rainy put the question on its proper level. It is a high one. The loyalty of the Christian is not to the traditions of men, but to the truth of Christ.

<sup>18</sup> Free Church of Scotland Appeals, p. 545. Edinburgh, 1904.

<sup>19</sup> Life of Principal Rainy, P. Carnegie Simpson, D.D., II, 438.

XIV. The conditions under which reconstruction, or doctrinal and ceremonial changes short of reconstruction, can properly be brought about vary in different Churches. In Scotland the Barrier Act of 1697, in this country the Royal Supremacy, acts as a check upon hasty and ill-considered change. More decisive, however, than the positive restraints imposed by the wisdom of the legislator, either on the zeal of the reformer or the stubborn *non possumus* of the obstructive, is the mysterious instinct which guides the life of mankind in accordance with an ever-widening purpose to a distant but an assured goal. The society of the future, economists tell us, will differ widely from that of the present. The same may be said, and with equal certainty, of its religion. The simultaneous movement of thought in all the Churches, and its substantial identity under a variety of surroundings, are as calculated to excite the attention of the observer as were the signs which announced the shattering of the imposing fabric of European society which took place more than a century ago. And we may apply to the former the words used by Burke of the latter — the wisest perhaps that he ever wrote of the great event in question:

“If a great change is to be made in human affairs, the minds of men will be fitted to it; the general opinions and feelings will draw that way. Every fear, every hope will forward it; and then they who persist in opposing this mighty current in human affairs will appear rather to resist the decrees of Providence itself than the mere designs of men. They will not be resolute and firm, but perverse and obstinate.”<sup>20</sup>

<sup>20</sup> *Thoughts on French Affairs.*

## ENGLISH OPINION OF LUTHER

PRESERVED SMITH

POUGHKEEPSIE, NEW YORK

## I. CONTEMPORARY

It is sometimes said that what matters in history is not so much the fact as what people think is the fact. This is perhaps especially true of those commanding personalities whose names are household words. Popular ideas of them are usually only roughly correct. The names become symbols to denote qualities dear to a succeeding age but often foreign to the persons they designate. To every generation Christ has become something different, this or that side of his character being emphasized to fill the ever changing need of living men. How many philosophies and passions have been read into Shakespeare's plays! So to every generation Luther has meant something different; in each succeeding century he has been both loved and hated, but for different reasons. No country save his own has given him such attention as England. It is the aim of the present paper to give a very broad idea of the general trend of British opinion throughout four hundred years.

Luther's appearance on the English horizon was as stormy as most of his career. The dawn of the Reformation "came up like thunder" across the North Sea. Within two years after the posting of the famous Theses we are told that Oxford and Cambridge had declared war on the Saxon. This was due to the infection of certain of their members with the new tenets. On March 8, 1521, William Warham, Archbishop of Canterbury,

wrote to Wolsey that it was a pity that "a small number of incircumspect fools should endanger the whole university with the charge of Lutheranism." In the same year, if not earlier, Luther's works were burnt at Cambridge, after having been examined by Drs. Humfry, Watson, Bullock, and Ridley. Erasmus heard that the said works would have been publicly burnt by the government in May, 1520, had not he (Erasmus) interceded for them. This ceremony actually took place in the presence of the king and all the court at St. Paul's Churchyard, Sunday, May 12, 1521, on which occasion John Fisher, Bishop of Rochester, delivered a sermon "reprobating the friar Martin and upholding the authority of the Pope." Two days later a mandate was issued by Wolsey forbidding the circulation of the heretic's works in England, an act repeated later at intervals. Cuthbert Tunstall, afterwards Bishop of London, while Ambassador at the Diet of Worms, wrote a very hostile estimate of Luther and his works, which he prayed God to keep out of England.

Before any of his subjects, Henry VIII publicly entered the lists against the heretic. His *Assertion of the Seven Sacraments*, published in 1521 as a refutation of *The Babylonian Captivity of the Church*, was declared by Pope Leo X the best medicine against the new errors that he had ever read, and it won for its author the title of Defender of the Faith. The argument does not concern us now. The writer's estimate of Luther is thus forcibly expressed:

"What pest so pernicious has ever attacked the flock of Christ? What serpent so poisonous has ever come forth? . . . What a wolf of hell is he, seeking to scatter Christ's flock! What a limb of Satan! How rotten is his mind! how execrable his purpose!"

Five years later Henry published another *Letter against Martin Luther*, in which he said to his subjects:

"For we doute not that it is well knownen to you all, that Martyn Luther, late a frere Augustyne, & now ron out i Apostacy & wedded, hath not only scraped out of the asshen and kyndeled agayne all the embres of those old errours & heresies hytherto; but hath also added some so poysoned pointes of his owne, so wretched, so vyle, so detestable, provokyng men to myschefe, encoragynge the worlde to syn, preaching an unsaciate lyberte, to allechte them withall."

Most of those under the influence of the court followed the example of their sovereign in execrating the German. On St. Martin's Eve, November 10, 1527, the boys of St. Paul's school, under their master, Rightwise, gave a play at court glorifying Wolsey and representing "the heretic Luther like a party friar in russet damask and black taffety, and his wife like a frow of Almayne in red silk."<sup>1</sup>

The greatest Englishman of his day, Sir Thomas More, also took a strong stand against Luther. According to the king it was More who "by subtle, sinister slights most unnaturally procured and provoked him to set forth a book of the assertion of the seven sacraments." More was sincerely repelled by most of Luther's doctrines, first of all by the *sola fide*.<sup>2</sup> Determinism was also repulsive to him, and he blamed the Wittenberg professor for saying, "God doth damn so huge a number of people to intolerable and interminable torments only for his own pleasure, and for his own deeds wrought in them only by himself."<sup>3</sup> He also criticized the freedom of the German theologian's treatment of the Bible, saying, "Luther goeth so farforth that no scripture can be evident to prove anything that he list to deny. . . . And sometime if it be too plain against him, then will he call it no scripture, as he playeth with the pistle of

<sup>1</sup> C. W. Wallace, *Evolution of the English Drama to Shakespeare*, 1912, pp. 66-68. The conjecture of Brandl (*Quellen des weltlichen Dramas vor Shakespeare*, 1898, p. lvi) that the source of this play was Hasenburg's *Ludus ludentem Luderum ludens*, is very doubtful.

<sup>2</sup> More's *Workes*, 1557, p. 418 h.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.* 273 c.

St. James.”<sup>4</sup> Had More confined himself to these reasonable strictures he might have done a permanent service to the cause he had at heart. Unfortunately he fell into the foul-mouthed invective common at the time. “Luther is an apostate,” he wrote, “an open incestuous lecher, a plain limb of the devil, and a manifest messenger of hell.”<sup>5</sup> He mocked at “Friar Luther and Cate Callate his nun lusking together in lechery.”<sup>6</sup> He objected to the German’s scurrility in the following passage,<sup>7</sup> in the translation of which I have been obliged to expurgate some words absolutely unprintable:

“Luther and counsellors disperse themselves throughout all the wagons, vehicles, and boats, the baths, eating-houses and barbershops, the taverns, brothels, bakeshops, privies, and houses of ill fame; in these places they diligently observe and write down on tablets whatever the wagon driver has said basely, or the slave servilely, or the drunkard wickedly, or the parasite scurrilously, or the harlot petulantly, or the bawd vilely, or the bathman obscenely. . . . When they have done this for several months they stuff the whole nasty mixture of reviling, scolding, scurrility, jeers, petulance, filth, dirt, mud, mire, and dung into the fetid sewer of Luther’s breast.”

At other times he called Luther an ass, a liar, an evil angel of Satan, a cursed beast, and a drunkard. No wonder that even his friend Erasmus thought that More had written more bitterly than Luther himself. Not content with words, More had his own servants “striped like children,” when he found them inclining to the new doctrines.

A similar tone was taken by John Langland, Bishop of Lincoln, who in a sermon preached at Westminster, November 27, 1527, thus apostrophized the Saxon: “O Luther, Luther, worst of liars and lost deceiver of men,

<sup>4</sup> More’s Workes, 1557, 161 c.

<sup>5</sup> Ibid. 274 h.

<sup>6</sup> Ibid. 423 h.

<sup>7</sup> Mori Opera, 1689, p. 38.

minister equally unfaithful to God and to the Christian world, I know thy heresy!"

The Scotch poet David Lyndsay wrote in 1540:

"As I pray to the Rude  
That Martin Luther, that fals loun,  
Black Bullinger and Melancthoun,  
Had bene smorde in their cude."

As Luther heard chiefly of the hostility to his "gospel" in Britain, it is not surprising that his opinion of the islanders was mostly unfavorable. "There are no wolves in England," he once said, "because the English are themselves wolves." Henry VIII he judged as "a damnable and rotten worm who with malice aforethought has blasphemed my King in heaven," and as "a devil incarnate." Wolsey he held to be "the pest of the kingdom." Lee, Wolsey's successor as Archbishop of York, he classed among "the snivelling, drivelling sophists bred by the Thomist swine." More he thought "a most cruel enemy of the gospel" and he rejoiced at his execution and at that of Fisher.

But it must not be imagined that Luther did not have strong partisans in England from the very first. Early in 1519 Froben exported many of Luther's writings to Britain. On May 30 of that year Erasmus wrote Luther, "In England there are men who think well of your writings, and they the very greatest." Precisely what persons Erasmus had in mind is uncertain, but quite probably he referred to John Colet, who early in 1518 had sent him the Ninety-five Theses. In 1520 we know that there were already Lutherans in London, and they continued to be a growing party until the ultimate triumph of Protestantism under Elizabeth. At an early date some students of Cambridge, among them Bilney, Arthur Ridley, Latimer, and Coverdale met at the White Horse Inn to form a Lutheran organization. They were

mocked at as "Germans" and their meeting place called "Germany." Several prominent Englishmen were among Luther's personal friends, among them Robert Barnes, an Augustinian and Oxford doctor of divinity, Edward Fox, Bishop of Hereford, Nicholas Heath, Archdeacon of Stratford, and Lord Paget. On some of the English Reformers Luther exercised a decisive influence, notably on Cranmer. Tyndale was apparently more of a Zwinglian, at least in his eucharistic doctrine. He got much help from Luther's German Bible, though he denied that in making his translation he had been "confederate with Luther," as More and others asserted. There is no evidence to show that he ever saw Luther.

Coverdale was even more dependent on the German Bible than was Tyndale, so that when the first complete edition came out in 1535 the title-page proclaimed that it was translated out of "the Douche and Latin." Coverdale explained this in his preface by saying that he had been helped by "the Douche interpreters: whom (because of theyr syngular gyftes and speciall diligence in the Bible) I haue ben the more glad to folowe for the most part." Coverdale also translated other works of Luther into English, among them some of his hymns, including *Ein' feste Burg*. Besides these there were seven of Luther's works turned into English before his death, five of which were popular enough to be printed more than once. In addition to this John Bale put into his own tongue, *The true Historie of the Christen Departyng of the Reverend Man D. Martyn Luther, collected by J. J[onas], M. C[elius] and J. A[urifaber] which were present thereat*. A manuscript copy of this in the British Museum is dated 1545, an apparent anachronism due to the old habit of beginning the year on March 25. Luther died February 18, 1546, and the version must therefore have been made at once. It was printed as soon as made.

## II. THE AGE OF SHAKESPEARE

Save for the short reign of Mary, England became a Protestant nation after the death, within a year, of Luther and Henry VIII. From the same time, however, the influence of Calvin appears, and gradually overshadowed that of the German Reformer, until the triumph of the Puritans. In the reign of Edward VI there were three new translations of Luther's works into English, in the reign of Mary one, seventeen under Elizabeth, not counting five reprints, and one in the reign of James I. In 1550 or 1551 we learn from a letter of Hales to Gualter that the likenesses of Luther, Bucer, Melanchthon, and Oecolampadius were to be found everywhere in London. The chief stumbling-block to the Protestants was the lack of unity among their leaders, especially the unfortunate schism on the doctrine of the real Presence. Thus John Hooper wrote to Bucer in 1548:

"I entreat you, my master, not to say or write anything against charity or godliness for the sake of Luther, or to burden the consciences of men with his words on the holy supper. Although I readily acknowledge with thankfulness the gifts of God in him who is now no more, yet he was not without his faults. . . . After the dispute with Zwingli and Oecolampadius respecting the supper had begun to grow warm he did violence to many passages of Scripture that he might establish the corporeal presence of Christ in the bread. . . . Everyone is aware with what calumnies and reproaches he attacked even the dead."

Another great scandal to the English Protestant divines was Luther's doctrine that polygamy and concubinage were at times permissible. More had blamed the statement in the *Babylonian Captivity* that bigamy was preferable to divorce,<sup>8</sup> and a similar expression was fastened

<sup>8</sup> *Opera*, 1689, p. 145.

on by Dr. Thomas Martin. In 1556 the Lutheran Ponet<sup>9</sup>

"vindicated Martin Luther against a common falsehood raised up of him, which Dr. Thomas Martin thrust into his book; namely that Luther had writ in his book *De Captivitate Babylonica*, *Si uxor non possit aut non vult, ancilla venito*; that is, If the wife cannot or will not, let the maid come. Whereupon our author (Ponet) accosts Martin: 'Speak again, Martin, where saith Luther these words? Thou sayest in his book *De Captivitate Babylonica*. The selfsame lie maketh Pighius. . . . I assure thee, good reader, it is a foul lie.'"

The words attributed to Luther actually occur in his *Sermon on Marriage*, of 1522.<sup>10</sup>

In 1559 Dr. Feckeham, abbot of Westminster, made an oration in Parliament, "with very unworthy, and unbecoming reflections upon the foreign Protestants of greatest eminence, as Luther, Melanchthon, Zwingli, and Martyr, for their different sentiments about the sacrament."

A third great stone of offence to Luther's reputation was his doctrine of the bondage of the will. An early radical, Cole of Faversham, declared that the doctrine of predestination was meeter for devils than for Christian men. In 1562 Grindal, Bishop of London, thus expatiates upon it:

"It is astonishing to see that they are raising such commotion about predestination. They should at least consult their own Luther 'on the bondage of the will.' For what else do Bucer, Calvin, and Martyr teach that Luther has not maintained in that treatise? Unless perhaps they wish to take refuge in some recantation of Luther, whom they all regard as a god. Luther has indeed deserved exceeding well of the church, and is worthy of being celebrated by all posterity. But he would have been more eminent in my eyes, if these Canaans were not always discovering the nakedness of their father, which all godly persons desire to be concealed."

<sup>9</sup> Strype's *Memorials*, 1822, vol. iii, part i, p. 531.

<sup>10</sup> *Werke*, Weimar, vol. x, part ii, p. 290.

In 1568 Cheny, Bishop of Gloucester, said:

"Luther wrote a very ill book against *free-will*; wherein he did very much hurt. But Erasmus answered him learnedly. I am not of Luther's opinion therein, but of Erasmus' mind."

Some controversy on the subject was excited by a work of the Catholic Osorius (1563) who "reproved our later reformers, beginning with Luther, whose ghost he tore with evil speeches, reproaching him for a bold, for a popular, nay for a mad-man." Osorius asserted that Luther "wickedly taught extreme desperation, and a bold and presumptuous confidence in salvation." John Foxe, the martyrologist, branded these statements as "two notorious lies." Haddon replied to Osorius:

"That man of God whom you thus miscal, rendered a sound and sober account of his faith in an august assembly before the Emperor Charles; that mad-man stood safe against the wisest patrons of your Church thirty years, however they raged against him."

A very high opinion of Luther was expressed by another Elizabethan divine, Bishop John Aylmer, who said that Luther was able

"to set up the cross of Christ, to pull down the chair of Antichrist, to restore God's Word, to banish the Devil's sophistry, to make of darkness light, of lies truth, of plain foolishness true wisdom, and, as it were another Helena, to find out the cross of Christ hidden in the dunghill of devilish doctrine, covered with the rotten bones of Romish martyrs, sinful saints, and counterfeit confessors."

Further evidence of the trend of public opinion is given now and then indirectly. Just as Knox praises Geneva as the most perfect school of Christ since the Apostles, so Roger Ascham proclaims Protestant Germany as the abode of all the virtues. Then again the name of Martin Marprelate, assumed by the author of some famous tracts, was undoubtedly suggested by Luther's prenomen.

John Foxe in part iv of his *Acts and Monuments* (1563) has much on Luther, with lists of his works and some translations. He presents him as the man of God raised up to do a particular and necessary work in the church. For about three centuries this book held a high place in popular estimation and influenced the current ideas of the Reformation more than any other, but of late the author has been violently attacked for his strong bias and rather frequent inaccuracy. There is no doubt that he wrote rather for the edification of the pious than for the impartial presentation of the facts.

A high estimate of Luther is witnessed by some of the folk literature of the time. William Bullein in *A dialogue both pleasaunt and pietifull, wherein is a godlie regiment against the Fever Pestilence*, speaks of a painting by William Boswell, exhibited in Paternoster Row, showing the following pairs: "Christ and Satan, Sainct Peter and Simon Magus, Paule and Alexander the Coppersmith, Trace and Becket, Martin Luther and the Pope." The same antithesis is seen in a contemporary *Ballad of Luther, the Pope, a Cardinal, and a Husbandman*. In this there are reminiscences of *Ein' feste Burg*. Luther addresses the Pope thus:

"Thy false power wyl I bryng down,  
Thou shalt not reign many a yere,  
I shall dryve the from citye and towne,  
Even with this PEN that thou seyste here:  
Thou fyghtest with swerd, shylde, and speare,  
But I wyll fyght with Gods worde."

The references to Luther by the Elizabethan poets are few and far between. There is no mention of him by Spenser, though some scholars have seen veiled allusions to him in the First Book of the *Faerie Queene*.<sup>11</sup> It is thought that the Red Cross Knight represents Henry

<sup>11</sup> F. M. Padelford, *The Political and Ecclesiastical Allegory of the First Book of the Faerie Queene*. 1911.

VIII, Una the true Church of England, and the "deceiving image," which takes Una's form to mislead the knight, Lutheranism. But the whole theory is doubtful, most of all in the last identification.

Save for one phrase about "the spleeny Lutherans" in *Henry VIII* there is no reference by Shakespeare to either the German Reformer or his followers. As far as I can discover, contemporary dramatists showed an equal lack of interest in the subject. Thomas Nash in his *Unfortunate Traveller* (1594) describes an imaginary

"solempne disputation where Luther and Carolostadius scolded leuell coile. A masse of words I wot well they heapt up against the masse and the Pope, but farther particulars of their disputationes I remember not. I thought verily they would have worried one another with wordes, they were so earnest and vehement."

In the same class with the above may be mentioned Fynes Morrison's *Itinerary*<sup>12</sup> and John Taylor's *Travels in Germany* (both 1617). Both show interest in Luther. If Nash is not afraid to poke fun at the Reformer, a much bitterer satire on him appeared in 1609 under the title *Pruritanus [sic] . . . sive Apologia pro Puritanis & novatoribus universis*. The author gives his name as Horatius Dolabellus Neapolitanus, and the place of publication as Lutetiae Britannarum, both obviously invented.

Francis Bacon has left one guarded account of Luther in his *Advancement of Learning*, Book I:

"There are . . . three distempers of learning. . . . The first disease, which consists in luxuriancy of style, has been anciently esteemed at different times, but strangely prevailed about the time of Luther, who, finding how great a task he had undertaken against the degenerate traditions of the Church, and being unassisted by the opinions of his own age, was forced to awake antiquity to make a party for him; whence the ancient authors both in divinity and the humanities, that had long slept in libraries, began to be generally read."

<sup>12</sup> Morrison visited Wittenberg in 1591. He says he saw the house of "Dr. Faustus the famous conjurer" there. The same connection of Faust and Wittenberg is made in Marlowe's play.

## III. THE PURITANS

The Puritan feeling for Luther was rather a cool one, not professedly hostile but decidedly critical. There were two reasons for this. On the Continent the mutual hatred of the Calvinists and the Lutherans was almost as great as their common detestation of the Catholics. The point that divided the Protestant churches was the doctrine of the sacrament, Lutherans holding to the corporeal Presence more literally than did Calvinists. These disputes were also rife in England, though in a milder form. Then again the German had too little respect for the proprieties and austerities so dear to the Puritan heart. He had expressed approval of amusements like cards and dancing, anathema to the Independents.

During the whole of the seventeenth century there were only six new translations of Luther's works and ten reprints as against seventeen new translations and five reprints during the reign of Elizabeth. The history of one of these new versions, *Dr. Martin Luther's Colloquia Mensalia, or his last Divine Discourses at his Table, translated out of the High Dutch by Captain Henry Bell, 1652*, illustrates both of the points just mentioned. In the first place, in order to make his work acceptable to the English palate Bell thought it worth while to assert, contrary to all truth, that in these "last divine discourses" Luther had revoked the "error he once held touching the sacrament." Then when Bell petitioned the Commons for license to print, an assembly of divines was appointed to examine the work, and reported, May 3, 1647,<sup>13</sup> that although the book contained many good things, most of them extant in the Reformer's own works, yet it also abounded in passages contrary to modesty, gravity, and truth, making it unfit for public use.

<sup>13</sup> Historical Manuscripts Report, vi, 173.

A similar cool, critical position is taken by Sir Thomas Brown, who, in his *Religio Medici* (1642) says that he holds the faith of the Church of England, and that

“whatsoever is beyond, as points indifferent, I observe according to the rules of my private judgement or the humor and fashion of my devotion, neither following this because Luther affirmed it, nor disproving that because Calvin hath disavouched it.”

Though Oliver Cromwell has left no estimate of Luther, there were in his camp a small party of extremists who appealed to the authority of the German to justify their antinomian and anti-social tenets. Such was William Dell, a field-chaplain at Cromwell's headquarters, a preacher in a radical form of justification by faith only. Dell also abused Luther's authority to support an attack on human learning. In his *Tryal of Spirits* (1660) he printed under the title, *Testimony of Martin Luther touching Universities*, a part of the Reformer's *Answer to Ambrose Catharinus*. Dell prefaces it thus: “These now are Luther's own words, which I have made legible to English men. Wherein it is manifest that he condemns Universities in the very Institution and Constitution of them.” Of Dell's party was John Eaton, the author of *The honey-combe of free justification by Christ alone* (1642). In this essay it would seem that he both built upon the Wittenberg theologian and went beyond him.

John Milton confesses that he “had not examined through” Luther's works, and was certainly not deeply indebted to him. Coleridge states that Milton got the idea that Eve ate the apple at noon from the *Table Talk* translated by Bell. It is possible that the poet may have been thinking of the Reformer in his description of Noah in *Paradise Lost*:

“The only son of light  
In a dark age, against example good,  
Against allurement, custom, and a world  
Offended. Fearless of reproach and scorn  
Or violence.”

But this is merely a conjecture. That he thought well of Luther, as far as he thought of him at all, is seen in an obiter dictum in the *Apology for Smectymnuus*, where the poet is excusing the violence of his language. After appealing to the example of the Bible he goes on:

“Yet that ye may not think inspiration the only warrant thereof, but that it is as any other virtue, of moral and general observation, the example of Luther may stand for all . . . who writ so vehemently against the chief defenders of the old untruths in the Roman Church, that his own friends and favorers were offended with the fierceness of his spirit. . . . And herewithal how useful and available God made this tart rhetoric in the Church’s cause, he often found by his own experience.”

Of Luther’s *Commentary on Galatians*, one of the first of his works to be put into English and one of the most frequently reprinted, the following high estimate is given by John Bunyan:

“When I had but a little way perused, I found my condition in his experience so largely and profoundly handled as if his book had been written out of my own heart. . . . I do prefer this book of Martin Luther upon the Galatians (except the Holy Bible) before all the books that ever I have seen, as most fit for a wounded conscience.”

The other chief religious writers of the age have little or nothing to say of Luther. Neither in George Fox on the one hand nor in Chillingworth and Baxter on the other, have I found one word about him. Jeremy Taylor barely mentions him, in his *Power falsely pretended to by the Church of Rome*, as the opponent of the Pope. Bishop Burnet, however, had much to say of him in the famous *History of the Reformation* (1679), and all of a highly laudatory character. Burnet’s partisanship went so far that he even suppressed facts discreditable to the Reformer of which he was certainly in possession.

The poets and wits of the Restoration naturally had no use for Luther, and, as far as my rather limited knowledge of their work goes, never mentioned him.

#### IV. THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY

At no time has the name of Luther meant less to England than during the age of Voltaire. The rationalism, sophistication, and worldliness characteristic of the period resulted in a deadly indifference to a man of so opposite a spirit. During the whole century there was but one new translation from Luther. John Wesley represented the reaction always found among a minority against the prevalent spirit, and it is from him that the strongest testimony to Luther's influence comes. As is well known, he ascribed his "conversion" (although he was at the time, 1738, already a clergyman) to hearing read a passage from Luther's preface to the Epistle to the Romans, "describing the change which God works in the heart through faith in Christ."

Another mark of interest is shown by the publication in 1709 of Strype's voluminous *Annals of the Reformation*. Though concerned mainly with the printing of English sources, there is a good deal about Luther in this and the tone is decidedly favorable.

Jonathan Swift's *Tale of a Tub* satirizes impartially the churches of Rome, Wittenberg, and Geneva, under the names of the brothers "Peter, Martin, and Jack." On the whole Martin's course is approved more than that of either of the others, the one being thought too conservative, the other too radical.

Though one may look in vain for any allusion to Luther in the writings of Johnson or Goldsmith or Pope or Addison, we find in the secular historians some estimate of the man. Robertson's famous *Charles V* (1769) was the most impartial account of the Reformation yet

written. A sincere and on the whole successful endeavor is made to depict both Luther's virtues and his faults. A particularly labored apology for his violence of language shows how alien were both his enthusiasm and his grossness to the spirit of the time. A far greater historian, Gibbon, has left, in his monumental work, two references to Luther expressing pretty nearly the same general attitude as that taken by Robertson. He ascribes the horrors of the sack of Rome in 1527 to the fact that the troops

"had imbibed, in the first fervor of the Reformation, the spirit as well as the principles of Luther. It was their favorite amusement to insult or destroy the consecrated objects of Catholic superstition; they indulged, without pity or remorse, a devoted hatred against the clergy."

In a more elaborate passage Gibbon weighs the merit and value of the Reformation. He notes that if we ask from what articles of faith above or against our reason the Reformers enfranchised Christians, "we shall rather be surprised by the timidity than scandalized by the freedom of" these men. They adopted from Catholicism all the creeds, mysteries, and miracles, and Luther even maintained a corporeal and Calvin a real Presence of Christ in the eucharist. "Yet," adds Gibbon, "the services of Luther and his rivals are solid and important; and the philosopher must own his obligations to these fearless enthusiasts." In the first place, they levelled with the ground the lofty fabric of superstition, consisting of the worship of saints and of relics, and substituted for it a simpler and purer worship. They also restored myriads of monks and nuns to liberty and labor. Finally they broke the chain of authority, though this act was "a consequence rather than a design" of the Reformation.

## V. THE ROMANTIC MOVEMENT

The violent reaction from eighteenth century modes of thought, called Romanticism, showed itself also in the changed opinion regarding Luther. At no time has the Reformer been so warmly praised in England as during the first half of the nineteenth century. In certain quarters this high estimate has continued, but the prevailing tone of thought has since changed.

The highest encomiums of Luther were uttered by Coleridge and Carlyle. Coleridge could not imagine a more charming book than one containing Luther's letters, especially those written from the Wartburg. "The only fit commentator for Paul was Luther," he thought "—not by any means such a gentleman as the Apostle but almost as great a genius." The English philosopher himself wrote a commentary on the *Table Talk* in Bell's translation. Much of it is rather too metaphysical, discussing points which the original author would not have understood, and sometimes expressing opinions with which, I am sure, he would not have been in agreement. In general the commentator warmly endorses all that is said in the text. When the Wittenberg professor pontificates that the best proof that the world has been created by God is that Moses wrote everything down just as it happened, the Englishman adds a hearty "Hear! Hear!" or words to that effect. When Luther says that it is better to have the temple broken than to have Christ hidden therein, Coleridge simply and truly remarks, "Sublime!"

Carlyle came prepared to "worship" Luther as one of the "heroes" of history. To him the Reformer was one of the strong men who have been rightly kings, "the bravest heart then living in the world . . . if also one of the humblest and peaceablest." Luther's books, he

says, are not well written, though their dialect became the language of all Germany:

"But in no Books have I found a more robust, genuine, I will say noble faculty of a man than in these. A rugged honesty, homeliness, simplicity; a rugged sterling sense and strength. He flashes out illumination from him; his smiting idiomatic phrases seem to cleave into the very secret of the matter. Good humor too, nay tender affection, nobleness, and depth; this man could have been a Poet too! He had to *work* an Epic Poem, not write one. I call him a great Thinker; as indeed his greatness of heart already betokens that."

It is perhaps worth while remarking that Carlyle's hero was not the historic one, but at least in part legendary. At that time (1840), without more special study than Carlyle cared to put on the subject, it was not possible to get at the real Luther. There were two legends current, the Catholic and the Protestant, and of them the latter was nearer the truth. I do not mean to imply that the Scotch writer's admiration was wholly based on a false estimate, for his portrait of Luther is quite recognizable, nevertheless it is no less unmistakably idealized.

There are many proofs that the popular opinion of the Reformer was as high as that of the leading thinkers. During the nineteenth century there were forty-three new translations of his works and fourteen reprints, as against one new version and three reprints in the preceding century. Some of these books included several separate works of the Reformer; a few of them came from America.

Many distinguished writers have left brief but exalted estimates of Luther. De Quincey speaks of him as "the heroic reformer." Wordsworth, in one of the *Ecclesiastical Sonnets*, writes of the early English Protestants, banished for their faith, as "most happy reassembled in a land by dauntless Luther freed." Robert Browning, in *The Twins*, versifies a story from the *Table Talk*, commencing it:

“Grand rough old Martin Luther  
    Bloomed fables—flowers on furze,  
The better the uncouther:  
    Do roses stick like burrs?”

Some very favorable opinions may be found among the greater historians of this “romantic” age. The highest possible tribute to the Reformer is paid by J. A. Froude, himself a rationalist. He calls the appearance before the Diet of Worms the most notable spectacle witnessed on the planet since Christ stood before Pilate. The German translation of the Bible, says Froude, “is as rich and grand as our own,” and the table talk as full of matter as Shakespeare’s plays. Luther was found to be the incarnation of conscience, and withal sociable, cheerful, without a trace of vanity or self-interest.

J. A. Symonds (in his *Catholic Reaction*, 1882) writes:

“Luther was stronger in his weakness than the creator of the Jesuit machinery, wiser in his simplicity than the deviser of that subtle engine. But Luther had the onward forces of humanity on his side—Ignatius could but retard them by his ingenuity.”

## VI. OUR OWN TIMES

No less than four separate causes have undermined the position of Luther in England during the last two generations. As these causes have affected America much less, it is only in our own age that one sees a marked national divergence between the mother country and her daughter in this regard. While Luther is held in high honor in America as a whole, and perhaps also in Scotland, the prevailing tone in England, though with a minority opposition, is one of bitter hostility, expressed now in a sneer and again in a tirade.

The first and strongest of these causes was the Catholic movement in the Church of England. J. A. Froude said in 1867 with perfect truth:

"Two generations ago the leading Reformers were looked upon as little less than saints; now a party has risen up who intend, as they frankly tell us, to unprotestantize the Church of England, who detest Protestantism as a kind of infidelity, who desire simply to reverse everything which the Reformers did. One of these gentlemen, a clergyman, writing lately of Luther, called him a heretic, a heretic fit only to be ranked with—whom do you think?—Joe Smith, the Mormon Prophet. . . . The book in which this remarkable statement appeared was presented by two bishops to the Upper House of Convocation. It was received with gracious acknowledgments by the Archbishop of Canterbury, and was placed solemnly in the library of reference, for that learned body to consult. So too a professor at Oxford the other day spoke of Luther as a Philistine—a Philistine meaning an oppressor of the chosen people; the enemy of men of culture and intelligence, such as the professor himself."

The neo-Catholic movement had got well under way by the time Froude wrote. Its leader, John Henry Newman, before he joined the Church of Rome, attacked the Reformers in his *Lectures on Justification* (1838). "It is aimed," said he, "at the Lutheran dictum that justification by faith only was the cardinal doctrine of Christianity. I considered that this doctrine was either a paradox or a truism—a paradox in Luther's mouth, a truism in Melanchthon's. I thought the Anglican Church followed Melanchthon." But Newman was not yet ready to break with the Reformation entirely. Five years previously he had written: "No great work was done by a system; whereas systems rise out of individual exertions. Luther was an individual. The very faults of an individual excite attention; he loses, but his cause (if good and he powerful-minded) gains." But naturally even such qualified approval of the first Protestant had to go when the author became a Roman Catholic. In his *Apologia* (1865) he wrote: "The spirit of Luther is dead; but Hildebrand and Loyola are alive." Even now, however, he was capable of quoting the German to buttress his own defence against Kingsley. Arguing

that equivocation was worse than lying, he quoted the famous "pecca fortiter" of Luther with the comment, "I anathematize his formal sentiment, but there is a truth in it when spoken of material acts." Elsewhere he attempts to prove that Lutheranism is a private, arbitrary, unscriptural system of unreal righteousness and real corruption, a system of words without ideas, and that Lutheran faith could not exist and could not justify if it did exist.

Newman's circle was no whit behind him in reviling the Reformers. Hurrell Froude confessed that he could not express the amount of his hatred for them. To Father Brigett, the biographer of Sir Thomas More, Luther was nothing but "a foul-mouthed German boor." Were it worth while, an anthology of very derogatory Catholic opinion might be cited from contemporary England. Following the lead of Pope Leo XIII's Encyclical of December 28, 1878, it has been the fashion to blame the Reformation for such evils as are, in the Catholics' opinion, modern socialism and anarchism. Hilaire Belloc has written to this effect (1912).

The temper of the universities may be gauged by the honorary doctorate in divinity and its accompanying encomium given to Father Denifle for writing his *Luther und Lutherthum*, rightly described by the English historian Gooch as "eight hundred pages hurled at the memory of the Reformer, and among the most repulsive books in historical literature."

Opinion among Anglican Catholics has varied from supercilious attenuation to a virulence unsurpassed by their Roman brethren. One of the most noted of them is Sir William Hamilton, for in this respect his view was determined entirely by his religious, not by his philosophical, prepossessions. In a work *Be not Schismatics* he deprecated Luther. He was answered by Archdeacon J. C. Hare, and returned to the subject in his *Discussions*

of *Philosophy and Literature* (1853). The tone of his invective may be gathered from his calling Bucer the *âme damnée* of the Reformation, punning on his name as "puss," a feline nature, and by his characterization of the Hessian Reformer Melsingen as "a syphilitic saint and trigamist." Luther he thinks will be most finally condemned by simple quotation from his works. It is interesting to see what he selects. He groups all his charges under three heads. 1. Luther's determinism, including his doctrine that God damns and saves irrespective of merit. 2. Luther's opinion that polygamy is lawful. 3. His Biblical criticism. It seems as if Hamilton really thought that it was the climax of the Reformer's baseness that he said the Book of Kings was more worthy of credit than *Chronicles*, that Solomon's *Proverbs* had been gathered by others, that *Hebrews* was not by Paul, that *Job* was a fable, and that *Esther* and *James* should be excluded from the canon. In our day it is hardly needful to remark how much more in the line of modern science and philosophy were the observations of the Wittenberg professor than were the dogmas of the Scotch metaphysician. Indeed, the self-contradiction of those who alternately blame Luther for bibliolatry and then find supreme offence in his rational treatment of Scripture, has only been brought out in the latest age. An anonymous writer in the *Athenaeum* (1911) takes exactly this position, remarking, *à propos* of Luther's objections to *James*, "that he rules himself out of court as a theologian by endeavoring to concoct a system of divinity while neglecting one of the documents."

One of the favorite methods of depreciating Luther has been to exalt one of his contemporaries, usually Colet, More, or Erasmus, at his expense. This is done in a very mild way, without vituperation, by Lupton in his various works on Colet, by W. H. Hutton in his life of More, by Seebohm in his *Oxford Reformers*.

Another line of attack is found by the Anglicans, as by the Roman Catholics, in attributing various modern tendencies, alleged to be bad, to the Reformation. Dr. J. Neville Figgis, of the Society of the Resurrection, has cultivated this field with diligence. He brackets Luther and Machiavelli as the two chief sources of modern absolutism and the immoral "reason of state." How completely he wishes to identify himself with the Catholic view of Luther may also be seen in his review of the life of Luther by the Jesuit H. Grisar, a ponderous work now being Englished for the edification of the faithful.

Nevertheless, there has been even among the highest dignitaries of the Anglican Church a certain section disposed to find a support for conservative doctrine in Luther's authority. Thus Frederick Temple, Archbishop of Canterbury, in his *Charge to his Clergy* (1898) stated that the Anglican theory of the real Presence was hard to distinguish from Luther's doctrine. This opinion, Dean Hensley Henson informs us, was received by the (Anglican) Catholics "in disgust at the suggestion that they stand in the Eucharistic doctrine with the protagonist of Protestantism."

A temperate, and on the whole very fair estimate of Luther is given by Bishop Mandell Creighton in his well-known *History of the Papacy*. His wife, in her life of him, says: "With the central figure of his drama, Luther himself, the Bishop was not much in sympathy. He was to him an astounding phenomenon, an extraordinary force, without whom the Reformation would have been impossible, but Erasmus was far more congenial to him." Writing to Kolde in 1894 Creighton said that Luther's personality was the hardest to understand in the whole period; that he was neither a theologian nor a statesman, but a popular leader, with the capacity of picking up what was in the air and expressing it forcibly.

But there is another group of critics of the Reformer and his work who are under no confessional bias at all. It is a remarkable fact that from the days of Erasmus till now there have been "intellectuals" to whom the principles as well as the methods of the Reformation have been repulsive. The best representative of these in the nineteenth century is Henry Hallam, who devotes considerable space to Luther in his *Introduction to the Literature of Europe in the XV, XVI, and XVII Centuries* (1837). Although he professes to "regard Luther as a great man, endowed with many virtues, and an instrument of Providence for signal good," one would hardly suspect as much from the constant tone of his other references. He says that he will "neither dissemble nor slightly censure the enormous paradoxes which deform Luther's writings"; that the tendency of his doctrine was antinomian and disparaging to virtue; that his "grossness was scandalous," and that he "disgraces himself with nasty and stupid brutality." Moreover he thinks that Luther's intellectual gifts have been much exaggerated, that his works are marked by "intemperance, coarseness, inelegance, scurrility, wild paradoxes that menace the foundations of religious morality," these qualities not being compensated "by much strength and acuteness, still less by impressive eloquence." In short most of them are "bellowing in bad Latin," and show a "total absence of self-restraint."

Matthew Arnold thought it worth while to publish, under the title *St. Paul and Protestantism* (1883) an elaborate attack on the doctrine of justification by faith only and its author. "Solifidianism," says he, "is an erroneous human development." "What gives a religious teacher his permanent worth and vitality is," says Arnold, "after all, just the scientific value of his teaching, its correspondence with important facts, and the light it throws on them." As he distinctly implies that Luther's

teaching did not have this value, we conclude that in Arnold's estimate he had little worth and vitality.

With the advent of Darwinism it became inevitable that the Reformation should be judged by its relation to progress. The character of the Reformer is no longer the decisive criterion among the more thoughtful historians, nor is even the rationality of his tenets, considered from the philosophical standpoint, as had been the case with Voltaire and Gibbon. By a large school he is now weighed in the balance against what he might reasonably have been supposed to contribute to the causes of science, democracy, social reform, popular enlightenment, and secularization. In answering these questions it is remarkable that men under no confessional bias should divide on Luther almost as sharply as Catholics and Protestants. On the whole the verdict among these new judges has been unfavorable to Luther. W. E. H. Lecky, in his brilliant *History of Rationalism* (1865) mercilessly exposes Luther's credulity, superstition, intolerance, narrowness, and his persecuting and despotic spirit. A similar work has been done in America by Andrew D. White's *Warfare of Science and Religion*. C. Beard, in his well-known Hibbert Lectures on the relations of the Reformation to modern thought, took a favorable view of Luther's character but a rather doubtful one about the value of his work. He evidently preferred the method of Erasmus. Bertrand Russell, on the other hand, finds that the first serious breach in the mediæval theory of absolute authority was made by Luther's assertion of the right of private judgment on the fallibility of General Councils.<sup>14</sup>

A part of the growing coldness towards Luther is due as much to dislike of his methods as to disapproval of the results of his work. Thus Mark Pattison in his biography of Erasmus contributed to the ninth edition of the

<sup>14</sup> Why Men Fight, 1917, p. 26.

Encyclopædia Britannica (and allowed to stand with revisions in the eleventh edition) speaks of Erasmus's quiet rationalism as doing more for progress than "all the rage and uproar of Luther's pamphlets."

Carrying this modern criticism of the Reformation in its relation to progress to an extreme, there has now arisen a school convinced that Luther was really a conservative, and his movement reactionary. Nietzsche is the great exponent of this view in Germany, though his position has been adopted more or less by scholars like Troeltsch. In America this line of criticism, the one which would naturally appeal to the progressive proclivities of our countrymen, has been carried much further than in England, and, in my judgment, to a length that can only be described as paradoxical. It is beyond the scope of this article to notice American opinion, and I shall therefore confine myself to English. Mr. P. S. Allen finds him "a religious leader contemning the things of this world and ensuing human advancement and even truth with aid from realms in which reason is not always allowed to have its perfect work" (1913). A. W. Benn in his *English Rationalism* (1906) says that it is a great mistake to describe Protestantism as a revolt of reason from superstition, though the fact that it has been so described is highly suggestive. J. B. Bury takes the same position, perhaps more unfavorably to the Reformers. Many similar judgments could be quoted. Fundamentally the same idea is set forth by Havelock Ellis in his *Impressions and Comments* (1915), as follows:

"Look, again, at Luther. There was the Catholic Church dying by inches, gently, even exquisitely. And here came that gigantic peasant with his too exuberant energy, battered the dying Church into acute sensibility, kicked it into emotion, galvanized it into life, prolonged its existence for a thousand years. The man who sought to exterminate the Church proved to be the greatest benefactor the Church had ever known."

As in international relations fear and hatred seem to play a more important part than good will, so it often appears that a man's intellectual alliances are determined fully as much by his dislike of one thing or party as by his love for another. Thus among the intellectuals we find a number of men rallying to Luther's support, though they have no special bond with him, because they hate so much the system which he combated. Thus the tribute paid to Luther by J. A. Symonds was apparently due to his loathing for the Jesuits.

It is difficult to class Bernard Shaw, because one of his dominant ideas is to prove that he is other than you think. He has discovered that praise from an enemy may be more irritating than any invective, and he has thus taken under his wing Jesus "as a first-rate political economist" and Luther as "a legitimate predecessor of Voltaire." Both of the latter gentlemen, he observes, were Tartars for the Catholic Church. Religion is to Shaw "a quaint but intelligible evolution from crude attempts to propitiate the destructive forces of Nature among savages." Among these propitiatory attempts were the austerities of mediæval saints. "But Luther delivered us from all that. His reformation was a triumph of imagination and a triumph of cheapness. It brought you complete salvation and asked from you nothing but faith."

The third of the forces in modern England working against Luther is socialism. The strongest attack made on Luther, and one of the utmost violence, because he had no sympathy with political or social reform, is that by Belfort Bax in his three works on *Social Germany*, the *Peasants' War*, and the *Anabaptists*. To him the "true inwardness" of the Reformation lies in its change from a coöperative to an individualistic society, and its mainsprings are economic. He thinks it worth while to attack Luther's character and doctrines as well as his

political ideas. Thus he says he was no Protestant in the English Puritan sense, and would not have been acceptable to the British Nonconformist conscience as representative in Parliament or even as a grocer-deacon. His views of marriage, says Bax, were very low. He accuses Luther of first supporting and then deserting the revolt of the knights under Sickingen, and of first egging on the peasants and then turning savagely against them. In the last charge there is much truth; in the others none. Bax's chief source is Janssen, and his animosity towards Luther extends to the latter's biographer, Principal T. M. Lindsay.

Even in this day it is so true that the interest in the Reformation is mainly theological that very little can be quoted on Luther from the socialist camp. Many writers, however, like those in the *Cambridge Modern History*, have been offended by his cruelty to the peasants. It is interesting to quote one high, if indiscriminating, tribute to Luther from John Helston, a poet who claims to be a socialist and sceptic. In a poem entitled, *To Germany in her Progress towards Socialism* (1913), he writes:

“The tyranny of later Rome began,  
Till was humbled there a continent about the feet of Lies;  
But Germany was waiting with a man,  
And the voice of Luther thundered; and although they sought  
to burn,  
Poison, torture, maim, and murder as they might,  
Mostly in the south they did it; northward men began to turn  
To the first far beams of morning from the night.”

The last of the four main currents making against Luther in contemporary England is hostility to Germany. As this is not confessedly allowed to color religious and historical judgments it is difficult to adduce texts in support of this assertion, but it can certainly be felt as an influence underlying and contributing to many of the

other judgments expressed and quoted above. Perhaps the sneers of Chesterton at "our German Luther" are as much animated by national as by confessional antipathy. Occasionally when something disparaging is said of Luther one will hear some such remark as "How German he was!" Sometimes, however, in the present war, Luther is appealed to against his countrymen. Thus *Punch* of April 19, 1916, has a full-page cartoon, alluding to the alleged horrors of the Wittenberg prisoners' camp, representing Luther saying to Shakespeare: "I see my countrymen claim you as one of them. You may thank God you're not that. They have made my Wittenberg—ay, and all Germany—to stink in my nostrils." Luther's words on war—"that it was as necessary as eating and drinking and any other business"—have been much quoted against him. No one, as far as I am aware, has called attention to the fact that his entire position in regard to war and whether soldiers can be in a state of grace, is taken bodily from the Canon Law (*Decreti pars ii*, capp. 3-7, c. 3).

These combined forces, operating in distinct and often in mutually antagonistic fields, have depressed Luther's reputation almost to its nadir in the England of today. He is neglected, hardly read or studied at all. Reviewers of books on Luther express their frank opinion that he is a man no longer worth writing about. In the twentieth century not one translation from Luther has been made by an Englishman. Two Scotch women have added to the list of his English works, one a selection from his sermons, one a selection from his letters. During the same time two very elaborate translations of his works have been undertaken in America, both series promising to extend to a number of volumes. A version of his correspondence has also been recently started in America, and a fresh translation of the *Table Talk*. From America too one could quote a much larger

number of good words about Luther and a much greater enthusiasm for him. This has been noticed by English writers, who attribute it to the backwardness of our intellectual culture. The only British scholar who has written extensively and sympathetically of Luther in the present century is a Scotchman, the late Principal T. M. Lindsay. To him the Reformer appears as a great religious genius, the central figure of his age, and the not faultless but on the whole very wonderful pattern of personal piety.

And yet testimonies to the Saxon are not wholly wanting even among contemporary Englishmen. I shall close with a few of them. Walter Pater (in his *Duke Carl of Rosenmold*) speaks of "the cheerful genius of Dr. Martin Luther, with his good times and his ringing laughter which sent dull goblins flitting." Next in this miscellaneous collection may be quoted a few words from Israel Zangwill's play *The Next Religion* (1912). The hero, Stephen, forced by conscience to give up the tenets of the Anglican Church in which he is a priest, exclaims, "Just as Luther was called to make the religion you now hold, so am I called to make the religion of our children." This is not cited as a personal tribute from Mr. Zangwill, but as evidence of his belief that some portion at least of English opinion still regards Luther as the prophet of their faith. Indeed, not altogether rarely one finds something that proves that this is so. One of the finest appreciations is by the Rev. E. S. Buchanan, of Oxford, a well-known scholar, who says (*Expositor*, 1915):

"I may say that spiritually I owe more to Martin Luther than to any of my own countrymen, and am under a greater debt to him for his bravery, for his courage, for his truth, for his humanity, for his total absence of all hypocrisy. If you ask me what was the grand thing about Martin Luther, it was that the man had not a line, not a trace of hypocrisy in his whole composition. I think this can scarcely be said truly of any other great ecclesiastic."

THE GENESIS OF ST. AUGUSTINE'S IDEA OF  
ORIGINAL SIN

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The thought of Augustine on the two ethical categories of sin and grace is of great importance in the history of Christian theology.<sup>1</sup> His system of grace and predestination prevailed for many centuries, although not without strong opposition, and underwent, through scholastic elaboration, substantial changes in order to save the freedom of the will; and finally it reappeared in the conception of the spiritual life shaped by Luther and the other teachers of the Reformation. It is on account of his doctrine about grace and predestination that Protestant theologians like to call Augustine "der Paulus nach Paulus und der Luther vor Luther."<sup>2</sup> Whatever may be the exactness of this genealogy, it shows at least the value and efficacy of the Augustinian conception of the natural and supernatural life on the development of the European spirit. In the Catholic tradition this thought of Augustine is at the very basis of the ethical, ecclesiological, and sacramental systems; in the Christian but non-Catholic movements this doctrine, interpreted in a rather paradoxical way, gave a starting-point to the Reformation.

<sup>1</sup> The success of the Augustinian doctrine was amazing. The author was still living when Prosper of Aquitania in his letter to Rufinus said: "Non solum Romana Africanaque ecclesia, sed per omnes mundi partes universi promissionis filii cum doctrina huius viri congruunt."

<sup>2</sup> Vide E. Troeltsch: *Augustin, die christliche Antike und das Mittelalter*. München, 1915, 1.

No wonder therefore that in the history of Christian dogma no other doctrine has been so largely and deeply explored and discussed as has the Augustinian doctrine of sin and of restoration. And yet it is my conviction that in this analysis there is some gap, if not some mistake. The point in which the work of the scholars on this subject is defective, is that of the relation of the Augustinian thought to the Christian writers who preceded him. Some unexpected coincidences, some passages of the *Retractationes* insufficiently explained and others completely misunderstood to this day, led me on a path which seems to be the safest in order to trace back the origin of the Augustinian thought of original sin, which, it seems to me, is the primitive nucleus of the whole Augustinian system of sin and restoration.

A. Harnack, misled, if I am not mistaken, by Förster's book on Saint Ambrose,<sup>3</sup> wrote that while the Augustinian theories on sacraments, faith, and the Church show some connection with Ambrosiaster and with Optatus Milevitanus, yet his ideas about sin and grace were inspired by his baptizer, Ambrose<sup>4</sup> himself. It is not my intention to discuss here the truth of the first assumption, which I believe is partially wrong; but I affirm that the second one is entirely without basis. I cannot see how Ambrose, the author of the allegoric biblical commentaries, can be the spiritual father of the *De Genesi ad Literam*, neither can I recognize any dependence of the characteristic Augustinian opinions in regard to original sin and its psychologic consequences, which are so impregnated with a crude materialism, upon the very loose assumptions of Ambrose about our responsible

<sup>3</sup> Förster: Ambrosius, Bischof von Mailand. Eine Darstellung seines Lebens und Wirkens. Halle, 1884.

<sup>4</sup> "Haben Ambrosiaster und Optatus die Lehren Augustins über die Sakramente, den Glauben, und die Kirche vorbereitet, so Ambrosius die über die Sünde und die Gnade." Dogmengeschichte, III<sup>8</sup>, 44 (Tübingen, 1897).

participation in the sin of Adam.<sup>5</sup> I think that it is exactly in his theories of original sin that Augustine depends closely and in a decisive way upon Ambrosiaster, from whom he derived,

(1) The formula in which he embodies the notion of our responsibility in the sin of Adam.

(2) The interpretation of the most discussed Pauline passages, especially Rom. 5:12.

(3) The fundamental notion of man "servus culpae servus gratiae."

(4) The general method of positive and realistic Scriptural interpretation, which is peculiar to the *Tractatus in Paulum* of Ambrosiaster, and which is so different from the method that Augustine used when under the influence of the sermons and the *Enarrationes* of Ambrose.

It is the purpose of this article to supplement Souter's volume on Ambrosiaster,<sup>6</sup> and to supply a new proof of the great value of Ambrosiaster in the development of Christian thought during that period which was so rich in great religious writers and so miserable for its tragic political events.

Those who are familiar with the books of Augustine have noticed the great change that his thought underwent between the years 396 and 397.<sup>7</sup> In his book *De libero Arbitrio* (394-395) Augustine thinks of the

<sup>5</sup> For instance, Ps. 49:5: "'Iniquitas calcanei mei circumdabit me.' Hoc est iniquitas Adae non mea. Sed ea non potest mihi esse terror; in die enim judicii, nostra in nobis non alienae iniquitatis flagitia puniuntur, unde reor iniquitatem calcanei magis lubricam delinquendi, quam rectum aliquem nostri esse delicti." Ambrose, *Comm. in Paul. III* (Edition by Ballerini, Milan, 1876).

<sup>6</sup> A. Souter: *A Study of Ambrosiaster; Texts and Studies*, VII, 4. Cambridge, 1905. Souter has already published a good edition of the *Quaestiones Veteris et Novi Testamenti* of Ambrosiaster in the *Corpus Scrip. Eccl. Lat. of Vienna*. A new edition of the Pauline Comment is announced by Brewer.

I believe that Augustine did not know the *Quaestiones* at all. The passage of the *Quaest. XIX* is insufficient to prove such knowledge in Augustine. *Quaest. XXIII*, about the possibility of a material transmission of the soul through the act of generation, is in open contradiction to the thought of Augustine.

<sup>7</sup> I follow here the chronology of Augustinian writings as given by Rottmann. On this evolution of Augustinian thought, see Turmel: *Histoire du dogme du péché originel*. Macon, 1904, 73.

organism of Adam and Eve in Eden as of ethereal substances, which were transformed into bodies of flesh because of their disobedience. The consequences of their fault were death, ignorance, and the body itself—"mortales et ignari et carne subditi" (III, 54). Furthermore he does not assume that the traducianistic system is the best explanation of the origin of the human soul; on the contrary he insinuates, in a rather indefinite way, that original sin alone is not a sufficient cause for a man, otherwise innocent, to be condemned for ever (III, 66).

To this moment Augustine, still under the strong influence of Neoplatonic philosophy and of Ambrose's thought, conceives of the nature of Adam and Eve before the sin as of an impalpable and ethereal nature, and of our body as a consequence of the sin; in other words he thinks that sin brought an organic modification in the human being and not a helpless perversion of a fleshly organism already in existence. But afterwards Augustine does not wish to teach, as he did before, that men after the sin were "carne subditi," but that they became "concupiscentiae subditi." At first sight it seems that the first and older opinion was more pessimistic than the second; but if we consider carefully we shall find that this is not true. The radical transformation of the human nature from an ethereal to a bodily substance possibly might have left intact in the human compound the capacity of the spirit to work for its rehabilitation. On the contrary, introducing into an organism, already material and fleshly, the incessant trouble of corrupted sensuality, the sin, in the new attitude of the Augustinian thought, effaces at once the very possibility of free will, which became slave of the evil. The old Manichæan spirit of hatred against human generation and the conservation of the race was thus still underlying the thought of Augustine.<sup>8</sup>

<sup>8</sup> Augustine himself in *De Dono Perseverantiae*, XII, 30, emphasizes the legitimacy of his spiritual evolution.

His change of view about original sin is already effected in his writings of 396-397, which inaugurated his episcopal career in Hippo, namely the *De Divinis Quaestionibus ad Simplicianum* and the collection *De LXXXIII Quaestibnibus*. From that time mankind appeared to Augustine identified with Adam, in his sin and in his condemnation. Original sin is then described as an infection which propagates itself from father to son through the act of generation, which being an act of organic trouble caused by the sin, is a sin itself and determines the transmission *ipso facto* of the sin to the new creature. The stigma of original sin is impressed upon the body of the human being through the persistent stimulus of an unreasonable sensuality, and it is equally impressed upon his soul, because—for the logical exigencies of the system—it is considered as transmitted with the body through the material act of generation and therefore guilty itself of the guilt of the first father. Mankind is thus an agglomeration of condemned creatures which cannot acquire any merit before God, and whose hopes for forgiveness and atonement are only in the benevolent grace of the Father and the infallible decree of his predestination.

“Ex quo in paradiſo natura nostra peccavit, non secundum spiritum, sed secundum carnem, mortali generatione formamur, et omnes una *massa luti* facti sumus, quod est *massa peccati*. Cum ergo meritum peccando amiserimus, nihil aliud, peccantibus, nisi aeterna damnatio debetur” (*De LXXXIII Quaestibnibus*,<sup>9</sup> 9, 68, 3). . . . Tunc facta est *una massa omnium*, veniens de traduce peccati et de forma mortalitatis. . . . Sunt igitur omnes homines *una quaedam massa peccati*, supplicium debens divinae summaeque justitiae, quod sive exigatur, sive donetur nulla est iniquitas. A quibus autem exigendum est et quibus donandum sit, superbe judicant debitores; quemadmodum conducti ad illam vineam iniuste indignati sunt, cum tantummodo aliis donare-

<sup>9</sup> In *Retractationes* (edition by Knoell in *Corpus Scrip. Ecc. Lat.*, XXXVI, 1, 26) Augustine says that his *LXXXIII Quaestiones* were revised for publication after his elevation to the episcopate, between 396 and 397.

tur, quantum illis reddetur" (*De Divinis Quaestionibus ad Simplicianum*, I, 16).<sup>10</sup>

In these words we find clearly outlined the two fundamental ideas of Augustine in his anti-Pelagian struggle about grace and predestination in their relation to free will: the first, the conception of mankind as of a people condemned; the second, the idea of the initial movement of grace as of a free gift of God. Which one of these two ideas came first to the mind of Augustine?

Towards the end of his life Augustine himself, writing his book *De Predestinatione* to instruct his friends Prosperus and Hilarius, both Gallic, attributed a peculiar efficacy for the development of his thought to the words of Paul (1 Cor. 4 7), "quid habes quod non accepisti," etc. But we think that we do no wrong to the consistency of the great bishop if we assume that this later remark of the *De Predestinatione*, like the other in the *Retractationes* II, 1,<sup>11</sup> was determined by the peculiar way in which the problems of forgiveness and spiritual vocation were shaped in his mind during the period of the harsh polemics caused by his treatises to the troublesome monks of Adrumetum, *De Gratia et de libero Arbitrio* and *De Corruptione et Gratia*.<sup>12</sup> In reality the logical development of Augustine's system requires the priority of the idea of the radical perversion of mankind before the idea of its inability to merit restoration and salvation. The effort towards

<sup>10</sup> Ambrose died April 4, 397, and was succeeded by Simplicianus. The treatise of Augustine must be assigned to that year.

<sup>11</sup> Augustine recalls in this passage, while writing to Simplicianus, how deeply influenced he was by the words of Paul (1 Cor. 4 7) when he felt in himself the harsh contrast between the notions of grace and freedom of the will. By the virtue of these words, he says, "vicit gratia Dei."

<sup>12</sup> Although there is no doubt about the sincerity of Augustine, yet sometimes his memory played him false. For instance, when in the *Retractationes* he speaks of his treatises written immediately after his baptism, there is some inaccuracy in the chronology which he gives. Timme, in *Augustins geistige Entwicklung in den ersten Jahren nach seiner Bekehrung* (Berlin, 1908), claims to be the first to notice these inaccuracies, but the Maurin Editors had already remarked the fact in their *Augustinian biography*.

restoration and the gift of divine grace for that purpose presupposes necessarily the fall. Other of Augustine's writings confirm this conclusion. In fact the fundamental idea that recurs with remarkable frequency in those writings, especially those belonging to the hot period of Pelagian controversy (412-418) and of polemics about Predestination (426-429), is the appalling definition of mankind as a "massa peccati, massa luti, massa damnationis, massa damnata."

How did Augustine undergo this change in that decisive period of his life (395-396), and why was his thought modified so deeply? What influence of Christian writers, or what way of personal thinking, led him to such a pessimistic conception of original sin?

In the passages of the *Retractationes* where he speaks about his works of those years we may find perhaps, besides the intention of the author, some help toward a better understanding of the interior evolution of his spirit. In Book I, Chapters 23-25,<sup>13</sup> he mentions that "adhuc presbiter" he wrote some comments on the Epistle to the Romans (about which he had already talked with several friends), under the title *Expositio quarundam Propositionum ex Epistola ad Romanos*. He confesses with a kind of regret that he was at that time unable to grasp the true meaning of the passage 7 14, because he did not dare to apply to the Apostle the qualification of "carnalis." But later he says, "lectis quibusdam divinorum tractatoribus eloquiorum, quorum me moveret auctoritas, consideravi diligenter, et vidi etiam de ipso apostolo posse intelligi quod ait: 'scimus quoniam lex spiritalis est, ego autem carnalis sum.' Quod in eis libris, quos contra Pelagianos nuper scripsi, quantum potui, diligenter ostendi." Finally he recalls

<sup>13</sup> Before the end of the year 395. What Augustine says in these chapters coincides exactly with the contents of the book *De libero Arbitrio*, ended about 394-395.

that it was his intention to write comments on the whole Epistle to the Romans, but that he was overcome very soon "operis magnitudine ac labore deterritus."<sup>14</sup>

These words are very significant, and I wonder that they have been passed by without remark by the historians of the Augustinian system. They give us a clear statement of what happened. While Augustine was writing the last chapters of his *De libero Arbitrio*, he was led by talks with some friends to find a deeper meaning in the Pauline sentences of the Epistle to the Romans. Some passages proved to be very hard and inconsistent with his conception of spiritual life and of the elective power of the human soul. He tried to explain them in the best way, and attempted even a complete exegesis of the obscure Pauline Epistle. But he happened then to read a Pauline comment by an authoritative Christian writer, and while reading it he realized the difficulty of the work he had undertaken; yet, on the other hand, he found in those comments a new explanation of the mysterious words of the Apostle. From that source the mind of Augustine drew new light and under that influence his anthropological and soteriological system took a new direction. This change wrought consequences which were weighty for the development of the religious spirit of the Christian world. Who is this "tractator divinorum eloquiorum," who influenced so deeply the mind of Augustine in this very critical moment of great mental stress?

The first thing to notice is the idiomatic peculiarity of the phrase by which Augustine expresses the solidarity of all men in the sin of Adam—"massa damnata." Today we take the word "massa" in its figurative rather than its original meaning, and therefore we fail to realize that in the use of it by Augustine there is a bold and

<sup>14</sup> The fragment that survives bears the title, *Epistolae ad Romanos inchoata Expositio*, and was written also in 394.

original metaphor. "Massa" originally means only an indistinct amalgam of inorganic elements. Figurative language in its development is a good guide to discover the development of ideas. The point is this—who first used this metaphor, "massa," upon which we may say without exaggeration is built up the whole anthropological system of Augustine?

The dictionaries give us very little help in this regard. Besides the well-known meaning given to the word "massa" as a conglomeration of farms and rural tenements, which is common in the writings of mediæval authors, we find another meaning of the word in a passage of Orosius, which is not quoted by dictionaries. With reference to the sack of Rome in the year 410 he says that it was a riddle for the chosen people, like "ex magna massa frumenti grana viva" (Hist. adv. Paganos, VII, 39).<sup>15</sup>

In the Vulgate we find "massa" about a dozen times, only four of which appear in the New Testament (Rom. 9 21; 11 16; 1 Cor. 5 6; Gal. 5 9), where the correspondent Greek word is *φύραμα*.<sup>16</sup> The meaning is in every case "paste," or an amorphous compound of inorganic or vegetable substances. That gives no clue for our purpose. In two of the four Pauline passages the word is used in the well-known proverb, "Modicum fermentum totam massam corrumpit."<sup>17</sup>

Now it was only a commentator on the Pauline Epistles living in Rome under Pope Damasus (366–384), who made a paraphrase of the passage Rom. 5—"in quo

<sup>15</sup> Tertullian too speaks of "massa frumenti." De Prescr. III, 9.

<sup>16</sup> Originally "massa" must have been the transliteration of *μάζα* (barley bread), which probably was a word of Hebrew derivation. Cf. H. Van Herwerden: Lexicon graecum suppletorium et dialecticum. Lugduni, 1910, II, 909.

<sup>17</sup> Jerome, who besides being a good translator, is, when he likes, a subtle critic, observes (Gal. 5 9): "Male in nostris codicibus habetur modicum fermentum totam massam corrumpit, et sensum potius interpres suum quam verba apostoli transtulit; modicum fermentum totam *consersionem fermentat*." Tertullian too in De pudicitia, quoting 1 Cor. 5 6, says "consersionem." Cf. Rönsch: Itala et Vulgata. Marburg, 1875, 309.

omnes peccaverunt" — exactly with the figurative word "massa," and it was Ambrosiaster.<sup>18</sup> He wrote:

"*In quo, id est in Adam, omnes peccaverunt.*"<sup>19</sup> Ideo dixit 'in quo,' cum de muliere loquatur, quia non ad speciem retulit sed ad genus. Manifestum itaque est in Adam omnes peccasse, *quasi in massa*; ipse enim per peccatum corruptus, quos genuit, omnes nati sunt sub peccato. Ex eo igitur cuncti peccatores, quia ex ipso sumus omnes."

It is well known that Augustine was acquainted with this Pauline comment and held it in great consideration as coming from Hilarius of Poitiers. In the *Contra duas Epistolas Pelagianorum* addressed to Pope Boniface about 420, Augustine, holding the opinion that the words "in quo" are to be related to Adam, writes, "Et sic Sanctus Hilarius intellexit quod scriptum est 'in quo omnes peccaverunt,'" and he quotes the passage above to the letter.<sup>20</sup>

Is it not very significant that this metaphor "massa," brought in to express the idea of the original participation of mankind in the sin of Adam, is to be found here in a passage known and quoted by Augustine?<sup>21</sup>

As we stated above, the two fundamental elements of Augustine's thought about original sin and spiritual

<sup>18</sup> It is known that Ambrosiaster, commenting on 1 Tim. 3, says about the Church: "Cujus rector hodie est Damasus."

<sup>19</sup> The passage is invariably given by all the quotations of the New Testament prior to the Vulgate. See *Novum Testamentum*, etc., F. Wordsworth et H. White. *Partis II, fasc. I, Epistola ad Romanos*. Oxford, 1913, 85.

<sup>20</sup> This metaphor of "massa" is so characteristic that I think that Pelagius himself was acquainted with Ambrosiaster when he commented on the Pauline passage in the following words, quoted by Augustine in his *De peccatorum meritis et remissione*, III, 5: "Iniustum est ut hodie nata anima non ex massa Adae tam antiquum peccatum portet alienum." I submit this remark to Mr. Souter.

<sup>21</sup> The word "massa" is used three times by Optatus Milevitanus, edit. by Ziwsa, *Corpus Scr. Ecc. Lat. XXVI*. Twice (V, 9; VI, 21) the meaning has nothing to do with our purpose; the third time it is very significant. Speaking (II, 26) about the rigorous discipline imposed by Donatists upon the Catholics who had joined their party, he says that they made them "massam penitentium." Augustine was acquainted with the work of Optatus or rather with its sources, but there is no reason to think of any influence from that side, because Augustine disliked Optatus, whose ideas on anthropological and political problems were very far from his own.

rebirth are the real and full responsibility of all human individuals in the sin of Adam, and the gratuitous character of grace. Now we think it right to assume that Augustine took from Ambrosiaster, with which he became acquainted in 395, the metaphor of "massa peccati," and from it, through a natural reference to the words of Rom. 9 21, "massa luti," from which the potter makes pots according to his will, Augustine drew the notion of the absolute and inscrutable freedom of God in electing his own people, the saints. Other passages which bear evident traces of the influence on the writings of Augustine of Ambrosiaster's comment, justify our assumption, and throw a new light on the question of the theological relations between Ambrosiaster and Augustine, which to this day has been superficially viewed by the historians.

An old and unsatisfactory article attributed to C. Marold<sup>22</sup> affirms that Augustine shows plainly his knowledge of the writings of Ambrosiaster only from the passage quoted above on the interpretation of Rom. 5 12, and dubiously from another passage of the "De Peccatorum Meritis" (I, 11-15), where Augustine opposes the reading of Rom. 5 14 as it is given by Ambrosiaster. Souter<sup>23</sup> remarks that the assumption of Marold is very unsound, especially if we think of the extraordinary comprehensiveness of Augustine's theological work, but he does not point to any other passage showing dependence on Ambrosiaster. The alleged affinity between the definition of fornication given in Augustine's sermon 162 and a passage of Ambrosiaster on 1 Cor. 6 18, is very dubious, because this passage, which is lacking in some manuscripts, cannot be taken as authentic. Turmel<sup>24</sup> repeatedly says that the patristic knowledge of Augustine, very poor in

<sup>22</sup> Der Ambrosiaster nach Inhalt und Ursprung, in Zeitschrift f. wissenschaftl. theol. XXVI, 415-470. 1883.

<sup>23</sup> Page 3.

<sup>24</sup> Cf. Histoire de la théologie positive, 227. Paris, 1904.

the beginning of his theological career, was greatly enriched during the Pelagian controversy, and that as far as it concerns Ambrosiaster, Augustine knew it as a work of Hilarius, but very soon discovered his mistake and in his later writings carefully avoided making use of it. There is no serious basis for such an assumption. Augustine himself confesses in his *Retractationes* (I, 21) that because of his insufficient knowledge of texts he did wrong to Donatus, reproaching him for adulterating some biblical passages. Moreover he engaged in harsh polemics with Jerome for the sake of sincerity in regard to his comment on the Epistle to the Galatians. But in all his work there is no hint that he was ever aware of his mistake about Ambrosiaster; and such a gap, in so far as we may argue from the other instances, would lead us to think that he never doubted the Hilarian authorship of the Ambrosiaster comment.

As a matter of fact, the patient and detailed comparison of the Augustinian doctrines in their development during the Pelagian controversy, with the anthropology and the soteriology of Ambrosiaster, gives us the conviction that the Pauline comment of the latter underlies the arguments and the capital points of the Augustinian polemical writings. Furthermore, it seems to me that Augustine, far from repudiating Ambrosiaster's comment because he had become aware of the usurped Hilarian authorship of it, on the contrary, makes constant allusions to it when he invokes generically the authority of Hilarius against his adversaries. That may seem too much, but it is evident from the context of the passages themselves.

In the *Retractationes* (I, 23) Augustine reminds us that he was at first very unwilling to apply to Paul, already converted and called to the apostleship, the word "carnalis" of Rom. 7:14, and that afterwards he was persuaded to do so by the authority of a Christian writer

commenting on the passage. Now it is exactly in this passage of the Epistle to the Romans that Ambrosiaster not only applies to the apostle himself the appellative "carnalis," but also outlines some ideas which are of capital interest in the Augustinian controversy against Pelagius and Julianus. Notice, for instance, the following passage:

"Hoc est, conditum esse sub peccato, ex Adam qui prior peccavit, originem trahere. Adam vendidit se prior; per hoc semen ejus subiectum est peccato. . . . Homo fragilis est, et paterno subjugatus delicto, ut potestate sui uti non possit, circa obedientiam legis. . . . Quid est enim subiectum esse peccato, nisi corpus habere vitio animae corruptum, cui se inserat peccatum, et impellat hominem quasi captivum delictis, ut faciat voluntatem ejus?"

I noticed already that the interpretation of the "in quo omnes peccaverunt" through the figure of "massa," suggested by Ambrosiaster, led Augustine to associate the passage Rom. 5 12 with the other passage Rom. 9 21, where there is the comparison of the potter, who "has power over the clay, of the same lump to make one vessel unto honor and another unto dishonor." Combining these two passages, Augustine formulated his doctrine of grace gratuitously given by God and predestination. This course of development of Augustinian thought is clearly shown in his letter<sup>25</sup> to the Roman priest Sistus (afterwards pope, succeeding Celestinus), who seemed to be favoring some doctrinal points opposed by Augustine, before Pope Zosimus had decided the question. There is in this important document a remarkable passage: "Ubi quia universa ista massa merito damnata est, contumeliam debitam reddit justitia, honorem donat indebitum gratia, non meriti prerogativa, non fati necessitate, non temeritate fortunae." If we compare these words with those of Am-

<sup>25</sup> Number 194 of the collection. It was written in 418.

brosiaster commenting on the Pauline sentence about the potter—"Deus, cum omnes ex una atque eadem massa simus in substantia, et cuncti peccatores, alius miseretur et alterum despicit non sine justitia"—we cannot fail to realize that the words of Augustine are the true echo of Ambrosiaster.

But there is something more. Among the various details of the anthropological doctrines of Augustine the most peculiar is his idea of free will. Free, according to Augustine, is not he who can choose between two acts morally opposite, but only he who accomplishes with delight the will of his master. In a remarkable chapter of the *Enchiridion*, written about 420, Augustine says:

"Liberaliter servit, qui sui domini voluntatem libenter facit. Ac per hoc ad peccandum liber est qui peccati servus est. Unde ad juste faciendum liber non erit, nisi a peccato liberatus, esse justitiae cooperit servus. Ipsa est vera libertas propter recti facti laetitiam, simul et pia servitus propter praecepti oboedientiam."<sup>26</sup>

Hence he emphasizes the necessity of humility because men by themselves are unable to accomplish anything but wrong and sin.

The thought of Ambrosiaster coincides with the definitions given by Augustine. In fact in his comment on Rom. 6 20 Ambrosiaster holds that to be free from God is to be slave of sin: "Manifestum est, quia qui liber est a Deo est servus peccati; dum peccat enim recedit a Deo, et fit sub peccato." Later, commenting on Ephes. 2 10, he too affirms that man has no merit whatever in accomplishing his salvation, and he speaks of the predestination of the saints with the following words, which remind us very closely of Augustine:

"Omnis gratiarum actio saluti nostrae ad Deum referenda est, qui misericordiam suam nobis praestat. . . . Ideoque non est gloriandum

<sup>26</sup> The same ideas reappear in *Contra duas Epistolas Pelagianorum*, II, 9, even in a more definite way.

nobis in nobis ipsis, sed in Deo qui nos regeneravit nativitate cœlesti per fidem Christi, ad hoc ut bonis operibus exercitati, quae Deus nobis jam renatis decrevit, promissa mereamur accipere."

There is a reasonable objection against this attempt to bring together Augustine and Ambrosiaster in a mutual dependent relation. Could he not have elaborated his anthropologic and soteriologic system directly upon the Pauline data, without any reference to the intermediate exegesis of the unknown Roman commentator? Such an objection would be valuable if the parallelism shown above were only representing some abstract coincidences in the writings of men working on the same topic. But in our case, the dependence of Augustine upon Ambrosiaster is proved by circumstances of fact, like the explicit quotation from the *Contra duas Epistolas Pelagianorum*, the words of the *Retractationes* about the authoritative comment on the Pauline Epistles which gave a new direction to his own exegesis; and finally the method of interpretation peculiar to Ambrosiaster, a positive and realistic method which only from the year 396 becomes the method adopted by Augustine, against the one he had followed to that time under the influence of Ambrose.

The question now arises by itself, whether Augustine, when he refers generically to the authority of Hilarius against the Pelagians, is alluding to the Pauline comment, the supposed work of Hilarius, rather than to the other genuine writings of the Gallic bishop. There is no doubt that Augustine had in mind in those passages the Pauline comment. Quotations from Hilarius are not very numerous in Augustine, about twenty altogether.<sup>27</sup> Some of them have reference to Trinitarian doctrine, and they have nothing to do with our purpose. Others are second-hand quotations, like those in *De Natura et Gratia* 72, which are drawn from the *De Natura* of Pelagius himself, against whom Augustine argues in that treatise. Another

<sup>27</sup> See the indexes of the Maurin Fathers in their Augustinian edition.

quotation, which comes in several times and which seems to be made directly, is from the *Tract. super Ps. CXVIII*. Finally, Augustine more than once invokes the authority of Hilarius and Gregory of Nazianzus without a specific quotation of the passages alluded to. A typical instance will prove that this Hilarius in the mind of Augustine was the author of the Pauline comment known as Ambrosiaster. In the *Contra Julianum Pelagianum*, VI, 23, 70, Augustine remembers once more his mental evolution of the year 396, and he says that after long hesitation he was convinced that the word "carnalis" could be applied as well to the apostle, who wanted to express "gemitum sanctorum contra carnales concupiscentias dimicantium"; and he adds immediately, "Hinc factum est ut sic ista intelligerem, quemadmodum intellexit Hilarius, Gregorius, Ambrosius." The reference is undoubtedly to the interpretation of "carnalis" given by Ambrosiaster, and therefore the Hilarius invoked by Augustine here is but Ambrosiaster himself.

We think that the dependence of the Augustinian anthropology upon Ambrosiaster cannot now be denied, and that it will solve not only a literary problem. In a remarkable essay on Julian of Eclanum,<sup>28</sup> A. Brückner observes that in the Augustinian doctrine of sin several Manichæan survivals found place. As instances he refers first to the notion of the Not-being hypostatized and almost opposed to the creative principle; then to the idea of human nature as naturally wrong and to the diabolic origin of the sexual instinct. Although these specific instances do not betray a direct Manichæan influence, yet I agree that an exaggerated pessimism left its traces in the anthropology of Augustine. But I should like to point out rather the significant affinity of the Augustinian conception of man as the servant of goodness or of evil

<sup>28</sup> Julian von Aeclanum, sein Leben und seine Lehre. Texte und Untersuch. XV, 3, 66-68. Leipzig, 1897.

according to his status of affranchisement, with the Manichæan doctrine of the elements of light destroyed by the king of darkness and his sons after the defeat of the primordial man and restored through "*ἀσχησις*."<sup>29</sup> As a matter of fact, there are in the Augustinian notion some elements obnoxious to the real status of the human soul and its possibility of working out spiritual salvation, and these elements were repudiated by the Church. It is therefore not untrue to affirm that his Manichæan fellowship left in the mind of Augustine a pessimistic background which was unconsciously brought to light again by the fervor of Pelagian controversy. But the influence that led him from Platonic speculation and from the symbolism of Origen and Ambrose to a realistic point of view and a literal exegesis, was undoubtedly the influence of Ambrosiaster; to whom therefore it would be fair to do justice and to give some credit for his part in the system which gained for Augustine the name of "Doctor gratiae."

<sup>29</sup> F. Cumont: *Recherches sur le Manicheisme: I, La cosmogonie manichéenne*, 19. Bruxelles, 1908.

## PREACHING AND WORSHIP

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It is not with the details of homiletics that this paper will occupy itself—how to write a sermon or how to behave in church. These profitable lessons it will dismiss to the class-room or the Sunday School, and will then hold itself free to expand in joyous exaltation of the magnitude and dignity of the training requisite for the fit discharge of the highest duties of the ministry. Every ability which one brings to it may help—those of the carpenter and the goldsmith, of him that smootheth with the hammer and him that smiteth the anvil. But all powers and all training will adjust themselves to its main purpose, the curve of which is determined by its two foci—for every great process is not circular but elliptical—the foci of preaching and worship. Around these the details of a theological curriculum will revolve. The Pentateuch and the Synoptic Problem, the Nicene Council and the Social Settlement House, the Anselmic theory of the Atonement and the Malthusian theory of population, all will have in view their ultimate end of preaching and worship, and all will come bringing their gifts of gold, frankincense, and myrrh.

“The Country Parson,” says George Herbert, “preacheth constantly; the pulpit is his joy and his throne. . . . As soon as he awakes on Sunday morning he presently falls to work, and seems to himself so as a market-man is when the market-day comes, or a shop-keeper when customers use to come in.” This constant preoccupation with preaching as his great business and the eager anti-

cipation of it as a joyous opportunity, give the preacher a sense of the precious frequency of great occasions, when his hand is on the lever of life and his words have weight. Every such opportunity one who loves power will prize. In contrast with this, other holds of a minister upon his people show their meagreness. Social entertainments, musical services, political addresses, parish visiting even, offer the minister an immediate grasp, which must often be seized in order to get any grasp at all. But its immediacy is its value and its danger. These occupations, persisted in, dry up the springs of the minister's deepest helpfulness. Activities take with him the place of thought, and indiscriminate kindness of spiritual leadership. His devotion to kindergarten methods with his people blocks development for them also. They lose first appetite and then capability for growth; and if he awakes to the harm he has done, he discovers that the apostles were wise when they declared that it was not meet to leave the word of God and serve tables. He echoes regretfully St. Paul's lament, "I have fed you with milk and not with meat, for hitherto ye were not able to bear it, neither yet now are ye able." A diet exclusively of milk results in softening of the bones. "Every one that useth milk is unskilful in the word of righteousness, for he is a babe. But strong meat belongeth unto them that are of full age." The old proverb is true—"A house-going parson maketh a church-going people"; but though by frequent visits he may bring his people to church, he cannot keep them there unless he has something to give them after they get there. It is pathetic to see the search for spiritual nutriment which goes on all over the land. There are devout persons who wander from church to church and from one denomination to another, not because they are in religion light of love or whimsical of spiritual appetite, but precisely the opposite—because they cannot find plain food for their

souls. They ask bread, and are given a stone. It is little wonder that they soon come to swell the number of those good people outside the churches who constitute for many inside so puzzling a problem.

There is a common newspaper-fostered impression that people in modern times object to doctrinal preaching. This is, I am convinced, a complete misapprehension. They are, it is true, no longer interested in the kind of doctrinal preaching common in the days of our fathers. Doctrine whose necessity to conduct is not apparent they are inclined to disregard. An unorthodox believer of today does not reject the Nicene theology; he simply has no interest in it. But where theology can show itself fruitful, men welcome it eagerly. This is especially the case with the basic doctrines of God, Christ, and immortality. Wherever men meet for unrestricted talk — at the club, in the steamer's smoking-room, in the country store — the conversation is likely to turn in half an hour to some aspect of these great subjects; not indeed to these in technical form or as parts of a doctrinal system, but to some practical problem which has its roots in them. In case of the first the emphasis has changed. There are now comparatively few discussions as to whether there is a God. That is taken for granted. The question is not whether, but what? What sort of a Being is it that you God-believers set forth? And it is very apt to be the case that God is brought before His own judgment bar; that is, the reality of the type of God set forth is tested by its consonance with what approves itself as the Divine character. God must meet His own standards. "Shall not the Judge of all the earth do right?" Is there a heart behind the power which is unquestionably behind the world? Is there a cosmic conscience? Does the Infinite exclude the finite; that is, is the Divine of a different pattern from the human, so that the human is the non-Divine? or must God be, even if more, at least as

much as the ideal man? Does the universal include the particular, so that God notes the sparrow's fall, or am I hidden from His view in the crowd of things and men? It is such questions as these that men are, often unconsciously, often shamefacedly, always eagerly asking. Especially at the present time do these questions press, when faith in the promises of the Bible is overthrown by the war-pictures in newspapers and magazines. What a mockery the childishly confident assertions seem! "They that seek the Lord shall not want any good thing. The righteous cry, and the Lord heareth, and delivereth them out of all their troubles. He keepeth all their bones; not one of them is broken; and none of them that trust in Him shall be desolate. The upright shall not be ashamed in the evil time, and in the days of famine they shall be satisfied. A thousand shall fall at thy side, and ten thousand at thy right hand, but it shall not come nigh thee." Have these words today any meaning? that is men's fierce and bitter demand; and in spite of the idea that in the face of this crisis theology is helpless, it is only theology, that is, the knowledge of God, that can give an answer.

Or again, the doctrine of mediation—how largely that has defeated its own comforting purpose! Instead of interpreting God and clearing the way to Him, it has blackened His character into repulsiveness and blocked up the way. The necessity of a mediator as the pacifier of an angry God, who is to be appeased only by blood, the transfer of moral responsibility and its results from guilty to innocent, salvation as a forensic transaction rather than a state of character, and conditioned upon a belief in such a transaction—these caricatures of reality have shut up that approach to the Heavenly Father which the doctrine of mediation should have opened. How deeply men need to be prevented from throwing it away and religion with it, as many of

them do on account of this misunderstanding; need to have exhibited to them the precious reality underlying every one of these misrepresented steps! Jesus, the Mediator, as the ultimate medium of communication with God, blood as the historic symbol of life offered with pain, vicariousness, the precious involvement of the loving guiltless with the loved guilty, salvation as the inevitable result of like to like—these are significant and needful keys through which daily life opens up Christianity and Christianity opens up daily life. Through them a distant and hostile Deity is changed into a welcome and trusted friend. And for such change men, though they do not know it, are thirsting.

“How would our souls stand up, O Lord,  
Erect and strong and free,  
If we but knew the ample hoard  
Of wealth we have in Thee!

“We do not need to sway Thy mood,  
Nor beg of Thee to hear.  
Ere our own mind has understood,  
Expectant is Thine ear.”

But perhaps there is no subject on which doctrinal preaching is more welcomed than in regard to conditions after death. It is pitiable to see men running to learned theologians, to ministers with little learning, to trance-mediums, astrologers, to any and every body who may choose to set up a claim to know, in the endeavor to get a trustworthy peep behind the curtain of the future. Is there a life after death? Is knowledge of it possible? How is it related to this life? Does the eschatology set forth in the Bible depict it? Does science recognize or even permit it? What part in it does happiness or misery play? and are these retributory or arbitrary or inevitable? One might suppose that these questions would have little insistence until the pressure of advancing age

emphasized the necessity of an immediate answer. Yet the old are generally no more urgent for an answer than they are desirous of dying, and it is the young, eager for life and for all that it means, who are the more feverishly intent on peering into the future. It is they who from the midst of their tennis and their love-making, insistently but for the most part dumbly, beg, "Tell us what you know about this, not what your creed says. Yet how can any knowledge here be possible!"

I am sure we underestimate this deep, mainly unconscious, demand for doctrinal preaching. Where there is any one who can meet it, ten men of all kinds will take hold of the skirt of such a Jew and eagerly exclaim, "We will go with you, for we have heard that God is with you." Preachers are apt to have a not sufficiently high estimate of the capacity of their people, but to put them off with practical directions or, worse still, the canned declarations of an institution or a creed. In their desire to avoid what is supposed to be the common danger of preaching over people's heads, they too often preach under their feet. One might almost say that the whole homiletic law is summed up in this—Be real. Preach nothing you have not yourself understood and which has not had value for you. Men will pardon the preacher simplicity, heaviness, even sensationalism, even learning, if his words convey the impression, "We speak that we do know and testify that we have seen."

How to secure preachers of such power and attraction is the problem for every church. The endeavor is sometimes made to solve it by having a class of specialists, who shall devote themselves to preaching, like the preaching Orders in the Roman Catholic Church. I cannot speak from personal knowledge of the success of the Roman Catholic experiment, and I do not know of any similar class among Protestant ministers. Re-

vivalists have a different function; for they aim not at the whole field of spiritual edification but at one part of it only. Here and there a minister will announce that he does not propose to make parish calls but will devote himself to his sermons. When a young man does this, it is almost always fatal to his success. For, costly of time as parish calling is, it is essential in order to give the minister the knowledge of men in general and of the particular people whom he serves. He needs to feel continually the pulse of humanity. It is for this reason that professors in colleges and seminaries are rarely good preachers, unless they have previously held parishes. Their trajectory is apt to be adjusted to the scholastic mind. Their sermons need more carpenters and washerwomen in them.

I doubt whether making preachers specialists will give wide effectiveness to preaching. Yet this is not saying that it may not be wise for a minister to lay his main emphasis upon it. He may well take St. Paul's estimate of the relative importance of the several functions of the ministry: "First apostles, secondarily prophets, thirdly teachers; after that"—how unexpected that so marvellous a gift should come so low in his list!—"after that, miracles; then gifts of healings, helps, governments, diversities of tongues." In his earnest coveting of the best gifts a minister may rightly desire to be a teacher and prophet. But he will do well to follow again St. Paul's directions and devote himself to the line of his special ability, whatever that may be; he that teacheth, let him wait on his teaching, or he that exhorteth on exhortation; he that ruleth, with diligence. This course is the most economical for the parish as well as for the minister. If the Sunday sermons are the glowing points of the week, it is unwise for the parish to nag the minister because they do not see him often in their houses. If he is a genius in managing the Sunday School and the

Boys' Club and is a radiating centre of good fellowship for the community, the parish must not complain if he has little to give them on Sunday. Instead of demanding of him to be a preacher, a pastor, an executive, a financier, a musician, an intelligence office, all in one, the parish would get better service if they would help him do that which he can do best, and not worry him or themselves because it is not something different.

It is sometimes supposed, not only by those who are not members of the Episcopal Church but by those who are, that that Church lays little emphasis on preaching. Yet in the Prayer Book preaching is continually placed on a level in importance with the administration of the sacraments. The Bishop asks the one who is being ordained priest, "Are you determined, out of the Scriptures, to instruct the people committed to your charge?" "Will you give your faithful diligence always so to minister the doctrine and sacraments and the discipline of Christ, as the Lord hath commanded?" And when the candidate has given assurances, the Bishop says, "Take thou authority to preach the word of God and to minister the holy sacraments in the congregation." In the Litany are the prayers, "That it may please Thee to illuminate all Bishops, Priests, and Deacons with true knowledge and understanding of Thy word, and that both by their preaching and living they may set it forth and show it accordingly." "That it may please Thee to give to all Thy people increase of grace to hear meekly Thy word." At the consecration of a church the prayer is offered, "Grant, O Lord, that by Thine holy word which shall be read and preached in this place, and by Thy Holy Spirit grafting it inwardly in the heart, the hearers thereof may both perceive and know what things they ought to do, and may have power and strength to fulfil the same." A rubric requires that there shall be a sermon every time the

Communion is celebrated: "Then shall"—not "may" but "shall"—"follow the sermon"; a rubric which is habitually disregarded, even by those who pride themselves on observing all the rubrics.

As we trace back, on the one hand, the service of preaching and prayer to the Jewish Synagogue, and, on the other hand, ceremonial worship to the Temple, we find the Ecclesiast comparing them and emphasizing the superior worth of that in which preaching bears a part: "Keep thy foot when thou goest to the house of God, and be more ready to hear than to give the sacrifice of fools."<sup>1</sup> In the opinion of the Psalmist the apprehension of God's thought is the most important avenue to the understanding of Him: "Thou has magnified Thy word above all Thy name."<sup>2</sup> It is interesting in this connection to note that the opinion of some modern writers is different. The *Tracts For The Times* says: "We would not be thought entirely to deprecate preaching as a means of doing good. It may be necessary in a weak and languishing state; but it is an instrument which Scripture, to say the least, has never recommended." And Paley, in his lectures to theological students, says: "As to preaching, if your situation requires a sermon every Sunday, make one and steal five."<sup>3</sup>

The depreciation of preaching came as an inevitable reaction from the excessive importance it had obtained among the Protestant churches after the Reformation, and especially among the Puritans, just as this was a reaction from the excessive development of ceremonial in the Roman Catholic Church. And yet that there is no necessary opposition between elaborate ceremonial and earnest preaching is shown in the missions of the Roman Catholic and Episcopal Churches. An "either, or" is always an unfortunate antithesis, because it finds little

<sup>1</sup> Eccles. 5, 1.

<sup>2</sup> Ps. 138, 2.

<sup>3</sup> Both quoted in *Directorium Pastorale*, J. H. Blunt; pp. 99, 122.

place in life. When we are presented with two opposites and the demand "Which?" is made upon us, we generally and wisely reply "Both"; and both then generally approach within our grasp in greater or less degree. This is wise, because, as I have said, all the great thought-guided processes of life are not circular but elliptical. So here we find preaching calling to its brother-focus of worship. As the former appeals mainly to the intelligence, so the latter appeals mainly to feeling, and both are necessary to bring the human soul in its fulness before God. That this is being more widely recognized today than heretofore is shown by the growth of ritual in worship among those who, like the Congregationalists and the Quakers, have hitherto been most opposed to it. It is true that these have always had their special ceremonial, though it has been different from that of the historic churches; for to insist on a black coat and a voluntary prayer or a brown coat and a silent prayer, is as truly ritualistic as to require a surplice and a Prayer Book. Yet all the churches are now tending to adopt such forms of worship as bowing or kneeling in prayer, responsive readings, "Amens" or other participation by the congregation, the use of the Lord's Prayer and of chants in common, which until recently were confined to the so-called liturgical churches. The increased use of music and of flowers and other adornments of the houses of worship points to the need that is felt of kindling emotion in Divine service, of calling upon not only the soul but all that is within us to bless God's holy name.

Another cause of this tendency towards development of ritual is in the growing recognition of the corporate nature of religion and therefore of that worship which is its expression and its aid. Society in ancient and mediæval times was based on the idea of corporate relationship. The family, the tribe, the class, the State, were the dominant factors, while the individual had small

consideration and few rights. In the Renaissance the individual asserted his right to himself, and the upheavals which have since taken place in social institutions have been largely owing to efforts for the greater recognition of the individual. This is noticeable in religion. Before the Renaissance the fundamental relation of the soul to God was determined—so it was generally held—by membership in a church, while worship consisted in being present at acts of ritual. With the coming of the Reformation religion was adjusted more immediately to an individual basis. With Luther it emphasized the pronouns of the Bible: "Thou art my God"; "I will save thee." Personal religion, as it was called, pressed upon every one its imperative demand, "Are you a Christian?" and the answer to this must rest on conscious experience in feeling or will. With the last half-century, however, the world has been becoming more fully aware of corporate relationships. Science has been, unconsciously to itself, revealing the significance of the doctrine of election—that the chief conditions of life are not chosen but imposed. In the domain of mind it has been directing its research largely to those regions which are beyond the control of the will. The business of the modern world is carried on less by individuals acting independently and more by combinations, syndicates, institutions. So Protestantism has been awaking to the fact that man's relation to his fellow-man and to God is more than chosen and conscious; it is organic; and this type of religion therefore has been appealing through agencies other than the intellect and the will. Man and God are both found to be greater and more complexly related than had been supposed; and the soul, in its new realization of the Infinite, exclaims afresh with the Psalmist, "O Lord, Thou hast searched me and known me! Thou knowest my down-sitting and mine up-rising; Thou understandest my

thought afar off. Such knowledge is too wonderful for me; It is high; I cannot attain unto it."

Such an attitude is worship. It is the response of the soul to the consciousness of being in the presence of God, its out-going into harmony with Him. To educe this is the aim of all the services of the church. And here is the difference between those churches which, like the Roman Catholic, regard ritual as an ultimate contribution to God, and those which regard it as useful but not ultimate. To the strict ritualist the acts of ritual are in themselves pleasing to God, apart from any effects they may have on men. To the utilitarian ritualist they are valuable—he might even venture to use the technical term "valid"—only by reason of what lies behind them—instruction, awakening, conviction, awe, fear, love. It is such spiritual motions which, he must believe, are pleasing to God; and any ritual whatever which is not accompanied by these is but as "sound-  
ing brass and as a tinkling cymbal."

There are many who hold that the function of ceremonial is wholly expressive; the soul is filled with these spiritual motions and desires to express them to itself and to God. Such psychology posits first the existence of these inward feelings and then their outward embodiment. Sacraments are thus "the outward and visible sign of an inward and spiritual grace." But this view, that the internal moulds the external, leaves out of sight that the external also moulds the internal. Polite manners not only express kind feeling but tend to create it. Military discipline not only springs from respect for authority and obedience to it but tends to beget the respectful and obedient spirit. So the bended knee and the uplifted cross, the marriage ceremony and the sacrament of bread and wine, not only utter the language of the soul but tend to create that of which they are the utterance. This is the fact upon which the High Church-

man of whatever church bases his ceremonial. "But if I have not these inward states to express"—objects the Low Churchman. "Perform these acts," replies the High Churchman, "and you will have them." It is a policy opening the door, on the one hand, to unreality and hypocrisy, and, on the other, to the broadening and deepening of the soul.

This separation from common things points to the side of the Divine nature which worship chiefly contemplates—the transcendence of God. It is the other focus—His immanence—which most deeply underlies preaching. The preacher endeavors to open the eyes of the torpid to discern the eternal lying all about in common things, which they think they understand. The Lord showed Jeremiah a basket of figs, and said to him, "Jeremiah, what seest thou?" and he, who thought he knew a fact when he saw it, answered promptly, "Figs"; but the Lord then proceeded to show him in this common object the whole condition of Jerusalem. Yet beneath the main part of the Old Testament there lies rather the conception of the Divine transcendence, waiting for the New Testament to reveal the other side of God's glory—His immanence. It is the earlier revelation which lends itself more directly to worship. Something of distance seems necessary to awaken the sense of wonder, awe, authority, gratitude for attention unmerited—or, as the theologians define "grace," favor to the undeserving—which constitute the soul's primary response to the consciousness of the presence of God. Worship therefore differentiates the sacred from the common. It establishes a difference between them in time, place, occupation, dress, manners. This important distinction is overlooked by those who oppose observing one day in the week as a Sabbath on the ground that every day should be a Sabbath; by those who would utilize church-buildings for concerts, clubs, picture-shows, picnics, and

other secular interests, because of enlarged public service; by those who object to a uniform for ministers because they hold to the priesthood of all believers; by those who decline to baptize their children because all children are children of God. Such positions assume that the particular is the denial of the universal; although, on the contrary, the universal is necessary to the particular, and it is through the particular that the universal is revealed. The minister differs from other men in dress and occupation in order to call attention, not indeed to a universal occupation, but to a function which is universal. The child is baptized not because the unbaptized are not children of God but to illustrate that they are. The difference then between common and sacred is but an extension of the difference between mine and yours. Wherever two personalities approach, there must be the recognition of that which belongs specifically to each, as well as that which they have in common.

It is this recognition of the specialness of God which worship emphasizes; yet wherever it is torn apart from its correlate—the community of man with God—dissected out and left bare, unreality must result and that inhumanity in the conception of God which is a denial of the truth of the Incarnation. St. Paul can find nothing but the majestic phrases of Hebrew poetry sufficient to express his feeling of the vastness of God above men: “O the depth of the riches both of the wisdom and knowledge of God! How unsearchable are His judgments, and His ways past finding out! For who hath known the mind of the Lord, or who hath been His counsellor?” Yet almost in the same breath he can exclaim, “Abba, Father! The Spirit itself beareth witness with our spirit that we are the children of God.” And as if the blessed intimacy needed expansion, he expatiates, “If children, then heirs; heirs of God”; and even, to put it on the highest plane, “joint heirs with Christ.”

This feeling of the presence of God will shape in all its parts the service of the church. It will create a hush among the ebullient activities of life, so that laughter and loud talk will drop to silence on entering a church, not because they are wrong but because other feelings there claim way. It will make chat right and left with one's fellows before the service jarring, and the absence of it after service equally jarring. It will prevent minister and congregation from regarding the parts of the service other than the sermon as "preliminary exercises," and will estop him from sitting and fingering his sermon while the congregation stand and sing. Perhaps it may even prevent him from speaking of them as "the audience," and of the church as an "auditorium." It may affect the construction of the church-building; and instead of having the lines of attention converge upon the minister or the choir just behind him, the eye will be led to an altar or communion-table or some other symbol of the central mystery of Christianity. It will mould the sermon. Not that it will banish all forms of it but one, but it will make the ultimate aim of all forms the same—to awaken in the soul a joyful upreach and a responsive "I will." To this end instruction may be necessary; but it will not be the object of the sermon, as it is properly of a lecture. For a sermon is, or should be, a poem, having its aim to arouse feeling. It will of course endeavor that the feeling shall not snuggle content with itself but shall be transmuted into inward action; as it was with the Psalmist, who declared, "Mine ears hast Thou opened," and then said at once, "Lo, I come to do Thy will, O my God!" Attitude in the soul comes thus to be regarded as of more importance than opinions or specific acts of the will, and the tone, the atmosphere, of a service more important than the ideas which are brought away from it. As one who has been busy with the interests of the world leaves a

church which is filled with this atmosphere, he is compelled to exclaim with the patriarch Jacob, "Surely, God is in this place, and I knew it not."

Can this worshipful attitude be taught? In spite of the opinion that the poet and the preacher and every kind of artist is born, not made, and that teaching here is futile, I cannot but believe that it is possible to teach much not only of the practice but of the spirit of worship. For this it will not be necessary to found professorships of ecclesiastical manners, though the etiquette-books have a function; but, here as elsewhere, the spirit of God, brooding upon that which is without form and void, will evolve order and beauty. And in judging results we must ever remember that there is no form of worship which is best, but that every form is to be judged by its efficiency, or, to use St. Paul's word, its capacity for edifying. For when he was regulating the irregular worship of the Corinthian Church, he announced as the true law of worship, "Let all things be done unto edifying." Does the ritual result in upbuilding? does it spring from and give rise to reverence, awe, joy, purpose, enlargement of soul, communion with God? Antiquity may be a precious element in it, as may be also its fitness to the immediate occasion. But its test will be not roots but fruits. "By their fruits," said our Lord, "ye shall know them." Edification can flow through utterly unlikely channels. Forms historically pagan may give rise to worship truly Christian, and ideas of God which, when logically faced, are shocking, when bathed in the mists of custom, may, in spite of their insecure foundations, become beams of the glory of God; as says the Psalmist, "He layeth the beams of His chambers in the waters." Yet because good fruit may sometimes defy logic and grow on poor soil, it does not follow that attempts to provide good soil are superfluous. Roses grew better in Sharon than on Mt. Carmel.

In considering what characteristics ritual should have in order to be edifying, we find three. First of all, it should be historic. Not that "as it was in the beginning" implies "is now, and ever shall be"; but the ritual should have its roots in the past, basing itself on the devotion of the ages, using to some extent their forms, their very words; otherwise it will smell of the paint. The hand of the adapter must not be seen, furnishing the house; for a ritual should have something of the permanence, the inevitableness, of a work of nature. If changed every week, it pleases only the inventor, and him not long. "Sir," says the thirsty soul, "thou has nothing to draw with, and the well is deep." To feel oneself standing surrounded by generations of the past at their devotions is a step to feeling oneself standing in the presence of God; for the voice of the individual is then blended with that of all the generations in their rapt utterance, "Lord, Thou hast been our dwelling-place!"

The second characteristic of an edifying ritual is that it should include the individual element. All the great liturgies do this through their elastic admission of local variations. There are hardly two parishes in any church particular for uniformity where the service is exactly alike; and, more express than this, place, large or small, is always established for that distinctive field for individualism—a sermon. Further still, the attitude of the ritual to its worshipper must be not that of a master but of a servant; not "Here am I, established, divine, sacrosanct. Conform yourself to me," but "How can I best serve the multitudinous you?" The worshipper should feel himself not cramping his limbs into a mould, but expanding with a deep inspiration of the joy of existence. "I opened my mouth and drew in my breath, for my delight was in Thy commandments." He, or his representative — some committee, convention,

synod, or other establishing body—may pick and choose stones for their temple. Let them beware that it is not furnished and upholstered in the latest fashion; but let them also beware that they do not build the tombs of the prophets.

The third characteristic of an edifying ritual is that it should include not only the individual but the corporate element. It must ask not only a conscious response but an unconscious one. The primary predominant choice which utters itself in "I will" is the strongest of the bands of a man; but behind and around it are the cords which are tied to ancestry, education, custom, taste, belief, and by all these must worship draw the soul. While at one time it gives him the consciousness of standing naked and alone before God, at another it will make him feel himself tied in with the great mass of humanity and, through living in ways which are saving, moving on with it to salvation unconsciously and steadily, as the glaciers move. He is glad Jesus said that the kingdom of God cometh not with observation, but that the earth bringeth forth fruit of herself, so that a man may cast seed into the ground, and then sleep and rise night and day, and the seed will spring and grow up, though he knoweth not how. Something of this large, organic, cosmic character of religion must make itself felt in an edifying ritual.

The importance of preaching, on the one hand, or of worship, on the other, has been recognized in every age. The importance of both has been recognized more rarely. Their parity of importance found architectural expression in the church which George Herbert built at Leighton in Huntingdonshire; where, says Izaak Walton, "by his order the reading-pew and pulpit were a little distant from each other and both of an equal height; for he would often say 'They should neither have a precedence or priority of the other, but that prayer and preaching,

being equally useful, might agree like brethren.'" Preaching and worship are the two wings by which the services of the church are uplifted from the ground and borne on swift and efficient flight man-ward and God-ward; like the cherub of whom Ezekiel said, "With twain he did fly." Sermons which are not filled with reverence, ritual which is not revealing and edifying, both crawl. Only where each has the aid of the other does the service wing full flight toward heaven.

## BOOK REVIEWS

THE MYTHOLOGY OF ALL RACES. 13 vols. (Louis Herbert Gray, Editor; George Foot Moore, Consulting Editor.) Vol. X, North American. HARTLEY BURR ALEXANDER, Professor of Philosophy, University of Nebraska. Marshall Jones Co. 1916. Pp. xxvi, 325.

In spite of the interest taken and the great advances made in recent years in the study of the mythology of the American Indian, no serious attempt has been made for a generation to give in a single volume a critical *résumé* of the whole subject. All students therefore will take up this volume of Professor Alexander's with great anticipation, and will be keen to see how he has understood his task and presented his material. From the outset it is clear that the author has conceived his problem very broadly, and has thus, by the inclusion of a variety of elements pertaining more to religion than to mythology proper, written a treatise on North American Indian religion as illustrated by mythology, rather than a critical study of the tales themselves; he has given more of an interpretation than a presentation of the facts. In his selection of a geographic basis of arrangement for the material, he has followed what is, at least for the present, probably the wiser course. In so doing he has adopted, for the most part, the accepted scheme of culture-areas into which the anthropologist divides the continent, the chief exceptions to this being the inclusion of the Northern Athabascans in the Great Plains area, and of the Southern Athabascans with the tribes of the Interior Plateaus.

The first chapter is devoted to the Eskimo, who, because of their isolation and peculiar environment, present features of great interest. The broad scope and descriptive method characteristic of the whole book, makes itself felt here at once, in that barely half the available space is devoted to the myths themselves, the remainder being occupied by historical details and general descriptions of Eskimo life and religious beliefs. Unfortunately, no attention is called to the really distinctive features of Eskimo mythology, which lie in its striking uniformity over great areas, its matter-of-factness, and its lack of the type of animal tales so characteristic of most other parts of the continent.

The two following chapters deal with the Forest Tribes: the

Algonkian and Iroquoian peoples of the Great Lakes and the North Atlantic States. In his treatment of this area the author has been more fortunate, and has given an excellent outline of the characteristic beliefs. The dualistic features of the culture-heroes are clearly brought out, and the order and dramatic quality of Iroquoian cosmogony is emphasized. We meet, however, with a tendency, shown pretty strongly throughout the volume, to make generalizations which are hardly warranted by the facts, and which therefore give the reader rather unfortunate impressions. Thus it is declared (p. 30) that *all* Indians have developed the theory of Platonic Archetypes, a statement which although perhaps true for this particular region, is certainly not so for the continent as a whole. It may also be pointed out that it is decidedly open to question whether the Siouan tribes of this area are "intruders," and that it is doubtful if many would accept the theory that Iroquoian mythology was merely a systematization of borrowed Algonkian elements.

The next group treated comprises the tribes of the Gulf region, of whom the most important in historic times were the peoples of Muskogean stock. Inasmuch, however, as this stock was very probably immigrant from the region west of the Mississippi river, it is hardly accurate to speak of them as "aboriginals of the soil." In this chapter attention is called to the increased importance of the Sun in ceremonial rites, and an outline is given of the Busk or Green Corn dance characteristic of the Muskogean tribes. In the cosmogonic tales a distinction is made between the former and the Iroquoian Cherokee and the Yuchi, in that the Muskogean tribes show more of a relationship than do the latter to the types of the Southwest.

To the very important area of the Great Plains, two chapters are given. The various deities and the ceremonials held in their honor are first described, followed by an outline of the Northern Athabascan, Siouan, and Caddoan cosmogonies, a selection of tales of various types, and concluding with a consideration of migration legends. Selection from the large mass of material available for this region is difficult, but it seems to have been carefully done in this case, except that the Northern Athabascan has been unduly slighted and the Pawnee given rather too prominent a place. In describing the Morning Star sacrifice of the latter, a parallel is pointed out in the human sacrifice practised by the Kandhs of India. The statement, however, that the victim in this case was always a virgin is incorrect, as persons of both sexes were sacrificed, the victims being either kidnapped or bought. Attention must also be called to the absurdity of the views put forth on page 126. It is, to say the least, unfor-

tunate that the author should allow himself to trifle in this way, and seriously suggest that in the mythology of the Plains tribes we may see vague recollections of the glacial period, the mammoth, and sabre-toothed tiger, or that the Messianic tales of bearded culture-heroes are but the dim remembrances of the eleventh-century Scandinavian colonies in Greenland.

The two following chapters are headed "Mountain and Desert," and under this caption all the peoples of the Interior Plateaus, together with the Athabascans of the Southwest and the Piman and Yuman tribes of California and Northern Mexico, are discussed. The inclusion of the Athabascan, Piman, and Yuman tribes with the true Plateau peoples is unfortunate, inasmuch as they belong so much more clearly with the Pueblo groups of the Southwest. The tendency to draw far-fetched conclusions is here again shown in the suggestion that the episode of Coyote snatching the heart from a body about to be cremated, as told in a Yuman tale, is in some way related to the Nahuan custom of human sacrifice. The mythology of the Pueblo group is next considered, but in a manner which again illustrates the disproportionate space given to religion and ceremonial as contrasted with mythology proper, for nearly a third of the chapter is devoted to this aspect of the subject. When at length the mythology is dealt with, attention is concentrated, and rightly, upon the cosmogonic tales, but it is unfortunate that no mention is made of some other classes of tales which are of great interest.

The Pacific Coast is treated in the last two chapters, the first dealing with the tribes of California and Oregon, the second with those of the Northwest Coast. In the former, in referring to the great linguistic diversity of the region, it is compared with the Himalaya, where a similar diversity is said to obtain. The comparison is hardly an exact one, inasmuch as in the Himalayan area, although dialectic variation exists, all the languages belong to two or three linguistic stocks, whereas in California the differentiation is one not only of dialects but of stocks themselves. It may also be noted that it is the Pomo, not the Hupa as stated, who excel in basketry in California. By some error in binding, the titles of plates XXVIII and XXIX have been transposed. The chapter dealing with the Northwest Coast tribes, like that on the Pueblo peoples, devotes too much space to matters outside the scope of mythology proper, about half the chapter being taken up with such topics as the Secret Society organization, ceremonials, and the Potlatch. As a result, the Raven and Transformer cycles, so characteristic of this region, are inadequately presented.

The notes, which have been placed in an appendix, are grouped under subject headings, such as monsters, ghosts, Sun and Moon, Corn Spirits, etc. This gives an opportunity for brief general discussions of the several topics, and is in many ways very convenient. In many of the notes, however, as in the text itself, the author makes sweeping generalizations which in many cases would not find wide acceptance, and in others are not in accord with the facts. Thus in note 30 it is stated that "the ritual of the ceremonial pipe or calumet, is the *most important of all* North American religious forms"; and in note 29 it is said that human sacrifice in one form or another appears in *every part* of aboriginal America—whereas as a matter of fact it is extremely limited in its distribution in the entire continent outside of Mexico. A selected bibliography is given, following the regional arrangement of the book. This is convenient, and with a few exceptions the references given are well chosen. In some cases, notably under Algonkian Tribes in Chapters II and III and the Northern Athabascan and Siouan tribes of Chapters V and VI, there are several instances in which, in place of the titles given, more complete and modern sources might have been selected. Under the heading of Algonkian Tribes, of Chapters II and III, the inclusion of Iroquoian (Huron) and Siouan (Winnebago) material is hardly justified. The omission from the list of general works of Boas' critical discussion of North American Mythology, in J.A.F.L. XXVII, is also unfortunate.

Lest these various comments should seem too severely critical, let me hasten to say that weighed against the great general excellence of the volume, they are to be considered as distinctly of secondary importance. The task of presenting in any reasonable compass the mythology of the North American Indians is one of such difficulty, and one which demands so wide a knowledge not only of the mythology but of the whole range of American Anthropology, that the author deserves warm praise for the admirable manner in which he has accomplished it. Professor Alexander is by profession a philosopher, not an anthropologist, which probably explains why in this, his first serious undertaking in a subject which lies outside his own field, he has approached the matter more from the point of view of description and interpretation than from that of critical presentation. Having adopted the former method, however, one cannot help wishing that the evidences of transmission, in which Indian mythology abounds, had been more directly stressed, and the bearing of these facts on the growth of mythology in general had been made more clear. The author has, however, made a very

definite and valuable contribution to the literature on North American mythology, and in this volume, generously enriched by the publisher with a wealth of remarkably fine plates (many of which are in color), we have at last an account, entertaining in style and based upon trustworthy sources, from which student and layman alike may gain, better than ever before, a real knowledge of the mythology of the first Americans.

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DER TEUFEL IN DEN DEUTSCHEN GEISTLICHEN SPIELEN DES MITTELALTERS UND DER REFORMATIÖNSZEIT. EIN BEITRAG ZUR LITERATUR-, KULTUR-, UND KIRCHENGESCHICHTE DEUTSCHLANDS. Dr. MAXIMILIAN JOSEF RUDWIN. Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, Göttingen. 1915. (Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins Press.) Pp. xii, 194. 5m.

Dr. Maximilian J. Rudwin, formerly of Purdue University, now of the University of Illinois, is favorably known to mediæval scholars through a number of recent researches on the German ecclesiastical drama, beginning with a paper published in 1913 on the prophet and disputation scenes in the Christmas, Passion, and other religious plays. He has now followed up these detached studies with a comprehensive monograph on *The Devil in the German Religious Drama of the Middle Ages and the Reformation*, which is indeed, as the subtitle indicates, a "contribution to the literary, cultural, and ecclesiastical history of Germany."

The book is divided into two parts, which, however, frequently overlap and supplement each other. The first part deals with the individual scenes of the various cycles of plays in which a devil or devils appear; the second part attempts to give a consistent and complete picture of the character of the mediæval stage-devil and his realm.

Under the first heading there are discussed such scenes as the following: the fall of Lucifer; the creation of man; the fall of man; the temptation of Job, and other so-called prefigurations of Old Testament origin; the adoration of the shepherds; the slaughter of the innocents; the death of Herod; the death of John the Baptist; the worldly life of Mary Magdalen; the public career of Christ from the temptation in the wilderness to the passion, the harrowing of hell, and the ascension; the foolish-virgins scenes; the Antichrist scenes; the contract with Theophilus and Jutta. The method applied by the author to all these different cases is the same—first, the biblical or theological basis of the underlying conception of each

scene is established; then the modifications of the scene in the various plays are traced, notably the constantly increasing accretions of farcical elements; and finally, a characterization of its common dramatic type is attempted.

It cannot be said that this discussion brings out anything startlingly new. But the author has certainly brought together a great mass of interesting material and presented it in an orderly and judicious manner. And this material makes it perfectly plain that the function of the devil in the mediæval religious drama was not only that of a comic counterpart to the solemnly heroic scenes and figures, but stood in the very centre of the action as one of the principal moving forces, although a negative one, in the work of redemption. It is a pity that in the Oberammergau Play this feature of the mediæval drama has been entirely obliterated. As a specimen of the author's good judgment may be cited his discussion of the chronological position given in the majority of the religious plays to the scene of the harrowing of hell.<sup>1</sup> According to the *Symbolum Nicænum*, Christ's descent into hell took place between the entombment and the resurrection; in most of the Easter, Passion, and *Corpus Christi* plays, it follows the resurrection. Most scholars have found an explanation for this curious deviation from the accepted dogma in the impossibility of representing Christ's soul upon the stage without a body. Dr. Rudwin, more discerningly it seems to me, sees the explanation in the fact that Christ could not well be represented as victor over hell before he had appeared as victor over death.

The principal topics of the second part of the book are the hierarchy of the infernal realm; the constitution of pandemonium; the residences of the devils; their names; their various classes and callings; their language; their songs and dances; their intercourse with each other; their relation to God and mankind. Here again the value of Dr. Rudwin's observations lies more in their carefulness, accuracy, and comprehensiveness than in originality or critical acumen. Of particular interest is the chapter bringing out in detail the mediæval conception of the devil as "*Simia Dei*" and as "*Simia Christi*," and of Lillis, the devil's mother, as "*Simia Mariae*." The most illuminating chapter, however, seems to me the one in which

<sup>1</sup> It is to be regretted that the discussion of this scene is put at the very beginning, before the discussion of the Old Testament scenes, instead of connecting it with the other scenes from the passion. For although, in Dr. Rudwin's not altogether conclusive opinion, the harrowing of hell was the earliest scene in which the devil appeared on the stage, the arrangement in this chapter follows the order of biblical events, not the chronology of mediæval stage history.

Lucifer, the prince of hell, and his prime minister, Satan, are contrasted with each other—Lucifer, a hypochondriac, longing and wailing for his former angelic estate, nervous, capricious, sentimental, swaggering, a cowardly despot; Satan, ever active and optimistic, versatile, bold, full of fun, a loyal though misguided servant. The subordinate position of Satan as compared with the official status of Lucifer is very plausibly traced back by Dr. Rudwin to the Gospel of Nicodemus, where "*Inferus*" appears as Satan's superior.

To sum up—Dr. Rudwin's book is descriptive rather than analytic, statistical rather than historical. But it is a decidedly useful book. No one interested in the popular theology and demonology of the Middle Ages can afford to overlook it.

Two little details may be mentioned at the end. It is hard to see how the author can think (p. 51) that Satan in the John the Baptist episode of the Alsfeld Passion Play changes his disguise from that of an old woman to that of a prior, in the face of so obvious a correction of the text as Creizenach's substitution of "*habitu priori*" for "*habitu prioris*." The quotations from the *Zehnjungfrauenspiel* (p. 63) should have been from the edition of Otto Beckers, not from the older one by Bechstein.

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THE ELEMENTARY FORMS OF THE RELIGIOUS LIFE. A STUDY IN RELIGIOUS SOCIOLOGY. ÉMILE DURKHEIM. Translated by Joseph Ward Swain. George Allen & Unwin. 1915. Pp. xi, 456.

The distinguished French sociologist, É. Durkheim, offers in this work an elaborate and painstaking analysis of the rôle which religion plays in human societies. Durkheim is already well known as the editor of *L'Année sociologique* and as the author of *Les règles de la méthode sociologique*, *De la division du travail social*, and *Le suicide*, and as the leader of a brilliant group of sociologists whose influence has been increasingly felt beyond the borders of their own country. *La vie religieuse* is of profound interest to the philosopher, theologian, sociologist, and anthropologist. The author offers us an interpretation of religion, and he supports and illustrates that interpretation by an elaborate and penetrating analysis of Australian totemism. The noteworthy aspect of this most recent book of Durkheim is not that the author studies the social aspect and function of religious ideas and ritual, but that he undertakes in a radical and thorough-going fashion to derive every enduring and significant aspect of religion from man's social experience. Until you can see the way

in which religious ideas and rites are thrown off by the mechanism of social contact, by the life of men in groups, you have no proper understanding of what anything religious means. This is what Durkheim in substance says. And, incidentally, once you understand these processes of man's social life, you will comprehend not only his religion but the fundamental categories of his thinking as well. But that is another story.

Before coming to his own definition of religion, Durkheim clears the way by a criticism of some of the more common definitions of religion. It is entirely inadequate to define religion in terms of the supernatural and the mysterious; the idea of the supernatural is but a late-comer in the history of religion. It is foreign to primitive peoples as well as to the lower levels of culture. Nor is the idea of divinity, of the gods or of God, any more satisfactory as an earmark of religion. There is no such idea in authentic Buddhism, and even in the theistic religions there are many rites which have nothing to do with a god. How then shall we define the essence of religion? Durkheim's answer consists of two parts. First, religion centres around a distinction between the sacred and the common. This distinction differs from that between the supernatural and the natural in that both the sacred and the profane fall *within* man's natural experience. But magic, as well as religion, makes use of the distinction between common things and sacred things. Another constituent of religion must be found which distinguishes it from magic. Religion is always an affair of a church, of a social community; magic is individual and anti-social. "There is no church of magic" (p. 44). This idea of a church is no incidental concomitant of religion; it enters into the very essence and definition of religion. The most important thing you can observe about religion is the way in which it both cements and also gives utterance to the collective life of some group. Combining these two essential elements of religion, Durkheim gives us the following definition (p. 47): "A religion is a unified system of beliefs and practices relative to sacred things, that is to say, things set apart and forbidden — beliefs and practices which unite into one single moral community called a church, all those who adhere to them."

With this preliminary definition Durkheim next offers a trenchant criticism of two traditional conceptions of religion, animism and naturism. He contends that dreams cannot possibly account for the idea of the soul, that the phenomenon of death does not explain the transformation of a soul into a spirit, that neither the cult of the souls of the dead nor religious anthropomorphism at large is

primitive. Moreover, and more important, animism cannot be an adequate interpretation of religion, for it reduces religion to nothing more than a system of hallucinations. The author's words are worth quoting:

"It is inadmissible that systems of ideas like religions, which have held so considerable a place in history, and from which in all times men have come to receive the energy which they must have to live, should be made up of a tissue of illusions. Today we are beginning to realize that law, morals, and even scientific thought itself were born of religion, were for a long time confounded with it, and have remained penetrated with its spirit. How could a vain fantasy have been able to fashion the human consciousness so strongly and so durably?" (p. 69).

The naturism of Max Müller does not offer any more satisfactory account of religion. According to it, religion is permeated with illusions and fallacies, and it is unable to account for the division of things into sacred and profane. Where animism and naturism fail, totemism succeeds. The greater part of *La vie religieuse* sets forth a theory of totemism, and its significance in generating and sustaining religious rites and beliefs. The following is a summary of Durkheim's views: Totemism stands for a form of tribal organization in which "the men of the clan and the things which are classified in it form by their union a solid system, all of whose parts are united and vibrate sympathetically" (p. 150). The quality of sacredness—which is one of the two essential attributes of religion—attaches preëminently to the totem. This quality, like a subtle, impersonal force, also pervades the entire totemic group, composed of men and things. And totemism is in truth the religion of "an anonymous and impersonal force" (p. 188). This Mana—for such the anthropologists call it—is the essence and the vital principle which confers sacredness upon whatever comes in contact with it. To see the source of this idea of Mana is then to penetrate to the tap-root of religion. It is here that Durkheim is most bold and most original. The concept of an impersonal Mana, the force at once physical and moral which confers sacredness upon things and thus generates religion, is itself the creation of social pressure, of social contact and experience. Society alone, of all known empirical forces, has the power of "constantly creating sacred things out of ordinary ones" (p. 212). Religion is a symbol for the reality and the might of social forces. Society too is the literal object of religious worship; religion turns out thus to be no myth and no illusion precisely in so far as the collective life of man is no myth and no illusion. From this totemic principle, at once the giver of all sacredness and the

deposit of social experience, there is derived the idea of the individual soul, the ideas of spirits and gods, in short, all of the later religious concepts. The last part of the book studies the principal ritual attitudes involved in religion. Durkheim derives all religious rites from one and the same mental state and need: "In all its forms its object is to raise man above himself, and to make him lead a life superior to that which he would lead if he followed only his own individual whims. Beliefs express this life in representations; rites organize it and regulate its working" (p. 414).

In a brief conclusion Durkheim deals with some of the larger topics suggested by his interpretation of religion. It is to be hoped that he will return to these at greater length in a future study. He also here voices his hope for the future of religion in these noteworthy words:

"If we find a little difficulty today in imagining what these feasts and ceremonies of the future could consist in, it is because we are going through a stage of transition and moral mediocrity. The great things of the past which filled our fathers with enthusiasm do not excite the same ardor in us, either because they have come into common usage to such an extent that we are unconscious of them, or else because they no longer answer to our actual aspirations; but as yet there is nothing to replace them. . . . A day will come when our societies will know again those hours of creative effervescence, in the course of which new ideas arise and new formulæ are found which serve for a while as a guide to humanity; and when these hours shall have been passed through once, men will spontaneously feel the need of re-living them from time to time in thought, that is to say, of keeping alive their memory by means of celebrations which regularly reproduce their fruits" (p. 427).

To criticise this book with any justice would be to trespass upon most of the live issues in contemporary philosophy so far as they touch the practical interests of men. That Durkheim's studies as sociologist and anthropologist have led him to see the full measure of religion in the achievements of primitive societies and to be relatively indifferent to the individual pole of human life, is perhaps to be expected. The thoughtful reader is not likely to find all his problems solved. Nevertheless he will be grateful for so comprehensive and masterly an indication of the intimate and still problematic relation between men's religious life and their social experience.

GEORGE P. ADAMS.

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA.

THE LIMITATIONS OF SCIENCE. LOUIS TRENCHARD MORE, Ph.D., Professor in the University of Cincinnati. Henry Holt & Co. 1915. Pp. 268. \$1.50.

This is a critical review of present scientific tendencies, by a scientist. The value of such a book, except in the comparatively rare cases in which the author is both a scientist and a philosopher, lies in its selecting and presenting in comparatively untechnical form certain broadly characteristic instances of scientific method. The present book contains matter for critical reflection; and to have that matter so collected and summarized is of advantage both to the general reader and to the philosopher. But the author cannot be said to exhibit either originality or skill in his own criticism.

The book is a plea for a more rigorous positivism in science. Such a plea is timely in view of the present tendency among scientists to speculate on the ultimate constitution of matter. The new hypothesis of the electron, the conception of radio-activity, and the revision of the classic mechanics through the introduction of the principle of relativity, have led to such extravagances as Lorentz's attempt to conceive the ultimate substance as an electro-magnetic entity, or Einstein's hypothesis that length and time vary with motion. According to the author's view, it is both impossible and outside the province of science to conceive an ultimate physical substance that shall possess consistently and intelligibly all the properties that the most recent experimental discoveries require. Electricity is as impossible a substance as the earlier ether. The only hypothesis that has any virtue is the atomic hypothesis, and its only value is "to give a concrete, though crude, image of matter reduced to its simplest conditions." "The word electricity gives no such image of matter; it conveys absolutely no idea of materiality nor even of space or time relations."

It appears then that the author, after all, objects not so much to postulates that carry one beyond the data of experimentation as to those new postulates with which it is now proposed to supplant matter. He is not so much positivistic as conservative. In speaking of his own view, he says: "We have first postulated a real and objective universe, and assigned to matter rather than to energy the rôle of being an entity." He is not troubled by the fact that "the fundamental attribute of matter which makes it recognizable by our senses is force." In other words, although admitting that the phenomenon is force rather than matter, and that matter is thus a trans-phenomenal entity invoked for theoretical motives, he does not on that account hesitate to invoke it. He does not hesitate,

even though he has himself insisted on "the truth that we cannot attain any knowledge of things themselves but only of their attributes as they affect the senses."

Thus Professor More is not one of the radical positivists who would refrain from asserting the existence of anything that cannot be sensibly experienced, and confine science to the most economical possible description of the data of sense; but he is a positivist of the Spencerian, agnostic school, an old-fashioned relativist, who asserts the existence of an unknowable absolute. He does not escape the difficulty inherent in the agnostic view—how assert the existence of that of which we know nothing? Furthermore, it is inevitable that in such a view the agnosticism should annul the positivism. For if one can transcend experience in one's fundamental metaphysical assertion, why should science not hope to do likewise? And the mind which is convinced that reality lies beyond the range of perception or any mode of certain knowledge can scarcely be restrained from adventuring thither by the less trustworthy means of the imagination or the speculative reason.

HARVARD UNIVERSITY.

RALPH BARTON PERRY.

THE CENTENNIAL HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN BIBLE SOCIETY. HENRY OTIS DWIGHT. The Macmillan Co. 1916. Pp. vi, 605. \$1.00.

The Society was founded in the belief that the Bible is not only inspired but inspiring. The men who established it were confident that the book of itself, without comment, without the aid of preachers, was able to change the life of the reader and to save his soul. It had the independent efficacy of medicine; it needed only to be taken. They resolved to bring it within reach of every man. The first year they printed and distributed six thousand Bibles; the second year, seventeen thousand. With the third year they began to publish the New Testament separately: seven thousand copies of the Christian Scriptures, besides twenty-three thousand copies of the Christian and the Jewish Scriptures bound together. As the century of this publication ended, the report of the ninety-ninth year showed a sale of six million New Testaments over against three hundred and fifty thousand Old and New combined. These figures represent a lesson which the Society has learned by its experience. At the beginning the common theory was that the Bible is all valuable alike, being, as they said, the "word of God." It gradually appeared, however, as a matter of statistical fact that the New Testament is more valuable than the Old for the purposes of religion

in the proportion of six million to three hundred and fifty thousand; that is, the New Testament by itself is nearly twenty times as effective for the good of the soul as the Bible wherein the New Testament is encumbered with the Old. This is an interesting result of a hundred years of use of these books. If it had been foreseen, there might have been a lightening of the labors of some of the devout scholars who translated the Scriptures into the hundred and sixty-four languages in which the Society distributes them. It would have saved them from doing Leviticus and some other hopelessly local and obsolete books into Arapahoe, or Cambodian, or Esthonian, or Zapotec, or Zulu.

Another fact which this history confirms is that the Bible is a disturbing, dynamic, revolutionary book. The founders of the Society were lovers of peace, although it was noticed that the first meeting brought together "many of the most polemical theologians of the different denominations." They had no expectation of active resistance to their charitable work. But such opposition presently appeared; much of it in the foreign field where the Bible was a symbol of an intrusive religion, and was logically under the ban of the conservatives; but not there only. It was made plain that the Bible is essentially a Protestant book, individualistic, radical, in favor of changes in religion. The priest and the prophet represent each a permanent element in the spiritual life, but even a casual reader perceives that the Old Testament is mostly on the side of the prophet and against the priest, and that this is even more markedly true of the New Testament. The New Testament declares that Christ was crucified by priests because of his opposition to many of the things for which ecclesiastics chiefly cared. It reveals the Christian Church having its beginning in schism, and even after this beginning having for its chief minister and theologian an apostle who was frankly and eagerly proud of the fact that he was independent of the apostolic succession. Accordingly, the Bible Society found enemies everywhere among ecclesiastics. No priest of any communion could properly commend it to the perusal of his parishioners. Thus the distributors of the book entered into the perils of martyrdom at the hands of Christians as well as of pagans.

How these men and women met these perils abroad and at home, into what heroisms they came, what pains they underwent, what martyr-deaths many of them died, this centennial history tells. It might easily have been a dully pious record of statistics. Dr. Dwight has filled it with human interest. He has illustrated it with a thousand stories of adventure.

GEORGE HODGES.

THE COPTIC PSALTER IN THE FREER COLLECTION (Part I, Vol. X, Humanistic Series, University of Michigan Studies). Edited by WILLIAM H. WORRELL, Hartford Seminary Foundation. The Macmillan Co. 1916. Pp. xxvi, 112. \$2.00.

In this excellent publication Dr. Worrell has edited the following texts from the Freer Coptic Collection: (1) an incomplete Psalter, i.e. considerable portions of Psalms (vi, 5-liii, 3); (2) a Psalter fragment (Ps. xlivi, 25-xliv, 8; xlvi, 1-7); and (3) a fragment of the Book of Job (xxiv, 19-xxv, 3; xxvii, 10-19). All these documents, said to be of Fayyûmic origin, are in the Sahidic dialect. The Psalter manuscript, fully described in the introduction, is exceedingly interesting from a palaeographical standpoint. Like most ancient manuscripts, it is undated; but on account of its resemblance to some Fayyûmic manuscripts, the dates of which are fairly well established, its date is presumed to lie between that of the London Sahidic Psalter (about 700 A.D. according to Budge) and that of the Berlin Sahidic Psalter (about 400 A.D. according to Rahlfs). The writing seems to show three distinct hands: A, B, and C. A is a round or Coptic hand, characterized by round forms of Alpha, Mu, and Upsilon; B is a square or Greek hand, having square forms for these three letters; C is a very small, regular hand, which has exceptionally long and upright stems to Alpha and Mu, and a Shima leaning backward. C is found only in the last five pages. Notwithstanding these differences, Dr. Worrell thinks it probable that the whole manuscript is from one and the same scribe. His opinion is well founded, at least as regards A and B, for these two, except for the three letters mentioned above, are identical. In fact the admixture of the square and round forms of those three letters does not necessarily point to different hands; there are other instances in which one and the same scribe used them alternately. Cf. Hyvernat's *Album de Paléographie Copte*, plate IV, no. 2 (vi or vii cent.).

The Freer manuscript presents some orthographic peculiarities, v. gr. :  $\iota$  for  $\epsilon$  in words borrowed from the Greek;  $\alpha\iota$  for  $\alpha\epsilon$ ,  $\alpha\iota$  for  $\alpha\epsilon\iota$ ,  $\alpha\gamma\iota$  for  $\alpha\gamma\epsilon\iota$  in Coptic words. A more remarkable feature is the occasional doubling of  $\eta$  before initial vowels. This occurs not only for the particles  $\eta$  and  $\gamma\eta$ , but also for  $\eta\eta\eta$ ,  $\gamma\eta\eta\eta$ ,  $\chi\eta\eta$ ,  $\gamma\eta\eta\eta$ ,  $\eta\eta\alpha\gamma\eta\eta$ , and  $\alpha\chi\eta\eta$ . It would have been well to bring this out more plainly in the edition, and divide thus:  $\gamma\eta\eta\eta$   $\alpha\gamma\eta\eta\eta$ ,  $\eta\eta\eta$   $\alpha\chi\eta\eta\eta$ ,  $\gamma\eta\eta\eta\eta$   $\alpha\gamma\eta\eta\eta$ ,  $\alpha\chi\eta\eta\eta$ , etc.

The text itself stands in very close relation to that of the other Sahidic Psalters, and only in a few cases does it seem to imply a

textual difference in the Greek. The strange reading περιχριστος (xvii, 51; xix, 7), which is found also in the Parham Psalter, is probably an itacism for περιχριστος. In xliii, 22 the manuscript has πετωθινε, whilst the other Sahidic texts have πετηθινε in agreement with the Greek ἐκῆγητησε. It is interesting to remark that Lucifer of Cagliari (d. 371), quoting Ps. xliii, 22, in his work *Moriendum esse pro Filio Dei* (Migne, *P.L.*, vol. XIII, col. 1030), uses the present "requirit": "Si oblii sumus nomen Dei nostri et si expandimus manus nostras ad deum alienum, nonne Deus requirit ista?"

The edition of the Freer Coptic Psalter is a model of its kind. It reproduces the manuscript line for line as far as possible. The missing portions of the text have been supplied from the London manuscript and placed between square brackets; and, where the London manuscript is corrupt, from other sources indicated in the notes. The writer of this notice, having had the opportunity of collating many pages of the printed text with the photographs of the original, may be permitted to express his high opinion of the accurate and conscientious manner in which the editor has performed a most difficult task.

The Coptic character used in this edition was made under the supervision of Mr. J. W. Phinney of the American Typefounders' Company, from designs prepared by Dr. Worrell himself. It is clear, neat, and graceful, and represents intelligibly the square hand of the manuscript. This, we believe, is the first attempt to print Coptic texts in this country, and it is gratifying to see that the venture has been a great success.

A. VASCHALDE.

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THE BEARING OF RECENT DISCOVERY ON THE TRUSTWORTHINESS OF THE  
NEW TESTAMENT (The James Sprunt Lectures at Union Theological  
Seminary in Virginia, 1913). Sir W. M. RAMSAY. Hodder & Stoughton, 1915. Pp. xiv, 427.

This large volume is a characteristic book by Professor Ramsay, diffuse, encumbered by personal chat, often tedious in its looseness of construction, repetitious both within itself and in the use of previously published and familiar material, largely inconclusive; and yet possessing a real and captivating charm, and full of instruction. The title, like several of Ramsay's (or his publisher's) titles, promises more than the book performs, for the rather disconnected

chapters relate almost wholly to a few sections of the Gospel of Luke and the Book of Acts. The general purpose is to illustrate from contemporary history the fact that these New Testament books were written by an able historian possessing exact knowledge of the facts of the Greek world of the first century. For this Professor Ramsay is able to draw on stores of unfamiliar material, especially from inscriptions.

The most striking chapters are those which relate to the proconsul of Cyprus, L. Sergius Paulus (Acts 13 7, 12), and to the governor of Syria, P. Sulpicius Quirinius (Luke 2 2), both of whom will gain a new interest for any one who reads these pages. It appears that Sergius Paulus, a man of the highest Roman aristocracy, had a son who became governor of Galatia, and a daughter who, probably about 73 A.D., was married to G. Caristanius Fronto, a leading citizen of Antioch in Galatia. The glimpse gained here of the history of the Caristani Frontoes, a family of middle rank who had come from Latium to Asia Minor a hundred years earlier at the establishment of the colony, is in itself significant and picturesque; but Ramsay carries us farther by a startling although wholly undemonstrable conjecture. An inscription, namely, exists at Antioch in which the son of Sergia Paula and Caristanius pays honor to his father and mother, and, contrary to the usual custom, it is in Greek. That this Roman of high lineage should thus abandon the pride of his race in Roman ways and things, requires an explanation. May he not have sacrificed his public career and social position by accepting Christianity? If so, shall we not assume that he adopted the religion of his mother, who, through her father, might have come under the influence of the Christian faith preached at the proconsul's court in Cyprus by Paul on his first missionary journey? The confirmation this would give to the strange narrative of Acts 12 is plain, as is also the precarious nature of the theory.

Of the career of Quirinius Ramsay gives a spirited picture. From a comparatively humble origin in a small Italian town this able man rose by his merit and military capacity to the highest public positions, rendered great services to Rome, made a brilliant marriage (his wife was a great heiress and had been betrothed to Lucius Cæsar, who died), and attained an eminence which was not wholly dimmed by a scandalous lawsuit brought by him against his wife after he had divorced her.

In Bible history Quirinius figures because of the statement of Luke that he was governor of Syria when the enrolment was made

for which Mary and Joseph journeyed to Bethlehem. That Quirinius was twice imperial legate in Syria is established by an inscription, and Ramsay now (perhaps rightly) dates the earlier service in the years 10-7 B.C., a result which (unlike Mommsen's date of 3-2 B.C.) brings it well within the period of Herod's reign. He has also called attention to many facts brought out by recent editors of papyri relating to Roman taxation and census-taking in the East. But, for the most part, the lengthy discussion of the present work merely repeats what had been said in the earlier book, *Was Christ Born at Bethlehem?* (1898), and not enough has been added to justify this reprinting of the former arguments in such fulness.

The facts and arguments themselves are interesting but do not carry us as far as Ramsay thinks, and do not meet all the difficulties which have led many older scholars to question Luke's statements. It is Sir William's habit to present arguments in which gaps unfilled by positive evidence are supplied by assumptions; and readers can seldom, even with the best will in the world, share the author's confidence in his own power of divination. His views are always suggestive, but it ought to be recognized that they are often unproved, and hence can never be safely adopted without rigorous and independent scrutiny of the evidence. It would be unfortunate if they should become part of the common stock of popular and supposedly trustworthy biblical knowledge. This trait, of over-confidence in his unproved hypotheses, seems to have grown stronger with Sir William's later writings, and it must be admitted that he is by no means the only recent writer on biblical subjects upon whom the same judgment is to be passed.

And yet, when all is said and done, Sir William Ramsay is a great scholar, using fresh material from inscriptions to build up a living image of the world of the first century, especially in Asia Minor. He has stimulated other men, has given a new impetus to scholarly work, and has shown continually in his books qualities of mind which are far superior to the merit of any one of those books in its entirety. The source of his high qualities is not his learning, extraordinary as that is, still less his fatal gift of combination; it is rather his power to know a real man when he sees him, and to make an out-of-the-way bit of history live once more as an integral part of a real world.

JAMES HARDY ROPES.

HARVARD UNIVERSITY.

**APOTHEOSIS AND AFTER LIFE.** Three Lectures on Certain Phases of Art and Religion in the Roman Empire. Mrs. ARTHUR STRONG. Constable & Co. 1915. Pp. xxii, 293. 8s. 6d.

The three lectures which this book contains were delivered in the fall of 1913 on the Charles Eliot Norton Foundation of the Archæological Institute of America, before some twenty-five centres of the Institute and before a number of universities and colleges in this country. Mrs. Strong has now published them in somewhat expanded form, beautifully illustrated by thirty-two plates.

As we should expect, the lectures deal quite as much with art as with religion, and Mrs. Strong's wide acquaintance with monuments makes it possible for her to draw from many sources for illustrations of her theme. Her well-known interest in Roman art appears in the introductory address to students, in which she calls attention to the new attitude toward the art of Rome, and expresses her satisfaction that scholars no longer regard the first three centuries of the Empire as a period of complete decadence, but rather see in it a continuous development from the art of Greece and the East.

In her first lecture on "The Influence of the Imperial Apotheosis on Antique Design," she treats the apotheosis of the emperors as a factor in bringing about a return in the fourth and succeeding centuries to a scheme of composition which she discovers also in early Greek art—that is to say, the deified emperor was made the central motif. His image or statue is represented with a frontal pose looking squarely toward the spectator, and all the other figures have a centripetal relation. A similar arrangement Mrs. Strong finds in early Greek art, where figures were apotropaic, as, for example, the Gorgon in the pediment of the early temple at Corfu, or where divinity was to be emphasized. In the great period of Greek art this earlier scheme was modified by the fact that the Greeks had a pantheon of Olympian gods, no one of which universally imposed his claim to supreme adoration and devotion. There was a lack of a central theme to concentrate the artistic impulse, with the possible exception of the pediment sculptures of the temple of Zeus at Olympia, for the exact arrangement of which we are unfortunately obliged to resort to conjecture. One may raise the question at this point as to whether Mrs. Strong in her discussion of the change from the centralized composition of early Greek art to the more narrative schemes of the great period, does not underestimate the desire of the Greek artist to attain action, ease, and fluidity of composition.

In Roman art the imperial apotheosis provided the central motif, and we find gradually developing in the first three Christian centuries

forms of design in which the emperor occupies the centre of the composition. In one sense this attains its complete form in the reliefs on the Arch of Constantine. Gradually Christ replaced the emperor, so that, in Mrs. Strong's view, the *majestas* of the deified emperor paved the way for the *majestas* of Christian art. On these matters others are more competent to judge than the present reviewer, but he cannot refrain from expressing in general his feeling that while Mrs. Strong's main contentions are good, she forces her evidence over-much. And this suspicion grows as he reads the rest of the book.

Lectures II and III deal with religious matters more strictly, for they are given to the "Symbolism of the After Life" and to "Roman Tombstones." The greater part, however, of the second lecture is devoted to tracing the origin of sepulchral imagery, and in the search we are carried back to Mycenæan and early Peloponnesian *stelæ*. The historical survey occupies practically the whole of this lecture. The third lecture deals with the symbolism of the soul's apotheosis, with the eagle and the wreath which Cumont has shown are of Syrian origin, and with the Mithraic, Orphic, and Dionysiac elements which Roman tombstones in the Provinces especially exhibit. It is an interesting fact that there is comparatively little symbolism on Roman tombstones which can be connected with a belief in immortality until the end of the Republic; however, with the diffusion of a philosophy of religion which did not exclude at any rate a belief in immortality, and with the spread of Oriental doctrines, the symbolism of the future life becomes more common. But when Mrs. Strong (p. 202) sees in the representation of the story of Rhea Silvia and of Mars an allegory of death as a sacred marriage, we can hardly follow her. Her words,

"The Soul awakes to a vision of the divine, even as Rhea awakes from her weary slumber to behold the immortal lover swiftly descending to comfort her, for death is itself but sleep which leads to a blessed awakening and consummation,"

will hardly carry conviction to most students of her theme. She concludes with a discussion of an extremely interesting monument of the third century, still standing at Igel near Trèves, which should have careful consideration.

The three lectures as a whole contain a wealth of suggestive detail and deserve most careful examination; but at the same time, as the reviewer has already intimated, he does not find them wholly "convincing," if he may resort to a word drawn from the jargon of

literary reviewers. Over-interpretation, too subtle an imagination, and excessive readiness to combine things which are disparate, cause many blemishes in this book, for all its great learning.

CLIFFORD H. MOORE.

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215

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## CLASSIC AND ROMANTIC TRENDS IN PLATO<sup>1</sup>

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The problem of the One and the Many is a problem essentially Platonic. Characteristically Platonic is the saying of Socrates in the *Phaedrus*: "If I find any man who is able to see a 'One and Many' in nature, him I follow, and 'walk in his footsteps as if he were a god.'"<sup>2</sup> The problem of the One and the Many may indeed be said to be the point around which Plato's deepest concerns center. It occurs in most of his dialogues. It appears in different formulations, and it receives a variety of emphasis. It is certainly at the root of his morals. "Not life, but a good life, is to be chiefly valued,"<sup>3</sup> is Plato's fundamental teaching. And the good life is a life of law, order, justice. The diverse elements of the soul must be set in order; they must submit to one organizing principle; they must become a well-ordered unity. "Can there be any greater evil," asks Socrates, "than discord and distraction and plurality where unity ought to reign? or any greater good than the bond of unity?"<sup>4</sup> The ethical task of the many is "to grow up in a noble order";<sup>5</sup> they must constitute "one entirely temperate

<sup>1</sup> An address before the Philosophical Union of the University of California, February 23, 1917.

<sup>2</sup> *Phaedrus*, 266 (Jowett's translation).

<sup>3</sup> *Crito*, 48.

<sup>4</sup> *Republic*, 462.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.* 421.

and perfectly adjusted nature";<sup>6</sup> they must, like a work of art, become fashioned into "a regular and systematic whole."<sup>7</sup> The many are to become one, be the many the multiple elements of the individual soul or the plural citizens of the State. For Plato advocates no "double standard"—one for the individual and another for the group. "The just man," insists Socrates, "will be like the just State";<sup>8</sup> "the same principles which exist in the State exist also in the individual";<sup>9</sup> and "the States are as the men are."<sup>10</sup> This problem of the One and the Many is no mere ethical problem for Plato. His whole metaphysical quest is a quest for absolute essences behind the multiplicity of appearances. "Philosophers only are able," Socrates informs Glaucon, "to grasp the eternal and unchangeable, and those who wander in the region of the many and variable are not philosophers."<sup>11</sup> It is the task of philosophy to seek behind "the many and variable" for the absolute and eternal and immutable reality "not varying from generation and corruption." The doctrine of ideas, subject indeed to many and variable interpretations, must be regarded as Plato's metaphysical account of the nature of reality. "This universe," according to his belief, "is . . . Cosmos or order, not disorder or misrule."<sup>12</sup> That ultimate reality, despite appearances, possesses eternal harmony, absolute permanence, essential unity—this is the Platonic conviction formulated in the doctrine of ideas.

The search for unity then may in general be affirmed to be Plato's supreme speculative endeavor. What kind of unity is Plato seeking? Here we come upon a question which admits of no simple answer. I find in Plato two conflicting conceptions of unity. Whether they are with or without consistency maintained by him I am not prepared to discuss. To reconcile them, or to re-

<sup>6</sup> Republic, 443.

<sup>7</sup> Gorgias, 504.

<sup>8</sup> Republic, 435.

<sup>9</sup> Ibid. 441.

<sup>10</sup> Ibid. 544.

<sup>11</sup> Ibid. 484.

<sup>12</sup> Gorgias, 508.

duce one to the other, is a task for the specialist who is committed to defend the unity of Plato's thought. I am no Plato scholar, and I have no ready hypothesis which will explain the differing modes of his doctrine. That the dialogues actually contain two inconsistent notions of unity, however the professional Platonist may interpret them, can be demonstrated by quotations from the text. Their inconsistency may indeed be superficial or even specious; nevertheless they seem to me to represent two fundamentally different attitudes toward life and reality. And because I think it important to note the distinction between them, I venture, with all due apologies to Plato and the Platonists, to call attention to these seemingly conflicting views.

One conception of unity found in Plato is a *unity which is antagonistic to the many*. Variety, difference, change, complexity are excluded from it. The immortality of the soul, for instance, is argued by Plato from such a notion of unity. "We cannot believe," asserts Socrates in the tenth Book of the *Republic* "—reason will not allow us— . . . the soul, in her truest nature, to be full of variety and difference and dissimilarity. . . . The soul . . . being . . . immortal, must be the fairest of compositions and cannot be compounded of many elements."<sup>13</sup> In the notion of *uncompounded unity* lies Plato's chief guarantee for the eternal existence of the soul. In the *Phaedo* Socrates formulates the argument thus: "The compound or composite may be supposed to be naturally capable, as of being compounded, so also of being dissolved; but that which is uncompounded, and that only, must be, if anything is, indissoluble. . . . And the uncompounded may be assumed to be the same and unchanging, whereas the compound is always changing and never the same."<sup>14</sup> And it is such argument which leads to the conclusion that "the soul is in the very likeness of the divine, and

<sup>13</sup> Republic, 611.

<sup>14</sup> Phaedo, 78.

immortal and intellectual and uniform and indissoluble and unchangeable." <sup>15</sup> Although this notion of the soul affords perhaps the most striking example of Plato's view of an "uncompounded unity," this same view is also at the basis of his doctrine of ideas. "Tell me," Socrates asks of Meno, "tell me what virtue is in the universal; and do not make a singular into a plural, as the facetious say of those who break a thing, but deliver virtue to me whole and sound, and not broken into a number of pieces." <sup>16</sup> In the *Phaedrus*, *Phaedo*, *Republic*, and elsewhere the ideas are looked upon as being self-contained and transcending *internal* multiplicity and variety and change. What relation the ideas have to one another is a different question. But the ideas *quâ* ideas—the ideas of beauty, of justice, of goodness—are absolute and permanent, possessing a reality and dignity other than that of the flux of particulars. Socrates satirizes "the gentleman who is of opinion that there is no absolute or unchangeable idea of beauty—in whose opinion the beautiful is the manifold—he . . . your lover of beautiful sights, who cannot bear to be told that the beautiful is *one*, and the just is *one*, or that anything is *one*." <sup>17</sup> The true lover of knowledge, on the contrary, "will not rest in the multiplicity of individuals which is an appearance only." <sup>18</sup> But "those who see the many beautiful and . . . [not] absolute beauty . . . ; who see the many just and not absolute justice, and the like—such persons may be said to have opinion but not knowledge." <sup>19</sup> I fully realize the danger which accrues from citing isolated passages of Plato's dialogues, particularly those which concern the doctrine of ideas. The difficult questions which this doctrine raises lie indeed beyond the scope of an untechnical essay; the citations are justified, however, as merely illustrating one view of Platonic unity, a unity which is

<sup>15</sup> *Phaedo*, 80.

<sup>16</sup> *Meno*, 77.

<sup>17</sup> *Republic*, 479 (italics mine).

<sup>18</sup> *Ibid.* 490.

<sup>19</sup> *Ibid.* 479.

uncompounded and undifferentiated and thus opposed to multiplicity.

Contrasted with this is the other Platonic view of unity—*unity compounded of the many*. It is a unity which depends for its very existence and meaning upon multiplicity. The many bound together into a whole—organized, ordered, and harmonized—present a different sort of unity. It is a union of parts, not only admitting but demanding variety, difference, change, and complexity. The organization of life into such a well-ordered communion of parts is Plato's chief ethical task. As “the artist disposes all things in order, and compels the one part to harmonize and accord with the other part, until he has constructed a regular and systematic whole,”<sup>20</sup> so the just man will “look at the city which is within him, and take heed that no disorder occur in it.”<sup>21</sup> Strangely at variance with Plato's account of the metaphysical soul as “uncompounded” and “uniform” is his view of the soul's multiplicity and variety essential for the moral life. The image of the soul as a triple animal whose different natures are to grow into one is indeed allegorical<sup>22</sup>; equally allegorical is the description of the soul under the figure of two winged horses and a charioteer<sup>23</sup>; but the reference to “the city which is within” man is not metaphorical. For the entire *Republic* is an exposition of the exact parallelism between the individual and the State. A miniature State is Plato's individual; a magnified individual his State. “In each of us,” says Socrates, “there are the same principles and habits which there are in the State”<sup>24</sup>; “the just man . . . will be like the just State.”<sup>25</sup> As the State is composed of three classes—justice consisting in their harmonious co-operation—so the individual soul possesses, corresponding to these classes, three principles—desire, passion, and reason, the

<sup>20</sup> *Gorgias*, 504.

<sup>21</sup> *Republic*, 492.

<sup>22</sup> *Ibid.* 588 ff.

<sup>23</sup> *Phaedrus*, 246 ff.

<sup>24</sup> *Republic*, 485.

<sup>25</sup> *Ibid.*

harmonious condition of which defines the just man.<sup>26</sup> In Socrates' own words: "For the just man does not permit the several elements within him to interfere with one another, or any of them to do the work of others; he sets in order his own inner life, and is his own master and his own law, and at peace with himself; and when he has bound together the three principles within him . . . [he] is no longer many, but has become one entirely temperate and perfectly adjusted nature."<sup>27</sup> The just soul is thus a united soul—an organic whole of differentiated, non-interchangeable, and interdependent parts. The same *organic unity*—on a larger scale—characterizes the just State. "Each individual," insists Socrates, "should be put to the use for which nature intended him, one to one work, and then every man would do his own business, *and be one and not many; and so the whole city would be one and not many.*"<sup>28</sup> In Plato's concept of the *well-ordered State* made up of various and distinct classes but "bound each to each in mutual piety," we have the harmonization of unity and plurality. The singleness of the State does not destroy, but on the contrary preserves, its multiplicity. The two concepts are here correlative. The many by retaining as individuals their distinct characters can become one and whole. "Citizens," exclaims Socrates in the parable of the metals, ". . . you are brothers, yet God has framed you differently."<sup>29</sup> That the individuals can achieve genuine individuality only by thus being distinct members of a whole is, of course, a much later thought, though implied in Plato's concept of the State. Whether Plato viewed the universe as having the character of a "well-ordered State" cannot here be asserted with confidence. The *Parmenides* may be quoted in support of this view. And not inimical to such an interpretation is the following

<sup>26</sup> *Republic*, 441 ff.

<sup>27</sup> *Ibid.* 443.

<sup>28</sup> *Ibid.* 423 (italics mine).

<sup>29</sup> *Ibid.* 415.

passage from the *Gorgias*: "Philosophers tell us," Socrates mentions to Callicles, "that communion and friendship and orderliness and temperance and justice bind together heaven and earth and gods and men, and the universe is therefore called *Cosmos* or order, not disorder or misrule."<sup>30</sup>

Enough passages have now been quoted, I think, to suggest the nature of Plato's two concepts of unity—one in *essential opposition* to the many, and the other resulting from their *harmonious co-ordination*. I venture to apply the predicate "romantic" to Plato's search after a unity which transcends multiplicity, whereas his view of unity as exemplified in the conception of the "well-ordered State" I regard as "classic." My reason for employing these predicates in connection with Plato is twofold. In the first place, I wish to render the terms "classic" and "romantic"—as far as possible within the limits of this address—philosophically articulate, and thus contribute something toward their rescue from the vagueness and triviality which they have acquired as exclusively literary categories. And in the next place, I find that the romanticists in literature—particularly the German romanticists—share many paradoxical features with Plato, these features in the case of both resulting from an essential clash between the one and the many, between the universal and the particular.<sup>31</sup>

It is the search for a transcendent unity and harmony which leads the "romantic" Plato to invest the multi-

<sup>30</sup> *Gorgias*, 508.

<sup>31</sup> I refer here mainly to German romanticists because it was they—particularly Friedrich Schlegel (1772-1829)—who clearly formulated a theory of romanticism which they sought to carry out both in life and in art. The group comprising the "Romantic School" consisted of Friedrich von Hardenberg (called Novalis), the two Schlegels—August and his brother Friedrich—and Ludwig Tieck; but I have in mind their later followers as well, such as Brentano, Arnim, von Kleist, Fouqué, Hoffmann, Chamisso, Eichendorff, Heine. I do not think, however, that there is an essential difference between the romanticism in Germany and what is vaguely enough called by the same name in the literatures of other countries. For the romantic tendencies alluded to in this essay it will not be difficult, therefore, to find illustrations in general European literature.

plicity of the world with a negative character. Speaking broadly, the manifold existences of life when contrasted with the unity of Plato's ideal realm become for him either *grotesque* or *symbolic*. By grotesque I mean to denote his notion of the world of particulars as distorted, meaningless, unreal; by symbolic his other notion that the same world of particulars may yet be viewed by the philosopher as a suggestion or hint or intimation of a transcendent realm of universals. In the words of Pindar: "Things of a day, what are we and what are we not? The dream of a shadow is humankind; yet when a god-given splendor falls, light shines radiant upon men and life is sweet."<sup>32</sup> Grotesque is the world as portrayed in the parable of the den in the seventh Book of the *Republic*. Living in an underground cave, with their legs and necks chained so that they cannot move toward the light which is above and behind them and are therefore doomed to mistake for realities the shadowy images on the screen in front of them—such is the existence of those in the "region of the many and variable." This grotesque world of images or "the shadows of images"<sup>33</sup> is contrasted by Plato with the "upper world" which is revealed to the "mind's eye" of the philosopher. Equally grotesque is the situation of the soul "fastened and glued to the body," as depicted in the *Phaedo*.<sup>34</sup> Philosophy, Socrates tells us, consists in "the study of death"—death to all that which is "of the human and mortal and unintellectual and multiform and dissoluble and changeable."<sup>35</sup> The disciple of philosophy, however, can, according to Plato, overcome the visible and discordant world in yet another way. It is by viewing it as a *sign* or *symbol* of a different

<sup>32</sup> Quoted by J. W. Mackail: *Lectures on Greek Poetry*, London, 1910, p. 120.

<sup>33</sup> *Republic*, 517.

<sup>34</sup> *Phaedo*, 79 ff.

<sup>35</sup> *Ibid.* 80. This notion of "death" occurs in Novalis. Indeed he made a "resolution" thus to die. And in a letter to Friedrich Schlegel (January 20, 1799) he speaks of the longing of Christianity as "absolute Abstraktion, Annihilation des Jetztigen, Apotheose der Zukunft — dieser eigentlichen bessern Welt."

realm. Appearances, apparitions, shadows, ghosts—the “many”—are when taken by themselves weird, grotesque, bizarre; interpreted, however, as suggestions of a reality other and deeper than themselves they become instinct with spiritual significance. It is the particular *as* particular which is unspiritual, sordid, corrupt; as sign or medium of a universal nature it is raised to a different level. Thus Plato's doctrine of love may be interpreted. The ideal of love, revealed by Diotima in the *Symposium*, is to attain true beauty, “the divine beauty, . . . pure and clear and unalloyed, not clogged with the pollutions of mortality and all the colours and vanities of human life.”<sup>36</sup> But this is the *ideal* goal. As aids to its attainment the earthly beauties themselves, though “clogged with the pollutions of mortality,” become spiritualized. I quote Diotima's words: “The true order of going . . . to the things of love is to begin from the beauties of the earth and mount upwards for the sake of that other beauty, using these as steps only, and from one going to two, and from two to all fair forms, and from fair forms to fair practices, and from fair practices to fair notions, until from fair notions he arrives at the notion of absolute beauty, and at last knows what the essence of beauty is.”<sup>37</sup> The discussion in the *Phaedrus* whether the non-lover or the lover is to be preferred revolves around the same distinction between false love and true love. Grotesque is the notion of love which is not “the love of immortality,”<sup>38</sup> “taken from some haunt of sailors,”<sup>39</sup> whereas true love is symbolic, i.e., beauty of bodily form is to be loved as an intimation and expression of divine beauty.<sup>40</sup> “Sight is the most piercing of our bodily

<sup>36</sup> *Symposium*, 211.

<sup>37</sup> *Ibid.* 211.

<sup>38</sup> *Ibid.* 207.

<sup>39</sup> *Phaedrus*, 243.

<sup>40</sup> This doctrine of “symbolic love” is one of the cardinal teachings of German romanticism. It has received a variety of expression. The attitude of the lover toward the beloved in Friedrich Schlegel's *Lucinde* is typical. Says *Lucinde*'s lover: “Lass mich's bekennen, ich liebe nicht dich allein, ich liebe die Weiblichkeit selbst. Ich liebe sie nicht bloss, ich bete sie an, weil ich die Menschheit anbete.” (Edition 1799, p. 70.)

senses," says Socrates, "though not by that is wisdom seen; her loveliness would have been transporting if there had been a visible image of her, and the other ideas, if they had visible counterparts, would be equally lovely. But this is the privilege of beauty, that being the loveliest she is also the most palpable to sight. . . . He . . . who has been the spectator of many glories in the other world, is amazed when he sees any one having a godlike face or any bodily form which is the expression of divine beauty . . . ; looking upon the face of his beloved as of a god he reverences him, and if he were not afraid of being thought a downright madman, he would sacrifice to his beloved as to the image of a god."<sup>41</sup> In the seventh Book of the *Republic* a similar contrast is brought out between the objects of sense and the objects of science. The study of astronomy, for instance, when its objects are the mere visible and perishable stars, is rebuked by Socrates. Thus: "That knowledge only which is of being and of the unseen can make the soul look upwards, and whether a man gapes at the heavens or blinks on the ground, seeking to learn some particular of sense, I would deny that he can learn, for nothing of that sort is matter of science; his soul is looking downwards, not upwards, whether his way to knowledge is by water or by land, whether he floats or only lies on his back."<sup>42</sup> Arithmetic, geometry, astronomy, and the kindred sciences of relations and order have for Plato educational value because they are suggestive or symbolic of the ideal world. They tend "to make more easy the vision of the idea of good."<sup>43</sup>

Many more passages could be cited to show that the "region of the many and variable" is viewed by Plato now as grotesque or unreal or impure, now as symbolic or suggestive or representative of the absolute and permanent "upper world." What I wish to emphasize, how-

<sup>41</sup> *Phaedrus*, 250-251.

<sup>42</sup> *Republic*, 529.

<sup>43</sup> *Ibid.* 526.

ever, is this—the clash between unity and multiplicity, between the ideal and the real, with the consequent transformation of the latter into the grotesque or the symbolic is the very *differentia* of romanticism. The pendular oscillation between the grotesque and the symbolic—between regarding the particulars of the world now as illusory, now as intimations of the infinite—appears to be at the root of most of the romantic paradoxes. It is this oscillation which renders intelligible the union of so many contradictory traits found in both the life and the art of romanticists. Cynicism and reverence; self-parody and self-worship; self-concentration and self-expansion; individualism and cosmopolitanism; loyalty and infidelity; dreamful ease and prodigious activity; superficiality and profundity—these are but a few romantic tendencies having their source in the Platonic longing for an ideal world opposed to the actual.<sup>44</sup>

The romanticists are adept specialists in the art of the grotesque. I need but allude to the tales of Novalis, Tieck, Chamisso, Hoffmann, Victor Hugo, Poe. With the German romanticists, however, the cultivation of the grotesque is a conscious design to destroy the common conceptions of things. It is a quasi-Socratic *reductio ad absurdum* of the generally accepted world. For the romanticists the world is full of wonder and mystery undreamt of by the “many,” the philistines. But this wonder and mystery, because so obvious to them, lose their strangeness. Hence the reverse romantic tendency to depict the miraculous and the fabulous as the familiar. The romantic world is veritably *verkehrt*. The familiar becomes strange, the strange familiar; the near grows far, the far near. It is to this spirit that we owe a wealth

<sup>44</sup> I should not be understood as deriving romanticism historically from Plato. I am well aware, in the case of German romanticism, of the intimate relation between it and the Fichtean philosophy. I am using romanticism here as an elemental attitude possessing philosophic generality, of which the Fichtean doctrine of the world-building and world-destroying Infinite Self, engaged in the restless quest after an unattainable ideal, is itself a notable expression.

of modern fairy tales and an appreciative interest in distant languages and literatures.

His longing for an ideal harmonious world determines the romanticist's strange theory of values. The worth of things resides in the moods they arouse, the dreams they inspire, the hidden realities they suggest.

"To me the meanest flower that blows can give  
Thoughts that do often lie too deep for tears,"

says Wordsworth at the close of his *Ode on Immortality*. Or in the words of another poet,

"Not the slightest leaf but trembling teems  
With golden visions and romantic dreams."

Contrasted with the ideal, all particular things and interests are equally nugatory; as suggestions or symbols of the ideal everything is equally relevant. This double standard applied to *all* things, at once or successively, is typically romantic. It engenders an elasticity of mood and feeling and thought and expression which is consistent in its capriciousness. Loyalty to the ideal requires a constant flux of symbols. In order not to become enmeshed in particulars the romanticist must continually transcend them. So it comes about that for him loyalty and infidelity are Siamese twins. Loyalty to the universal is conditioned upon faithlessness to the particulars. The symbolic character of the particular can be demonstrated only by forsaking and exchanging it for another particular. The romanticist may therefore be called an intellectual and emotional "polygamist." In love with the infinite, no finite aim, interest, mood, or person can lay claim to his sustained fidelity. Because his allegiance belongs to the eternal he must perforce repudiate temporary and transient embodiments of it.

"No more of me ye knew,  
My Love!  
No more of me ye knew,"

is the "rover's adieu" to his fugitive attachments. Paradoxical though it may seem, fickleness is the very expression of his constancy. *Don Juan* is the romanticist's most faithful lover.

Thus in search for unity and harmony the romanticist becomes a wanderer from particular to particular. *Wanderlust*—the universal romantic *motif*—acquires for him the dignity of a philosophic principle. Aimlessness, exemplified, for instance, in Eichendorff's *Das Leben eines Taugenichts*, is his conscious aim, and is extended as a programme to all intellectual, emotional, and imaginative pursuits. The acquisition of a definite and particular purpose is accompanied with the ache of self-limitation, and calls therefore for relief through the cultivation of new interests. For particular ends and purposes are but transient means to appease one's yearning after the infinite. Care must be taken to discover constantly new means. The frequent abandonment of particular interests is the romanticist's sincere proof that his goal is the universal, not the particular. Hence his protean activity, his catholicity, his versatility. His is the life of the adventurous wanderer. He roams through field and forest, art and religion, philosophy and science, life and love, with the *élan vital* of Shelley's *West Wind*. He heeds not the call,

"Wild Spirit which art moving everywhere;  
Destroyer and preserver; hear, O hear!"

Of necessity then his nature must be untamed and undisciplined. Discipline and waywardness do not dwell within the same breast. In this the romanticist glories. The wanderer's life alone is the free life. The freedom romanticism eulogizes is the *freedom from particularity*. Stoicism too advocates such freedom. But there is a radical difference between the two. Stoicism wins its independence by withdrawing from the particulars; roman-

ticism by pursuing and appropriating *all* possible particulars. The stoic turns his back upon the vicissitudes and complexities of life; the romanticist experiments and plays with them. The freedom from particulars, from their ties and responsibilities which the player and the wanderer alone enjoy, is the romantic ideal. Viewing thus all things through the eyes of the passing pilgrim, the romanticist can give you no definite picture of what he sees. He can but give you his fugitive and sensitive impressions. For this reason all romantic art has a lyrical quality about it. It is an art of suggestion and mood. It is what the Germans call *stimmungsvoll*. And no accident is it that romantic art excels in the epigram, the fragment, the lyric, the essay, the tale, the song, and all the other casual forms of expression. Romantic achievement is the achievement which requires no sustained effort, no prolonged attention, being the product of the moment's mood and inspiration. Thoroughly at home the German romanticists—so protean in their interests and so prodigious in their industry—were in no one field. They paid the price of the rover's life. The pathos of the wanderer's homelessness none felt more keenly than they. In endless pursuit of their ideal, seeking and finding no particular object which will embody it, doomed therefore to aimless and restless straying, the romanticists have repeatedly given voice to the thought,

“We look before and after,  
And pine for what is not.”

The romantic fate has perhaps been most pointedly stated by the author of the *Imitation of Christ*. Thus: “Thou hast no dwelling city and wherever thou be thou art as a stranger and a pilgrim.” You will also recall the lamentation of Schubert's *Wanderer*: “*Dort wo Du nicht bist, da ist das Glück.*”

Consistent with his theory of values is the romanticist's attitude toward himself. As "destroyer" and "preserver" he ranges and strays among the experiences of his inner life which can afford him a resting place as little as the world outside him. Here again he is a stranger and a pilgrim. At once "grotesque" and "symbolic," distorted and clear, worthless and profound, ephemeral and infinite his passions and thoughts and moods appear to him.<sup>45</sup> As particular among particulars he is himself something to be estranged from and forsaken. But like all things finite, he also

"Hath had elsewhere its setting,  
And cometh from afar."

He is not only finite; he too is an intimation of the infinite. Thus the dramatic oscillation between the grotesque and the symbolic is projected into the romanticist's inner life. In his exalted moods he regards himself as God's beloved, as the inspired vehicle of the Eternal. Hence his genuine love and reverence for himself. His dreams, his words, his tears, are instinct with universal meaning; he bares them as revelations of a nature deeper and vaster than his own; they have for him the awesome significance of oracular signs. Thus sings Emerson:

"I am owner of the sphere,  
Of the seven stars and the solar year,  
Of Caesar's hand and Plato's brain,  
Of Lord Christ's heart, and Shakespeare's strain."

\* This is a familiar paradox in romantic literature. Goethe's *Faust* complains:

"Zwei Seelen wohnen, ach! in meiner Brust;  
Die eine will sich von der andern trennen;  
Die eine hält in derber Liebeslust,  
Sich an die Welt, mit klammernden Organen;  
Die andre hebt gewaltsam sich vom Dust  
Zu den Gefühlen hoher Ahnen."

And Victor Hugo's *Mahomet* laments:

"Je suis le lieu vil des sublimes combats;  
Tantôt l'homme d'en haut, et tantôt l'homme d'en bas;  
Et le mal dans ma bouche avec le bien alterne,  
Comme dans le désert le sable et la citerne."

But—and here is the romantic paradox—because he is a symbol of the divine, because he worships the ideal within him, he must burst the bonds of his own particularity, he must not be smothered in the flux of his inner life. The deep love of the universal of which he is a medium leads him to absolve himself from himself, not indeed in the stoic's or in the mystic's fashion. The romantic way is the cynical way. Self-parody is the romanticist's mode of purging himself of his particularity. Cynical self-contemplation is the "destroyer" of his ephemeral and the "preserver" of his eternal nature. Cynicism toward himself becomes his sublimest expression of reverence for the universal, just as his deliberate infidelity to definite ends was the very instrumentality by which the romanticist could show his supreme allegiance and longing for the infinite. Self-parody is thus seen to be a method of solving the Platonic problem of the universal and the particular.

Viewed thus, the principle of "romantic irony," formulated by Friedrich Schlegel with especial reference to the artist's attitude toward his work, is simply another aspect of romantic freedom from particularity. It is, to borrow a phrase from Walter Pater, the "fastidious refusal to be or do any limited thing." The romanticist refuses to identify himself with his work because, being particular, it never can be an adequate expression of his infinite ambition. For the romantic ideal is the universal—Schlegel's *Universalpoesie*; as such it can achieve no realization in any *particular* content and form. The artist's love for art is to be measured by his ability to transcend his own product. Freedom and independence of his own particular efforts are demonstrated by his willingness ever to repudiate them. The test of his earnestness is self-irony. Irony is his explicit acknowledgment that the ideal is more precious than the actual. Irony toward his work is simply the disavowal of the particular-

ity which attaches to it in favor of the universal essence of which it is to be an intimation. With the various ways in which this principle of irony has been applied, notably by Tieck and Byron and Heine, and more recently by Shaw, we are here not concerned.

These are but a few romantic trends and paradoxes which have their *logical* source in the Platonic longing for an ideal and harmony transcending this world of the "many and variable." In his *Lucinde*—a book which contains in a nutshell the entire philosophy of romanticism, theoretical and applied—Friedrich Schlegel characterizes the object of romantic longing as longing itself. And Novalis has supplied the symbol for this notion in his well-known figure of the "blue flower." The concept "longing for longing" is typically Platonic. Longing as such, by being its own object and devoid of definite content, becomes a sort of "colourless, formless, intangible essence,"<sup>46</sup> which can find embodiment or rest in no particular nature. More than a superficial resemblance has this idea of longing to Schopenhauer's notion of the "will," but what interests us here is the Platonic dualism of the universal and the particular implied in it. Infinite longing and the many and the particular objects of longing cannot coalesce; for ever sundered they must remain, since the only *definite* thing which longing seeks is *indefinite* longing itself. It is this yearning after itself—a transcendent thing—which sends the romanticist a-roving. It is this which constitutes the romantic career—

"To burst all links of habit—there to wander far away,  
On from island unto island at the gateways of the day."

It is this which explains his eternal *Wanderlust* among all experience, among all the objects of nature and life, of love and art.

While the romanticist's longing can never come to rest, it seems to find a momentary haven of refuge in the

contemplation of the past. The modern historic spirit, inaugurated by the German romanticists, is intimately bound up with romantic longing. Their interest in the past springs from the feeling that the harmony and unity longed for had once been realized, had had embodiment in epochs remote from the present. The historic spirit of romanticism consists in a conscious reconstruction of the past in terms of an ideal vainly sought for here and now.<sup>47</sup> Thus the past becomes idealized. And thus commences the romantic *regressive* pilgrimage. The Middle Ages, Hellas, or perchance a more antique Golden Age, are endowed with the heaven of beauty and harmony and perfection. The isles of Greece become romantic Arcadia; and the unmatched glories and splendors of mediæval life, art, and religion were not seen until discovered, loved, and cherished by romantic poets. This idealization of the remote past, and the motives for it, the romanticists share with Plato. In Plato also may be found the projection into antiquity—a very *remote* antiquity in his case—of an ideal and perfection “not varying from generation and corruption.” The Platonic theory of “recollement” is based upon the assumption of a previous existence more perfect than the present. All knowing, all learning is but recalling what the soul beheld in that perfect state. “The Soul,” Socrates states in the *Meno*, “. . . being immortal, and having seen all things that exist, whether in this world or in the world below, has knowledge of them all; and it is no wonder that she should be able to call to remembrance all that she ever knew . . .; the soul has learned all things, there is no difficulty in her eliciting, or as men say learning, out of a single recollection all the rest . . .; for all enquiry and all learning is

<sup>47</sup> The historic spirit of romanticism should not be confused with that of Hegel. In general, the romanticists emphasize the discontinuity of past and present, exemplified in *Die Christenheit oder Europa* by Novalis, in *Atala* by Chateaubriand, in Rousseau's works; whereas Hegel insists upon their continuity. The romanticists look backward for an ideal in contrast with the actual; Hegel looks to the past for the seeds of the full-grown present.

but recollection.”<sup>48</sup> The *Phaedrus* likewise goes back to a former state of existence, in which the gods and men have once seen the divine forms of “justice, and temperance, and knowledge absolute, not in the form of generation or of relation, which men call existence, but knowledge absolute in existence absolute.”<sup>49</sup> Plato’s “golden age” is depicted more vividly and more poetically in the following passage: “There was a time when . . . we beheld the beatific vision and were initiated into a mystery which may be truly called most blessed, celebrated by us in our state of innocence, before we had any experience of evils to come, when we were admitted to the sight of apparitions innocent and simple and calm and happy, which we beheld shining in pure light, pure ourselves and not yet enshrined in that living tomb which we carry about, now that we are imprisoned in the body, like an oyster in his shell.”<sup>50</sup> This “historic” spirit of Plato, this looking “backward” to a blessed “state of innocence” is born of the same yearning as that of the romanticists, the yearning to find in a “previous” existence unity, harmony, perfection, and an escape from the present strife of the one and the many, the universal and the particular.

The “classic” trend of Plato remains now to be briefly suggested. Whereas his romanticism lies in the clash between unity and multiplicity and in the consequent transformation of the latter into the grotesque or the symbolic, the ideal which dominates his classicism consists in the reconciliation of the one and the many, the universal and the particular. In his “well-ordered State” Plato has defined for us a novel concept of unity—a unity which logically requires multiplicity. It is the unity of a *whole* which results from the organization and co-ordination of the many. Here diverse elements are welded together into an harmonious structure. Here we have a

<sup>48</sup> *Meno*, 81.

<sup>49</sup> *Phaedrus*, 247.

<sup>50</sup> *Ibid.* 250.

unity which is compounded of the many. Here the particulars constitute a universal. These particulars—the many elements of the State—are not ephemeral shadows or faint copies of a transcendent universal; they are real and necessary and constitutive parts of a whole. Thus, universal and particular, whole and part, unity and multiplicity are interdependent and mutually inclusive. The problem of monism and pluralism—to use metaphysical concepts—receives here perhaps its only adequate solution. Unity without multiplicity is “empty”; multiplicity without unity “blind.” Plato’s State illustrates a multiplicity which is an organic unity, a unity which is a well-ordered multiplicity.

The parts which constitute such an organic union, however, cannot be equal. The State is a whole which is no mere sum of external parts; its wholeness is achieved through differentiation. That is, the particulars which enter into such union must be *different* particulars; otherwise we should have a blurred and not a well-ordered whole. One particular member of the State, for instance, cannot be allowed to usurp the function of another particular. Each has in the structure of the whole a unique and distinct place. “In all well-ordered States,” says Socrates in the *Republic*, “every individual has an occupation to which he must attend.”<sup>51</sup> Also, “Each individual should be put to the use for which nature intended him.”<sup>52</sup> Justice of the State as well as of the individual resides for Plato in the harmonious co-operation of *distinct* interests and activities. The just soul is the well-ordered soul; the just State is the well-ordered State. Well-ordered organizations then are unities which are composed of a plurality of distinct parts. The wholeness of any organism is secured, preserved, and rendered effective by the very particularization and specialization of its members. Thus not escape from particularity, as

<sup>51</sup> *Republic*, 406.

<sup>52</sup> *Ibid.* 423.

demanded by romanticism, but loyalty to the special rôle which the whole assigns to each of its members is the classic ideal. Not freedom from particularity—the romantic ambition—but freedom to be a particular, to have a definite place in the organic composition of the whole is the classic aim.

To exhibit in detail that the Platonic notion of “organic unity” or “organic wholeness” is at the basis of the classic theory of art lies beyond the province of this paper. I hope I shall be pardoned, however, for citing in this connection a lengthy but significant passage from S. H. Butcher.

“It may be noticed,” says he, commenting on Aristotle’s *Poetics*, “that the opposition between the poet and the historian in the *Poetics* is incidentally introduced to illustrate the sense in which a tragedy is one and a whole. These two notions as understood by Aristotle are not identical. A unity is composed of a plurality of parts which cohere together and fall under a common idea but are not necessarily combined in a definite order. The notion of a whole implies something more. The parts which constitute it must be inwardly connected, arranged in a certain order, structurally related, and combined into a system. A whole is not a mere mass or sum of external parts which may be transposed at will, any one of which may be omitted without perceptibly affecting the rest. It is a unity which is unfolded and expanded according to the law of its own nature, an organism which develops from within. By the rule, again, of beauty, which is a first requirement of art, a poetic creation must exhibit at once unity and plurality. . . . The idea of an organism evidently underlies all Aristotle’s rules about unity; it is tacitly assumed as a first principle of art, and in one passage is expressly mentioned as that from which the rule of epic unity is deduced. ‘The plot must, as in a tragedy, be dramatically constructed; it must have for its subject a single action, whole and complete, with a beginning, a middle, and an end. *It will thus resemble a single and coherent organism*, and produce the pleasure proper to it.’

“Plato in the *Phaedrus* had insisted that every artistic composition, whether in prose or verse, should have an organic unity. ‘You will allow that every discourse ought to be constructed like a living organism, having its own body and head and feet; it must have middle and extremities, drawn in a manner agreeable to one another and to the

whole.' Aristotle took up the hint; the passage above quoted from the *Poetics* is a remarkable echo of the words of the *Phaedrus*; and indeed the idea may be said to be at the basis of his whole poetic criticism."<sup>53</sup>

There is no need to show in this essay how the Platonic ideal of a well-ordered whole dominates the practice of Greek art as well as its theory. This ideal it is which furnishes a standard of character and life associated with "the glory that was Greece." A criterion of conduct as well as of taste is supplied by it. The harmony and coherence and repose of classic art, the felicity and beauty and restraint of classic life, are grounded in the Platonic conception of "organic unity." And this conception, in both its aesthetic and moral excellence, is the model of modern classicism. French literature in the seventeenth century is classic in this sense. And the same classic ideal inspires the mature poetry of Goethe and of Schiller. It is the Platonic view of a well-ordered and harmonious whole which defines, for instance, in *Wilhelm Meister*, and in *Iphigenie* Goethe's standard of conduct and of art.

I am convinced that an analysis more exhaustive than here attempted of Plato's two concepts of unity would yield a logical basis for defining most of the problems connected with classicism and romanticism both in art and in philosophy. Here I could do no more than suggest that the distinction between the classic and the romantic ideals is fundamental and intimately related to the Platonic teachings. Whether Plato was essentially a classicist or essentially a romanticist, or both in strange union, I do not know. I must reiterate, as I close, that I venture upon no interpretation of Plato himself. However the classic and the romantic trends in his writings be explained, the distinction between them is important. For here, to speak with Socrates, "no light matter is at stake, nothing less than the rule of human life."

<sup>53</sup> Aristotle's Theory of Poetry and Fine Arts, Fourth Edition, Macmillan Co. London, 1911, pp. 186-189.

## A POSSIBLE CASE OF LUKAN AUTHORSHIP

(JOHN 7 53-8 11)

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In his *Philology of the Gospels*<sup>1</sup> Professor Blass referred somewhat casually to the Lukan style of the *pericope adulterae*. His theory of a Roman edition of Luke's works issued by the author himself, in connection with which his reference was made, has not received very wide acceptance, and so the linguistic phenomena to which he called attention were not made generally known. The motives of the present writer in bringing the subject forward again are not merely that the Lukan style of this passage impressed itself independently upon him, as it might upon any one familiar with Luke's style, but because von Soden's careful study of the text of the passage,<sup>2</sup> and Harnack's recent use of the style of the Lukan writings<sup>3</sup> make it desirable to give a fresh presentation of the evidence.

With regard to the text of the *pericope adulterae* it must at once be confessed that it is one of the most uncertain passages in the whole N. T. The variants are extremely numerous, and as the section is entirely omitted by most of the great uncial MSS., a decision on readings cannot be made by the usual methods of valuation. Von Soden divided the authorities into seven main groups, and attempted to appraise them and arrange them and so to recover the original text. To many however his reconstruction will not seem convincing. It will be safer therefore for us in considering the style of the passage

<sup>1</sup> P. 159 (1898) with a reference to his edition of Luke, (1897) p. xlvi.

<sup>2</sup> Die Schriften des N. T. I, pp. 486-524.

<sup>3</sup> Especially Luke the Physician and The Date of the Acts.

to limit ourselves to no one form of the text but to include all variants, remembering constantly that some of the examples given are probably not the original readings.<sup>4</sup>

The style of Luke, on the other hand, has become better known with the study of his writings. He has the most distinctive vocabulary of any New Testament writer, and a style so individual as to be recognizable in nearly every verse. No matter what his subject or his source, these characteristics make themselves everywhere evident. Not merely in the nativity stories with their canticles at the beginning of his work, nor in the "we" passages at its close, may we find with Harnack abundant evidences of his style. Even the stories which he takes bodily from Mark are filled with his own peculiar ways of speech<sup>5</sup>; so homogeneous is the style of the Lukian writings. It is therefore all the more striking that this brief passage—bearing as it does the evidence of antiquity and verisimilitude, yet certainly not part of the Fourth Gospel, as both its language and the MSS. prove—should reveal nevertheless so many marks, some of them almost unmistakable, of Luke's style.

First let us consider the negative evidence. There are of course some words in the passage that do not occur in Luke or Acts. They are

ἀναμάρτητος  
 αὐτοφόρω αὐτοφόρω αὐτῷ τῷ φόρῳ  
 διακελεῖω (μ<sup>1</sup>)  
 καταγράφω (μ<sup>1</sup> 2)  
 κατακύπτω κάτω κύπτω  
 κατηγορία <sup>4</sup>(D) <sup>6</sup>(μ<sup>2</sup> 3 4 6 7) (a variant in Lk. 6 7)  
 μοιχεῖα (all MSS. except D)

The first five of these are not found in any New Testament writer but are all compound words in the

<sup>4</sup> All readings that are not found in all groups of MSS. will be marked below with von Soden's symbols for the groups that contain them, e.g., μ<sup>1</sup>, μ<sup>2</sup>, etc. The numbers represent very nearly the order of preference given the groups by von Soden.

<sup>5</sup> See Plummer, Luke, *passim*.

manner of Luke. Compare his use of *ἀπογράφω*, *ἀνακύπτω* *συνκύπτω*, *διατάσσω*, etc.<sup>6</sup>

There are also some expressions which are less like Luke than like some other New Testament writer. The mention of the Jews in D and one or two other MSS., the use of "high priests and Pharisees" ( $\mu^1$ ) in place of "scribes and Pharisees," are both variants that agree exactly with the manner of the Fourth Gospel. And the reading ( $\mu^4$  5) *μηκέτι ἀμάρτανε* without *ἀπὸ τοῦ νῦν* agrees exactly with Jn. 5 14. For the reading *εἰς καθ' εἰς* ( $\mu^2$  3 4 5 6 7) perhaps the nearest parallel is in Mk. 14 19 (*εἰς κατὰ εἰς*).

Compare now with these possible linguistic affiliations to the other Gospels the likenesses of the passage to Luke-Acts.

The following words or phrases occurring in this passage occur in Luke or Acts but in no other Gospel:

*ἀνακύπτω*  
*ἀπὸ τοῦ νῦν* ( $\mu^1$  2 3 6 7)  
*εἰς ἐκαστός* <sup>8</sup> ( $\mu^5$  6) <sup>9</sup> ( $\mu^1$ )  
*ἐπιμένω*  
*ἐκπειράζω* ( $\mu^2$  D)<sup>7</sup>  
*κατήγορος* ( $\mu^3$  5 6 7)  
*δρθρος* Cf. *όρθριζω*, *όρθρινός*  
*προσποιέομαι* ( $\mu^5$  7)  
*σὺ οὖν* <sup>8</sup>  
*συνελδησις* ( $\mu^5$  7)

More striking still is the list of words found in the *pericope*, which though not limited to Luke are more abundant in his work than in the other Gospels. From Hawkins' lists of Lukan phrases <sup>9</sup> we find in this passage:

*ἄγω* ( $\mu^1$  2 3 5 6 7)  
*εἰπεν δέ, εἰπαν δέ*

<sup>6</sup> Plummer, Luke, p. 252: "Lk. is fond of compounds with *διά*." There are over 50 words compounded with *κατά* which occur in Luke or Acts but not in Mt., Mk., or Jn.

<sup>7</sup> The word occurs also in Mt. 4 7 (=Lk. 4 12) in a quotation from Dt. 6 16.

<sup>8</sup> According to Bruder only Lk. 4 7, 22 70; Ac. 23 21.

<sup>9</sup> Horae Synopticae, Second Edition, pp. 15-29.

έρωτάω ( $\mu^1 2 3 4 5 7$ )  
 ἔχω, with infinitive ( $\mu^5$ )  
 λαός  
 νῦν  
 πᾶς, or ἀπας ὁ λαός ( $\mu^1 3 5 6 7$ )  
 παραγίνομαι  
 πλήν ( $\mu^5 7$ )  
 ως=when

According to Harnack<sup>10</sup> we are justified in marking as Lukan:

εἰς τὸν οἶκον ( $\mu^2 3 5 6 7$ )  
 ἐν μέσῳ  
 πορεύομαι  
 αὐτῇ ἢ γυνῇ ( $\mu^1 2 3 4 5$ )  
 ως δέ

Further examples may be gained from the lexicon:

οἱ δὲ ἀκούσαντες ( $\mu^2 3 4 5 6 7$ ) (once in Mk.)  
 ἄρχομαι ἀπό (once in Mt.)  
 παραγίνομαι εἰς ( $\mu^1 2 3 5 7$ ) (once in Mt.)  
 πορεύονται (twice in Jn.)

In the following cases there is a likeness of expression such as commonly exists between the different parts of Luke's writings:

- 'Ιησοῦς δὲ ἐπορεύθη εἰς τὸ ὅρος τῶν ἑλαιῶν  
 Lk. 22 39 καὶ ἐξελθὼν ἐπορεύθη κατὰ τὸ ἔθος εἰς τὸ ὅρος τῶν ἑλαιῶν  
 ὥρθροῦ δὲ πάλιν παρεγένετο εἰς τὸ ἱερὸν καὶ πᾶς ὁ λαὸς ἤρχετο  
 πρὸς αὐτὸν
- Lk. 21 38 καὶ πᾶς ὁ λαὸς ὥρθριζεν πρὸς αὐτὸν ἐν τῷ ἱερῷ  
 καὶ στήσαντες αὐτὴν ἐν μέσῳ λέγοντιν αὐτῷ
- Ac. 4 7 καὶ στήσαντες αὐτοὺς ἐν μέσῳ ἐπυνθάνοντο  
 ταῦτην εὑρομεν ἐπ' αὐτωφώρω μοιχευομένην ( $\mu^6 7$ )
- Lk. 23 2 τούτον εὑραμεν διαστρέφοντα τὸ ἔθνος ἡμῶν κτλ; cf. Ac. 24 5.  
 ἵνα σχῶσιν (ἔχωσιν, εὑρώσιν) κατηγορεῖν (κατηγορίαν κατ')

<sup>10</sup> See Date of the Acts, pp. 5, 6, 9, 15; Luke the Physician, pp. 40, 50 f.

Lk. 6 7 ἵνα εὑρωσιν κατηγορεῖν (κατηγορίαν κατ<sup>3</sup>) αὐτοῦ

Lk. 11 54 D al ἵνα εὑρωσιν κατηγορῆσαι

Ac. 28 19 ἔχων τι κατηγορεῖν

ὅρθρου δὲ βαθέως πάλιν ἥλθεν (μ<sup>6</sup>)

Lk. 24 1 ὅρθρου βαθέως ἐπὶ τὸ μῆμα ἥλθαν

καὶ καθίσας ἐδίδασκεν αὐτοὺς (μ<sup>1 2 3 5 6 7</sup>)

Lk. 5 3 καθίσας δὲ [ . . . . ] ἐδίδασκεν τοὺς ὄχλους

Further examples of likeness are in construction and sentence structure:

With *πρῶτος βαλέτω λίθον* compare

Lk. 2 2 αὕτη ἀπογραφὴ πρώτη ἐγένετο and other adverbial uses of the adjective in Lk. 21 34, 24 18, 22, Ac. 20 6 D, 28 13.

With the position of the pronoun in *σὺ οὖν τί λέγεις*; compare

Lk. 16 7 σὺ δὲ πόσον ὀφείλεις;

Ac. 11 17 ἐγὼ τίς ἡμῖν δύνατος κωλῦσαι τὸν θεόν;

Ac. 19 15 ὑμεῖς δὲ τίνες ἔστε;

With the use of the participle in *ἐπέμενον ἐρωτῶντες* compare

Ac. 12 16 ἐπέμενεν κρούων

Lk. 7 45 οὐ διέλιπεν καταφιλοῦσα

Also Lk. 23 12; Ac. 8 16

With *κατελείφθη μόνος* compare

Lk. 10 40 μόνην με κατέλειπεν διακονεῖν

With the brief *οὐδεῖς* in *οὐδεῖς, κύριε* of the woman's reply compare

Lk. 22 35 . . . μή τινος ὑστηρήσατε; οἱ δὲ εἰπαν, οὐθενός

With *κύριε* in the same reply compare

Ac. 10 14, 11 8 μηδαμῶς, κύριε

Lk. 17 37 ποῦ, κύριε;

Ac. 9 5, 22 8, 26 15 τίς εἰ, κύριε;

Ac. 10 4 τί ἔστιν, κύριε;

With *πορεύονται ἀπὸ τοῦ νῦν μηκέτι ἀμάρτανε* compare

Lk. 5 10 μὴ φοβοῦται ἀπὸ τοῦ νῦν ἀνθρώπους ἔσῃ ζωγρῶν

No other N. T. writing has such close parallels as those given from Luke and Acts.

In view of the many misuses of the linguistic argument, especially in connection with Luke-Acts, it would be rash to assume at once from this evidence that the *pericope adulterae* is written by Luke. It is necessary to acknowledge that there are many limitations to the force of the examples given. First, few of them have unanimous textual support; second, many of them are not very unusual phrases in Greek literature. That no other New Testament writer uses a word is often an accident. But if N. T. standards are to be applied, there are a few unquestioned words that are really characteristic of Luke, as *ἀπὸ τοῦ νῦν*, *ἀρχομαι* *ἀπὸ*, *ἐπιμένω*, *εἰπεν* *δέ*, *ὡς*. And while of course some of the variants must be rejected, any form of the text which we accept, even von Soden's, which is the shortest, will include more than half of our list of examples. It can safely be affirmed that the passage in its oldest form contained as much distinctively Lukan language as the average passage of equal brevity and simplicity in Luke's acknowledged works.

Against the theory of Lukan authorship the subject-matter and method of treatment offer no objection, but rather a confirmation. The third evangelist shows throughout a sympathy with women and with sinners that is congenial to this passage. Jesus' association with them is frequently criticised by the strict Pharisees in Luke. No further example is needed than the story of Simon and the sinner woman in Luke 7:36-50.

Textual evidence, however, does not encourage the hypothesis. As is well known, the best Greek MSS. omit the passage entirely (S, ABCLW et al.). It was known, however, in the West, as is shown by the Vulgate and perhaps some earlier Latin versions, by the references in Ambrose, Augustine, and Jerome, and by the early

Greco-Latin codex D. Nearly all the authorities that contain or refer to it put it in chapter eight or at the end of the Gospel of John. The only exception is the Ferrar group which places it after Luke 21 38.<sup>11</sup> There is therefore little textual reason to assign it to any of the canonical Gospels, and less for Luke than for John.<sup>12</sup>

These facts bring us to a dilemma, either solution of which seems to contradict the current standards of New Testament criticism: either (1) the *pericope adulterae* is an original part of Luke's Gospel and was omitted without leaving any appreciable trace in the MS. tradition of that Gospel, or (2) it is written by another than the third evangelist in a style that completely matches his own.<sup>13</sup>

This paper aims not to solve the dilemma but to state it and to show its importance. For if the first solution is the correct one, then we must believe that in spite of their age, multiplicity, and agreement, our authorities for the N. T. text do not preclude such radical divergence from the autographs as the complete omission of a considerable section from one of the four Gospels. If this is possible, then certainly many of the most radical theories of interpolation and the most unsupported textual conjectures are also possible. Even radical scholars have often declared for the probable integrity of the best texts. Here, however, we should have a flagrant case of primitive tampering, for the omission could only be intentional.<sup>14</sup> And so our confidence in the transcriptional accuracy and in the doctrinal primitiveness of

<sup>11</sup> Also *Evangelistarium* 435.

<sup>12</sup> Of course its historicity is not dependent on its canonicity. Its internal character, agreeing as it does with the synoptic stories, bespeaks its genuineness as a tradition.

<sup>13</sup> I omit as unlikely a third alternative—that it was part of a third (lost) work of the third evangelist. Blass's view that it was from a second edition of the third gospel issued by the author himself combines the difficulties of this view with those of (1) above.

<sup>14</sup> The motive would probably be the fear that the section would be abused to condone looseness in sexual relations.

the earliest available text of the N. T. would be considerably shaken.

If, on the other hand, the passage is not from the pen of the *auctor ad Theophilum*, then some one, whether another author, a translator, or a scribe, intentionally or unintentionally,<sup>15</sup> wrote a style that is indistinguishable from the most distinctive of New Testament styles. In this case style proves to be a most unreliable criterion, and all critical arguments drawn from identity of style—such as the common authorship of John and 1 John, of Luke and Acts, of the Pauline letters, and even of the separate parts of a single work—lose some of their weight. Especially such an argument as that often made concerning the Lukan style of the “we” passages must be re-examined in the light of this evidence.<sup>16</sup> For if in the *pericope adulterae* identity of style does not even prove final Lukan editing, it certainly cannot be used to prove in the “we” passages original Lukan authorship without sources.<sup>17</sup>

<sup>15</sup> The decision between these alternatives and concerning the actual origin of the section if not from Luke forms a most interesting problem, but does not affect the implications of the main dilemma. Eus. H. E. III. 39, 16 suggests two possible second-century sources. He says: “(Papias) relates another story of a woman, who was accused of many sins before the Lord, which is contained in the Gospel according to the Hebrews.” The evidence of the story’s western circulation and the variety of its readings may suggest that it was translated into Greek from the Latin. That the later scribes wrote a style like Luke’s is not improbable. Blass, *Evangelium secundum Lucam*, 1897, pp. lvii ff., has given some interesting cases from variants in Mark, and unless one accepts his hypothesis of two editions by Luke, his evidence for the Lukan style of the “Western” text of Luke and Acts (cf. his Professor Harnack und die Schriften des Lukas, 1907) will point in the same direction. That this “Lukanizing” is intentional is improbable. Perhaps the style of Luke was the most familiar to the scribes and probably it was the most congenial to them on account of its literary quality. Many of Luke’s minor changes in Mark are made independently by scribes of Mark, e.g., in D.  $\delta\gamma\omega$  for  $\phi\kappa\omega$ .

<sup>16</sup> The argument that the “we” passages are so distinctly Lukan in style that the author cannot be using a source is presented most fully by Harnack, *Luke the Physician* (1906), pp. 40–120; *Date of the Acts* (1911), pp. 1–28; cf. also Hawkins, *Horae Synopticae*, Second Edition, pp. 182 ff. The inference of these scholars is that therefore Luke and Acts were written by a companion of Paul, presumably Luke.

<sup>17</sup> Since the foregoing article was written there has come to hand H. McLachlan’s *St. Luke Evangelist and Historian* (1912), with its full and independent argument for the Lukan authorship of the *pericope adulterae* (pp. 94–126).

## THE EVER MEMORABLE MR. JOHN HALES

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In the midst of dusty records in long-forgotten corners of history one sometimes comes pleasantly upon personalities which have all the freshness and charm of present-day acquaintances. At once they become such real friends that one wonders how they have escaped more general notice. One feels that it must have been untoward circumstances only which veiled their light and kept its radiance from shining down the centuries to reveal them at least to their spiritual kin of later times.

Such a one was John Hales of Eton College, called curiously enough by his own generation and that following the "ever memorable." We no longer render him the homage which his contemporaries felt would even now be his. One likes to feel, however, that theirs was not a mistaken judgment, but perhaps a prophecy. In many ways Hales was for his time peculiarly modern; he was one of those free thinkers who belong both to their own age and to a far-distant time; one of those whose ideas, when the years that form the gap between have been fulfilled, stand revealed in almost startling agreement with contemporary thought. He cannot remain but a dim name in the midst of the chaos of the seventeenth century.

He himself made no effort to win fame either among his contemporaries or from posterity. In the three small volumes which contain his writings there is nothing which was meant to serve more than the immediate occasion. It was only long afterward and with great difficulty

that the few scattered records of his thought were all collected. They consist of seventeen sermons, less than half a dozen small tracts of a few pages each on religious subjects, eight or ten letters to various of his friends, and a series of some thirty-odd letters to Sir Dudley Carlton, the English Ambassador at The Hague, whose chaplain Hales then was and by whom he had been sent to witness the proceedings of the Synod of Dort. He was above all else a scholar, and when we consider, for instance, the nine bulky volumes of his contemporary, Archbishop Laud, a busy executive, his record seems meagre indeed. His little writing was not from lack of power but was due mainly to deliberate choice. His friends urged him to write more, but he as persistently refused. To personal glory he was indifferent, an attitude which constitutes much of his charm. He felt that he could do more good by teaching, by direct contact with people, than by writing. He deplored the mass of controversial literature of his day. He realized that many of his own opinions were not those commonly held, and he wished to avoid any possibility of injury that might result from obtruding them upon others. Not only did he refrain from writing but he would not accept high position in either the universities or the Church. By choice he passed most of his life in scholarly retirement at Eton College, where he might, as he said on one occasion when expressing his preference, have "a small, a private, a retired Auditory."

Yet no man was accorded greater praise than he by a wide circle of learned and influential friends. The Earl of Clarendon spoke of him as "one of the least men in the kingdom and one of the greatest scholars in Europe." He marvelled at his preferring to live at Eton when his learning and ability were such as to have gained for him, had he so wished, any position within the gift of the Church. He praised his profound

judgment and his discerning spirit, and remarked that he had read more and retained more in his memory than any man he knew except Lord Falkland, who he thought "sided him." The two men, Hales and Falkland, thus placed together by Clarendon, were themselves intimate friends. They were much alike in spirit. Anthony à Wood gave Hales a high place among his Oxford worthies. On one occasion he applied to him the epithet, "a walking library," and on another, when speaking of the life of John Donne by Isaac Walton, the greatest praise he could give the book was to say that Hales, "the best critic of the last age," had approved of it. Stillngfleet, Bishop of Worcester, in praising his wisdom, judgment, and moderation, spoke of him as "that incomparable man." Dr. Heylin, Laud's biographer, called him a "man of infinite reading and no less ingenuity, free of discourse, and as communicative of his knowledge as the celestial bodies of their light and influence." Andrew Marvel, a man of opposite religious views, counted it "no small honor to have grown up into some part of his [Hales'] acquaintance, and to have conversed awhile with the living remains of one of the clearest heads and best-prepared breasts in Christendom." Bishop Pearson, of Chester, long Hales' friend, described him as "a man of as great sharpness, quickness, and subtlety of wit, as ever this or perhaps any nation bred." "His industry did strive," he said, "if it were possible, to equal the largeness of his capacity, whereby he became as great a master of polite, various, and universal learning, as ever yet conversed with books."

None of these men could find terms strong enough, seemingly, in which to express their admiration for Hales. Yet while many of their names are today household words with us, he of whom they thus spoke is almost entirely forgotten. If what they said of him was true, and we do not doubt their testimony in other matters,

he too was a force in his generation. His was the quiet radiation of a luminous personality, a direct man-to-man influence, with only the intangible result of more threads of pure gold woven into the fabric of the lives of those who knew him. To catch again the full vision of such a life is difficult indeed, yet such is the charm of even a few bright gleams, that, as a child that seeks the end of the rainbow, one is led irresistibly on in the hope of discovering the full brightness of the treasures of mind and heart which endeared Hales to his contemporaries.

He was born at Bath in 1584. His father was John Hales, who acted as steward to the Horner family in Somersetshire. At Bath he was educated in "grammar learning," in the phrase of Anthony à Wood, and at thirteen, he went to Oxford, where he became a scholar of Corpus Christi. Finally in 1605, when he was twenty-one, as that old worthy quaintly continues, "the prodigious pregnancy of his parts being discovered by the Hedge beaters of Sir Henry Savile, he was encouraged to stand for a Fellowship at Merton." Although the competition was strong and all the candidates "sifted and examined to the utmost," he stood easily first among those appointed. One is not surprised that he did if Wood's testimony be true that certain seniors at Oxford, at his (Wood's) first coming there, told him that no one "in the then memory of man" ever went beyond him for "subtle Disputations in Philosophy, for his eloquent Declamations and Orations; as also for his exact knowledge in the Greek tongue." He proceeded M.A. in 1609. For a time he was lecturer in Greek at Merton, and in 1612 was made public university lecturer in the same subject. Part at least of Wood's praise of him must have been well founded. During the years from 1610 to 1613 were published the volumes of Sir Henry Savile's fine edition of Chrysostom. Savile was at this time warden of Merton. He had been the first to recog-

nize Hales' ability and to secure his promotion. It was he whom he chose to help him in his great work of editing the eloquent Greek Father. Hales' own joy in the task and the extent to which he shared the spirit of the author, are evident from the numerous references to Chrysostom in his own later sermons.

In 1596, without giving up the wardenship of Merton, Savile had been made provost of Eton College. As a part of the Eton foundation were a number of Fellowships designed for the support of resident scholars, men of mature and recognized ability, who would thus have leisure amid congenial surroundings to carry on their researches. They also shared the common life and work of the college. Each college was proud of the record of the scholars whom it could thus permanently attach to itself. Although Sir Henry was, as Wood curiously laments, "troubled with the cumbrances of marriage," he desired to improve the college of which he was the head with "riches and literature." Accordingly in 1613, as one step toward the latter end, he made his young Oxford assistant one of the Fellows of Eton. To Hales the appointment was peculiarly pleasing. Besides continuing his intimate and happy companionship with the older scholar, it afforded him just that measure of seclusion which his modest yet industrious soul most craved. He felt that he could do more good through his researches than by accepting a position involving wide pastoral duties. The money reward of more active work made no appeal to him. Clarendon quoted him as saying on one occasion that his Fellowship and the place of bursar, which he also filled at Eton, brought him fifty pounds a year more than he could spend. Yet their combined income was very small. His only personal extravagance was books. His library was valued at twenty-five hundred pounds, and was, in Aubrey's phrase, "a noble one and judiciously chosen."

Clarendon considered it the best private library he had ever seen. It is with Eton that Hales' name is always associated. There were passed the busy, mature years of his life, from the time when he was twenty-nine until he was sixty-five. From his activity there not only many generations of Eton boys but men of eminence in England and on the Continent came to know and admire him.

We have noted the high place assigned him as a critic and as a scholar. Although his refusal to write more has kept us from having anything like a complete record of his thought, still the bits which we do possess, miscellaneous and disconnected as they are, furnish indisputable evidence of his intellectual power.

We have for one thing considerable light on the methods by which he did his work. They were strikingly like those of modern scholars. He disclosed them in the talks which from time to time he gave to the boys of Eton, who we think must have been decidedly proud of the quiet but famous little scholar who dwelt among them. Interests primarily religious did not, in his view, excuse one from the labor of critical scholarship. "Piety," he affirmed, "doth not require us to be either short-witted or beggarly." On the contrary, St. Paul himself expressly forbade "greenness of scholarship." Moreover, as he put it with unconsciously humorous emphasis, in interpreting the Scriptures rightly "that which here gives us the victory must be the grace of God and our own industry." He knew the value of systematic work. He was fond of quoting the advice of a former scholar who had said that if a man had thirty years in which to acquire knowledge, he might with greater profit use twenty of them in learning how to study than to spend the entire period in diligent but unregulated work. On the other hand he warned them against securing exactness at the sacrifice of things more worth while. Quoting

Quintilian, he declared that it ought not impeach the learning of a good Grammarian to be ignorant of some things, since there were many "unnecessary quibbles and quirks in Grammar, of which to purchase the knowledge were but loss of labor and time." The difficulties which beset the path of the real student he never underestimated. Knowledge he declared to be indeed a very pleasant thing to possess, but the process of learning was, he warned them, "harsh and tedious above all things else in the world." By knowledge he meant not merely knowing what others had put into books, but the attainment of ultimate truth as far as that was humanly possible.

The earnestness with which he himself sought to reach this high goal is evident from a passage of remarkable beauty in a letter he wrote to Archbishop Laud.

"The pursuit of truth," [he said], "hath been my only care, ever since I first understood the meaning of the word. For this, I have forsaken all hopes, all friends, all desires, which might biass me, and hinder me from driving right at what I aimed. For this I have spent all my money, my means, my youth, my age and all that I have; that I might remove from myself that censure of Tertullian, *Suo vitio quis quid ignorat?* If with all this cost and pains, my purchase is but error; I may safely say, to err hath cost me more than it has many to find the truth: and truth itself shall give me this testimony at last, that if I have missed of her, it is not my fault but my misfortune."

What pretended to be truth, he told the students, must be diligently weighed and sifted. He loved Epicharmus' maxim that "The chiefest sinew and strength of wisdom is not easily to believe." This attitude, now particularly dear to the historian, is further emphasized in one of his letters. A friend who was about to undertake the guidance of a young gentleman in the study of Roman history, wrote to him for advice. His answer, printed now as a tract with the title *The Method of Reading Profane History*, reveals not only a wide knowledge of the literature of Roman history but also

a surprising grasp of scientific methods of procedure in its study; such things as due attention to geography and chronology, the critical emendation and comparison of texts, tests of the accuracy and good faith of authors, reliance upon primary sources, orderly methods of taking notes, in fact most of the things which only in the last seventy years have come to be generally recognized as the bulwarks of historical scholarship.

What are the results of his untiring and surprisingly scientific search for truth as shown by his conclusions in regard to the big problems of his own day? Those of which we have fullest record concern the religious situation, one of the two vital issues about to plunge the nation into civil war. Here his intellectual power is abundantly evident, though he did not succeed in solving the vexed problem. His fundamental fallacy, one common to the majority of men in his day, Anglican and Puritan alike, was his belief in the close connection between Church and State. A Royalist in politics, he believed that a single Church organization under the king's control and in religious sympathy with him was a political necessity. He feared that were private unauthorized religious meetings allowed, they might serve as a cloak for treasonable attempts against the sovereign; hence his acquiescence in Laud's severe policy of enforced conformity. He held at the same time views as to the freedom and independence of the individual which are in our opinion a direct denial of the rightfulness of such a policy. He sought to reconcile the two positions by a scheme of comprehension—a single Church which would make provision for individual differences. This was not his idea alone but was common to a whole group of Anglican liberalists. His position was unique in the greater stress which he laid upon the need for individualism and the extent to which, accordingly, he would have altered existing doctrine and practice.

As authoritative sources for the determination of religious truth, he would acknowledge nothing except Scripture and reason; "beyond these two," as he said on one occasion, "I have no ground for my Religion, neither in Substance nor in Ceremony." This was a bold position. It meant the possible rejection of the precepts of one's early training, of usages sanctioned by age or by universality, of decrees of national churches and of general councils, all of which, as he proved in a series of masterly expositions, were but the expressions of man's authority only. To none of these, therefore, belonged infallibility. On the contrary, the command was laid upon each individual, no matter how lowly, "of what sex, of what rank or degree, and place soever, from him that studies in his Library, to him that sweats at the Plough-tail," to know for himself not only "*what*" he believed but "*wherefore*, upon what reason." Such an injunction of course presupposed freedom of thought and the impossibility of coercing belief. On no subject did Hales express himself more strongly.

"The nature of Truth is such," he explained, "that if the understanding apprehend it for Truth, it cannot but assent unto it. No Man can force himself to believe what he lists, or when he lists." Again, princes "can restrain the *outward man*, and moderate our *outward actions*; by *Edicts* and *Laws* they can tie our *hands* and our *tongues*; Thus far they can go, and when they are gone thus far, they can go no farther; But to rule the *inward man*, in our *hearts* and *souls*, to set up an Imperial throne in our understandings and wills, this part of our government belongs to *God* and to *Christ*. . . . Men may be kings of Earth and Bodies, but Christ alone is King of Spirits and Souls." Wherefore, "if Secular Princes stretch out the skirts of their Authority to command ought by which our souls are prejudiced, the King of Souls hath in this case given us a greater command, 'That we *rather obey God then men.*'"

With individualism in belief thus given free range, how then, one asks, could there be any unity at all, any scheme of comprehension, however broad? His answer,

and that of the others of this group, was that there were certain fundamental Christian truths so clearly set down in Scripture that no one not of evil mind could fail to recognize them. Here we grant that their psychology was at fault, for unanimity even on a single point is not so readily attained. But of such a possibility they did not have a doubt. In the fundamentals only was belief to be required. All other points of belief, those not fully explained in Scripture or those based on passages the meaning of which was ambiguous, were from their very nature non-essentials. Here, since men's powers of interpretation differed, their conclusions must inevitably be different. That such was the case was wholly negligible, provided men did not make them a ground of separation or try to force them upon others. Opposite opinions of the same thing might even, Hales thought, be of such a nature that both might not only be held without offence, but profitably taught. "It is," he said, "*unity of the Spirit in the bond of peace*, and not *Identity of conceit*, which the Holy Ghost requires at the hands of Christians."

He also interpreted belief even in the fundamentals much more broadly than did most of the men of his day. In his classification of "weak Christians," all of whom were to be received into the Church, he included men of upright lives who perchance knew little or nothing of Christ. This somewhat startling position was at least partly due, I fancy, to his love of the classics and of the men of ancient days. The Holy Spirit, he affirmed, had endowed the "famous Ethnicks," as he called them, with "Natural Wisdom and Moral discretion." All the good which such men accomplished, and others like them at present, so-called "moral men," was a part of God's will written in their hearts. In so far as they acted conscientiously, they acted like Christians, and were to be received as such. "Two parts there are," he explained,

“that do compleatly make up a *Christian* man, A true *Faith*, and an honest *Conversation*.” The first part might seem the “worthier” since it gave us the name of Christians, but the second was the “surer.”

His view of the ritual of public worship was an application of the distinction made in matters of belief. Only those parts of the service which rested on essential beliefs were of fundamental importance. Here no error could be tolerated by the worshipper. All other observances, based as they were upon elements of belief which were not essential to salvation, were in their turn matters really of indifference. Here to him and to all those who desired comprehension, was the solution of the English situation. The Anglican Church, they felt, was without error in the fundamentals and hence in the parts of her ritual based on them. In other phases, either of her creed or her ritual, individuals might conceivably and possibly rightly differ from her, but since such matters were of minor importance, other views concerning them did not justify their holders in separating from her communion, or in refusing to join in forms of worship other than they might personally have desired. Such conformity was, in their view, but a small price to pay for peace and for political safety. Hales himself would have liked to see the Church take the further step of so simplifying her ritual that it should contain nothing which was not based on a fundamental belief. Then indeed, he felt, would be removed the last conceivable barrier to the common worship of all Christians. “Why may I not,” he reasoned, “go to an Arian Church, so there be no Arianism exprest in their Liturgy?”

To a man with these views, the bitterly antagonistic attitude toward one another expressed by the various religious sects of his day seemed utterly needless and wrong. “You shall not find,” he exclaimed, “two things of more different countenance and complexion, then that Christ-

ianity which is commended unto us in the writings of the Apostles and Evangelists, and that which is current in use and practise of the times." The Church's story he called an "*Index of Controversies*." With all the earnestness of his nature he prayed that God might truly come to be with those to whom was committed the waging of controversies, that He might like Lazarus "drop one cooling drop into their Tongues, and Pens too, too much exasperated each against other." If this were not possible, he hoped the end of the world might speedily come. Had all men possessed his generous nature, his widely tolerant attitude, his depth of spiritual vision, the bitterness of hatred culminating in civil war would not have been. He was truly the prophet of what Charles Beard calls "that Reformation of Erasmus that is yet to be."

Religion, however, was not his only interest. His letters, even the few of them which we possess, disclose a wide range of secular studies. They also incidentally throw a curious light upon intellectual development in the seventeenth century.

He was so much an Egyptologist that a famous traveller and scientist, Mr. John Greaves, who had just returned from measuring the Pyramids, sent him his book on the subject for criticism. Although Hales modestly attributed his doing so more to his affection than to his judgment, his reply reveals the keenly critical interest of the scholar. He wished that Mr. Greaves had included in the book a topographical map of the Nile in the region of the Pyramids in order that he might the better test the conclusion of

"a learned gentleman of Bavaria, Johannes Fredericus Herwart, who in the XXI Chapter of his *Admiranda Ethnicae Theologicae Mysteria*, endeavors to take off from the founders of those stupendous buildings the scandal of folly and madness, which in the common judgment of the world, hath stuck upon them; and would

persuade us that the Pyramids are monuments of the singular wisdom of the raisers of them, and of wondrous use and benefit to the country, in maintaining the banks of that part of the river upon which the city of Memphis stands, which otherwise were in danger to be swept away by the unruly eruptions of the river, if it were not checked by those wonderful structures."

Whether he accepted either of these somewhat startling interpretations, we cannot tell; in the letter he showed the wisdom of suspended judgment, and was anxious to learn Mr. Greaves' opinion on the subject. He also wondered whether he were right in concluding that the Sphinx "is not of such moment as many report," since Mr. Greaves did not in his book "do it so much honour as to name it."

Mr. William Oughtred, a famous mathematician, was his intimate friend. A few days after one of his visits to Eton, Hales wrote a letter thanking him for a number of solutions he had given him, but explaining that he could not quite agree with one of them, a demonstration concerning the "projectures of an oblique circle." His reasoning shows him to have been no mean mathematician, but with the humility of the true scholar, he added, "If I take upon me to dispute with you, it is but only to learn, and learn I cannot of you except I betray my ignorance unto you." At the same time he returned by Mr. Oughtred's servant his "little compendium of triangles" by which he confessed himself "much eased." The grace and courtesy of the letter are charming, and Mr. Oughtred must indeed have valued his "true, plain, and loving friend, John Hales," as the latter signed himself in closing.

Upon matters of conduct, especially those involving a knowledge of historical precedent, his judgment was much sought. Two letters, one to a man and the other to a woman, were answers to queries concerning the rightfulness of usury, a practice at that time of much doubt.

He acknowledged that "traffic, and merchandise, and all dealings in stock of money, will utterly fail if way be not given to usury: and therefore in commonwealths, and so in ours, the moderate use of it by law is to be rated." John Calvin, he said, was the first good man "from the beginning of the world" that ever sanctioned the practice, and if all abided within the limits set by him, he admitted that no harm would result. He personally wished, however, that Calvin "had been pleased to conceal his conceit," since the multitude was likely to ignore such limitations. And he regretfully added, "What shall we say to God himself, who everywhere decries it! What unto all good men, both Ethnic and Christian, who for many hundred years have still protested against it?" Another man wished to know whether it were lawful for first cousins to marry. He replied in the affirmative, and supported his views with an astounding array of authorities—the Bible, the Church Fathers, the Romans, and ten Church councils.

Apparently no subject was considered too abstruse for him to solve. One letter of distinctly seventeenth-century flavor is a reply to an "Honourable Person," whose rank, from the tone of the letter, must have been high, who had written to ask his opinion of "a new-devised cure of wounds, by applying the salve to the weapon that did the mischief." Hales' answer affords us a curious glimpse into the mind of a man gradually freeing himself from mediæval superstition, but yet fully aware of the weight of arguments which his opponents might plausibly offer. It is evident that he considered the notion of weapon-salve utterly ridiculous, nevertheless he marshalled his forces after the usual method of the schools, and discussed the matter with all fulness and dignity. The supposed antiquity of the "cure" he discredited by connecting it with a "merry gallery" of the times, the so-called "Brethren of the Rosie Cross," a

school of quack scientists who claimed to be followers of Paracelsus. Their alleged proofs of the efficacy of weapon-salve based on the usual authorities, reason, Scripture, and experience, he proceeded to demolish by sane common-sense arguments upon which not even a modern scientist could improve. But right in their midst are two curiously mediæval touches. The Scriptural argument propounded did not, as he plainly demonstrated, support the weapon-salve theory, but it did, as he warned his correspondent, place its authors in danger of prosecution by the Court of High Commission for attributing to so-called scientific forces the miracle-working power of Elisha's bones. That he himself believed in miracles there can be no doubt. He referred to them repeatedly. Christ and the Apostles used them, he said, to prove that they were of God, and under similar circumstances they would be necessary now. The transitional stage of his thinking is apparent, however, from the fact that the reasons he gave for accepting them are in line with those by which now similar events become only natural phenomena. Why should we let this matter of miracles trouble us so much, he asked on one occasion; "Seems it unto us a greater miracle that our Saviour once turn'd a little water into wine, then every year in so many Vine-trees to turn that into wine in the branches, which being received at the root was mere water? Or why was it more wonderful for Him once to feed five thousand with five loaves, then every year to feed the whole world by the strange multiplication of a few seeds cast into the ground?"

Wholly without any modern trend, however, was his statement that if weapon-salve were possible, a position he did not once grant, its potency would proceed from supernatural powers. It was in all seriousness that he affirmed that "*Spirits*, by reason of the *subtilty of their nature* and long experience, know certainly *more*

*mysteries in nature then we do.*" In the same vein he condemned the Greeks for consulting the oracle at Delphi, on the ground that "*Apollo was the Devil.*" In one of his sermons too we see evidence of his belief in supernatural agencies when he quoted the experience of miners, who often on returning to the mine in the morning found their work of the previous day all in confusion, owing to the mischievous pranks of the spirits which dwell in the minerals. A Puritan contemporary, Flavel, was accused by Wood of plagiarizing from him. It was this story of the mine gnomes that he stole. On another occasion Hales quoted from a book on meteors the fact that before a storm a great noise is often heard "which is the banding of good and evil Angels, the one striving to annoy us with tempests, the other striving to preserve us from the danger of them." Yet he was perhaps more scientific and less credulous than any man of his age.

It was not, however, for his intellectual acumen, the clarity of his theological vision, his scientific interests, or his accumulation of mediæval lore, that men loved him most, but for the rare charm of his personality. Bishop Pearson, after recounting his high intellectual gifts, almost burst out with, "and had he never understood a letter, he had other ornaments sufficient to indear him. For he was of a nature (as we ordinarily speak) so kind, so sweet, so courting all mankind, of an affability so prompt, so ready to receive all conditions of men, that I conceive it near as easy a task for anyone to become so knowing, as so obliging." To Anthony à Wood the gentleness and sweetness of his disposition were the more marked in that, in his opinion, those were qualities which, as he said, "seldom accompany hard students and critics." Although Hales seemed utterly unconscious of possessing such attributes himself, he well understood their value in others. Moreover, on reading his analysis

of "goodness," one cannot help feeling that he is indeed revealing the motive force of his own life. Goodness he defined as "*a soft, and sweet, and flexible disposition,*" more to be desired than any other virtue. "For," as he expressed it,

"all other Excellencies and *Eminent qualities* which raise in the minds of men some opinion and conceit of us, may occasion per-adventure some strong respect in another kind; but *impression of love* and true *respect*, nothing can give but this. *Greatness* of place and authority may make us fear'd, Depth of *Learning* admired, Abundance of *Wealth* may make men outwardly obsequious unto us; but that which makes one man a *God* unto another, that which *doth tie the Souls of Men* unto us, that which like the *Eye of the Bridegroom*, in the *Book of Canticles*, *ravishes the heart of him that looks upon it*, is *Goodness*:" . . . Of all our qualities, goodness is *most available* to *Humane Society*. . . . All other *Qualities*, how excellent soever they are, seem to be somewhat of a *melancholick* and solitary disposition. But *Goodness* is more sociable; and rejoiceth in equalling others unto itself, and loses its nature, when it ceases to be *communicable*."

The value he put upon goodness in this sense is evident from the emphasis he continually gave it. He loved to dwell upon the goodness of God. Severity, he held, was a quality not natural with Him, but only casual, and unto which, as he expresses it, "He is constrained besides His nature." Comparing God to a person, he described His countenance as "fair as the Sun in its strength; no frown, no wrinkle in His forehead." In almost ecstatic exaltation he cried out, "When He created this beautiful frame of Heaven and Earth, Men, and Angels, and in that wonderful order, who counselled Him?" Christ's acts upon earth were all, he said, but the issues of His tenderness. He saw no purpose in that which was harsh and ugly. He marvelled that man had been given the faculty of anger, since he really had so little use for it! Duelling, for instance, he said could be justified only by texts from the Old Testa-

ment, since the Apostles could not think of Christians shedding one another's blood. In a sermon preached to the boys at Eton he curiously remarked that "*It hath been observed of the Ancient Cornish Language, that it afforded no forms of Oathes, no phrases to swear in.*" Said he, "I should never think our Language the poorer, if it were utterly destitute of all forms and phrases of reviling and opprobrious speech." It is so useless, "that except a man did love a vice for its own sake, he can give no reason why he doth affect it." Its only supposed use, he continued, was in reproof or in administration of justice, but neither require it, as both may better be performed without it. Good words were as cheap as bad ones and far more effective. Thereupon he told the story of the north wind and the sun in their race to deprive a man of his coat. Repeatedly in his sermons, which with their formalism, their Latin and Greek, their mention of long-forgotten names, would sound queer indeed to modern boys of sixteen, does one find these bright gleams of rare human kindness.

But with all his gentleness there was in him no lack of virility. It was to the strength of men that he continually appealed. "Even the natural man," he said, quoting a heathen historian, "is a creature of great strength, and if at any time he find himself weak, it is through his fault, not through his nature." As for the Christian, strength was his birthright. Quoting the words "I can do all things," he exclaimed, "These words are Anakims . . . he that hath a right unto them must be one of the race of Giants at least." There would be difficulties enough to overcome, for "it is a hard way that leads to life." But there was the test of the man. There was, he held, a martyrdom even in time of peace. If a man's faith was to save him, he must be ever ready to lay down his life for it. He who would have failed under temptation was lost, even though no temptation

came to him. In his view, it was entirely possible for men, if they so willed, to live without sin. Why, he asked, should any man think otherwise and so discourage himself from what he termed "the happiest experiment in the world"? He was aware, he said, that many did not agree with him and lived accordingly, but he would have all under his charge "hold it possible," and "live as if they meant to prove it." He had no patience with the kind of religion that, as he said, might be compared to a "quotidian Ague; it comes by fits; every day it takes us, and every day it leaves us." All work of whatever nature ought to be in a large sense religious in character, for, he maintained, "whoever labors not with God *is idle*, how busie soever he may seem to be in the world." Living and devotion were to him synonymous terms. The motive force of a godly life was a right mental attitude, to maintain which constant prayer was essential. Its exercise need not interfere with whatever else one might be doing. "For the mind of man," he explained with somewhat naïve psychology, "is a very agile and nimble substance, and it is a wonderful thing to see how many things it will at one moment apply itself unto without any confusion or lett." Thus only through the control of sinful thought could one maintain the inner purity of life. Enormities, the greater sins, were the temptations of comparatively few. It was the multitude of lesser sins that most men had really to fear. To cast the blame of one's sins upon the Devil was shirking, for the fault lay rather with one's self. "I doubt not," he said, "if we would but shut up our wills, and use that grace of God which is offered, but a great part of this suggesting power of his would fall to nothing." Self-indulgence he condemned with a sternness that was almost more than Puritanical. He regularly fasted from "Thursday dinner to Saturday." Eating too much was, he held, a vice, and the

root of many of the worst evils. All feasts in memory of the saints he abhorred. Out of his asceticism grew doubtless his queer mediæval theory as to the nature of the body after the resurrection. It was to look outwardly just as it does now; but since in heaven there could be neither hunger nor thirst, there would be no eating there, and the new body would lack all the organs that eating renders necessary. Certainly, here was an antithesis of the Mohammedan view of Heaven! He was too sensitive, however, too much the Humanist, to banish harmless pleasure or beauty from the world. "To refresh his spirits," he used canary to a moderate degree. Aubrey found him, when he visited him shortly before his death, clad in a "violet-coloured cloth gown with buttons and loops." "He wore not a black gown," explained Aubrey. The soft bright color was evidently more pleasing to him. His æsthetic sense also found expression in an almost child-like play of fancy. Particularly was this true of his appreciation of nature. "Who is not moved," he cried, "with that Parable of *Jotham*, in the Book of *Judges*, that the trees went forth to choose a king?" It underlay his fondness for parables in general. He rejoiced that Christ had filled the Gospels with them. He had made them, he said, like Divine and Christian *Aesop's Fables*, because he found it to be exceeding profitable. Much of his own teaching power resulted from his use of vivid illustration.

His love of humanity was so wide and deep that with prophetic vision he seemed almost to forecast the trend of modern social movements, to picture indeed an era of co-operative effort along all lines, the possibility of which we in our day are just beginning to realize. His sense of such possibilities made him like to read about the much-condemned "Familists." The emphasis which they placed upon the common brotherhood of man and upon mutual responsibility greatly appealed to him.

He was wont to say, according to Aubrey, "that sometime or other those fine notions would take in the world." "No man," he maintained, "is born only for his own good, but for the good of his friends, for the good of his country, and for millions more beside himself." In religion this view meant the responsibility of laymen. "Every one of you," he told his hearers, "hath cure of Souls, either of his child, or his servant, or his friend, or of his neighbor; and if any of these perish through your default, his blood shall be required at your hands." In matters of material betterment also he had a keen sense of common obligation. Of worldly wealth it was his firm belief that one should keep only enough for the necessities; the rest was a trust to be administered for the good of others. Over-carefulness in giving was, he felt, apt to defeat its own purpose. "How many occasions of Christian charity," he lamented, "do we let slip when we refuse to give our alms, unless we first cast doubts, and examine the persons, their lives, their necessities, though it be onely to reach out some small thing, which is due unto him, whatsoever it be." The common practice was "like to the Sun in winter, long ere it rise, and quickly gone." Of his own small store of wealth he gave liberally. When as bursar of the college he received bad money, he always substituted for it his own money, a practice which often resulted in an outlay of as much as twenty or thirty pounds at a time. Poor students walking to Oxford received help from him as they passed through Eton. He was the common god-father of all the children of Eton. As he walked from there to Windsor, it was pretty to see, said Aubrey, how they fell on their knees and asked his blessing. All the groats he received as bursar he saved for them and by the time he reached Windsor bridge he usually had none left. Pleasing pictures, these, of him who had termed "goodness" the quality "most available to humane

society, and that which doth tie the souls of men to us"! They accord with the tribute paid him at his death, that the poor did him more honor than the rich. Such was Hales, the man.

That his friends did not fail to appreciate these qualities in him is evident from the few delightful glimpses that we fortunately have of him as he appeared among them. Clarendon described him as being "not in the least degree inclined to melancholy, but on the contrary of a very open and pleasant conversation; and therefore very well pleased with the resort of his friends to him, who were such as he had chosen, and in whose company he delighted, and for whose sake he would sometimes, once a year, resort to London only to enjoy their cheerful conversation." In the works of the dashing Cavalier poet, Sir John Suckling, is a letter in verse with no name on it, beginning:—

"Whether these lines do find you out,  
Putting or clearing of a doubt,  
(Whether predestination,  
Or reconciling three in one,  
Or the unriddling how men die,  
And live at once eternally,  
Now take you up) know 'tis decreed  
You strait bestride the colledge steed:  
Leave *Socinus* and the Schoolmen  
(Which Jack Bond swears do but fool men)  
And come to town. . . ."

There are forty-one lines of it, all in similar strain. It is evidently a whimsically phrased yet earnest invitation to Hales to leave his studies for awhile and come to London. For there in a day he may have as much news "as serves all Windsor for a year" and partake of

"Dishes, with names not known in books,  
And lesse amongst the colledge cooks."

His friends, who also strove to be “masters of truth, as victory” would be the gainers, for where he came “a Synod might as easily erre.” In his Session of the Poets, Suckling furnishes another characteristic picture of him.

“Hales set by himself most gravely did smile,  
To see them about nothing keep such a coile,  
Apollo had spied him, but knowing his mind,  
Past by and called Falkland that sate just behind.”

Nicholas Rowe, the first biographer of Shakespeare, relates in his Preface an incident which reveals Hales' independence as a critic, a trait which must have been much relished by at least part of these literary men. Sir John Suckling, a professed admirer of Shakespeare, a position then requiring much courage, was defending him to Ben Jonson, another member of the group. Hales, who sat quietly by, listening, finally remarked that if Shakespeare had not read the ancients, as Jonson affirmed, he had likewise not stolen anything from them. Thereupon he challenged Jonson to produce any topic fully treated by the ancients upon which he could not show something at least as well written by Shakespeare. We have already noticed his friendship for the scientists, Mr. Greaves and Mr. Oughtred, for Sir Henry Savile, and Lord Falkland. Among his younger friends was William Chillingworth, whose book *The Religion of Protestants a safe Way to Salvation*, at once gave its author the position of the greatest controversialist of his age. Hales helped him write it. Indeed, during a period of twenty years of Hales' life, from 1619 to 1638, Anthony à Wood, who looked only for the objective facts of life, found nothing to record of him except his friendship for Chillingworth. Hales' own mention of Chillingworth is a whimsical one. A friend had asked him for one of his books. Hales was sorry that he could not “please” him, since his good friend Mr. Chillingworth, “a gentleman that borrows books in haste, but

restores them with advice," had gotten it into his hands, and he scarcely expected to see it again, particularly since it was the second time he had borrowed it. No man, he said, had ever borrowed the same book twice of him and restored it. Clarendon observed, curiously, that Chillingworth was only a little taller than Hales, and added, by way of parenthesis, that "it was an age in which there were many great and wonderful men of that size." Another "little" friend of Hales was Archbishop Laud. The liberalism of Hales' tract on *Schism and Schismatics* had at once alarmed Laud. He sent for him to come to see him at Lambeth. They spent the entire day in earnest conversation. Later Hales wrote Laud a letter in which he disclaimed any purpose of disturbing the peace of the Church, restated his views, but did not disavow their essential tolerance. Not long afterward Laud appointed Hales one of his own chaplains and Canon of Windsor, a position he held, without giving up that at Eton, from 1639 until the outbreak of the war. That Laud should on investigation thus signally honor Hales is not surprising. Although in natural tendencies two men were never more unlike, for practical purposes they were agreed, since both believed that comprehension supplied that unity in religion on which in their view political safety depended. With all its terrible grimness there was a more pleasing side to Laud's nature; this recognition of the Eton scholar was one of its all too infrequent manifestations. Hales was already past middle age and well known. Now a still wider circle grew to appreciate his genial presence, for Wood tells us that "when the King and the Court resided at Windsor he was much frequented by Noblemen and Courtiers, who delighted much in his company, not for his severe and retired Walks of Learning, but for his polite Discourse, Stories, and Poetry, in which last, 'tis supposed, he was excellent."

For many happy, busy years thus lived Hales, the guide of Eton boys, and the friend of scholars, poets, and noblemen, all of whom, no matter how widely different their interests, found that in him which called forth their admiration and their love. Then the monster of civil war descended upon England; the quiet, gentle scholar was turned out of the position he had so graced by the Long Parliament, which claimed curiously, though conscientiously, that it did so in the name of religion. Such was Hales' hold upon men, however, that even those of the victorious party felt no personal animosity toward him. Penwarden, the Presbyterian divine who was chosen to succeed him at Eton, insisted on returning the Fellowship to him. He, however, refused to accept as a favor from Parliament what it had denied as a right. After the war, Andrew Marvel, one of the most redoubtable fighters in the Puritan ranks, counted it "not one of the least ignominies of that age," as he said, "that so eminent a person of the Church of England (as Hales was) should have been by the iniquity of the times reduced to those necessities under which he lived."

It was indeed a hard lot that he had to bear for the remaining seven years of his life. The Sedleian family of Kent offered him one hundred pounds a year, two horses, and a servant's diet. "But he," said Wood, "being wedded to a retired and studious life, refused to accept this generous (!) offer." To us it is small wonder that he, the wisest scholar of his time, should refuse a servant's place in a nobleman's family. Wood, however, mentioned the matter with no disparagement, but, with somewhat of surprise, continued by saying that soon afterward he accepted a position as tutor, at one-fourth the salary formerly offered, in the family of one Madame Salter near Eton. He was to instruct her son Will, "but he being blockish," said Wood, "Hales could do nothing upon him." Poor Will! He must have been dull indeed if

such a master failed to make an impression. We almost doubt Wood's testimony; for in his will Hales left all his Greek and Latin books (except *St. Jerome*, reserved for another friend) to his "most deservedly beloved friend, Wm. Salter," together with five pounds for a "fair seal ring of gold, engraven with his arms and hatchments doubled and mantled, to preserve the memory of his poor deceased friend." However, when the act was passed by Parliament, forbidding any one to harbor Royalists—malignants, as they were called—Hales refused to endanger the Salters by staying longer. In the town of Eton, opposite the churchyard, lived Hannah Powney, the widow of one of his old servants. Thither he went to lodge. Wood spoke of her as "very careful and respectful to him, as having formerly at her marriage received of his bounty"—another glimpse of Hales' kindly generosity. Aubrey, who visited Hales some seven years later, shortly before his death, has left us an even more pleasing picture of her. "She had been handsome," he said, and was "of good understanding and cleanly," a woman "primitively good and deserving to be remembered." People who were "primitively good" were sure to be discerned by a penetrating spirit like Hales, and by him honored, no matter what their rank. Hannah lived, to follow Aubrey's quaint description, in a "handsome, darke old house. The hall above the wainscot, painted cloath, with godly sentences out of the Psalmes, etc., according to the pious custome of old times; a convenient garden and orchard." It was here that Aubrey found him, clad in his violet-colored gown, with its buttons and loops, peacefully reading Thomas à Kempis. We are pleased with this bit of evidence as to the nature of the few books which, as he told Aubrey, he had kept "to wind up his days withal." The rest of his large library he had been forced to sell, receiving for it less than one-third of its value. Yet despite his

straitened circumstances, which were daily growing more so, a situation far from bright for a man of seventy-one, Aubrey could still describe him as "a prettie little man, sanguine, of a cheerful countenance, very gentle and courteous," who, as he was proud to say, "received him with great humanity." Anthony Farindon, one of his earlier protégés, also visited him in these last months of his life. After a "slight and homely dinner" they had gone to walk in the nearby churchyard. With composure Hales spoke of his own death, saying that he was "weary of this uncharitable world." But it was its lack of charity toward others rather than himself that caused his sorrow. His only personal regret seems to have been that he had not more to leave to others. He told Farindon that he did not wish to be buried in the church at Eton, since he was not its founder and could "not now be its benefactor." By his will also, written in the morning of the day on which he died, he indicated as its one binding provision, that "since in his life he had done the Church no service, so he would not that the Church at his death do him any honour." He wished to be buried in the churchyard at Eton, as close as possible to the body of his little godson, Jack Dickinson, a beautifully human touch; his funeral was to be absolutely without the usual ceremonies, "without any sermon, or ringing the bell, or calling the people together." His sense of unworthiness was the outgrowth of his deep humility of spirit, his sorrow, part of his unconscious greatness, not a note of pessimism. Throughout his conversation with Farindon the latter described him as "gravely cheerful." That in these last years when position and worldly wealth, even the little he had enjoyed, were gone, he kept undisturbed the happy serenity of his mind, is not the least among his claims to the title "The Ever Memorable Mr. John Hales."

## KANT'S MORAL THEOLOGY

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The most generally acknowledged mode of apprehending God or argument for his existence, is the Moral. The argument has various forms, of which the more commonly accepted and influential, in its main principles, is that of Kant. Kant emphatically rejected the traditional arguments for the existence of God—the Ontological, Cosmological, and Teleological—as inadequate and invalid. More generally, he rejected or greatly subordinated the theoretical reason in the sphere of religion, and gave primacy to the practical or moral reason. He went far in teaching that the sphere of science and the sphere of religion are separate and independent of each other.

The essence of Kant's moral argument for the being of God, very briefly stated, is as follows: The *Summum Bonum* of rational creatures is composed of two elements, the one superior the other inferior, the one conditioning the other conditioned. The first is virtue; the second is happiness. Practical reason demands obedience to the moral law; and decrees that the obedient, the virtuous, should obtain happiness that is proportionate to their virtue. Then Kant concludes: We must believe in a God who shall do for the virtuous what nature will not do for them and what they cannot do for themselves; who, because of his supreme intelligence and power and rule over nature, shall secure for them the happiness that should fall to their lot. A God is not needed to make men virtuous, but only to make them happy.

They can be virtuous, or acquire moral law and morality, of themselves; they cannot acquire happiness.

There is much interest in observing the course of reasoning by which Kant was led to the rejection of the common scientific or intellectual arguments for the existence of God and of the employment of the theoretic reason in theology, and to placing reliance upon the practical or moral reason alone.

The first fact to be noticed is Kant's view that the theoretic reason does indeed furnish us with the idea of God as the free and intelligent author of all things. This idea, it is said, is a primitive and necessary conception of reason considered as a faculty distinct from sense and understanding and higher. If reason is excited by the understanding or acts in view of its operations, it still produces the idea entirely from itself, it owes nothing in generating the character of the idea to any influence or communication from sense or understanding or any external source. The idea is the "offspring of reason alone" acting according to its "original laws."

But while Kant thus ascribes to the idea of God so eminent an origin and so special a character, he repeatedly and very earnestly denies that we have in the idea any ground for thinking that there is an object corresponding to it. He denies the possibility of passing, by any legitimate intellectual process, from the subjective idea to an objective being. He asserts that it is "a mere innovation of scholastic wisdom to attempt to pick out of an entirely arbitrary idea the existence of the object corresponding to it"; and again, that God is a "perfectly unknown being," "a something of whose existence in itself we have not the least conception." The question whether there is a real God, or whether it is right or permissible to believe in, or practically to assume, his existence, Kant removes entirely from the determination of the intellect and speculative reason. The speculative reason

creates the idea of God, but gives not the least knowledge or assurance of a being answering thereto. It cannot tell that there is such a being; yet also it cannot tell that there is not.

Still, in the view of Kant, though the idea of God, necessitated by the "very nature" of reason, affords no real knowledge of any being beyond its own subjective self, it has yet a very important regulative office. This great office is to give a systematic unity to the productions or objects of the understanding, or to "finish and crown the whole of human knowledge";<sup>1</sup> to cause the divisions and objects of the universe or nature, as these are severally perceived by the understanding or perceived with imperfect synopsis, to appear as if they formed together the creation and systematic construction of a free and intelligent Supreme Being. In short, the idea gives "order and system," a collective unity, to the world; especially a teleological unity, which is the highest mode of unity, making the world seem the "artistic edifice" of a divine Author.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Pure Reason (Müller tr.), p. 515. Reason prescribes "to the understanding the rule of its complete application" (p. 469). It "frees, it may be, the concept of the understanding of the inevitable limitation of a possible experience" (p. 330).

"All our knowledge begins with the senses, proceeds thence to the understanding, and ends with reason. There is nothing higher than reason, for working up the material of intuition, and comprehending it under the highest unity of thought" (p. 242).

All future quotations from the *Die Kritik der reinen Vernunft* will be made from Müller's revised translation.

<sup>2</sup> "The supposition, therefore, which reason makes of a Supreme Being as the highest cause, is relative only, devised for the sake of the systematical unity in the world of sense, and a mere Something in the idea, while we have no concept of what it may be by itself" (p. 545).

"The ideal of the Supreme Being is . . . nothing but a regulative principle of reason, which obliges us to consider all connection in the world as if it arose from an all-sufficient necessary cause, in order to found on it the rule of a systematical unity necessary according to general laws for the explanation of the world" (p. 498).

"We have not the slightest ground to admit absolutely the object of that idea (to suppose it in itself)" (p. 550).

No experience can ever be adequate to "an extension of our knowledge beyond all limits of experience, till it reaches the existence of a Being which is to correspond to our pure idea" (p. 518).

"The concept of an absolutely necessary Being is a concept of pure reason, that is, a mere idea, the objective reality of which is by no means proved by the fact that reason requires it" (p. 477).

Thus Kant contends that, though we have a primitive and necessary idea of God produced by our reason, yet with the idea we have no knowledge of an objective reality. A very important part of Kant's opposition to a scientific or intellectual knowledge of God is his effort to demonstrate the invalidity of the common "proofs" of the existence of God.

The Ontological proof, which has indeed always been but a roundabout way of begging what was to be proved, Kant considers as invalid, on the general principle that we have no authority to affirm the existence of a being merely from the possession of the conception of such a being.

On the Cosmological proof he remarks: "As soon as we suppose that something exists, we cannot avoid the conclusion that something exists necessarily. On this quite natural, though by no means therefore certain conclusion, rests the whole cosmological argument" (*Pure Reason*, p. 495). "It rests on the apparently transcendental law of causality in nature, that everything *contingent* has its cause, which, if contingent again, must likewise have a cause, till the series of subordinate causes ends in an absolutely necessary cause, without which it could not be complete" (p. 487). But the argument is not cogent. We cannot truly rise from the contingent to the necessary, from the conditioned to the unconditioned, from nature as an effect to a supreme universal cause, having no cause above it.

He thus describes the Teleological or Physico-Theological proof:

"There are everywhere in the world clear indications of an intentional arrangement carried out with great wisdom, and forming a whole indescribably varied in its contents and infinite in extent. . . . The nature of different things could never spontaneously, by the combination of so many means, co-operate towards definite aims, if

these means had not been selected and arranged on purpose by a rational disposing principle, according to certain fundamental ideas."

But we cannot approve of the claims which this argument advances.

"The physico-theological proof can never establish by itself alone the existence of a Supreme Being" (p. 503).

It rests upon the Ontological proof. Kant makes note of a particular defect, as follows:

"According to this argument, the fitness and harmony existing in so many works of nature might prove the contingency of the form, but not of the matter, that is, the substance in the world. . . . The utmost, therefore, that could be established by such a proof would be an *architect of the world*, always very much hampered by the quality of the material with which he has to work, not a *creator*, to whose idea everything is subject. This would by no means suffice for the purposed aim of proving an all-sufficient original Being" (pp. 504, 505).

Kant comes to the general conclusion respecting the classic theistic arguments, that "no satisfactory proof whatever, from merely speculative reason, is possible, in support of the existence of a Being corresponding to our transcendental idea" (p. 499).

But the greatest opposition of Kant to the traditional theistic proofs is in the radical principles of his epistemology or theoretic philosophy. These proofs, especially the cosmological and teleological, have been employed for the most part by their advocates upon the assumption that the apparent universe, the apparent cosmos of space, time, and material realities, is external to and wholly independent of our mind; that all its immeasurable extent and duration, all corporeal objects from the least to the greatest magnitudes, in their motions, interactions, reciprocal adaptations, require a cause, as creator, fabricator, and sustainer, infinitely greater than man and

any combination of men. This external nature of immense extent and duration and of marvellous construction is the ground or affords the premises of the proofs.

Kant would maintain an entirely different view. He holds that the supposed external nature is not external, but is really only internal; that it is a system of phenomena or appearances within the mind and produced by the mind—a system of the mind's own states; that all our knowledge is of phenomena in the mind. In particular, he says that space is nothing outside the mind, but is only an *a priori* form of our thought, is wholly subjective.

“Space does not represent any quality of objects by themselves, or objects in their relation to one another; *i.e.*, space does not represent any determination which is inherent in the objects themselves, and would remain, even if all subjective conditions of intuition were removed” (*Pure Reason*, p. 20). “We maintain that space is nothing, if we leave out of consideration the condition of a possible experience, and accept it as something on which things by themselves are in any way dependent” (p. 22).

He asserts likewise of time, that it is only a form of thought, existing entirely within the mind and produced by the mind.

“Time is not something existing by itself, or inherent in things as an objective determination of them, something therefore that might remain when abstraction is made of all subjective conditions of intuition.” “Time is nothing but the form of the internal sense, that is of our intuition of ourselves, and of our internal state” (p. 26).

Kant affirms in general:

“What we call nature is nothing but a whole of phenomena, not a thing by itself, but a number of representations in our soul” (p. 94). “The understanding . . . is itself the lawgiver of nature, and without the understanding nature, that is, a synthetical unity of the manifold of phenomena according to rules, would be nowhere to be found, because phenomena as such cannot exist without us but exist in our sensibility only” (p. 103). “Everything which is perceived in space

and time, therefore all objects of an experience possible to us, are nothing but phenomena, that is, mere representations, which, such as they are represented, namely, as extended beings or series of changes, have no independent existence outside our thoughts" (p. 400). "If we take away the thinking subject, the whole material world would vanish, because it is nothing but a phenomenon in the sensibility of our own subject, and a certain class of its representations" (p. 310).

In this manner Kant denies or annihilates the universe of space and matter upon which the ordinary theistic proofs have been grounded. The visible universe is not an existence external to the mind and independent of it and possibly the work of a divine cause, but is only an appearance within the mind, and the product, in matter and form, of the mind's faculties of sense, understanding, and reason.

Thus all our knowledge is of phenomena in the mind, subject-objects. But yet Kant plainly asserts the existence of things that are external to or independent of the mind; though they are unknowable, and therefore incapable of being the medium of the cognition of anything else. There are objects that affect our senses and occasion the rise of sensations and perceptions; but the sensations and perceptions or phenomena they occasion in us give us no knowledge of them. We know at most only that they exist. Our knowledge is rather of what they are not than of what they are; for we know that they are not spatial and temporal, because space and time belong only to phenomena and are "met with nowhere except in ourselves" (p. 303). "It must not be supposed," says Kant, "that an idealist is he who denies the existence of external objects of the senses; all he does is to deny that it is known by immediate perception, and to infer that we can never become perfectly certain of their reality by any experience whatsoever" (p. 299). Again: "I certainly admit that there are bodies outside us, that is,

things, which though they are wholly unknown to us, as to what they may be in themselves, we cognise through presentations, obtained by means of their influence on our sensibility." They are "to us unknown, but not the less real."<sup>3</sup>

Though Kant affirms in many plain and positive statements that all our knowledge is of internal appearances, subjective objects, states of the subject, and that nature is the "sum total of all phenomena" and is made by the faculties of the subject, yet he is far from maintaining self-consistency in his utterances. He is found to say: "This present world presents to us so immeasurable a stage of variety, order, fitness, and beauty, whether we follow it up in the infinity of space or in its unlimited division, that even with the little knowledge which our poor understanding has been able to gather, all language, with regard to so many and inconceivable wonders loses its vigour" (*Pure Reason*, p. 500); and speaks of the "wonders of nature and the majesty of the cosmos" (p. 502). In a notable passage he declares: "Two things fill the mind with ever new and increasing admiration and awe the oftener and the more steadily we reflect on them: *the starry heavens above and the moral law within.*"<sup>4</sup> Again he avers that our belief in a supreme Author of the universe rises to "an irresistible conviction" (*Pure Reason*, p. 502). He says also: "The belief in a great and wise *Author of the world* has been supported entirely by the wonderful beauty, order, and providence, everywhere displayed in nature" (p. 702). Here we have instances of the profound inconsistency and self-contradiction of Kant's exposition. This admired world around us and the starry heavens above are, according to his fundamental teaching, his fundamental idealism,

<sup>3</sup> *Prolegomena* (E. B. Bax tr.), p. 36.

<sup>4</sup> Kant's *Critique of Practical Reason* and other Works on the Theory of Ethics, Translated by T. K. Abbott, B.D., p. 260. All citations hereafter from Kant's ethical works will be made from this translation.

not around and above us at all, but wholly inside us. This apparent space of illimitable extent and illimitable division is nothing but a form of our subjective thought, having no existence outside and independent of our mind. All this order, variety, beauty, all these wondrous forms and majesty of nature, have no external being, but are altogether a system of appearances within, and the production of, our "poor understanding." We have not the "slightest ground to admit" the existence of a divine author of the universe. By this mode of reasoning the traditional arguments for the existence of God are by Kant proved invalid, because they are rendered useless and futile. Their ground or their resources are entirely taken away from them. No place is left, no requirement remains, no basis for argument exists, for an objective divine cause and architect of the knowable universe; since it subsists only within the rational creature's mind, and has its full cause in his own faculties of sense and intellect.

By denying the knowableness of realities outside and independent of the mind, and reducing what the generality of men have accepted and treated as a vastly extended and knowable universe to a system of subjective phenomena, he would seem to abandon every ground for arguing to a divine cause except the mind of the rational subject and its productive and constructive processes, and the community of rational subjects. But he does not even retain this much; for he holds that no man knows his own mind as it really is in itself, or the minds of other men as they really are, but only appearances or mental states.<sup>5</sup> Evidently, unknowable mind or minds can form no basis for the inference of any other being. There is

<sup>5</sup> "In no way whatsoever can we know anything of the nature of our soul, so far as the possibility of its separate existence is concerned," etc. (*Pure Reason*, p. 801). "We know ourselves as a phenomenon only, and not as it is by itself" (p. 761). "I have no knowledge of myself as I am, but only as I appear to myself" (pp. 761, 762).

nothing left then as a ground for argument to any reality distinct from and higher than the mind, save the appearances of the mind and the constructive operations going on with them. It is however a notable fact that Kant seems never to regard the mental phenomena as a worthy or proper ground for arguing to a higher mind as the ultimate author. He generally treats the soul with its faculties or functions as if it were self-existent and self-sustained, requiring no cause beyond itself; treats it as producing the apparent universe, but as itself produced by nothing or as if self-caused.

In excluding from knowledge all things as they exist in themselves, both external things and even the mind itself, and in restricting knowledge to internal phenomena alone, the states or determinations of the mind, Kant exhibits one of the most remarkable spectacles of all philosophical history; namely, the spectacle of a philosopher most strenuously backing off, most resolutely and persistently pulling himself away, from reality. He zealously degrades reality and the knowable to a minimum. He resolves to content himself with a knowledge of internal appearance, of appearance that is to no extent the true appearance or representation of anything.

All goes to show how impossible it was for Kant consistently to hold to a God knowable by intellectual or scientific knowledge. He gave up the traditional arguments for God because of their supposed defects; but he gave up a great deal more than these in abandoning all reality, or knowable reality, independent of our thoughts, upon which an argument might be founded for the existence of a God independent of our thoughts—of a God as an infinite Cause of an external infinite spatial universe and of finite minds, gifted with remarkable endowments or faculties, which were not self-created or self-existent. He very consistently asserts, as was observed above, that “no satisfactory proof from merely

speculative reason is possible in support of a Being corresponding to our transcendental idea."

Yet though Kant thus so decidedly declares the impossibility, on the principles and postulates accepted by him, of a speculative or scientific knowledge of God, he is very far from resigning himself to the theological agnosticism or blank atheism which would seem to be logically involved. He as earnestly and vigorously contends for what he regards as a noble practical theism as he contends against a speculative theism. There is, he still pleads, a genuine and admirable theology; but it has its foundation wholly in the laws of morality ordained by our practical or moral reason.

"All attempts," says Kant, "at a purely speculative use of reason, with reference to theology, are entirely useless and intrinsically null and void, while the principles of their natural use can never lead to any theology, so that unless we depend on moral laws, or are guided by them, there cannot be any theology of reason" (p. 512). He says also: "This moral theology has this peculiar advantage over speculative theology, that it leads inevitably to the concept of a *sole, most perfect, and rational* first Being, to which speculative theology does not even *lead us on*, on objective grounds, much less give us a *conviction of it*" (p. 653).

A primary expedient of Kant, of which note has already been made, is the sharp division of reason, or the employment of reason, into the theoretical or scientific and the practical or moral. He withdraws true theology entirely from the domain of the theoretical reason, and then assigns it to the domain of the practical reason. The theoretical reason is supposed to have no importance for religion. It gives us not the least real help to getting hold upon or discovering the primary object of religion, God; it furnishes no way of passing from the "primitive" and "necessary" idea of God, which it itself produces, to a corresponding object. Only practical reason is of service in apprehending God. In this wise the practical reason

has primacy over the theoretical. Morality, or the law of the moral reason, demands for its own support or its own interests, the postulate of a God as the governor of nature; and on that ground alone, without any theoretic or scientific knowledge, the postulate deserves to be accepted as true. By this scheme Kant fulfils in religion his significant general proposition regarding the objective validity of the ideas of reason: "I had to remove *knowledge* in order to make room for belief" (p. 700).

Kant's division of reason, or the use of reason, into theoretical and practical, and the assignment of primacy to the practical in morality and religion, have had an immense influence upon the subsequent theistic and ethical ontology and epistemology, and seem in latter days to be more influential than ever. This is manifest in the discussions of "Intellectualism" and "Voluntarism"; in the propaganda of "pragmatism"; in the very superior place ascribed to "value-judgments" over intellectual or existential judgments. Practical need, serviceableness, utility, has been given primacy in general ontology and epistemology. It has been avowed that the useful is true, that practical value is the criterion of reality. Says Kaftan: "The relation to the Will and our practical purposes is the sole measure of reality given to us."<sup>6</sup>

From this general view we proceed to consider the peculiar character and course of Kant's moral proof of the existence of God with some special attention, in order to obtain a true idea of its real worth, and to ascertain how well it justifies the great claims made for it by Kant and his followers. The main line of argument runs in this wise: The moral law commands us to make the *summum bonum* the ultimate object of our endeavors. The *summum bonum* consists of two elements, morality or virtue and happiness. Virtue is the "first and principal element" ("it is the worth of the person, and his worthi-

<sup>6</sup> The Truth of the Christian Religion (Ferries tr.), II, p. 289.

ness to be happy"); happiness is the inferior element, it is conditioned by virtue.<sup>7</sup> Practical reason demands that the virtuous — those who are governed by the unselfish and imperative sense of duty — shall obtain a degree of happiness proportionate to their virtue. Now since it is made a duty, a moral necessity, for the finite rational agent to realize and promote the *summum bonum*, it must be possible; but it is not entirely possible for the rational agent himself, because he is not the cause of the world and nature. He cannot then make nature harmonize with his moral mission and facilitate the accomplishment of it. He cannot bring nature to favor him so that he shall receive the degree of happiness he conceives is due his virtue. Besides, unintelligent nature could not of itself distribute happiness in exact proportion to virtue.<sup>8</sup> It is then necessary to believe in the existence of God, a being who is the cause and ruler of nature; who possesses adequate power to control nature so that it shall be in harmony with and promote the interests of morality — the happiness of the virtuous — and possesses the intelligence necessary to understand the true relation between virtue and happiness, or the exact correspondence happiness should have to virtue. This is the substance of Kant's moral proof of the existence of God. In brief,

<sup>7</sup> "Virtue and happiness together constitute the possession of the *summum bonum* in a person, and the distribution of happiness in exact proportion to morality (which is the worth of the person, and his worthiness to be happy) constitutes the *summum bonum* of a possible world; hence this *summum bonum* expresses the whole, the perfect good, in which, however, virtue as the condition is always the supreme good, since it has no condition above it; whereas happiness, while it is pleasant to the possessor of it, is not of itself absolutely and in all respects good, but always pre-supposes morally right behaviour as its condition" (Prac. Reason, pp. 206, 207). "Morality is the supreme good (as the first condition of the *summum bonum*), while happiness constitutes its second element, but only in such a way that it is the morally conditioned, but necessary consequence of the former" (p. 215).

<sup>8</sup> "The acting rational being in the world is not the cause of the world and of nature itself. There is not the least ground, therefore, in the moral law for a necessary connexion between morality and proportionate happiness in a being that belongs to the world as part of it and therefore dependent on it, and which for that reason cannot by his will be a cause of this nature, nor by his own power make it thoroughly harmonise, as far as his happiness is concerned, with his practical principles" (Prac. Reason, p. 221).

we may or must believe in or postulate a God as necessary to the "possibility of the *summum bonum*."<sup>9</sup>

It should be attentively observed that Kant assumes the existence of God, not as necessary to the possibility of the whole of the *summum bonum*, but only of one of its two elements, and that the inferior element, namely, happiness. Kant never postulates a God as necessary to the possibility of the "first and principal element" of the *summum bonum*, virtue or morality. More fully it should be noted, that he does not treat God as the author of the community of moral rational agents in the world, or as the supreme object of their moral reverence, or as the producer of moral law, or the inspirer of moral life, or as himself having ordained that virtue shall be accompanied by proportionate happiness, or as having made it a duty to promote the *summum bonum*; that is to say, he does not postulate a God as necessary for any of the greater objects and concerns of morality, but only, or primarily, as the agent of the rather subordinate office of securing for the virtuous the happiness which they think they ought to have. Kant regards man as morally autonomous, as giving moral law to himself and obeying it of himself, as the sole author of his own virtue.<sup>10</sup> To assume that men are dependent upon God for the moral law and

<sup>9</sup> "It was seen to be a duty for us to promote the *summum bonum*; consequently it is not merely allowable but it is a necessity connected with duty as a requisite, that we should pre-suppose the possibility of this *summum bonum*, and as this is possible only on condition of the existence of God, it inseparably connects the supposition of this with duty; that is, it is morally necessary to assume the existence of God" (p. 222).

"It is a duty to realize the *summum bonum* to the utmost of our power, therefore it must be possible, consequently it is unavoidable for every rational being in the world to assume what is necessary for its objective possibility. The assumption is as necessary as the moral law, in connexion with which alone it is valid" (p. 242).

"In a mere course of nature in the world an accurate correspondence between happiness and moral worth is not to be expected, and must be regarded as impossible, and therefore the possibility of the *summum bonum* cannot be admitted from this side except on the supposition of a moral Author of the world" (p. 243).

<sup>10</sup> "What man is or ought to be in a moral sense he must make or must have made himself." "Duty commands nothing that is not practicable to us" (Theory of Religion (Abbott), p. 352 and p. 356).

for virtue would be postulating a species of heteronomy to which Kant is always decidedly opposed. He will not accept moral law even from God; he firmly claims autonomy. The supreme moral object for men is the moral law, which they produce of themselves and impose upon themselves.<sup>11</sup> In his moral theory the finite rational agent is really greater than God, for he performs a higher order of work. To produce moral law and moral character, to decree happiness, to ordain the *summum bonum*, are functions far superior to that of merely providing the inferior constituent of the *summum bonum*, happiness, by manipulating physical nature. Besides, it would seem that the agent who can perform these paramount functions ought to be able to procure the happiness he decrees for himself, without any aid or interposition at all of a God or moral necessity for postulating his existence. To attribute to man the whole power to acquire the "supreme good"—morality—and to deny him the power to acquire the inferior good—the appropriate happiness—is discordant and arbitrary. It is therefore quite evident that Kant's moral theology has in fact a very narrow connection with morality. The God he assumes has little to do with what is supreme in morality; his moral importance is comparatively inconsiderable. As far as our investigation has gone, we seem to be justified even in the conclusion that Kant's moral theistic proof is one of the most oddly conceived and frail arguments ever offered by philosopher for the existence of God or for belief in

<sup>11</sup> It is not meant that "it is necessary to suppose the existence of God as a basis of all obligation in general (for this rests, as has been sufficiently proved, simply on the autonomy of reason itself)" (Prac. Reason, p. 222).

Autonomy of the will "is the supreme principle of morality" (p. 59).

"Ethical legislation cannot be external (not even that of a divine will)" (p. 275).

Kant is expressly opposed to introducing "an external arbitrary legislation of a Supreme Being in place of an internal necessary legislation of Reason" (Critique of Judgement (Bernard tr.), p. 394). He says further: "Laws which Reason itself does not give and whose observance it does not bring about as a pure practical faculty, cannot be moral" (p. 428).

God. Praise has been lavished upon it by some who have not studied it enough to ascertain what it really is and how intrinsically poor it is.

Let us go on to consider one or two significant features of Kant's doctrine not yet sufficiently dwelt upon; namely, the real character of the faith in God, or apprehension of him, which we have by the practical reason; and the real nature of the primacy assigned to the practical reason over the theoretical in theology.

This faith or apprehension is not real knowledge at all. It effects not the least increase of the knowledge we have by the theoretical reason; it leads us not a step out of the total ignorance of the theoretical reason regarding the objective reality of God. All that the practical reason accomplishes in theology beyond the theoretical, is to encourage us to think, hope, and act as if there were an objective God corresponding to the necessary idea of God produced by the theoretical reason; a God who is willing, and as the author and governor of nature is able, to do for us what we cannot do for ourselves, that is, to make the connection between virtue and happiness sure, and in that manner and so far support the interests of morality — of morality which is supposed to be otherwise, or in its main constituents, altogether independent of him. Therefore the God, or the theistic ideal, of practical reason has only a "practical application," serves only a "practical use," "practical purposes." Practical reason has no proof, and can make no permissible presumption, of a real objective God.

These and other fundamental positions of Kant enable us to discern the real character of the alleged primacy of the practical reason over the speculative in religion. The practical has no "insight" respecting the existence and nature of God penetrating deeper than that of the speculative; it must not presume to "contradict" the latter (*Prac. Reason*, p. 216); and effects not the slightest

enlargement of its knowledge, or reduction of its ignorance, of the objective being of God (p. 234); but only urges to a practical application of the idea of God.<sup>12</sup> It would then appear that in fact the primacy ascribed by Kant to the practical reason amounts to very little, is indeed quite insignificant. Besides, practical purposes that do not concern themselves with known realities cannot in their turn be worthy of much concern. The real truth is that instead of giving primacy to the practical over the speculative reason, Kant always in effect places practical reason in subordination to the speculative.

It is a noticeable practice of Kant to make express claims for his practical theism far beyond what it warrants. The theory is to that extent one of unsustained pretensions and promises. For instance, he says: Faith of pure practical reason in God

"can never be reduced to unbelief" (*Prac. Reason*, p. 244). The existence of God is one of those ideas "the possibility of which no human intelligence will ever fathom, but the truth of which, on the other hand, no sophistry will ever wrest from the conviction even of the commonest man" (p. 231). "A want or requirement of pure reason in its speculative use leads only to a *hypothesis*; that of pure practical reason to a *postulate*" (p. 240). "This moral theology has this peculiar advantage over speculative theology, that it leads inevitably to the concept of a *sole, most perfect, and rational* first Being" (*Pure Reason*, p. 653). "What I really mean is, that the belief in a God and in another world is so interwoven with my moral sentiment that, as there is little danger of my losing the latter, there is quite as little fear lest I should ever be deprived of the former" (p. 665).

It does not seem it should be hard to shake faith in an unknown God who is assumed as a necessary cause only to procure the happiness the finite agent has of

<sup>12</sup> "The word 'belief' refers only to the guidance which an idea gives me, and to its subjective influence on the conduct of my reason, which makes me hold it fast, though I may not be able to give an account of it from a speculative point of view" (*Pure Reason*, p. 663).

himself decreed as a reward for his entirely self-acquired virtue. God is indeed postulated for a purpose; but not as a necessary cause of anything of foremost importance in morality — the moral law, virtue, the sense of duty, for these we obtain of ourselves, without God; but only of happiness, the inferior element of the *summum bonum* and conditioned by the superior element, virtue; which is not necessary like virtue, and which men, in their rapture of regard and devotion to the moral law, might possibly get along without and surrender the postulate of the necessity of a God. Again, faith in God is here represented as being thoroughly "interwoven" with our "moral sentiment" and of as certain tenure. But according to Kant's main teaching, this faith is really very slightly and imperfectly interwoven with our moral sentiment, or moral thought and feeling. God is conceived as having no relation at all to the production and necessary sustentation of moral law and duty. Our own practical reason is held to originate moral law and all sense of obligation quite independently of the existence of God. In this conception, faith in God is not interwoven with anything of primary significance in our moral experience and welfare. Obviously then, according to Kant's central and indisputable didactic, as remarked before, belief in God has a rather dubious moral connection and foundation. His enthusiastic assumptions as to its tenacity and perpetuity have but little justification. The belief is not justly assimilable, as to strength and endurance, to the conviction of duty which is produced directly within, by our own practical reason in entire independence of the agency of God, and seemingly might much more easily be lost. If he had contended that a God must be assumed as the cause of the kingdom of moral agents and of moral law, as a divine helper for moral living and attainment of moral worth (the chief constituent of the *summum bonum*), as well as the provider of corre-

sponding happiness, the belief in God would have had real moral importance reckoned to it; and much passionate assurance might naturally have been felt and expressed. To many, as it seems, Kant's argument has appeared the more plausible because they have not attentively noted how little, according to its capital positions, God has to do with morality; and often his readers have helped his argument out by their own strong moral predilections and prepossessions. There is much to substantiate the general judgment that so far as Kant felt the assurance expressed in the above citations, it had its real occasion in his speculative reason, and was confusedly and mistakenly ascribed to his practical reason.

The logical and final conclusion of Kant's moral theology amounts only to this: that we must assume a God practically, as the necessary procurer of happiness for the autonomously virtuous, while at the same time we are conscious that we have not the least ground for an intellectual knowledge of God as an objective reality. Practical reason gives us no real or scientific knowledge of God, it provides no means or method of bridging the gulf between the internal idea we possess from speculative reason and a corresponding being; it only encourages a sort of mystic faith in his existence. What Kant says in speaking of speculative theology is found to be the utmost that can be truthfully said of the practical: "Thus we are led to say, for instance, that the things of the world must be considered *as if* they owed their existence to some supreme intelligence; and the idea is thus a heuristic only, not an ostensive concept, showing us not how an object is really constituted, but how we, under the guidance of that concept, should look for the constitution and connection of the objects of experience in general" (*Pure Reason*, p. 539). The belief of the practical theology in God comes in the end to be but little if anything more than just a readiness to act, and

to trust for happiness, *as if there were* a Supreme Being of wisdom presiding over nature, of whom we have no knowledge. This result is very meagre in itself; certainly it is very meagre for so much theologizing, and quite unsatisfactory. In brief, Kant's moral theology is an hypothesis of large promises but of very disappointing fulfilment.

Several of the fundamental principles or postulates of Kant's theology, of which the conclusions of his practical theology just considered are the outcome, deserve a somewhat more extended notice than we have yet given them. *First*, Kant contends that by reason we possess a "primitive" and "necessary" idea of God; that the idea is entirely produced by reason without borrowing anything from the senses or understanding, and without receiving help from any source or without subjection to control because of relation to anything. The postulation of an idea of this character is of very questionable warrant. We have, no doubt, an idea of God as the author and ruler of the world; but the idea cannot be called "necessary," in the sense that it is produced by reason as if acting under an *a priori* compulsion; nor "primitive," in the sense that it is produced at once full-formed, by the momentary creative action of reason and without a process of intellection. Further, there is no adequate evidence that the idea of God is produced by any faculty of mind acting in entire freedom from external influence. This idea seems to owe much to the operations of external things upon the mind, and not to owe all to the independent, wholly unaffected production of reason. And the great strength of the conviction of God's existence seems not to be *a priori* but rather experiential, dependent upon the frequency of external occasions.

It was a confident assumption of Kant that there is no sure passage from the internal idea to an external object, or that the conviction that the idea of God has objective

validity is a scholastic illusion. He says in respect to the idea of God: "The conditions of the objective validity of my concepts are excluded by the idea itself" (*Pure Reason*, p. 543); and goes on to assert that we are altogether without authority to affirm the existence of a being merely from the possession of the conception of such a being. He holds that there cannot be a cognition of an external reality as it is in itself, "considering that we always depend on representations which are inside us" (p. 307).

We must grant that there cannot be an immediate knowledge or consciousness of a reality distinct from us or outside; for such knowledge never goes beyond our ideas or representations — of God or any species of external reality; for our immediate knowledge or consciousness is restricted by the most rigid determination to the affections and the confines of the self. If all our knowledge or all our experience were only immediate, then it would follow inevitably that we could have no experience of anything but our self and our ideas; we could know nothing of anything severed from us, certainly nothing of anything as it exists in itself. We should be compelled to submit to the idealistic conclusions of Kant. But we are not under logical compulsion to give up the possibility of a true mediate or representative knowledge of an external object through an idea as formed under the influence of the object. Every idea is wholly mental and produced by the mind; but the mind is still much affected by objects in forming its ideas of them. The particular attributes of objects occasion the mind to give particular attributes to its ideas. In this manner it may come about that ideas of realities outside the sphere of immediate experience, animate and inanimate, small and great, including our idea of God, which are themselves wholly within immediate experience, being pure modes of mind or self, shall be not only bare ideas but ideas in

which we have a cognitive hold upon the relative or corresponding external objects.

Secondly, it is fundamental with Kant and many moralists influenced by him, that the knowledge of the moral law or obligation, or the "categorical imperative," precedes and occasions the knowledge of God, and that the knowledge of God does not precede the knowledge of the moral law. Here again is an assumption of very doubtful validity. It is indeed the very heart of Kant's theology; but it is open to grave question. There is good ground for believing in the reverse order of events.

Respecting the primitive production by reason of the moral law, it is important to conceive and define precisely what is meant by moral law. Some mean by moral law or the categorical imperative, a norm, precept, statute for action, as the Golden Rule, or Kant's modification of it: "Act only on that maxim whereby thou canst at the same time will that it should become a universal law" (*Prac. Reason*, p. 38). Others mean by moral law the imperative feeling of duty or oughtness. Kant seems to use "moral law" and "categorical imperative" in both these senses, without precise discrimination. The two modes of law subsist in the closest association; the moral feeling always enforces the moral statute; but they are yet distinct in their character and origin. The one is subjective, the other objective.

Moral law as norm or statute for conduct we certainly come to possess with the clearest cognition; but it cannot be properly supposed to be a natural and necessary production of our reason. It cannot be assumed to be the *a priori* deliverance of reason uninfluenced by the observation of the facts and conditions of our life and by intellectual incubation.

Moral law taken as feeling, the feeling of duty or oughtness, is quite different from the moral precept and from the intellectual process by which the latter seems to

be apprehended. This feeling belongs to the emotional nature. It is to be regarded as a special and original variety of emotional experience, a new "variation," and not as just derived from or compounded of sensations or other modes of feeling, as those of fear, sympathy, retaliation. It is an original part of the matter of experience supplied by the "inner sense." The feeling enters into a peculiarly close alliance with moral precepts, becoming an immediate enforcing power.

The relation of the moral feeling to our knowledge of God or faith in his existence is a particular matter of our present consideration. In respect to this, Kant seems to mistake very seriously. He reverses the true succession of events. The faith in God, instead of following the rise of the moral feeling, really foreruns and occasions it. The history of the primitive races and conditions of men and their progress to full development, does not prove that the moral feeling preceded belief in the Supreme Being, but rather that some degree of belief in the Supreme Being or the gods preceded the moral feeling; and in its own development in clearness, purity, and fulness, leads the feeling in a parallel development in purity and strength. Antecedent faith or knowledge does not generate the moral feeling; but it appears to have been always an important or indispensable occasion for the wakening and evolution of the feeling existing before as an original emotion potentiality.

*Thirdly*, Kant and many others assume that it is altogether feasible for men to act with practical purposes and enduring satisfaction as if there were a God, while disclaiming all real knowledge of him as an objective being; to act upon value-judgments in the entire lack of genuine reality-judgments. They presume impossibilities. Men cannot be permanently content to ascribe high value for any purposes to mere appearances or illusions. They cannot practise for long such a mode of self-deception.

They will be satisfied only with obligations and purposes that have relation to known reality.

There is no disputing the great attention we give to things and our eager pursuit of them and strong conviction of their reality, because they serve our purposes, wishes, uses, and contribute to our gratification; but these facts should not lead us to ignore or deprecate the fact of our perception of things as possessing a real permanent existence and definite character in themselves apart from and altogether independently of us. Our judgments of their discrete being and qualities are as certain as our judgments of their value. The two modes of judgment may rarely or never be sharply severed, because of the near relation of things to us in the same world, and their constant effect upon our welfare; nevertheless, they are in themselves most evidently distinct, and demand recognition as such. The votaries of practical reason generally greatly undervalue the importance of the intellectual perception of realities and their external existence independent of our cognition and of our purposes and desires. Though their importance for us is chiefly in their utility, yet things have as certain being and properties as have we ourselves with our aims, wishes, interests. We have the benefits of, but we do not make, their reality. It is a hollow peace that was arranged by Kant between the theoretical reason and the practical reason, according to which we are to be satisfied to act as if there were a God, while we are still conscious that we have not the least theoretical or scientific knowledge of him.

## BOOK REVIEWS

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BAHAISM AND ITS CLAIMS. SAMUEL GRAHAM WILSON, D.D. Fleming H. Revell Co. 1915. Pp. 298.

The author of this volume was for more than thirty years a missionary and principal of a school in Tabriz, where he was in close communication with Persian Bahais — his language teachers were of the sect — and where he enjoyed the acquaintance of the French consul, M. Nicolas, the biographer of the Bab and translator of the Babi Scriptures. He has also had in his possession a manuscript life of Baha Allah, by Mohammed Javad Kasvini, which does not appear, however, to have furnished much information not previously accessible to Western scholars. For the history of the movement from the Bagdad period on, Dr. Wilson has drawn chiefly from Browne; the Western stage of the development of Bahaism is set forth more fully, chiefly from American publications by Oriental and American authors. His reading in these sources has been comprehensive, and he has made profitable use of the periodical issued every nineteen days at Chicago, at first under the title *Bahai News*, subsequently as *The Star of the West*.

Two chapters are given to setting forth the claims of Bahaism. The world is in need of a new and universal religion based on divine revelation, and Bahaism is this religion. The first of the three fundamental dogmas of Bahaism is the deity of Baha Allah, who is, in his own words, "the locus of God's essence in the world of the word and the creation." The term "incarnation" (*hulūl*) is avoided, having long since been put under the ban of heresy as a doctrine of some of the extravagant Sufis; "Manifestation" is the technical term of the ultra-Shiites, and is consequently adopted by the Babis and Bahais. What is meant, however, is made clear by the words of one of the missionaries sent to America to heal the dissensions in the order: "Upon the day when God Almighty, in the form of man known as Baha Ullah, declared himself, and said, 'I am God, and there is no God but me,' the old heavens and old earth passed away; all things became new."<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> "I am God, and there is no other God but me," comes from a well-known verse of one of the greatest of the Sufi poets, Bayazid, with whom it has an altogether different sense. The Bab appears to have appropriated the word for himself in a distorted meaning.

The second dogma is the absolute authority (and, for the present age, finality) of the revelation made in and by Baha Allah, and consequently the obligation of submission and unconditional obedience to his commands. These two dogmas, as Baha Allah himself says, are inseparable: "Man cannot take one, without the other." The third dogma is the exclusive authority of Abd ul-Baha as expositor and interpreter of the revelation and commandments of Baha. After the death of Abd ul-Baha, this authority will pass to a kind of supreme council, the "House of Justice," whose decisions will be infallible. Immediately after the death of Baha Allah a schism occurred over the succession, his other sons not being disposed to concede this supreme and sole authority to Abd ul-Baha (Abbas Effendi).

Of less consequence than these fundamental dogmas are the extravagant claims of Bahais concerning the originality and value of their revelations. According to some of them, Baha Allah was the first to conceive the idea of universal and permanent peace among the nations, of the harmony of religions, the equality of women with men — most of which have only that kind of originality which comes from an ignorance of the history of human thought.

The relations of Bahaism and Christianity are discussed in the two following chapters. The efforts of Bahais were early directed to proving that in Baha Allah were fulfilled, not only the expectations of the Imam Mahdi, who according to the Shia Moslems is to "fill the earth with righteousness as now it is filled with injustice," and among the extreme sects, with whom the Bahais are connected, is the latest "Manifestation" of the godhead in human form, but of the prophecies of the coming deliverer (Messiah) in the Jewish Scriptures and of the return of Christ in the New Testament. As Dr. Wilson significantly says, the missionaries had put these weapons into their hands by a Persian translation of Keith, *On Prophecy*. It must be remembered, however, that apocalyptic arithmetic had been cultivated independently and abundantly by Shia Moslems themselves, on the basis of Koran and tradition; and the calculations of the date of the appearance of the Bab in 1844, or the manifestation of Baha in 1863, based on the 2,300 days in Daniel 8 14, or the 1,290 days in Daniel 12 11, are intrinsically neither better nor worse than computations of the coming of Christ or the end of the world from the same data by similar processes.

In the syncretistic stage of Bahaism, which began at Acca, and in the missionary propaganda adapted to peoples of Christian education, there has been an extensive accommodation to the language

of Scripture and Christian phraseology, and an effort to present Bahaism as the consummation and fulfilment of Christianity. This has been accompanied by a free use of the religious principle of dissimulation, which has played so large a part in the history of Shia Mohammedanism, and has had such a mischievous effect on Persian character. The Ismailis, the Druses, the Ali Ilahis are earlier examples of sects which were all things to all men, and which allowed their adherents to profess Judaism, Christianity, or orthodox Islam — or all of them — according to circumstances, precisely as the Bahais permit or recommend their converts to be professing Christians, or to remain in the Jewish synagogue, or the Zoroastrian faith. The revelation of Baha Allah succeeded and superseded all that went before it — the Old Testament and the New, the Koran, the Beyan of the Bab — as each succeeding Manifestation is superior to his predecessors. This position resembles that of orthodox Islam toward the Jewish and Christian Scriptures.

Bahaism is in its ideal and intention a state, a theocracy. Its constitution and its laws — civil, criminal, and ritual — are embodied in a book of infallible authority, in which no change can be made before the coming of the next Manifestation, which Baha Allah declared would not be for at least a thousand years. This conception of the theocratic state and its divine law are taken over without the slightest modification from Shia Mohammedanism. The organs of the theocracy in this system are the Imams. During the period of occultation, when the Imam of the Age is concealed, the world is governed for better or for worse — chiefly worse — by political rulers, but when the Imam Mahdi appears, he will claim the sovereignty and the possession of the earth by divine right. The Bab openly made this claim, and the Babi rebellions against the Shah were, in the eyes of his followers, the beginning of the holy war by which the earth should be subdued beneath the rule of the Imam. Baha Allah, more wisely, disavowed the intention or expectation of establishing the reign of righteousness on earth by the sword — the universality of the true religion is to be achieved by the conversion of the peoples of the earth; but the goal to be thus achieved is, none the less, a theocracy. The best form of the state, as it appears in Baha's writings for Western readers, at least, is a constitutional monarchy. In the fundamental revelation, it does not appear, however, what functions are left to the monarch, constitutional or otherwise. The government is in the hands of "Houses of Justice," each consisting of nine or more Bahai men. There are local councils of this kind, and above them a national council. They are to be guided in all

things by the revelation which is in their hands — a kind of Sanhedrin, we may imagine. Finally, according to Abd ul-Baha, a universal "House of Justice" shall be organized. "That which it orders shall be the truth in explaining the commands of Baha Allah, and shall be obeyed by all. All men shall be under its supervision." National disputes will be settled by this tribunal, and, "if any nation dares to refuse to abide by the decision of the international court, all the other nations must arise and put down this rebellion. . . . They must rise up and destroy it, . . . band together and exterminate it." The resemblance of this plan to some of the most recent plans for securing the peace of the world by force of arms is obvious; the difference, however, is that this supreme arbitrament lies in the hands of a religious court.

A good deal has been made, in Occidental propaganda, of the equality of men and women in Bahaism. Abd ul-Baha created some amusement in a discourse in England on the equality of the sexes by remarking that "in the animal kingdom the male and the female enjoy suffrage; in the vegetable kingdom the flowers all enjoy equal suffrage; in the human kingdom the male and the female are equal before God; divine justice demands that men and women have equal rights." If we turn, however, to the revelation itself, we find polygamy intrenched in the sacred law. The Koran allows a man four wives at once, the *Kitab Akdas* of Baha Allah reduces the number to two — concubines do not count. As Dr. Wilson observes, the equality here seems to be one-sided, in as much as the corresponding right to have two husbands at a time is not extended to women. Baha Allah himself left families by three women, all of whom survived him. The power of divorce rests in the hands of the man, as it does in Moslem law, with only the restriction that if a man quarrels with his wife and wants to divorce her, he shall allow a year's time to elapse for a possible reconciliation. Marriage by contract for a fixed term (*Mut'a*), which is allowed by *Shia* law but not in orthodox Islam, was abolished by Baha Allah. Adultery is punished by a moderate fine, which is doubled for the second offence; but it does not appear that a woman can be released from the marriage bond because of the adultery of her husband.

Some of the American female Bahais, as is not unnatural, were perplexed that, with all the equality which Abd ul-Baha talked about, women were not allowed to be members of the Houses of Justice, either local or national; but they had to be content with the mild reproof, "The maid-servants of the Merciful should not interfere with the affairs which have to do with the Board of Consultation, or House of Justice."

In the following chapters (8-11), Dr. Wilson discusses at some length the Bahai claims to moral superiority over the rest of mankind. He tells over in detail the unsavory story of the period at Adrianople and Acca, the quarrels of the brothers Subh-i-Azal and Baha Allah, the mutual accusations of poison plots, the numerous assassinations, and the contentions among the sons of Baha Allah for the headship in the community after his death. The volume closes with a sketch of Bahaism in America and its present state.

That Bahaism has done some good in Persia, where alone it has a following numerous enough to measure results upon, Dr. Wilson would probably not deny, but the millennial conditions so glowingly depicted by some American pilgrims to the East have not come under his observation. The reputation of the Bahais for truthfulness, honesty, peaceableness, charity, and sobriety is neither better nor worse than that of their Shia countrymen. In the recent movements for political and social reform, which had so pathetic an outcome, the Bahais were not the leaders; by instruction, they prudently stood aloof. And, in fact, it would be a good deal easier for the Mullahs of the Persian state religion to accommodate themselves to liberal institutions than for those who have a brand new and unchangeable law-book on their hands.

Toward the Bahai missions in Europe and America, Dr. Wilson feels as a long-time Christian missionary in Persia might be expected to feel, and he would probably regard it as "Takiyya" (religious dissimulation) to disguise his sentiments, but his antipathy does not betray him into misrepresentation of the facts, for which, indeed, he quotes the authorities most approved among the Bahais, in their own words. The reader will therefore find in this volume an unsympathetic, but, so far as it goes, a trustworthy account of the movement.

The chief defect of the book is that it does not explain the origin of the religion, with what to the uninitiated reader might seem to be its distinctive or original ideas. How, for example, did Baha Allah take it into his head that he was God manifest in the flesh? And how did he find so many men prepared to take him at his word? How did the idea of the universality of the religion arise? The answer to such questions lies in the history of Shia Mohammedanism, with its doctrine of the infallible Imam, the Imam Mahdi, who is to come and establish the universal reign of truth and righteousness on earth, and the belief of the ultra-Shia sects that this Imam Mahdi is a Manifestation of the eternal godhead in human form. From the same source comes the doctrine of successive Manifestations, each

more complete than its predecessors, each with its fuller revelation of the Truth, and of the necessity of an authoritative personal guide. Bahaism is intelligible from its own premises, and entitled to the respect which every great and coherent system of religious thought commands. Men brought up in these ideas and beliefs were predisposed to recognize, first in the Bab and then in Baha Allah, the fulfilment of immemorial hopes and expectations, which are, in their way, parallel to the Messianic beliefs of Jews and Christians, and to the expectation of the Mahdi in orthodox Islam; and as in these religions, the expectation has produced its fulfilment. The nearest analogies to Bahaism, however, are to be found in the Ismailis and the Druses. Bahaism is not essentially a new religion, except in the sense that it recognizes the Manifestation in a different individual.

The student of the Bahai movement will also recognize in it an increasingly potent Sufi strain. Sufi influence is evident in the Bab himself. It was strong in Subh-i-Azal, the younger brother of Baha, whom the Bab named as his successor, and it appears in all the Oriental representatives of Bahaism in larger or smaller measure; it sometimes goes to the length, as I have pointed out above, of the appropriation of famous passages of the Persian mystical poets.

It is to be regretted, also, that Dr. Wilson did not make larger use of the most important of all the Bahai Scriptures, the *Kitab Akdas*, the "Most Holy Book," which, with the *Responsa* appended to it, is the fundamental religious law of the Oriental Bahais. He has quoted occasionally from a summary of this work by Browne in the *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society*, and has looked into a manuscript translation of it by Kheirallah, but apparently is not aware that the work has been printed and is accessible to Orientalists. On page 38 f., he quotes from the opening sentences of the *Kitab Akdas*:<sup>1</sup> "Whoever lays hold of him, lays hold of all good, and he who denies is lost, even though he bring all good works." The essential dogmatism and legalism of the religion are here most unqualifiedly avowed.

Although Dr. Wilson does not bring out this character in as strong relief as he might have done, he fully recognizes it, as no one in the least acquainted with the history or the texts could fail to do; and

<sup>1</sup> There is no indication of the source of this translation; but by the omission of the most significant clauses, and by a translation which takes the pith out of the trenchant sentences, the high claims of Baha Allah are reduced to being the dawning place of the revelation — which to Occidental ears sounds harmless enough — and the teeth of the dogma that there is no salvation except by belief in him and obedience to him are drawn.

the book will therefore serve as a wholesome corrective to such misconceptions as those into which Mr. Vail has fallen in his article on Bahaiism in this REVIEW (July, 1914). Bahaiism is a religion—an Oriental religion—of a perfectly well-known type, and has a right to demand that it shall be appreciated and treated as such, and not as a farrago of platitudinous oracles on elementary morals, or the shreds and patches of Persian mysticism.

Dr. Wilson would have been well-advised to have the proof read by some one more familiar with the fashions of transliterating Arabic and Persian words in English. "Madh Ulya" (repeatedly) is perhaps an awkward misprint, but "*Akstag fur Allah!* God forbid!" (p. 188) is a good deal to make the compositor the scapegoat for. It takes some imagination to recognize old acquaintances in the list of would-be founders of religions on page 19. There are some other slips: Montanus (p. 12) is in strange company with Manes and Mazdak. The quotation (p. 89), "I was a hid treasure, I desired to be known, therefore I created the world," is not from the Koran; it is one of the innumerable spurious "traditions of the Prophet" by which the Sufis gave semblance of authority to their speculations. These are minor matters; in essential things the book seems to be accurate enough.

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THE HEART OF JAINISM. MRS. SINCLAIR STEVENSON. Oxford University Press. 1915. Pp. xxiv. 336. 7s. 6d.

It is a rather surprising fact that an age so full of interest in every kind of religion and at the same time so well equipped with competent investigators as is ours, should have paid but scant attention to one of the oldest religions of the world, and one which in many points is quite unique. This Western lack of interest in Jainism is due in part to the fact that until thirty years ago it was considered merely an offshoot of Buddhism, in part to the inaccessibility of much of its ancient literature, and in part perhaps to the bad name given it by Professor Hopkins in his very influential book, *The Religions of India*; in which he caricatures Jainism as "a religion in which the chief points insisted on are that one should deny God, worship man, and nourish vermin." In the latter part of the last century, however, the attention of a few scholars began to turn toward Jainism, and Professors Jacobi and Bühler in particular made a beginning toward emancipating it at the same time from Buddhism and from

obscurity; so that with the present century the religion of Mahavira has begun to receive some degree of popular recognition. Several little books concerning it have appeared in the last fifteen years — the most valuable of them being probably Mrs. Stevenson's *Notes on Modern Jainism*, written in 1910. Up to the publication of the book under review, however, we have had no thorough and systematic treatise upon the subject; and every student of Jainism for years to come will find it necessary to refer repeatedly to *The Heart of Jainism*.

For there is no other work in which one can find the history, the doctrines, and the present customs and conditions of Jainism expounded with thoroughness and in detail. And certainly few other scholars would be able to do what Mrs. Stevenson has done. For she combines with the knowledge of the ancient sources an intimate acquaintance with present-day Jainas and their Gujarati writings. For eight years, as a missionary in Kathiawar (the centre of Jainism,) she has had almost unequalled opportunities to know the men and women of whom she writes, observe their customs, and understand their feelings.

Jainism, as has been pointed out, is one of the oldest religions in the world. In fact, all the Jainas stoutly maintain that it is absolutely the oldest, and that it was founded by the first of their twenty-four Tirthankaras, "Lord Adinath" by name, who lived 100,000,000,000,000 *palya* ago. That this makes the Jaina religion decidedly venerable will be admitted when we realize that a *palya* is the length of time it would take to empty a well a mile square stuffed full of fine hairs, if one hair were removed every century. Needless to say, Western criticism has never accepted the historicity of Lord Adinath; and in fact for a long time refused to recognize even Mahavira, the last of the Tirthankaras, as a historical character. Mahavira's historicity, however, has been for some years well established; and Mrs. Stevenson in the book under review agrees with Dr. Jacobi in going one step further with the Jainas, and admitting that Parsvanatha also, the Tirthankara immediately preceding Mahavira on the list, was probably historical. Mahavira — the elder contemporary of Buddha — was thus not the founder of Jainism but the reformer of a sect already in existence. The few trustworthy facts of his life are woven together in Chapter III into a surprisingly presentable biography; while in Chapters II, IV, and V we have a historical account of the Jaina community from the earliest times to the present. This is followed by an elaborate and scholarly exposition of the Jaina metaphysics and ethics; and the book is concluded by a

number of excellent chapters on the Jainism of today as it affects the life of monk and layman.

Mrs. Stevenson is a missionary, and she believes that Jainism is bound some day to yield absolutely to Christianity. This, however, does not prevent her from bringing to her study of the religion which she seeks to destroy a very considerable sympathy; and though the reader is constantly reminded that the author is a missionary, he also feels that there is little prejudice and a great deal of real appreciation involved in her account. In one respect only is the book a disappointment — namely, in its failure to make any mention of the very interesting campaign of reform and revival which forms the centre of discussion in the Jaina community today. Groups of young Jaina idealists have been formed in various parts of India, organizations have been founded, periodicals published, and schools established with the aim of abolishing various ancient evils and bringing Jainism "up to date." Of all this one gleans no hint in Mrs. Stevenson's book. It is, of course, likely enough that this movement is but a passing episode in the story of a religion now over 2,500 years old; and the steady decrease in the Jaina community — which, all told, numbers but a million and a quarter — does not promise brilliantly for its future. But it is just possible that the future historian of Jainism will point out that Mrs. Stevenson, with all her insight, left unnoticed one of the turning-points of Jaina history, and one which lay before her very eyes.

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A HISTORY OF BABYLON FROM THE FOUNDATION OF THE MONARCHY TO THE PERSIAN CONQUEST. LEONARD W. KING. F. A. Stokes Co. 1915. Pp. xxiv, 340.

The present volume is the second of a comprehensive work on Babylonian and Assyrian history of which the *History of Sumer and Akkad* was the first. Mr. King has used most successfully the new material which has come to light, especially within the past half-decade, from recently acquired tablets and from excavations chiefly of the city of Babylon. As Assistant Keeper of Egyptian and Assyrian antiquities in the British Museum, he has had a large share in the publication of those records upon an intimate knowledge of which his history is based.

In the preface the author points out that the most striking fact about Babylon's history is the continuity of her culture during the

whole of the dynastic period, the principal modification having been in the system of land-tenure. From the list of persons to whom acknowledgment of indebtedness is made the reader misses the name of Dr. Koldewey.

After an introductory chapter on Babylon's place in the history of antiquity, in which he points out that the continued preëminence of a single city for over fifteen hundred years was founded upon natural conditions and their resultant economic conditions, he passes to an account of the excavation of Babylon by the Deutsche Orient-Gesellschaft. Mr. King spent some time at Babylon in 1901, and although the plans used in this chapter are taken from Dr. Koldewey's *Das wiedererstehende Babylon*, the chapter is not a mere restatement of Koldewey's book, but is an account based upon his own personal observation and interpretation of the texts. In two important particulars Mr. King differs from the excavator, namely, in regard to the identification of the city walls and the famous Hanging Gardens of Nebuchadnezzar. Perhaps both points can be settled only by further excavation. The vaulted chambers upon which the Hanging Gardens are supposed to have rested seem to have been used for storing grain. The criticism that they could not have been kept free from moisture if the space above them was a garden is not convincing, when one considers the very extensive use made of asphalt, and the fact that the plan shows an air space between the chamber walls and the strong surrounding wall.

The chapter on chronology contains Mr. King's most important contribution to our knowledge of the period. He points out that the most serious defect from which Babylonian chronology has suffered, is the complete absence of any established point of contact between the Babylonian dynasties and the earlier dynasties of Nisin and Larsa. This connecting link has been established by Mr. King, thanks to his ingenious use of a complete list of Larsa kings and other material recovered by Professor Clay for the Yale Collection, a transcription of which was placed at Mr. King's disposal before Professor Clay's work was through the press. Such courtesy cannot be too highly commended, as the material from the Yale Collection furnished the *sine qua non* for the new chronology. The list of Larsa kings accredits Rim-Sin with a reign of sixty-one years, followed by Hammurabi and Samsuiluna, in the tenth year of whose reign Rim-Sin was actively leading a revolt against the Babylonian ruler. Mr. King produces evidence to prove that Rim-Sin put an end to the dynasty of Nisin in his seventeenth year, which fact establishes the desired point of contact between the dynasties of Babylon, Larsa,

and Nisin, but it also raises the question of the probability of Rim-Sin being an active political force in the eighty-third year of his reign. Mr. King assumes, as we think correctly, that a mistake in a contemporary document is unlikely. The explanation that Rim-Sin was retained as a vassal and that the sixty-one years include the period both of his independent and dependent rule, that the scribe mechanically added up the column of figures without deducting from the total the years of Rim-Sin's dependent rule, is likely to commend itself to those whose experience in dealing with Babylonian records makes them most competent to judge. The two defeats of Nisin by Sin-muballit and Hammurabi are therefore, contrary to the usually accepted opinion, to be regarded as temporary successes, which preceded Rim-Sin's capture of Nisin.

Another chronological difficulty that has taxed the ingenuity of scholars is in regard to the relation of the second dynasty of Babylon to the first and third. To Mr. King is due the generally accepted belief that the kings of the second dynasty never occupied the throne of Babylon. We must commend Mr. King's open-mindedness in changing his views when evidence requires it. He is now in a position to prove the rule of the Sea-Country kings over southern and central Babylonia, and the incorporation of the Sea-Country kings in the Babylonian dynastic history he regards as a weighty argument for believing some of them to have ruled in Babylon. Dr. Kugler's astronomical method of arriving at the date of the first dynasty and the references of late Assyrian and Babylonian kings to earlier rulers are shown to confirm the results already attained. These new discoveries do not involve any drastic change in the accepted chronological scheme, but lead to local readjustments and regroupings.

In his discussion of the Western Semites, Mr. King shows that they acquired a civilization in Canaan, which had been in turn considerably influenced by that of the Tigris-Euphrates valley. When they moved eastward along the middle course of the Euphrates River, leaving the Hittite city of Carchemish to the north, they founded the Amoritic kingdom of Khana; then they descended the Euphrates and founded the dynasties of Nisin and Larsa a century before the rise of Babylon. Assyria is also believed to have received its Semitic population at this time as another offshoot of this great racial movement. Assyrian culture is not to be regarded as merely a copy of that of Babylon, for the Assyrians were an amalgamation of an Anatolian (Mitannian) race with the Amurru. The rise of the dynasty of Babylon, the gradual extension of its influence in southern Babylonia,

and the struggle with Elam, are interestingly depicted. The geographical term "Subartu" is regarded as referring to both Ashur and Nineveh, and Hammurabi's occupation of Assyria is believed to have been of a permanent character.

Few scholars who are competent to deal with the material at first hand have the ability to conjure up the past as vividly as Mr. King has done in describing the age of Hammurabi. In dealing with the difficult period of Kassite rule, with its dearth of Babylonian sources, Mr. King has recourse to the Tell-el-Amarna letters and the recently discovered correspondence at Boghaz-Keui, to show that at this time Babylon stood aloof from active participation in the political affairs of Asia Minor, engrossed in commerce, while Egypt dominated Syria; the kingdom of Mitanni acted as a check upon Assyrian expansion; the Hittites acquired a position of power before which Egypt declined and the kingdom of Mitanni fell. The Hittites are regarded as a race indigenous to Asia Minor and probably akin to the Mitannian people, whom our author believes to be totally non-Indo-European. Mr. King agrees with the prevailing opinion that the Kassites were Aryan by race.

To avoid the repetition of what must necessarily be given in the third volume of this series, the period of Assyrian domination has received summary treatment. The devotion of only fourteen pages to the Neo-Babylonian period appears disproportionately small. The statement that "in 586 Jerusalem was once more taken and *the greater part of the remnant* of the Jews [the italics are mine] followed their fellow-countrymen into exile," is an inaccuracy of statement which Mr. King rarely allows himself. The suggested identification of Gubaru, an officer high in command in the army of Nebuchadnezzar with Gobryas, the governor of Gutium, who played so prominent a part in the Persian conquest, furnishes a welcome explanation of the ease with which Babylonian rule was supplanted by Persian domination. Babylon's real decay is shown to have begun only when Seleucus recognized the greater advantages for maritime commerce offered by the river Tigris.

The last chapter is devoted to a discussion of Babylon's cultural influence and is in particular an examination of a theory proposed by the late Professor Winckler, who would make all ancient civilization to a large extent a mere modification of Babylonian culture. For scientific circles the reply to this theory has been definitely given by Professor F. X. Kugler in his *Sterndienst und Sternkunde*, and in greater detail by the same author in his *Im Bannkreis Babels*. Since the influence of this theory extends to a wide circle, it is fitting that

a treatment so just as that of Mr. King should be accessible in English. For the scholar a more fruitful line of research has been opened by such studies as that of Professor H. Zimmern in his *Akkadische Fremdwörter als Zeuger babylonischen Kultureinflusses*.

In a work which describes the fortunes of Babylon during the whole of the dynastic period, there are of necessity several points — chiefly of minor significance — on which the reader might take issue with the author. More evidence is needed to fill in many gaps; there are blanks in our knowledge which in some cases extend over centuries; the rich material offered by the large number of commercial documents has not been utilized for any comprehensive study of economic conditions. In the present state of our knowledge, there is probably no one who could have shown more prudence, cleverness, accuracy of method, and soundness of judgment in the execution of his task. Mr. King's history, both for the general reader and the scholar, is the standard work which even replaces the second edition of Eduard Meyer's *Geschichte des Altertums* in those parts which deal with the overlapping of additional dynasties with the first dynasty of Babylon and the circumstances which led to the rise of Babylon to power.

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PAUL'S DOCTRINE OF REDEMPTION. HENRY BEACH CARRÉ, Ph.D. The Macmillan Co. 1914. Pp. xiv, 175. \$1.25.

This essay maintains the thesis that the key to Paul's doctrine of redemption is to be found in a dualistic cosmology. The Apostle thought (Dr. Carré assumes) that the history of the universe is the progress of a struggle between God and the Satanic host. Man has become involved in this conflict by becoming subject to Sin (by which name Paul designates a personal Evil Spirit, Satan's *alter ego*); a subjection brought about by Adam's transgression. As Sin's slave he is allied to God's enemies, and this slavery brings him under the power of another "cosmic foe" of God or "hypostasis of Satan," "Death." God "redeems" man from his slavery to Sin, by making Christ become man and die. In some unexplained way, Christ's death makes it possible for man to get away from the clutch of the Evil Spirit (or cosmic foe of God, or hypostasis of Satan), Sin, and unite his life to that of Christ, and so to the life of God. Men who believe the gospel experience this deliverance or "redemption," and at once begin to take God's part in the "cosmic conflict." On the

Satanic side are the unredeemed men. "Men are still the agents through whom the Chieftains — God and Satan — operate."

Dr. Carré supports his thesis by citing and explaining various classic passages from the Pauline Epistles. An estimate of the success of his contention could not be given without entering into exegetical details to an extent forbidden by the limits of this notice. Perhaps one interpretation may be mentioned as giving the reviewer pause: "While Christ is said to redeem us from the curse of the law, what is really meant is that He has liberated us from the demonic Powers or the cosmic forces of evil, of which one was the Law." It is rather startling to find the Law, which Paul said in Galatians had been "ordained through angels," and had been given to prepare God's sons for the free life in Christ, and in Romans to be "holy, just, and good," classed with evil spirits, the enemies of God.

The decisive question regarding the merits of this essay is not that of the soundness of its exegesis but of the merit of its method. Can we reasonably expect to find one of Paul's leading religious thoughts by first seeking his philosophy, and then, having assumed the quest to be successful, interpreting his religious teaching by it? Have we any better means of knowing the former than the latter? And what right have we to assume that his religious teaching is the consistent development of a philosophy? Can anything but examination of it make us sure that it does not contain incongruous elements? The "proposition" which our author says is one of his guides in his discussion — that "Paul's theology is not distinguishable from his philosophy, and therefore the salient features of his theology, so-called, are rooted in and are one with his world-view" — is apparently drawn from his inner consciousness. To understand what Paul says about sin in Romans 8, should we go to his "cosmic philosophy" or to his experience? And if we take his strong language as the expression of an experience, why read into it a dualistic philosophy of which it bears no trace? Dibelius, on whom our author leans at times heavily, sees that this would be sheer wilfulness, and says that in Romans Paul lays aside his notion that Sin is a demon and treats it as a psychological experience. We must make his complete thought of sin a prime factor in shaping his thought of redemption.

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**GREEK AND ROMAN MYTHOLOGY.** WILLIAM SHERWOOD FOX. Vol. I of The Mythology of All Races (12 vols.), (Louis Herbert Gray and George Foot Moore, Eds.) Marshall Jones Co.

This comprehensive undertaking naturally opens with the volume before us, in which that mythology which has had most influence on our own intellectual life is well treated. The remaining volumes will be given to the myths of the ancient Teutons, Celts, and Slavs, the Finno-Ugric and Siberian peoples, the Semites, the East Indians and Persians, the Armenians and the Pagan tribes of Africa, the Chinese and Japanese, the Malayo-Polynesian and Australian peoples, the American Indians, the Egyptians, and the peoples of Burma, Siam, and Annam. The whole work is to be made more available by an analytical index. Besides this volume by Professor Fox of Princeton University, there have also appeared the volume (IX) on the myths of the Malayo-Polynesian and Australian peoples, by Professor Dixon of Harvard University, and the two volumes (X and XI) by Professor Alexander of the University of Nebraska, on the mythology of the American Indians.

Mr. Fox knows his subject well, and has given an admirable account of the chief classic myths, so far as the plan of the work allowed him. He writes for the general reader primarily, but this of course does not mean that his work is not scholarly. From the vast amount of material at his disposal he has naturally been obliged to select what has seemed to him most important. In general his selections will meet approval. The present reviewer somewhat regrets that a more limited choice was not made, that a fuller treatment might be given to certain myths; but no doubt others will not share his feeling.

In an introduction Mr. Fox discusses some interesting questions as to the nature and origin of myths, their sanction and persistence. His paragraphs on the nature of Greek religion and the unique character of Greek mythology are well put; likewise what he has to say on the meaning of myths and on their relation to Ethics and to Art will meet the approval of modern scholars. So far as the interpretation of mythology is concerned, our author acknowledges his allegiance in general to the anthropological or comparative method, which English scholars, notably Lang and Frazer, have made so preëminent in the last quarter of a century. The scope of his work prevented Mr. Fox from entering far into the fascinating field of interpretation, but it is useful to have his attitude stated clearly in his introduction.

The main work falls into three sections: I, The Myths of the Beginning, the Heroes, and the After-world; II, The Greek Gods; and III, The Mythology of Ancient Italy. In the first part the myths are given, so far as possible, on the basis of locality—the Peloponnesus, the Northern Mainland, Crete, and Attica. Of the heroes, Herakles and Theseus have each a chapter, while a like assignment is made to the Voyage of the Argo and the Tale of Troy. The Greater Gods receive individual treatment—Zeus and Hera, Athena, Leto, Apollo, Artemis and Hekate, Ares, Hermes, Aphrodite and Eros, Hephaistos and Hestia, Poseidon and Amphitrite, Dionysus, Demeter, Kore, and Hades. The lesser divinities are grouped according to their associations or functions. It seems to the reviewer that the Mythology of Ancient Italy might well have been omitted entirely. The material, so far as native Italian myths are concerned, is very small and of uncertain value; and what the cultivated reader desires is a statement of that Romanized Greek mythology found in the Roman poets and by them passed on to the mediæval and modern world. This Mr. Fox was debarred from giving by the plan of his work; what he has said will scarcely be of great interest to any but the expert, who hardly needs it. If this third section had been omitted, space would have been secured for a fuller discussion of some of the more important Greek myths.

The work is well illustrated with over sixty full-page plates, and with a few pictures in the text. The illustrations are wisely chosen and handsomely reproduced; but, as is quite too often the case in such works, they are frequently placed at some distance from the text with which they belong.

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**HISTORICAL GEOGRAPHY OF BIBLE LANDS.** A Manual for Teachers, with fourteen maps. RICHARD MORSE HODGE, D.D. Charles Scribner's Sons. 1915. Pp. vii, 84. \$1.00.

**THE TESTING OF A NATION'S IDEALS.** Israel's History from the Settlement to the Assyrian Period. CHARLES FOSTER KENT, Ph.D., and JEREMIAH WHIPPLE JENKS, Ph.D. Charles Scribner's Sons. 1915. Pp. vii, 149.

The *Historical Geography of Bible Lands* provides a course of thirteen lessons (adaptable for children of fourteen or over, or for adults) in the study of geography as a factor in Bible history. It is accompanied by a pupil's Historical Atlas, containing tables, maps, and pictures. The course combines narrative and map work in a series

of imaginary tours starting from the United States and punctuated by historical anecdotes. The stereoscope is an adjunct of the course. "In every chapter . . . places are first to be recognized as parts of the present-day world and then identified as the locations of certain events of Bible history." The arrangement of the Manual is excellent, and its treatment of the subject graphic and in line with modern educational method. The maps, which both explain and are explained by the text, are original and illuminating. The course is highly to be recommended as imparting to the study of Bible history a sense of vividness and reality.

*The Testing of a Nation's Ideals* is planned primarily for college students and adult classes. In twelve compact chapters it shows how the Hebrews, from the time of their settlement in Canaan to the coming of the Assyrian conquerors, underwent a process which put to severe test their inherited political, social, moral, and religious ideals. The following chapter-headings indicate the type of subjects treated: The Necessity of Political Unity; The Need of Breadth and Self-Control in Statesmanship; Culture without Religion; The Fundamental Importance of a Right Financial Policy; The Expression of the Will of the People; A Nation's Destiny. The book is notable for its correlation of parallel readings from a wide variety of sources, ancient and modern. Of the three books (besides a standard work on American history) required "for constant reference" two are by Herbert Croly and A. Lawrence Lowell. Thus the currents of political history and the characteristics of political leaders of Old Testament times are interpreted in the light of similar forces in the modern world.

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"A Society for the publication of Grotius" was recently formed at The Hague, with the object of preparing a new edition of the works of Hugo Grotius (1583-1645), the famous Dutch scholar, renowned alike as Lawyer, Theologian, Philosopher, and Historian. A commencement will be made by publishing the letters written by and to Grotius. A committee has been appointed, consisting of the following gentlemen: Prof. Mr. C. van Vollenhoven, Leiden, President; Mr. G. J. Fabius, Rotterdam, Treasurer; Prof. Dr. J. Huizinga, Leiden; Prof. Dr. A. Eekhof, Leiden; Mr. G. Vissering, Amsterdam; Dr. D. F. Scheurleer, The Hague; and Dr. P. C. Molhuysen, The Hague, Secretary.

# HARVARD THEOLOGICAL REVIEW

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## ZIONISM

KEMPER FULLERTON

OBERLIN, OHIO

About six o'clock on the morning of Oct. 12th, 1914, the *Porto di Rodi* dropped anchor off Jaffa. No one with a particle of historical imagination can look for the first time without a thrill on the scene that spread itself out before us in the long luxurious roll of the Mediterranean and the easy flowing lines of the distant hills. The little city stood opposite us black against the morning sunshine, which came pouring over the mountains and into the Philistine plain. On such a day some two thousand years ago a man had gone up to a house-top in that city. It was also at the sixth hour, though, being Jewish reckoning, this meant the dazzle of the noon. The man did not notice the sky effects. His attention was concentrated upon a curious phenomenon. An object like a great sheet seemed to be descending out of the sky. As it reached the level of the house-top and he was enabled to look into it, he found it full of all sorts of squirming things, every one of them unclean and very offensive. Disgusted at the sight, he was about to turn away when a command came from somewhere: "Rise, Peter, kill and eat." "But I cannot," the man said. "I have never eaten anything common or unclean." "What God hath cleansed make not thou common," replied the voice.

While the man stood wondering at the strange experience, there was a loud knocking at the door, and he was informed that a certain Cornelius, centurion of the Italian cohort, wished to speak to him about a matter touching the welfare of his soul!

Jerusalem, the capital of Judaea, looks eastward and backward; Jaffa, the port of Jerusalem, looks westward and forward. At Jaffa the truth was revealed that religion was to be no longer national but cosmopolitan, that from this port there was to radiate across the freedom of the seas in waves of light as rich and full and vivifying as the eastern sunshine the idea of a religion adapted to the needs of all mankind. *Ex Oriente Lux!*

But is a universal religion capable of keeping itself from secularization? Can a religion flexible enough to adapt itself to the needs of a Hottentot or a New York stock-broker have sufficient inner integrity and resisting power to withstand the tremendous pressures from without? Can religion survive without the unyielding bony structure of dogma and tradition? On the other hand, can it accomplish its world mission if its intended universal adaptability is to be checked and impeded by an anatomic structure incapable of the sinuousness of the serpent? This is the problem which is being worked out before our eyes in Judaism today. It is a problem which, equally, though somewhat less obviously, concerns Christianity also. Zionism is one attempt to solve this problem. For this reason we did not spend the few hours at our disposal before the train left for Jerusalem in a visit to the house of Simon the Tanner where the problem originated, but walked out, instead, to Tell Abib where an attempt is being made at its solution.

Of all the strange sights that greet the Western traveller in the Levant Tell Abib is in some respects the strangest. When we visited this little city it was only some five years old. But it had grown out of the sand

dunes just north of Jaffa with all the rapidity of Jonah's gourd and in 1914 numbered about five thousand inhabitants. In its neatness and concreteness, its uniformity and evident municipal efficiency, it might have been taken for a Gary or a Pullman, bodily transported by the rubbing of an Aladdin's lamp from the flats of Illinois to the flats of Philistia. Here was none of the narrowness or cramp of an old Oriental city, squeezed together by the lateral pressure of its walls of defense. Here were roomy avenues and pretty little public squares, the feeling of space, the suggestion of future expansion. It was of such a city that the prophet dreamed when he promised to the Jew a Jerusalem without walls, where the old men and the old women could sit in the sunshine and the children could play in the streets. One did not have to watch his steps in walking through the streets of Tell Abib, for the "filth of the streets," proverbial in the East, was not to be found here. A perfect sewage system had been installed. Trees had been planted along the sidewalks and in the parks, and were already relieving with their shade the dazzling whiteness of the little concrete houses in the hot October sun. They had been able to attain such wonderful growth in the short space of five years because of the fine municipal water-works, which had tapped the abundant supply of water lying only a few meters below the arid surface of the soil, and enabling irrigation to do its perfect work. Electric lights swung at the street corners. At one point in our walk through the town we passed a municipal theatre, at another a great school building, the largest building in Tell Abib, as finely and solidly built as a modern public-school building in our own country, well lighted, with wide cool halls and many recitation rooms.

There were two synagogues in the town; one, which I took to be the synagogue of the more liberal Jews, significantly located in this school building; the other, the

orthodox, in another quarter of the town. On our walk we had observed that the streets were deserted and we had also noticed the little artificial arbors erected in the courtyards or on the roofs of the houses. In the school building we learned the reason. It was the last day of the Feast of Tabernacles. We entered the liberal synagogue. The apparent lack of decorum in the average synagogue worship is at first the most striking feature to an onlooker, and the more orthodox it is the more tumultuous it becomes. Everybody is constantly moving about and prayer and conversation seem quite compatible in their simultaneousness. A young man whose features were almost feminine in their refinement was chanting what we took to be an ancient Hebrew melody, for it had the same curious and haunting cadences which characterized the Arab music with which we had become familiar, only it was more developed and melodic. The face of this young Levitical singer was tense with emotion. Whether the origin of his feeling was æsthetic and romantic or whether it expressed a genuine thirst for the living God I could not quite decide. There was no question of the genuineness of the emotion at the orthodox synagogue, however. Here men were gathered under their black and white prayer-mantles, whose fringes waved with the restless emotion of the worshippers beneath them. Just outside the door our attention was called to a timid-eyed, stoop-shouldered man. "That is Beiliss," we were told. We were looking at the victim of the latest and in some respects most celebrated of all the ritual-murder trials of modern times. Here he stood, saved in Tell Abib, but with the look of a hunted deer still clinging to him.

But we had come to Tell Abib to meet one of its chief promoters, to whom, through a happy accident of travel, we had secured letters of introduction. He was not at the orthodox synagogue, nor yet at the liberal synagogue.

We were therefore directed to his home, a comfortable modern villa. Dr. Ruppin, to whose energetic work Tell Abib owed so much of its prosperity, was seated at his study table on the last day of the Feast of Tabernacles reading Bergson's *Creative Evolution*! Could anything have been more paradoxical, incongruous! Yet it has always seemed to me that the coincidence had a certain symbolism in it which I have been trying ever since to understand.

What is the relationship of the historical in religion to the essence of religion, of tradition to modernism, of a religion of dogma to religion in an era of science? How is religion to effect the transition from its past historical forms to the new forms or formlessness which scientific and historical inquiry seem to be necessitating, without losing its character as religion and merging itself into mere ethics or philosophical speculation? The man before me, reading *Creative Evolution* in the quiet of his study on the Feast of Tabernacles, while his orthodox fellow-citizens were worshiping under their prayer-mantles in the synagogues of the little city which he had done so much to bring into being, seemed to be the most remarkable embodiment which I had ever seen of these questions so disconcerting to the modern world. In the case of the Jew there is much less chance to dodge these questions than in the case of the Christian. The Christian can gradually abandon the orthodox tradition in which he has been brought up without ever becoming acutely conscious of having done so. In the transition he is not compelled to change from one clearly marked stage of culture to another; he still remains in a Christian civilization, and his associates and associations remain substantially the same. Unless he thinks hard and thinks straight he may never fully realize that he has made a fundamental change in his philosophy of life. But with the Jew it is different. When he abandons orthodoxy he

abandons the ancient Jewish culture and adopts an alien culture. His entire mode of life is revolutionized. For him, indeed, old things have passed away; behold, all things have become new, and *consciously* new. He cannot escape the necessity of looking down into the tremendous chasm which yawns between the Feast of Tabernacles and Creative Evolution. It is this which makes the study of present-day Judaism so instructive to the Christian. The problem of the Christian is in essence the same as the problem of the Jew—the problem, namely, of adjusting himself to an undogmatic form of religion without at the same time ceasing to be religious. But because the problem is more obvious in Judaism, its outlines more clear-cut, a study of it is of the greatest service in awakening Christian thought upon it.

Dr. Ruppин introduced us to his secretary, Miss Cohen, of Cleveland, Ohio, and after going up to his house-top (the only Orientalism connected with our visit) to get a bird's-eye view of Tell Abib, we were accompanied by them on a tour of inspection through the city and had it interpreted to us. Tell Abib is thus far probably the completest expression of Zionism. It is a home in Palestine for the oppressed Jews of all nations, a home in which they can develop unhampered what they believe to be their own peculiar culture and their religion as the most important element in that culture, and where, because of their isolation, they can make the attempt to adjust themselves at the same time to the culture of the modern world without becoming extinguished by it. Tell Abib means practically Springtime, Renaissance. Here, it is hoped, the Jewish people will experience a new birth. The city administration is entirely in the hands of the Jews themselves. In taxation, in the judiciary, in the police administration, Tell Abib is autonomous. What is of at least equal importance, the official language of the municipality is Hebrew, not Yiddish but the classical

Hebrew! It is revised, of course, to suit modern needs, but the attempt is made to develope it organically out of the Old Testament and the Talmud. If the community does not possess a word to meet its needs it sends to a philological committee which sits in Jerusalem and secures one. It is especially through this use of the Hebrew language that the effort is made to preserve the peculiar culture of the Jew. In its isolation from a dominant Western culture, in its use of Hebrew which is favored by this isolation, in its public-school system in which the Jewish child is introduced to modern culture through the medium of his own language, and in its connection with the previously established agricultural colonies of Palestine, Tell Abib is the completest embodiment of Zionism, the attempt of Judaism to preserve itself from disintegration as it emerges into the modern world. Will it succeed? In order to answer this question it is necessary to give a brief review of its origin and development.

In origin Zionism is the immediate outgrowth of anti-Semitism and can only be understood in the light of that movement. Anti-Semitism is not simply a recrudescence of the mediæval religious antipathy to the Jew, though that antipathy is no doubt found in it, especially among the Russian peasantry. It is the result of two great movements in the nineteenth century—the economic transition to the industrial era, and the new emphasis upon nationalism. At the end of the eighteenth century and the first half of the nineteenth century the democratic spirit which produced the American and French revolutions also operated in favor of Jewish emancipation. It was in this period that the Ghetto was practically abolished throughout Europe, though in Russia the establishment of the Pale of Settlement in 1791 became in a way its substitute. In this period the Jews of western Europe as contrasted with the Jews in eastern Europe became practically free, politically. The immediate consequence

of emancipation in western Europe is seen in the new status of the Jew in the industrial world.

The era of emancipation coincided to a very large extent with the development of industrialism in Europe. Now throughout the Middle Ages the Jew had been confined for his livelihood very largely to money-lending, as this occupation was prohibited to the Christian. But the money-lender was at this time the usurer. He loaned money to Christians who were in financial needs. This did not tend to his popularity. Further, because of the fact that his calling was not recognized by the law and was exposed to great risks, the interest charged was proportionately high. This increased the popular ill-will toward him. But with the rise of industrialism money-lending, as Dr. Ruppin points out,<sup>1</sup> took on a new form. It now became banking, and was utilized not to stave off bankruptcy but to initiate business. The Jewish money-lender was no longer a leech, sucking the blood out of the needy Christian; he became the ally of the Christian in his industrial enterprises. Again, because money-lending now became a legalized practice, it was not necessary for the Jew to charge his former extortionate interest rates in order to protect himself against the risks of his business. Thus the odium of money-lending passed away, because, as Dr. Ruppin would have us believe, Christian business now adopted Jewish methods. No more striking instance of the change from the view of the Jew as a usurer to the view of him as a capitalist, is to be found than in the first recognition of the Jews in England. It was the city of London which was the first city in England to look upon them with a friendly eye, and as early as 1668 Sir Joseph Child, governor of the East India Company, "pleaded for their naturalization on the score of their commercial ability."<sup>2</sup> As a capitalist

<sup>1</sup> *The Jews of Today.* Henry Holt & Co.

<sup>2</sup> *Encyclopædia Britannica*, XV, p. 406.

the Jew began to take his place in European civilization among the bourgeoisie, the great industrial middle class, and because his instinct for trade had been sharpened by the bitter experiences of the Middle Ages, he soon began to exercise an influence in this class out of all proportion to his numbers. But the industrial class had become the most powerful class in Europe. The Jew, therefore, as one of the most influential members of this class, at once attained a commanding position. The consequence was that the very movement which had resulted in his emancipation almost automatically forced him into a situation which was calculated to rouse new jealousies and oppositions.

These were still further aggravated by another development in European thought. The great tidal wave of democracy, which originated in the French political earthquake at the fall of Louis Philippe and the establishment of the Second Republic (Feb., 1848) and rapidly swept over Germany and Austria, was followed by a heavy ground-swell of nationalism. This is most clearly seen in the movement for the unification of Germany. Hegel also, who wrote in the first half of the century, had developed a system of ethics in which the theory was advanced that the life of the State is the culmination of ethical development. But the State must be a unit like the individual; ideally it must contain no heterogeneous element within it. At once the question arises, What is the relationship of the Jew to the State? Is Judaism a religious or a racial phenomenon? In the former case the Jew might reasonably be expected to coalesce with the State in which he was born; in the latter case he would be regarded as an alien and therefore a dangerous element in the State by those who accepted Hegel's theories of nationality and ethics. Thus with the emergence of the Jew out of his Ghetto as a leading factor in the new industrial era on an equality with the Christian before

the law and a successful competitor, and with the insistence in Europe upon the principle of nationality, which was favored by the most important democratic movements of the time and encouraged by one of its most influential philosophers, a new and very serious crisis was prepared for the Jews.

It was precipitated in Germany in 1873 in the movement known as anti-Semitism and spread like wildfire throughout Europe. In 1873 the wild speculations due to the unexpectedly speedy payment of the French indemnity, had run their usual course and a great crash came. Many Jews were involved in the financial scandals. In the same year a pamphlet was published by a certain Wilhelm Marr on *The Victory of Judaism over Germanism*, in which Hegel's doctrine of the State was made the basis of an attack upon the Jews as an alien element. By 1879 anti-Semitism had become a burning political question. The brilliant writer of the article on anti-Semitism in the *Encyclopædia Britannica*, from which this brief sketch of it is mainly drawn, lays the responsibility for this upon Bismarck. The Jews had been very prominent in the National Liberal Party, which had been the chief support of Bismarck in his unification of the Empire. But conditions had changed, and this party had now become distasteful to him. It is suggested that Bismarck utilized the anti-Semitic sentiment in order to bring the party into discredit. The Conservatives and the Catholic Centre could be relied upon in the contest; the first because they represented agrarian capitalists who were naturally suspicious of the industrial capitalists, the second because they had old scores to pay off for the activity of the Jews in the Kulturkampf. An anti-Semitic League was formed in Berlin and Dresden, and the movement was launched. The two most conspicuous anti-Semitic leaders were Pastor Stöcker, who, as head of the so-called Christian Socialists, formulated more particularly the

economic indictment against the Jews, and Hermann Ahlwardt, who urged especially the racial indictment (Marr's book went through nine editions in 1879). The latter attack was by far the more bitter and unscrupulous and calculated to rouse the passions of the ignorant. This led to mob demonstrations and in 1892 to the revival of the ritual-murder charge, while in the literary propaganda some went so far as to reject not only the Old Testament but Christianity itself as expressions of Semitism.

The movement lost ground in Germany in the decade 1892–1903, but acquired new vigor in 1903–07. This is significant, for it is in these years that Jingoism and Anglophobia became rampant in Germany in connection with the great naval programme and the adoption of *Welt Politik*. The movement thus begun in Germany spread into Austro-Hungary, and finally culminated in Russia in the enactment of the infamous May laws of 1882 and the massacres of Kishineff (1903), Odessa and Bielostok (1905), while in France it issued in the unspeakable scandals of the Dreyfus trials (1894–1906). It will be seen that anti-Semitism ran its course in the quarter of a century 1880 to 1906. Wherever the movement is examined it is found sooner or later to become inextricably involved in the struggle between the reactionary and nationalistic ideals in Europe on the one hand and the progressive and cosmopolitan ideals on the other. It is this which makes the study of anti-Semitism so instructive. While it is probably a transient phenomenon, it has left two historical changes behind it of vast significance. The first is the migration of nearly two million east-European Jews into the United States, the direct result of the persecution of the Jews. The consequences of this upon the economic, social, and religious life of this country are simply incalculable. The other change for which anti-Semitism is at least indirectly responsible is the denunciation by the French government of the Concordat and

the disestablishment of the French Church. This momentous event grew, at least in part, out of the anger of the French government at the clericals who had played a very prominent part in the opposition to Dreyfus. But what has all this to do with Zionism?

That the two movements are intimately connected historically is suggested by the date at which the Zionist movement was inaugurated. This was in 1896. We have seen how the anti-Semitic movement began and practically ran its course in the last decades of the nineteenth century. It was therefore just in the midst of this frenzy that the Austrian Jew, Theodor Herzl, published his *Judenstaat* (1896). He proposed in effect that the Jews should accept the premise of their opponents, admit that they were a nation, and hence seek to establish themselves as a nation in some unoccupied part of the world, preferably Palestine. A number of congresses were held, great enthusiasm was aroused, and in 1903 an offer was actually secured from Lord Lansdowne of a large tract of land in East Africa for colonization purposes. But this was bitterly opposed by many of the Zionists themselves, who believed that only in Palestine was there any hope of setting up successfully a Jewish state.

The scheme of Herzl at once created a great division in Judaism. Western Judaism had for the most part followed in the wake of what was known as the Mendelssohnian movement. Moses Mendelssohn, grandfather of the celebrated composer, believed that the hope of Judaism lay in the adoption of Western culture. Judaism according to him was a religion, not a racial or nationalistic phenomenon. The Jew was a cosmopolitan, in England an Englishman, in Germany a German. The true tie was that of religion, rather than of race. This movement was favored by the cosmopolitan tendencies of the French Revolution. Thus, the Jewish Sanhedrin convoked by Napoleon in 1807 asserted the citizenship and

patriotism of the Jew in France, and agreed to adapt the law of the synagogue, particularly the crucial laws of marriage and divorce, to the law of the land.<sup>3</sup> It was largely owing to the assertion of these cosmopolitan principles that the Jews were so successful in gaining emancipation at the end of the eighteenth and beginning of the nineteenth centuries.<sup>4</sup> Hence the theories of Herzl seemed to many to signify the abandonment of those principles by means of which the Jews had been delivered from the Ghetto. To adopt Zionism was to acquiesce in one of the most dangerous premises of their enemies, and admit that they were an alien element in the nations in which they were living. The powerful movement known as Reformed Judaism which had arisen in the nineteenth century as a logical result of the emancipation of the Jews and their adoption of Western culture, has therefore rejected Herzl's ideas and combated them with the greatest vigor.

The principles of this movement are summed up in classic form in the declarations of the Pittsburgh Conference of American Rabbis in 1885. The fifth declaration reads in part: "We consider ourselves no longer a nation but a religious community, and therefore expect neither a return to Palestine nor a sacrificial worship under the sons of Aaron nor the restoration of any of the laws concerning the Jewish State."<sup>5</sup> The thought of this paragraph is reiterated again and again by the leaders of Reformed Judaism. Dr. Kohler, for example, who was president of the Pittsburgh Conference, insisted that Judaism is a religious truth, intrusted to a nation but destined to interlink all nations as a cosmopolitan factor

<sup>3</sup> Philipson, *The Reform Movement in Judaism*, pp. 26 ff. Many of the facts in what follows I owe to this book and to newspaper clippings from the files of Dr. Philipson which he has kindly placed at my disposal.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. the anonymous article on Zionism in the *Fortnightly Review*, November, 1916.

<sup>5</sup> Philipson, p. 492.

in humanity. He repudiated the idea that Judaea is to be the home of the Jew; such a principle would "unhome" the Jew the world over. As long ago as 1841 the Jewish congregation of Beth Elohim in Charleston, S.C., declared that "this country is our Palestine, this city our Jerusalem," and along similar lines are the recent utterances of such leaders of Reformed Judaism as Dr. Schulmann, Dr. Rosenau, and Dr. Philipson. Zionism is, according to Dr. Schulmann, the child of the last decades of the nineteenth century, which emphasized racialism and nationalism as against the earlier principles of individualism, democracy, and cosmopolitanism. He adds very significantly that the divisions of Judaism on this point endanger the problem of the Jew in the coming peace conference. "God forfend," exclaims Dr. Rosenau, "that Israel should be given to the emphasis of nationalism, which is responsible for the national hatreds of the present." According to Dr. Philipson the "race-Jew" is the cause of anti-Semitism. "The Reformed Jews are Internationalists. They cherish the idea of universalism, toward which scientific discoveries, remarkable inventions which bring the most distant parts of the earth into close touch with one another, treaties of peace and arbitration among the nations, seem to point," and they take their stand "on the idealistic interpretation of history, whereof we believe that Israel presents the most striking symbol as over against the nationalistic interpretation whereof the present war, the apotheosis of nationalism, is the climax."<sup>6</sup>

<sup>6</sup> The above citations are interesting reflections of the way in which the present war is aggravating the theological differences of Judaism. Already the possible effects of the peace settlement upon the future of Palestine have become an absorbing question for all Jews. It may also be noticed in passing that not a few among the orthodox have also been suspicious of the Zionist propaganda. The reason is partly theological, and is expressed in the following extract from a letter of Mr. Jacob Schiff to the American Hebrew of Sept. 22, 1907: "The political doctrine of Zionism has nothing in common with the Jewish Messianic hope. There is no Scripture warrant for attempting to establish the Jewish nation by human endeavor. To attempt to force the hand of Providence is always unprofitable."

The fundamental principle for which Judaism as a religion stands is, of course, according to all Reformed Jews, its "God-idea," i.e. its monotheism. The rabbinical law, represented especially by the Shulhan Arukh, the codification of Talmudic Law compiled by Joseph Qaro in the sixteenth century in the attempt to check the threatened disintegration of Judaism at the time of the Spanish expulsion, is discarded by Reformed Judaism. Judaism is a religion of development, and the ceremonialism of the law is only one historical phase. It is not of the essence of Judaism. Its essence is monotheism. The ceremonial must be discarded because it is absolutely out of touch with modern life, and if Judaism is chained to it it will inevitably die. Thus Reformed Judaism would save Judaism first by rejecting the idea that the Jews are a nation and by insisting upon the idea that they are a religious community, and secondly by discarding the vast accumulation of ceremonialism which has expressed the beliefs and hopes of past phases of Judaism and by insisting upon the principle of monotheism as its essence.

To all this Zionism retorts seriatim: Without a nucleus of Jews forming a Jewish nation and permitted to develop its own peculiar Jewish culture unhampered by a superior enveloping culture, the Jewish religion will be lost to the world. If the Jew remains in Western civilization, in the end he will be inevitably absorbed by it. The inducements to conform to the dominant Christian civilization will be too powerful to be permanently resisted. Again it is claimed, it is not the principle of monotheism which has preserved the Jew through the centuries of the dispersion. It is the Law, particularly the ritual law, the dietary regulations and Sabbath observance, which has kept the Jew a peculiar people and prevented assimilation. If the ritual law is abandoned, as the Reformed Jews demand, and if the Jews are at the

same time scattered through the Christian nations with no opportunity to develope their own peculiar culture such as they would enjoy if at least a nucleus of them could remain apart by themselves, the future of Judaism is hopeless. These are the theses of Dr. Ruppin's book *The Jews of Today*. Space forbids us to give in what follows more than a brief résumé of Dr. Ruppin's arguments.

We have seen how in the new era of industrialism the economic status of the Jew became suddenly changed. From a usurer he became a capitalist. The economic distinction between Jew and Christian which had endured for so many generations was thus wiped out. This at once paved the way for assimilation, especially in view of the fact that the Jew speedily occupied a very prominent place in industrialism. But where there is economic progress there is always a declining birth-rate. While the east-European Jew had families of six or ten, his west-European coreligionist began to have families of only two or three. The Jews have always been a prolific race, for marriage and the rearing of children have been considered religious duties. What was lost through assimilation in times gone by had thus been usually made good through the fertility of the race. But this offset to assimilation now becomes abolished in the course of economic development.

Another factor connected with the economic progress of the Jews is their congestion in large cities. The ten cities, New York (about 1,000,000), Warsaw, Buda-Pesth, Odessa, London, Vienna, Chicago, Philadelphia, Berlin, and Paris, contain about one-fifth of the total Jewish population of the world (12,000,000). But large cities are notably centers of religious indifference as compared with rural districts. The life of the town is emphatically a secular life. The Jews in large cities are engaged in the same callings as Christians, which naturally leads

them to associate with Christians, and because of the religious indifference of the city apostasy does not make a Jew a marked man as it would in the country. Assimilation therefore becomes especially easy in metropolitan centers.

Another marked development in modern Judaism is the abandonment of Yiddish and Spaniolisch. These are the mother-tongues of a great majority of Jews and are associated with all that they have been accustomed to hold dear in their religious and racial life. The adoption of the language of a country usually means the adoption of its manners and customs, which is a long step toward assimilation. Dr. Ruppin goes so far as to say that the Jewish religion is on firm ground only where Yiddish is spoken. If this is true, one can see how significant is the fact that more than one-third of the Jews no longer speak their mother-tongues.

But the most important step toward assimilation of the Jew, for which his economic development and the abandonment of his native tongue have paved the way, is his adoption of modern, that is Christian, culture. This is seen on the one hand in the decline of the Cheder or the Talmudic schools, in which only religious and distinctively Hebrew subjects are taught, and on the other hand in the crowding of Jewish children and youth into the public schools and institutions of higher learning. To take just one group of instances, there were in proportion to their numbers four times as many Jews as Christians in Austria (statistics of 1903-04), six times as many in Hungary (1907), and seven times as many in Prussia (1886-91). If the Roman Catholic looks upon the public schools and universities as dangerous to his religion, and if even dogmatic Protestantism seeks to protect itself against secular education by the denominational school and college, how much more fatal is secular education in Christian lands to Judaism! "It is as rare," Dr. Ruppin

asserts, "to find a Cheder pupil who discards the uses of his religion as it is to find a university Jew who holds fast to them" (p. 135 f.).<sup>7</sup>

Modern education is really incompatible with Jewish orthodoxy. A child brought up in its atmosphere becomes estranged from its orthodox parents and the ties which bind it to its past are easily broken. Thus secular education, which the Jews are drinking in with such avidity, is the precursor of what threatens to be a complete break with the past. Reformed Jew and Zionist are both alike aware of this effect of modern education. The Reformed Jew seeks to offset it by reinterpreting his religion, the Zionist by isolating the Jew in Palestine. With the breakdown of the economic and linguistic distinctions between the Jew and the Christian, with the congestion of the Jews in large cities and the abandonment of the Talmudic education in favor of secular education, it is not astonishing to find a painfully increasing indifference to religion. So long as the Jew was confined by the Christian to the Ghetto his religion was his all in all. In it he lived and moved and had his being, and he does so yet where he is not affected by modern culture, as is the case with most east-European Jews. But once let the economic and educational influences of modern civilization begin to play upon his religion, and it would appear to be doomed in its most distinctive elements, as the Zionists express it, or at least in those elements which keep the Jew distinct from his fellow-men, as the Reformed Jews would perhaps prefer to express it.

As we have seen, it is not the monotheistic principle which primarily distinguishes the Jew; it is his ceremonial laws, especially Sabbath observance, dietary laws, and

<sup>7</sup> The history of the Mendelssohn family is the classical illustration of the influence of modern education upon the Jew. Moses Mendelssohn was the champion of modern learning, and his translation of the Old Testament into German did for the Jew what Luther's translation did for the German. But while Mendelssohn himself remained true to the Law his descendants became Christians.

prohibition of mixed marriages. These laws come to the orthodox Jew as immediate commands of God. They are not principles nor even illustrations of principles but statutory law. They are not to be obeyed because of their inherent reasonableness or because they are capable of a spiritual self-authentication, but because they are enacted by divine authority. Now it is impossible to preserve one's faith in the divine and perpetually binding character of these laws in the face of modern knowledge. Economic pressure and historical criticism alike combine to destroy faith in them. And when faith in them as divine statutes is destroyed the next thing is to abandon their observance. When Peter shrank from eating the unclean contents of the heavenly sheet, his scrupulousness was justified if it was his desire to remain a Jew. As surely as he ate those things, just so sure was it that he or his spiritual descendants would cease to be Jews. As a matter of fact this is what happens wherever the Jew listens to the imperious command of economic necessity, as in the case of Sabbath observance, or to the teachings of science and history, as in the case of most of the other customs of his ancestral religion. There remains, therefore, to bind him to his coreligionists only his belief in monotheism. This tie alone in the opinion of Zionists as represented by Dr. Ruppin is altogether insufficient. Even though his racial attachment may keep him from immediate conversion to Christianity, the facts teach us that he is apt to become altogether indifferent to religion, and while he may remain for a time formally within the pale of Judaism the chances are that he will finally succumb and go over to Christianity.

Perhaps the most significant fact of all that testifies to the rapid disintegration of Jewish religious life is the increase of mixed marriages in western Europe. Since the time of Ezra and Nehemiah the law against mixed marriages has been the most effective means of self-pro-

tection which Judaism has possessed. But in the Sanhedrin assembled by Napoleon, in which, as we have seen, the cosmopolitanism of the French Revolution was especially influential, it was decided that the Law expressly forbade only marriage with Canaanites.<sup>8</sup> Since there were no longer any Canaanites, the inapplicability of the law to present conditions was sufficiently obvious. The fact that marriage had also been changed from a purely religious to a civil contract also favored mixed marriages. While there are practically no mixed marriages in eastern Europe, the practice steadily increases as we move westward and find the Jew securing economic independence and modern culture, though of course it has been checked in some measure by anti-Semitism. The effect of mixed marriages upon assimilation is clearly seen in the education of the children; in most cases they are brought up as Christians. The last stage in the assimilative process is conversion to Christianity and baptism. Here too the defection is far greater than is commonly supposed. While conversion in the evangelical sense, that is, conversion through the various missions to the Jews, is practically negligible, conversion due to economic and social reasons is frequent.

Basing himself upon the above arguments which are supported by very carefully worked out statistical tables, Dr. Ruppin concludes that Judaism is doomed unless something very definite can be done to check the assimilative process. It is true the east-European Jew is as yet largely unaffected by the influences to which the west-European Jew has been subjected. But as industrialism makes its way into Roumania, Galicia, Bukowina, and above all Russia, and as the Jews in those countries secure the same political rights and educational opportunities enjoyed by their western coreligionists, there is no reason to hope that they will not follow the same line of development as their western kindred, give up all

<sup>8</sup> Ruppin, p. 159, n. 1.

that is distinctively Jewish and ultimately become merged into the Christian population which surrounds them. Thus the only hope of the Jew, according to Dr. Ruppin, is, first, to be placed in a position where he can return to the soil; this will make him economically independent and secure for him a stability which his commercial instincts do not now permit him to enjoy. In the next place, there must be local segregation, so that he will not be continually tempted to conform to the dominant western, that is, Christian, culture. He must be taught modern science in his own language, so that it will not come to him in an alien form. If modern knowledge is acquired through the medium of Hebrew, he will be enabled, it is hoped, to adjust himself to the new world of thought without breaking too violently with the past. Lastly, he must be taught in his own schools, and the culture of the east-European Jew, which is the only strictly Jewish culture still surviving, must be made the basis of the new educational development. These conditions for the preservation of the Jewish race and Jewish culture can be found, it is claimed, only in Palestine. Hence the proposal of the Zionist to solve the problem of Judaism by the erection of a Jewish state in Palestine.

Zionism appeals strongly to the sentimental and romantic instincts of the Jew and even of the Christian.<sup>9</sup> Furthermore, it is not inconceivable that in the settlement to follow on the present war, especially if the Ottoman Empire is overthrown, Palestine may be formed into a neutral Jewish state, which would give to Zionism a standing in the domain of practical politics which it does not now possess. But looked at from the point of view of theory, it is doubtful whether Zionism can be regarded as a permanently satisfactory solution of the problem before Judaism. It is avowedly based on economic and social considerations. Zionism, at least as represented

<sup>9</sup> Temperamentally it may be compared to the Pusey movement in the Anglican Church.

by its protagonists, also adopts modernism. It is in no sense a return to Jewish orthodoxy. But can its desire to preserve the Jew by isolating him be fulfilled unless it frankly adopts the orthodox standpoint and isolates him spiritually, as it were, as well as locally? The Jewish people after the Exile were reorganized on a distinctively religious basis, and it was that which gave to the new community its stability. Zionism would preserve Jewish culture. But the Jewish culture of which Dr. Ruppin speaks is synonymous with the Jewish religion as that has been developed under the tutelage of orthodoxy. Can the one be preserved without the other? If Dr. Ruppin's arguments that the abandonment of orthodoxy means the doom of Judaism in western Europe are sound, will they not hold good for the fate of Judaism in Palestine as well? Is it to be supposed for a moment that Palestine will remain as secluded from the western world as it is at present? The chances are overwhelmingly against it. The restless West will not leave the brooding East alone, and it is not at all unlikely that we or our children will see the work of Alexander, so far as Hither Asia is concerned, completed. Will a Jewish nucleus in Palestine be able to separate itself from the irresistible march of events? After all, are those spiritual goods for which the Feast of Tabernacles and Creative Evolution respectively stand, really compatible? Is not Zionism, attractive as it is, really an anachronism, as the Reformed Jews assert? Reformed Judaism would seem to be on a far sounder basis when it seeks to solve the problem of Judaism by reinterpreting it in terms of modern life.

On the other hand, what answer can be made to the overwhelming array of arguments produced by Dr. Ruppin, that the principle of monotheism alone is insufficient to prevent Judaism from completely evaporating in time in a Christian atmosphere? The problem of the Jew is indeed a painful one and should be studied by the

Christian student with sympathy, for in it as in a magnifying-glass he may perceive the problem which is pressing ever more closely upon himself, the problem, namely, of the reconciliation of a dogmatic religion with modern culture. Catholicism, Greek and Roman, corresponds in Christianity to the orthodoxy of the east-European Jew. Protestantism, with its ever closer approximation to secular culture, corresponds to the Judaism of western Europe. As cosmopolitan culture advances, what effect will it have on Protestantism? Will it have the same effect as it has on the Jew? Will Peter's obedience to the command that came to him on the house-top of Simon the Tanner at Jaffa and which broke down nationalism in religion and introduced the era of cosmopolitanism, prove to be the first step in the merging of not only Judaism but Christianity itself into the general movement of civilization, in which dogmatic religion will have no place? These are some of the questions which a study of contemporary Judaism unavoidably raises, but which it is not the purpose of this article to answer.

## AMERICAN, ENGLISH, AND DUTCH THEOLOGICAL EDUCATION<sup>1</sup>

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To the student of differing methods of education the chief interest of a comparison between English, Continental, and American methods is that the first two represent entirely different views as to objects and methods, while American education is a compromise between them. It is therefore perhaps desirable before proceeding to discuss theological education in particular to develop a little more fully the general characteristics of the three forms.

The most important characteristic of English education is that in the English university the period of training in general culture, as distinct from professional instruction, is carried on longer, further, and to a more advanced stage than in any other country. The normally well-educated Englishman lives at a boarding-school, commonly known as a public school, from thirteen to between eighteen and nineteen. During this time he is taught Latin and Greek extremely well, mathematics not very well, French and German rather badly. He is encouraged, and if necessary forced, to acquaint himself with the general outlines of ancient and modern history, and with the classics of English literature. He is given no instruction in what is known as English,<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup>An address delivered before the Alumni Association of the Harvard Divinity School, June 20, 1917.

<sup>2</sup>The amount of time spent on this subject in an American school seems to most Britishers to be an appalling waste. The English boy who is taught it indirectly seems more frequently to achieve an approximation to grammatical idiom than the American boy who is taught it directly. But of course this is only possible where Latin and Greek are taught well, which is rarely the case in America.

except in so far as he is made to write correct English when translating other languages, is from time to time required to write essays, and is examined at intervals on what is called general information. I never had a lesson in my life primarily on English grammar, nor have most of my friends. The result is that a normally intelligent boy of eighteen and a half can generally be trusted to translate Latin and Greek into English or English into Latin and Greek with a considerable degree of idiomatic skill. He has probably no very accurate knowledge of dates but a fairly good grasp of the general outlines of the history of the world. Curiously and tragically enough, the part which he knows least well is that of modern Europe. At this stage he goes on to Oxford or Cambridge, where the education given him is merely the continuation and intensification of what he has already received. He has an abundant choice of "electives" at this point, but in general must choose between a combination of classics, history, and philosophy on the one hand, or mathematics and natural science on the other. His degree at the end of his career depends on his general knowledge of these subjects and not on the number of courses which he has followed; theoretically he need follow none. But in any case the education he receives is concerned entirely with his general culture, and has nothing to do with any professional or technical requirements.

Another characteristic of this education is that it is directed chiefly to the acquisition and accurate idiomatic expression of codified knowledge. The student is taught with great thoroughness and skill the existing state of knowledge on the subject which he is studying, but he is not encouraged to study problems which are unsolved or to think that it is his business or anybody else's to solve them. The result is that Oxford turns out every year a number of men who are admirably qualified

to give a good and pleasant exposition of philosophy or history. Nor is this exposition merely superficial; it goes to the bottom of things and leaves out nothing so far as codification has been reached. It is not superficial; but it is stationary and somewhat timid. It does not encourage men to attempt the solution or even the presentation of fresh problems, and therefore the amount of original work ever produced by these men is pitifully small. After all, there is no way which secures such a pleasant and rounded presentation of a case as an inability to see its limitations, so that that divine discontent with generally accepted solutions which inspires the researcher is a drawback rather than a help to the attainment of the highest distinction in an English university. It is often remarked that young Oxford lecturers produce little good original work. The cause has been sought in many directions, but I think the truth is that the system of training and examination encourages sterile brilliancy. They do not produce because they cannot.

The general result, therefore, is that by the age of twenty-three, when the normal Englishman takes his A.B. degree, he is an extremely well-educated man in codified knowledge with no professional or technical training, and has perhaps been injured rather than helped for any purpose of scientific research by the training through which he has passed. I believe that there has been a tendency in the modern-science schools at Cambridge to try to remedy this defect, and Professor Firth at Oxford has struggled hard to introduce a better state of things in the history school at Oxford.

If a man needs professional training he will probably begin it at this stage, and his comparatively advanced age will inevitably make him try to obtain it quickly and cheaply. The result is that beyond controversy advanced technical or professional education in England is bad, compared with that in other great countries.

The situation on the Continent is entirely different. It would probably be best to take Germany as typical, but as I know the Dutch very much better than I do any other Continental nation, I take Holland. There is in point of fact very little difference between any of the Teutonic countries. In Holland a boy goes to a day-school, either to the Gymnasium or to the Hoogeburger-school. In the first he is taught Latin, Greek, English, German, French, history, geography, mathematics, and elementary science. In the latter Greek is omitted and science is emphasized. The teaching is good and very intensive. A Dutch boy probably works nearly twice as many hours every year as an American boy, who does less work than any child that I have ever met. School begins at half-past eight in the morning, continues, if I remember rightly, until twelve, with an interval of twenty minutes somewhere in the middle of the morning, goes on again for two hours in the afternoon, and ends up with an hour or more of home work. Moreover the school year begins at the end of September and goes on until almost the end of July. Experience made me think that this scheme of education was too strenuous; but most of the Dutch children live through it without grievous harm, though I doubt if English or American boys could do so. The result is that somewhere between eighteen and nineteen they know about as much as the ordinary American A.B. and decidedly more than a boy of the same age in England, though not so much as an Englishman when he leaves college; but this is the end of their general education, which is "prescribed" from beginning to end. They then go up to the university, and their professional education begins at once, for the Dutch university corresponds entirely to the graduate school of an American university, and there is nothing which corresponds with the college. Thus the professional career of a man in England begins after he has taken his

university degree; on the Continent, when he leaves school.

If we now turn to professional education and take up the career of the man who is going to be a minister, the difference entailed by the variations between the English and the Dutch systems becomes apparent. The English student can stay on if he likes at the university and study theology. Neither in Oxford nor in Cambridge is this a particularly good form of training, but it is the best there is. Ecclesiastical interests have effectually toned down, even where they have not entirely suppressed, anything resembling scientific study of theology, and great scholars who are not Anglicans are debarred from professorial chairs, and, in Oxford even from degrees in divinity. The man who has already spent four years at the university crowds his theology into one extra year and is taught rapidly the solution of problems the real nature of which has never been properly stated to him. Moreover, inadequate though this system is, it is still feared as too radical, and there is a general tendency on the part of ecclesiastical advisers to urge men not to study theology at the universities, on the ground that it is liable to destroy faith. The result is that most men who are entering the ministry of the English Church go to some of the numerous theological schools scattered about England under the control of the bishops. The teaching in these schools is frankly denominational and unscientific. It could, indeed, scarcely be worse. Third-rate theology is taught by second-rate men to ill-educated hearers, and pupils and teachers between them achieve a certainty of statement which is in inverse ratio to their understanding of the facts. I was myself at Cuddesdon, which is one of the best of these schools. I had a very pleasant time there, but the teaching was bad, and when I sought for advice on difficult points I was warned against pride and urged to go to confession.

The situation in Holland is entirely different. The professors are appointed by the state and own allegiance to no denomination. But the Dutch Church is wise enough to refuse the entrance to its ministry to men who have not studied theology at one of the State universities. The ordinary career lasts three years, and includes Greek, Hebrew, the study of heathen religions, the Old and New Testaments, Church history, and some philosophy. The State does not teach systematic theology, on the ground that if it is scientific it is indistinguishable from philosophy, and that if it is based on a special revelation its understanding has been intrusted to the Churches and cannot be expected from State professors. To fill up this gap the State allows each Church to appoint a professor of its own to give instruction in systematic theology and in any other subjects which they may think right. The implied suggestion that the State professors have no religion and the ecclesiastical professors no science has worked curiously. Each has been so anxious to show that the suggestion is false that they have sometimes reversed their positions, and students have been known to complain of the undue pietism of the State professor and of the fierce intellectualism of the representatives of the Church. The shortest period of instruction is four years—one of them in the State curriculum, and one with the professors of the Church. This makes a man a "Kandidaat"; but the best students do not stop here, although the examinations which come at the end of their third and fourth years entitle them to become ministers. Most of them go on and take a doctor's degree, which usually requires at least two, and probably three, more years' work. The standard of excellence reached by these doctors of theology naturally varies. There are many men who achieve the degree by a kind of intellectual brute force. The favorite method is known in some circles as "body-snatching," for it is

said that the easiest way to a doctor's degree is to dig up a dead divine of the seventeenth century and write his life. This requires industry but little else. At the same time I think that this part of the Dutch theological education is probably the best. Its strength is that it introduces men not to codified knowledge but to "knowledge in the making," in a manner which is scarcely ever done in England. They learn to handle documents and to distrust books about books. Instead of going to lectures and listening to the more or less stereotyped lectures of the professors, they take their difficulties to the various members of the faculty and discuss general principles of work and thought.

If one now compares the American system with the English and the Dutch, it becomes plain how largely it is an attempt to combine the English and the Continental systems. American education started with the Latin School in Boston, and Harvard College was founded in imitation of the English University of Cambridge, just as the Latin School was the imitation or rather perpetuation of the grammar-school system of England. So far there was no difference in principle between the English and the American system; but in the nineteenth century Americans who had been in Europe tried to do for their own country what Berlin or Leipzig had done for Germany. But instead of reforming the whole system on a German model, they added on to the top of the existing colleges a superstructure of graduate schools. The result is that, whereas England has schools and colleges but no graduate schools worthy of the name and Germany or Holland has schools and universities which correspond in method and purpose to the graduate schools but has no colleges, America has the three institutions of schools, colleges, and graduate schools. It is perhaps worth noting that one result of this is that the age at which a boy goes to college in

America is considerably younger than that at which he generally goes to the University in Holland.

On the whole, I believe that the American system is the best of the three, or might become so if it were better worked. I intensely disliked the abrupt termination of general education which the student underwent in Holland, and I am sure that it is a good thing to bring men after they leave school into contact with scholars and to allow them to develop on freer lines than is possible in a school. The weak points seem to me to be the inferior education given in the schools and the disastrous effect of the course system in college. But these are defects of which every one is aware and they are sure to disappear in time. The system of final examinations already introduced at Harvard in the Divinity School and in the History Department is a move in the right direction which has already justified itself in the eyes of those who have seen it in working.

To summarize then the whole, it may be said that the English method sends out men who have received a higher degree of general culture; the Dutch system is preëminent in the teaching of scientific theology; the American comes half-way between the two, though it approximates more closely to the Dutch standard than to the English. Perhaps I may make explicit what I mean by saying that the Dutch student who leaves off as a "Kandidaat" is as a rule better equipped with general theological knowledge than the Bachelor of Theology of the Harvard Divinity School. But the Doctor of Theology of Harvard is at least as good as, and, on his own subject, probably better than the Doctor of Theology at Leiden. Both Dutch and American are incomparably better than the English product so far as scientific theology is concerned, though the average of general culture and power of expression is higher with the English system than with either the Dutch or the American, and for the

general efficiency of the clergy this is a large compensation for their intellectual handicap.

The important point is, however, that though the American and Dutch systems are successful in making scientific students and teachers, they are no better than the English for the successful making of ministers. This is not to praise the English system. For the great problem of theological education today is that none of us is succeeding in making ministers who can maintain the influence of the Churches as they ought. Both in England and in Holland the general complaint is made that the Liberal ministers are unsuccessful in holding their congregations. In Holland the successful minister, with very few exceptions, belongs to a reactionary form of Calvinism, in England to a bastard Catholicism. Neither type is liberal in its intellectual position nor is in the least likely to be influenced by scientific theology, which it regards as the invention of the Evil One. Outside of their ranks there are, it is true, many Liberal clergy in England and there are even more in Holland, but they are not gaining in strength and they are not keeping their Churches even moderately full. Now these men are the products of the theological schools in Holland; and in England, so far as the teaching of theology in the universities by men like Sanday and Burkitt has had any effect at all, it has been on the production of the Liberal clergy. Therefore to say that they are failing is to indict the whole system of the professional training of ministers.

I would not claim to be certain what the reason is and I should deprecate any revolutionary suggestions; but in the belief that the situation in America, though not so bad, presents already some disquieting symptoms and is likely to present more, I propose to venture on a few criticisms. Our present system is based on the inherited belief that the most important thing for a minister is to be able to expound Christian theology. But congre-

gations as a whole have settled down in Liberal Churches to the conviction, firmly held though not always very clearly expressed, that, though they wish to retain what they regard as the Christian religion, they do not think that the Christian theology is necessary to salvation or, indeed, always acceptable to the intelligent. This does not mean that they do not desire a rational and intelligible discussion of the problems of religion; on the contrary, there are few things which are more desired by most men and many women, and the clergy err grievously in so seldom recognizing this fact. But it does mean, in the first place, that they reject, partly as untrue, partly as unintelligible, traditional theology, and, in the second place, that they ask for light and leading on the difficult problems of conduct presented by modern life. The demand is primarily, though not exclusively, for ethical rather than metaphysical thought.

Let me put the same matter a little differently. In the time of our forefathers men believed that there was a definite and infallible gospel. If a man believed this gospel and lived in accordance with it, he would secure his salvation in the next world. This gospel was not the discovery of any human being but was the direct revelation of God to man, who could not have known anything about it if he had not been divinely instructed. The minister was the minister of the gospel because he knew accurately this divine message and could expound it correctly. Under these circumstances the minister always had something to say, could speak from a position of advantage, and his congregation had adequate reason for listening to him. It was important for both sides that the Bible and the theology based upon it should be adequately learned and taught, because it was necessary to the salvation of a man's soul.

With the coming of the Liberal movements this whole edifice has been destroyed. Liberal theologians con-

tinue to speak of theology, but in point of fact they no longer believe in any theology based on a special revelation, and they retain the use of the word "revelation" only by using it in a sense which would have been abhorrent to the theologians of the past. So far as I have been able to see, no modern Liberal theologian bases his position on anything except the facts of experience by the individual and the race, interpreted in the light of reason, and not as a supernatural revelation, although some of them achieve a verbal reconciliation between this view and traditional phraseology by saying that this experience *is* a supernatural revelation.

I do not see that this kind of theology really differs from philosophy. It is, in fact, merely a subdivision of philosophy which tries to coördinate the phenomena of religion with the rest of life. There can be no philosophy worthy of the name which does not do this, and the philosophers of other times occupied themselves with its problems just as much as do our theologians. But in those days the philosopher and the theologian were distinguished from one another because the theologian dealt with facts which had been communicated, as no other facts had been, by divine revelation and had not been discovered by reason or research. We have given up that which distinguished theology in the past from philosophy, and I am not sure that we have any right to use the word for our modern systems.

Whether it be called theology or philosophy, it is a mistake, I think, to suppose that because men no longer think that salvation depends on theology they are therefore not interested in philosophic teaching. I feel sure that the man in the pew is interested in it and expects to hear something about it. Unfortunately both in Holland and in England clerical opinion does not recognize this fact, and the young minister is constantly warned not to preach theology. Terrible stories are told of

men who emptied their churches by preaching sermons on the *Communicatio Idiomatum*. No doubt the church was emptied, but the reason was not because the man preached theology but because he spoke a jargon unknown to his congregation and probably unintelligible to himself. Philosophy or theology deals with ultimates, with the first and last things of human thought. It is desirable that all ministers should know and should understand the history of thought on these points, but it is also desirable that they should speak about them in simple language in a way which an ordinary man can understand and that they should know the meaning of the words which they use.

We are not so badly off in America in this respect, or rather we suffer from a different complaint. So many ministers and, still more, so many theological students, seem to have new systems of theology which may possess many "inspirational" merits but have not that of logic. I am convinced that there are few things which are more needed in all the Churches in this country than that the theological schools should train up a generation of preachers who would be more, rather than less, "theological," but would recognize that the repetition of a phrase in a wrong sense does not supply an argument, and that the rapid circulation of words can never be a substitute for reason. Perhaps I may venture to express the belief that the Harvard Divinity School is doing few things of greater value at the present time than forcing students in theology to explain the phrases which they make use of at oral examinations. Nothing would induce me to submit to the process myself, but I have been present at it often enough to realize its educative value. We need better philosophy or theology, not less.

Nevertheless, however we may prize intelligible theology, no one now makes the claim in the old sense that it is necessary for the salvation of a single soul, even of

his own, that his system of theology should be believed or even understood. Express it how we may, nearly all of us have come to think of salvation, if we use the term at all, as meaning progress in the right direction rather than the attainment of a final destination, and believe that progress depends, not on the acceptance of any given formula, but on the right use by men, whether as individuals or as a society, of all their faculties, physical, intellectual, and moral.

Therefore what the minister is required to do is to help men to use these faculties in the right way, and the use of faculties depends almost entirely upon circumstances. It is not very difficult to lay down abstract rules about right and wrong, but it is extremely hard to decide what is right or wrong under a given set of circumstances. It therefore follows that no man can be an effective minister unless he is able to stand out as preëminent for his knowledge of the circumstances of life, as the ministers of the past were for their knowledge of theology. No one can teach usefully on the moral issues of modern life if he does not know what the circumstances of modern life really are. But this raises the question whether it is possible to raise up a class of men whose occupation from the beginning is to study the circumstances of life in relation to their moral issues and to talk about them without being professionally engaged in them. Is it not probable that it will more and more obviously pass the powers of any human being fully to understand all the complicated circumstances of modern life, and especially the problems provided by occupations in which he is not professionally engaged? Personally I admit that I am far more stimulated by hearing a lawyer discuss the moral problems of law and a business man discuss the problems of business than I am by hearing the most gifted pulpit orator discussing the same subjects. I admit that in one way the pulpit orator generally has the advantage. He is able to use

a larger vocabulary with greater artistic effect and to make the whole problem appear easy. Some preachers are so gifted in this respect that they seem able to solve all modern problems by the magic touch of the homiletic art. After hearing them one feels that the problem of capital and labor can be solved by the application of a text from St. Paul; it is a shock to find that the representatives of capital in the congregation do not share this hope. Such preaching does not represent the best Christian tradition, least of all in New England; it is more akin to Dio Chrysostom. But it is unfair to blame the preachers. The truth is that modern life is too complex for one man to understand it all, and therefore I rather doubt whether it will be possible by any conceivable method of education to train up men to talk hebdomadally on all the moral problems of present-day life. I believe that the Churches would be well advised to invite prominent professional members of their congregations into the pulpit in order to obtain the statements on the moral issues of modern life of men who know by experience where the difficulties really are.

But preaching or teaching is not everything; there is another side to the professional work of a minister. The great strength of the Roman Catholic Church is that it makes an effort to deal with those who are spiritually sick in the only way in which sickness can be dealt with successfully—by taking each case separately as an individual problem. I do not mean to suggest that the Catholic method of the confessional is desirable or that the theory of sin and absolution with which it is bound up is capable of intelligent defense, but merely that it gives the Catholic the enormous advantage of taking each case of spiritual sickness separately, while the Protestant tries to deal with all cases *en masse* in the pulpit. For in any case the treatment of these cases must be one of the true concerns of any Christian Church, and

neither in England, in Holland, nor in America is there any sufficient attempt made to teach men how to fulfil these duties, which are becoming far better understood by doctors, lawyers, and social workers than they are by ministers.

Exactly how instruction in this matter ought to be given I do not know; but I can see plainly that the lecture room is not the right place, even though a university ought to undertake its organization. It seems to me that we ought to follow the example of doctors. The medical profession gives some of its instruction in the lecture room; but the most important part of it is given in the wards of a hospital. To my mind the most complete analogue to the wards of a hospital is the prison and the penitentiary. It is to those places that spiritual sickness, when long enough neglected, inevitably comes, just as disease in the last resource comes to the surgeon. But the medical student is taught by the surgeon how in many cases this tragedy might have been prevented or mitigated, and men are urged to consult doctors in order to prevent the spread of disease. Would it not be possible for the future minister to be educated on some such lines as the doctor? Show to him and let him study the worst cases of spiritual disease, in order that he may recognize the symptoms and know the remedy before it has gone so far in other cases. The work need not be confined to prisons or penitentiaries, for every parish provides some analogues to those who are under medical treatment, and every minister has experience of those who are spiritually sick. But to do this theological schools need the coöperation of ministers. At the present time, from the point of view of education, many of our students are wasting their time and forming bad intellectual habits by "supplying" pulpits while they are still at the School. The only excuse for the practice is that they need the money; but this is no justification.

They ought rather to be attached to large and flourishing churches not as a means of adding to their incomes but as part of their education. It is true that they would often be more hindrance than help to the ministers of the parishes to which they went; but our alumni are very loyal, and we count on their help. Just as practising physicians and surgeons constantly give up some of their time to teaching in the hospitals in our great medical centres, ought we not to demand from our older ministers that they should contribute to our teaching and allow our students to come and learn from them some of the practical problems which have to be faced by those who are the physicians of souls?

## PROFESSOR C. C. TORREY ON THE ACTS

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Dr. Torrey has produced a work<sup>1</sup> which, though contained in a little treatise of seventy-two pages, may well be an epoch-making contribution to our knowledge of Acts. He has undertaken to demonstrate two things: first, that Acts 1-15 35 is directly traceable to an Aramaic source which Luke translated; secondly, that the rest of the book is the work of one author.

This implies that we must revise all our previous ideas of the date not only of Acts, but of the written synoptic tradition. We must give up all theories of "sources," all ideas that Acts is in any sense a *Tendenz-Schrift*, and must subscribe to the orthodox assertion that Acts was completed by A.D. 64, and that Luke when he wrote was ignorant of what had happened to Paul after his two years' captivity at Rome. We must, naturally, acknowledge that Luke owes nothing to Josephus; on the contrary, if there was any borrowing, Josephus, who wrote his *Antiquities* at least thirty years after the Acts, was indebted to Luke. We must further postulate that the story of Acts 1-15 existed in its present form in an Aramaic document as early as A.D. 50, and that to Luke it was so important—I had almost said so sacred—that he did not presume to alter a word when he made his literal translation. Such are the consequences of Dr. Torrey's theory which we now proceed to examine.

Dr. Torrey's method is thoroughly sound. He may deduce more than his investigations warrant; but when

<sup>1</sup> The Composition and Date of the Acts. Harvard Theological Studies, No. 1. Harvard University Press, 1916.

he subjects a Greek verse or phrase to criticism he does not do so without good reason, and his knowledge of Aramaic is such that few could presume to call it in question.

The three chapters are entitled:

- I. The Aramaic Source of Acts.
- II. The Integrity of the Second Half of Acts.
- III. The Relation of II Acts and I Acts.

In chapter 1 Dr. Torrey shows why, in his opinion, in "the first fifteen chapters the language is translation-Greek." He begins by collecting a formidable array of Semitisms extending over the chapters from 1 1 to 15 23. He declares that these idioms are specifically not Hebrew but obviously Aramaic. He admits that some of them are traceable in the later parts of Acts, but urges that these are probably part of the *Koinè* language, which is obviously being used. Acts 1-15 35 ff. does not sound like the *Koinè*. It is translation-language, like 1 Maccabees, etc., and it cannot be that Luke is trying to write in the style of the LXX, for Acts 15 36-28 *fin.* is not at all in this style. Dr. Torrey is of opinion that Acts 1-15 35 was in Palestinian Aramaic, the language of Judæa as compared with the northern Aramaic dialect. He admits that we do not know much of this Palestinian variety; but he endeavors to use it as the basis of re-translation, taking as his models the fragments we have, the Targum of Onkelos, and the documents preserved in the Hebrew Ezra, etc.

Here are a few passages which are taken to prove the Aramaic origin of chapters 1-15 35:

Acts 2 47: ὁ δὲ Κύριος προσετίθει τοὺς σωζομένους καθ' ἡμέραν ἐπὶ τὸ αὐτὸν. The last three words are usually taken as "together" or "in the same place." In Biblical Hebrew they would be equivalent to יְמִינֵי. This makes sense in Luke 17 35, Acts 1 15, 4 26; cf. Ps. 2 2. But it does not make sense here. In the Textus Receptus and the A. V. an attempt

is made to get rid of the difficulty by connecting it with 31. Cod. D has *ἐπὶ τὸ αὐτὸν τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ*. But retranslation into the Palestinian dialect explains it all; in it means “greatly.” Thus the literal translation would be, “The Lord added to those that are saved daily greatly,” that is, the number of converts rapidly increased; but Luke’s ignorance of Palestinian Aramaic made him translate **לְחַדָּא** as if it were **יְחַדִּי**.

Acts 3:16: *Καὶ ἐπὶ τῇ πίστει τοῦ ὄντος αὐτοῦ, τοῦτον δν θεωρεῖτε καὶ οἴδατε, ἐστερέωσεν τὸ ὄνομα αὐτοῦ· καὶ ἡ πίστις ἡ δι’ αὐτοῦ ἐδώκεν αὐτῷ τὴν ὀλοκληρίαν ταῦτην ἀπέναντι πάντων ὑμῶν.* Here we have a very clumsily worded passage; note the ugly repetition of *ὄνομα*. Dr. Torrey’s explanation is extremely ingenious: Luke read the Aramaic **תְּקִרְבָּה שְׁמַה** *ἐστερέωσεν τὸ ὄνομα αὐτοῦ* instead of **תְּקִרְבָּה שְׁמַה** “made him whole.” The verse would then read consistently and intelligibly, “Yea, the faith which is through Him hath given him this soundness.”

Acts 4:25: The prayer of the disciples, containing the hopelessly unintelligible words *δ τοῦ πατρὸς ἡμῶν διὰ πνεύματος ἀγίου στόματος Δανειδ παιδός σου εἰπών.* No scholar has ever made sense of this jumble of words. But in Aramaic they would be **אָמַר הוּא דִי אָבוֹנָא לְפָום רֹוחָא דִי קָוְדְשָׁא** **דָוִיד עֲבָדָךְ**. The rendering of the feminine **הָיוֹא** ought to be, “That which our father David, thy servant, said by the mouth of the Holy Spirit.” The manner of Luke in sticking close to a difficult Aramaic text is, according to Dr. Torrey, characteristic of this writer as a translator.

Somewhat less convincing is the treatment of

Acts 8:10: *οὐτός ἐστιν ἡ δύναμις τοῦ θεοῦ ἡ καλουμένη μεγάλη.* How are we to account for the presence of *καλουμένη*? True, Gnostic formulæ speak of a *μεγάλη δύναμις*. “But this,” says Dr. Torrey, “is quite outside the atmosphere of the book of Acts; nor have we any reason for supposing that

the people of Samaria were a Gnostic community.” Klostermann thinks that may be a transliteration of מַגְלָא, “revealing.” The main difficulty, however, says Dr. Torrey, lies in *τοῦ θεοῦ*. He reminds us that Samaria was not Samaritan. As Wellhausen says, “The city of Samaria remained heathen and did not belong to the Samaritan community.” Philip therefore was preaching in a town where people believed in gods many and lords many. “What deity could the people of Sebaste have designated *δὲ θεός*?” I confess I do not see the force of these objections, and before showing how Dr. Torrey answers them, I should like to ask if they really present a difficulty. Καλουμένη occurs in Acts 9:11: *τὴν ρύμην τὴν καλουμένην εὐθεῖαν*, and we have the θύρα λεγούνη ὥραια (3:2). It is also quite possible that in Samaria there was a Gnostic community, especially if Sebaste, which, as Wellhausen says, *blieb heidnisch*, is the scene of Philip’s meeting with Simon. But we cannot argue both ways at once; either Sebaste is meant by *τὴν πόλιν τῆς Σαμαρίας* or it is not. In the former case a Gnostic community is possible; in the latter *δὲ θεός* presents no difficulty. I venture to think the whole context is against the implication that Philip preached in a heathen city. A mission to heathen at this stage is inconceivable. Simon is not said in Acts to have amazed the Gentiles, whatever he may have done later, but *τὸ ἔθνος τῆς Σαμαρίας*. The Apostles hear that Samaria has received the word (14). After the discomfiture of Simon they evangelize *πολλὰς κώμας τῶν Σαμαρειῶν*. The Samaritans meant are clearly the schismatical nation which practised the law of Moses. Otherwise the necessity of Peter needing a vision before he could go to the uncircumcised Cornelius is pointless, and a serious objection to the unity of these chapters, for which Dr. Torrey contends so earnestly, is provided.

But I must turn from the delightful task of showing a slight blemish in the argument of a friend and colleague

to return to a field where I can offer no criticism. The verse rendered into Aramaic would read as follows: **דָּין חִילָא דֵי אֱלֹהָא דֵי מַתְקָרָא רַב** which Dr. Torrey admits to be ambiguous, for, **חִילָא** being masculine, it may be rendered **אָנָתָה**, "this;" **וְנָתָבָה** is also possible: "This man is the power of God **τοῦ καλουμένου μεγάλου.**" "The Great God" is, of course, the God of the Jews. "In early Syriac 'Rabbā' is occasionally used absolutely as his title."

We now come to a passage which Dr. Torrey considers "one of the most satisfactory of all in the proof of translation which it affords." In 11 28 the famine foretold by Agabus was to be **ἐφ' ὀλην τὴν οἰκουμένην.** Cf. Luke 11 1, **ἀπογράφεσθαι πᾶσαν τὴν οἰκουμένην.** In both cases **οἰκουμένη** means the whole Roman empire; and neither the famine nor the enrolment affected, so far as we know, more than Palestine. In an Aramaic document we should have **בָּל אָרְעָא.** This a translator would naturally render by **οἰκουμένη**, "all the earth." But why should Luke not have used **וְגַן** if he had supposed the famine to be confined to Palestine and not to be universal?

To these passages Dr. Torrey adds other evidence, some of which is as cogent as any hitherto adduced, and I must reluctantly content myself with selecting only a few specimens.

(1) Acts 1 4: The difficult word **συναλιξθεντος** is the exact rendering of **מַתְמַלֵּח** an Ithpa'al, meaning to eat salt in company with. The Pe'al is found in Ezra 4 14. This verb is used in the Harklean Syriac. The Ithpa'al is only known to us in the Northern Syriac dialect.

(2) The employment of the words **ἥρξατο** (1 1), **ἀρξάμενος** (1 22, Luke 23 5, Acts 10 37). Of this Dr. Torrey says, "We see exemplified in a very striking way Luke's cautious faithfulness leading him to the employment of translation-Greek of the stiffest type."

(3) 2 24: *ἀδῖνες θανάτου*. Luke uses *λίθιας* in connection with this. It is a most unsuitable word; but in Ps. 17 5, 145 3, *ἀδῖνες* is used to translate **חַבְלִי**, “bands of.” Thus Luke must have had an Aramaic document with **חַבְלִיא**.

(4) 10 36 f.: This is a specially striking passage. In the first place, it occurs in a chapter which many pronounce to be a free Lukan composition, and it also has a very great theological significance. *Διὰ Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ· οὐτός ἐστι πάντων Κύριος* is a very strong expression for that age, and especially for Palestine. It would even have needed qualification at a much later date, for it appears to make Jesus Christ equal to the Father. Dr. Torrey suggests that *οὐτός* is not Jesus, but is the Aramaic **אֲזֶה**, “this,” and that it is the subject of the verb “sent”: “As for the word which this Lord of all sent to the children of Israel, etc.”

It is noteworthy that some examples of translation-Greek in the section Acts 13–15 35 are taken from the 13th chapter: verses 1, *τὴν οὐσαν ἐκκλησίαν*; 22, 24, 25 (ter). The last three are from the sermon at Pisidian Antioch. In chapter 14 there are only two examples: verse 17 (*ἐμπιπλῶν τροφῆς καὶ εὐφροσύνης τὰς καρδίας ὑμῶν*), and verse 27 —the use of *μετά*, which occurs also in 15 4, in the sense of **עַבְדָּ**, a preposition commonly connected with **עַבְדָּ**, meaning “to do to” anyone. I consider the place of these alleged Aramaisms significant. Taking into account Luke’s use of *οὐσα* and also that of Paul, it is difficult to consider its use in Acts 13 1 important; nor do I think that much weight attaches to those in chapter 14. There remains therefore only the Sermon, of which an Aramaic report may have been preserved.

Only the first thirty-five verses of chapter 15 come under discussion, as the second section of Acts commences with 15 36. All the Aramaisms are taken between 15 16 and 23 — the relation of the speeches and events of

the Apostolic council, which may have been in Aramaic. The suggestion which Professor G. F. Moore has given Dr. Torrey of the difficult phrase *τούτων τῶν ἐπάναγκες* (15 28) is interesting. He thinks the *τῶν* may be due to a ditto-  
graphy, and that a stop should be placed after *τούτων*. Then we should read, "to lay upon you no further burthen, except these: *ἐπάναγκες ἀπεχέσθαι ἐιδωλοθύτων*."

Such then is Dr. Torrey's argument. It is, as all will admit, very suggestive, and is packed with valuable helps to exegesis. That of 2 47 seems to me most ingenious. By his extensive knowledge of Aramaic dialects he has succeeded in explaining a very difficult phrase in a simple and probable manner, and the conclusion that an Aramaic original is at the back of this and other strange expressions is too strong for me to deny. But this is only part of Dr. Torrey's task, which is to demonstrate satisfactorily the absolute unity of the Aramaic document, which an author like Luke, whom he admits possessed great literary versatility, translated with such conscientious fidelity that he preserved its very errors, even those which must have been obvious to him.

The second chapter of our treatise must receive less attention than it deserves. In it Dr. Torrey points out the marked difference in the style from that of 1-15 35, the change in the Christology, and the impossibility of the Council of Jerusalem in Acts 15 having been so described by a companion of Paul's. But does not Dr. Torrey ignore the difficulty of accounting for a close friend of Paul's having incorporated into his narrative so damaging a statement as that relating to the proceedings of the Apostles and the promulgation of the letter to the churches of Syria and Cilicia? The main part of the chapter is, however, devoted to showing that Harnack's view, that 27 9-11 is by a later hand, cannot be maintained, and to exposing the fallacy of Norden's theory of Paul's Areopagus speech in Acts 17. It is to

be regretted that he does not deal with a far more serious objection, that of the integrity of the last part of Acts—the problem of reconciling Acts 28 17 *ad fin.* with all that is elsewhere known of Paul's attitude towards the Jewish leaders. How could a disciple of Paul who knew of the Epistles to the Romans, make the Jewish elders of Rome ignorant not only of his existence but of that of the Christian sect?

The third chapter—the relation of II Acts to I Acts—deals with three points: (1) Old Testament quotation and language in Acts; (2) the homogeneity of the Aramaic document; (3) the probable date of Acts.

In dealing with the first, Dr. Torrey points out that while there are, according to Westcott and Hort 94, and according to Nestle 83 quotations from the Old Testament in I Acts, there are only 4 in II Acts. From this he infers that Luke knew very little about the Old Testament till later in life, and its words and phrases did not come readily to his pen. It is open to inquiry whether the theme of II Acts lent itself to Old Testament quotation; and whether Acts 26—the speech of Agrippa—is one on which the conclusion that I Acts is translation-Greek and II Acts free composition can be maintained. Agrippa, it is true, was a Jew and an observer of the law; but would a speech like the sermon at Pisidian Antioch have been suitable? The sermon was suitable to a synagogue and the speech to a law court in the presence of a Roman procurator and a Hellenized Hebrew king.

Before conceding the homogeneity of the Aramaic document, it would be necessary to enter very minutely into questions of sources, and to discuss Harnack's theory of Acts 2 being a  $\beta$  source while Acts 3 and 4 is an  $\alpha$  one, both referring to the same event, not to mention other examples of doublets and inconsistencies. In this section, however, Dr. Torrey has, I think, proved his

thesis "that there is no introductory paragraph, though we are led to expect one." The opening sentence, *τὸν μὲν πρῶτον λόγον ἐποιησάμην περὶ πάντων, ὃ Θεοφίλε,* has no ending; and Luke, after writing these words, began to translate his Aramaic document, which began thus: "After (בְּתִרְבָּתָה) all that Jesus did and taught, up to the day when he gave commandment to the Apostles whom he had chosen by the Holy Spirit, and was taken up; to whom, etc."

When the main contentions of Dr. Torrey are conceded — namely, that I Acts and II Acts are each single homogeneous documents, combined together by Luke, the companion of Paul — the rest follows as a matter of course. I Acts must be a very early document, and Luke may have completed it after making his translation by adding his own experiences when a fellow traveller of Paul. The objections are familiar ones but to us of secondary interest. They are (a) that the Third Gospel was written after A.D. 70. Dr. Torrey shows that Luke 21 is a tissue of Old Testament quotations and thinks that it may well be prophetic; (b) Luke's indebtedness to Josephus, of which Dr. Torrey admits but two "correspondences" worthy of serious attention — Acts 5 36, cf. Jos. *Antiq.* XX, 5, 1; and Luke 3 1, cf. *Antiq.* XX, 7, 1 (Lysanias). His discussion of them is fair and ingenious, but it requires much more than the two pages or so which is all that is devoted to it.

It will take many judgments before a final decision can be given as to Dr. Torrey's case being proved. Mine is at best that of a judge of a court of first instance. That there were Aramaic sources for 1 Acts I feel convinced by the arguments presented to us. That nothing but Aramaic sources were used is, I consider, "not proven." That there was only one document appears to me extremely doubtful. That Luke translated this with meticulous accuracy, adding nothing of importance of his

own and adapting nothing to prove those points which he desired to establish, is, judging by his use of Mark and Q, to me at least incredible. I admit that there is a marked difference between the Greek of 1-12 and 16 36 *ad fin.*; but I am not so certain about 13-14, 15 1-35, except in some definite sections. I am, however, convinced that it is impossible to say with any degree of positiveness that Luke, the companion of Paul, was the final redactor of Acts, or that Acts, as we have it, comes from a Pauline source. My judgment may be reversed with my full but regretful consent when the case comes before judges of a higher court, the Supreme Court of New Testament scholars. But they will not reverse my final pronouncement that Dr. Torrey has done a great service to scholarship by promulgating his theory; and "right or wrong," he deserves the thanks of the learned world.

## THE ANONYMOUS HYMNS OF SAMUEL LONGFELLOW

HENRY WILDER FOOTE

HARVARD UNIVERSITY

On February 27, 1917, I had occasion to spend some hours in the library of Union Theological Seminary in New York, looking over the admirable collection of hymnody on the Seminary's shelves. As I came to the collection of Unitarian hymn-books I opened by chance a copy of the *Unitarian Hymn and Tune Book* (1877), when a letter fell from the volume. Picking it up I recognized the handwriting of Samuel Longfellow and saw that the letter had to do with certain of his hymns. It ran as follows:

"GERMANTOWN [Pa.] Nov. 18 [1880].

DEAR SIR:—

I have known of your interest in Hymnology and am glad to come into communication with you.

'Flung to the heedless winds' is certainly not my version. I do not know whose it is, nor why Dr. Martineau sh<sup>d</sup> have attributed it to me (as he did Dr. Hedge's version of Luther's 'Ein' feste Burg'). I am pretty sure that it was copied into the *B. of Hymns* from the Cheshire Collection. Perhaps President Livermore of Meadville could tell you about it. I have a collection of Luther's Hymns in German. There is only one of them which bears any resemblance to this, and that only in one verse. It is a very long Hymn, a sort of ballad about two young men put to death at Strasburg for their protestantism. If the H. in question be taken from that, as I suppose, it is a very free paraphrase.

Of the *Anons* in the *H. of the Spirit* a good many are hymns so much changed as not to be honestly attributed to anybody. Others were of authorship really unknown to us at the time, though since discovered, as in Martineau's new book. I should be glad to know

of any whose author you have found, if not in his book. I may say that Hymns 585 and 330 are mine. I did not put my name because two lines in the former and one line in the latter were not mine. 550 founded on a H. of Wesley is nearly all mine. 127 and 368 are mine but are of no importance.

Can you tell me anything of a 'Hymn of the Calabrian peasants,' upon wh. 60 (*H. of Sp.*) is founded. I tho't it was by Mrs. Hemans, but cannot find it in her volumes.

I will try to look up some dates. The only thing to add to my biography w<sup>d</sup> be my settlement in Germant<sup>n</sup> in 1878.

Very Truly,

SAM<sup>1</sup> LONGFELLOW.

438 (*H. of Sp.*) I versified from a passage in one of Martineau's sermons."

The letter was so folded that the signature and this postscript first met my eye. As I glanced at the latter the thought flashed across me that here was a clue to the authorship of the hymn beginning,

"He who himself and God would know."

That hymn has not infrequently been assigned to Dr. James Martineau, being obviously based upon a passage from one of his sermons.<sup>1</sup> It does not appear, however, in any one of Dr. Martineau's three collections, nor was it ever acknowledged by him, so that it has generally

<sup>1</sup> It may be interesting to compare the hymn with the passage. Martineau writes:

"Let any true man go into silence; strip himself of all pretence and selfishness and sensuality and sluggishness of soul; lift off thought after thought, passion after passion, till he reaches the inmost depth of all; remember how short a time, and he was not at all; how short a time again, and he will not be here; open his window and look upon the night, how still its breath, how solemn its march, how deep its perspective, how ancient its forms of light; and think how little he knows except the perpetuity of God, and the mysteriousness of life—and it will be strange if he does not feel the Eternal Presence as close upon his soul, as the breeze upon his brow; if he does not say, 'O Lord, art Thou ever near as this, and have I not known thee?' if the true proportions and the genuine spirit of life do not open on his heart with infinite clearness, and show him the littleness of his temptations and the grandeur of his trust. He is ashamed to have found weariness in toil so light, and tears where there was no trial to the brave. He discovers with astonishment how small the dust that has blinded him, and from the height of a quiet and holy love looks down with incredulous sorrow on the jealousies and fears and irritations that have vexed his life. A mighty wind of resolution sets

been printed as anonymous. It was evident that the hymn-numbers in Mr. Longfellow's letter did not refer to the volume from which the letter had slipped, so I ran my eye along the shelf until it lighted upon *Hymns of the Spirit*, the notable collection by Samuel Longfellow and Samuel Johnson, published in 1864. I turned eagerly to number 438. It was indeed,

“He who himself and God would know,”

and against it was a pencilled note, “S. Longfellow from Martineau's sermons.” In the index it was entered simply as “From Martineau.” This was a most interesting discovery. I turned next to the other hymns to which Mr. Longfellow referred in his letter, and found entered against each the information which he had given about them. Folded into the volume was also a post-

in strong upon him and freshens the whole atmosphere of his soul; sweeping down before it the light flakes of difficulty, till they vanish like snow upon the sea. He is imprisoned no more in a small compartment of time, but belongs to an eternity which is now and here. The isolation of his separate spirit passes away; and with the countless multitude of souls akin to God, he is but as a wave of His unbounded deep. He is at one with Heaven, and hath found the secret place of the Almighty.”

“Endeavors After the Christian Life.”  
Sermon 17, “Silence and Meditation.”

Longfellow's versification runs:

“He who himself and God would know,  
Into the silence let him go,  
And, lifting off pall after pall,  
Reach to the inmost depth of all.

“Let him look forth into the night;  
What solemn depths, what silent might!  
Those ancient stars, how calm they roll—  
He but an atom 'mid the whole.

“And, as the evening wind sweeps by,  
He needs must feel his God as nigh;  
Must needs that unseen Presence own,  
Thus always near, too long unknown.

“How small, in that uplifted hour,  
Temptation's lure and passion's power!  
How weak the foe that made him fall,  
How strong the soul to conquer all!

“A mighty wind of nobler will  
Sends through his soul its quickening thrill;  
No more a creature of the clod,  
He knows himself a child of God.”

card from Mr. Longfellow, addressed to Rev. F. M. Bird, of Lehigh University, a well known hymnologist, one of the contributors to Julian's *Dictionary of Hymnology*. Evidently the letter had also been addressed to him and had been slipped into another volume by mistake, after Mr. Bird had made his annotations. Mr. Bird's hymn-books were, apparently, later bought by Mr. Henry Day, another collector of the last century, from whom they had come to Union Seminary.

The little volume with its annotations has, upon further study, provided additional facts of interest regarding Mr. Longfellow's hymns, especially when compared with his *Hymns and Verses* published in 1894, after his death (1892). The preface of that collection, written by his niece Miss Alice Longfellow, speaks of *Hymns of the Spirit* as containing "twenty-two original hymns by Mr. Longfellow, but three of these are marked anonymous in the index, as Mr. Longfellow wished to avoid the appearance of introducing too much of himself into the book. The hymn 'Holy Spirit, Truth divine' bears some resemblance to one of Andrew Reed's hymns, but after careful investigation, proves to be quite distinct from it." Comparing the annotated copy of *Hymns of the Spirit* with the collection of *Hymns and Verses* I found that the former contained not twenty-two but twenty-three of Mr. Longfellow's hymns later included in *Hymns and Verses*, namely the nineteen which are ascribed to him in the index, including "Holy Spirit, Truth divine," and four others, set down as anonymous, namely:

127. "Father, give thy benediction."
330. "God of the earth, the sky, the sea."
485. "I look to thee in every need."
676. "God's trumpet wakes the slumbering world."

But Mr. Longfellow's letter reveals four more hymns in *Hymns of the Spirit* to which he had some claim, but

which are not to be found in *Hymns and Verses*. They are as follows:

368. "O Father, fix this wavering will,"

to which he refers as "of no importance";

550. "God of truth! thy sons should be,"

to which he made no claim because it was founded upon a hymn of Wesley's, although "nearly all mine";

585. "Every bird that upward springs,"

which, writing in 1880, he says he did not claim because "two lines . . . were not mine," but which in the index of *Hymns of the Spirit* he assigned to Neale; and

438. "He who himself and God would know,"

the hymn versified from Martineau which he did not claim because he evidently felt that it belonged to Martineau rather than to himself, and which he therefore entered in the index as "From Martineau." *Hymns of the Spirit*, therefore, contained not twenty-two but twenty-seven hymns to the authorship of which he felt that he had some claim.

Mr. Longfellow's habit of rewriting hymns by earlier authors, or of appropriating a line or two upon which to build a fresh hymn, has made it peculiarly difficult to identify the hymns which are wholly his. He evidently desired scrupulously to refrain from claiming hymns which were not wholly from his own pen, but it is interesting to note that hymn 330 in *Hymns of the Spirit*,

"God of the earth, the sky, the sea,"

to which he did not put his name because two lines were not his, has been included as his in *Hymns and Verses*. It is much more surprising that he should have put his name in *Hymns of the Spirit* to the hymn

"Holy Spirit, Truth divine,"

for, in spite of Miss Alice Longfellow's disclaimer, it is extremely difficult to avoid the conviction that Mr. Longfellow's hymn was directly founded on the well-known hymn by Andrew Reed, published in 1817,

"Holy Ghost, with light divine."

The similarity of the two hymns does not, indeed, extend beyond the first two lines of the first stanza and the first line of each succeeding stanza, but though Mr. Longfellow completely rewrote the rest of the hymn, something of Reed's nevertheless remains in it. In some modern collections the hymn appears as a composite of Reed's and Longfellow's versions, while in the new *Congregational Hymnary*, published by the Congregational Society of England and Wales, 1916, Longfellow's version of the hymn appears with still further alterations, presumably by one of the editors of the *Hymnary*. Mr. Longfellow's letter to Mr. Bird also illustrates a curious trick which his memory played him in permitting him to claim that all but two lines of hymn number 585 in *Hymns of the Spirit* ("Every bird that upward springs") were his own. He made that statement in 1880, thirty-two years after he had adapted the hymn from Neale for the 1848 *Supplement* to the *Book of Hymns*. Now as a matter of fact the hymn consists of stanzas 4, 5, 6, and 7, of Neale's Hymn for St. Andrew's Day, included in his *Hymns for Children*, 1842. Of the sixteen lines in Longfellow's version nine are taken unchanged from Neale, six contain part of Neale's wording, and only one is wholly Longfellow's! No one, of course, at all acquainted with Mr. Longfellow's character would dream of accusing him of consciously claiming as his own the work of another. With the lapse of years his own contribution to the completed product had come to bulk larger than it really was; he had simply forgotten how much he was indebted to Neale. Miss Longfellow also mis-

takenly included in *Hymns and Verses*, as an anonymous hymn of her uncle's, another to which he never made any claim, namely the translation from the Paris *Breviary* beginning "Supreme Disposer of the heart." It is in reality the work of John Chandler, and in both the 1848 *Supplement to the Book of Hymns* and in *Hymns of the Spirit* (1864) is entered as "Breviary."

One other pencilled note in the Union Seminary copy of *Hymns of the Spirit* suggests a problem for which I have no answer. Number 485 is Longfellow's exquisite hymn,

"I look to Thee in every need,"

printed as "Anon.," though included as his in *Hymns and Verses*. But in the margin is pencilled "v. 1, T. H. Bayley alt." Who was Bayley, and did he write some verses from which Mr. Longfellow drew his inspiration for this hymn? Was that why Mr. Longfellow did not acknowledge it in *Hymns of the Spirit*?

With the identification of these hymns contributed anonymously by Mr. Longfellow to *Hymns of the Spirit* we probably have a complete list of everything in the way of hymns which he wrote. It is a satisfaction to the student of hymnody to be able thus to trace more conclusively the songs of the writer who has made what is probably a more precious contribution in song to the religious life of America than any other nineteenth-century writer.

## BOOK REVIEWS

INTOLERANCE IN THE REIGN OF ELIZABETH, QUEEN OF ENGLAND. ARTHUR J. KLEIN. The Houghton Mifflin Co. 1917. Pp. xii, 218. \$2.00.

No higher praise can be given to this able historical study than to say that it recalls and ranks with Mr. Usher's *Reconstruction of the English Church*. That within a few years two works of such distinction, dealing with technical features of English Church history, should have come from America, augurs well for the mutual understanding which exists between the two nations already allied by blood and civilization, and now knit closer by coöperation in a common and sacred cause.

"Intolerance," says the author, "is essentially a social phenomenon based upon the group-conception of 'rightness'"; and attention is called to the fact that

"there is also a field worth investigating in the groups of non-religious intolerance. A very interesting book, or series of books, even more useful than much that has been written about religious intolerance, might be compiled by some one who turned his attention to the intolerance of medicine, of law, and of etiquette" (pp. 2, 4).

There is, however, this difference between the religious and the secular field, that on the former the conception of a fixed deposit of faith, which can neither be taken from nor added to, lies to hand. Given this premiss, there is a logical though not an ethical or a positive case for intolerance; while, on the latter, the content of the science or usage in question is obviously a variable quantity; so that intolerance, even if, like loss, it is "common to the race," is an inconsistency. On both, there are undoubtedly points of view which, though they are not our own, we may reasonably wish to see represented, because, while their predominance might be mischievous, they have a value as counter-balancing forces in the sum of thought and things. Only so can we secure

"the ultimate triumph of that sounder principle of national unity which recognizes the element of *variety* in a harmonious whole — a principle which only the modern world has realized" (p. 190).

We shall fail to understand the Reformation unless we realize how widely mediæval Catholicism differed from modern. The Reformation synchronized with, and to a great extent occasioned, the transformation of Catholicism into Romanism—the words are used in a historical, not in a controversial sense. What is meant is that before Luther the Western Church stood for Western Christianity, and that since Luther it has stood for Latin or Roman. There is all the difference in the world between the two. *La tradizione son' io*, said Pius IX; and no one dared to dispute the oracle. Had Clement VII or Leo X advanced the pretension, the stones would have cried out. For the Papacy was not then, as it has since become, the centre and sum of Catholicism. An important school of canonists sat loose to it, and the Great Schism had been an object-lesson. It had shown that, whatever the Pope might be theologically—that was a question for theologians—the Church could dispense with him in fact. And to a Catholic of the sixteenth century the Royal Supremacy was not the flat heresy that it is to the modern Romanist. In the Middle Ages two supremacies, the Royal and the Papal, struggled in the Church's womb.

A strong king was master in his own house; a strong Pope disputed his mastery; in ordinary times a *modus vivendi* was arrived at. But Henry VIII, high-handed as he was, could not have carried the nation with him had the Supreme Headship of the sovereign been as novel in fact as it was in name. The Reformation did not effect a revolution; it dissolved a partnership. The Pope was excluded from the government of the Reformed, the civil power from that of the un-reformed, churches. The latter process was gradual, and remained incomplete till our own day.

One notable result of these controversies was the heightening of the theological temperature. Both among Catholics and Protestants fanaticism overflowed its bounds; in England, happily, less than elsewhere, owing to the political forces at work in the religious settlement. The features of the English Church which are most displeasing to bigots—her distrust of enthusiasm and of extremes, her non-committal policy, what has been called her “quiet worldliness”—are not of post-Reformation origin; they are a direct inheritance from the secularized and sectarian temper of the Mediæval Church.

The Elizabethan settlement of religion, like the Revolution settlement of the succession (1688), which in many respects it resembled, was precarious for more than a generation. In each case the permanence of the new order seemed uncertain, and to whichever

side men attached themselves, they kept a foot in the opposite camp. At Elizabeth's accession there was an energetic Protestant minority, whose numbers and zeal had been increased by its Marian persecution, and a small but equally energetic Catholic minority whose hopes centred in the Queen of Scots; but the great majority of the people stood between the two. They resembled the nations of whom we read that "they feared the Lord but served their graven images." They were neither convinced Catholics nor convinced Protestants, but both, or neither, or something between the two. They were not Papists; the Papacy bulked less in Pre- than in Post-Reformation Catholicism; and they disliked, as Englishmen to this day dislike, religious change. The controversies of the age did not interest them. "These be not matters for burning," was their phrase. Among the educated the Queen's attitude, which was that of a somewhat detached outsider, was common. "Gentlemen," says Selden, "have ever been more temperate in their religion than the common people, as having more reason — the others running in a hurry."

The daughter of Anne Boleyn could not afford to be a Papist; and the sheer wickedness of the Counter-Reformation shocked her. She refused to admit Bonner to her presence — a fact which goes far to discredit the attempt made by later writers to whitewash him; and when, after the Massacre of St. Bartholomew, she and her court received the French envoy in mourning, there is no reason to question her abhorrence of that great crime. But she was a lukewarm Protestant. Temperamentally she had neither understanding nor sympathy with fanaticism; as a ruler, she detested sedition; and she believed, not without reason, that the more extreme forms of Protestantism stood for both. The formularies of the English Church were deliberately framed to include non-Papal Catholics. It was from circumstances, not from choice, that the Queen became the champion of the Protestant cause. Both she and the country were carried further and faster in this direction than she had either wished or intended, by the association of ideas which was not at first obvious, and by the course of events, which could not be foreseen. Henry VIII's Catholicism without the Pope had broken down in the clash of conflicting world-forces, and Europe fell into two hostile camps, in one or other of which men and nations had to take their stand.

In her first year she had to nominate twenty-five bishops. There were difficulties — legal, for many of the sees were not legally vacant, and moral, because the best men refused the position. The per-

secuting Marian bishops were out of the question. Men of the type of Bernard Gilpin, whom Mr. Gladstone used to quote as an illustration of the continuity of English religion — he had been ordained under Henry VIII, and remained undisturbed under Edward, Mary, and Elizabeth — held back. The more religious Protestants, unfortunately, scrupled at the ceremonies and habits which Calvin had allowed as *tolerabiles ineptiae*, and which it was necessary to retain from political motives. The government had to fall back upon lesser men. Parker and Jewel, who were the best of them and were chosen against their will, scarcely inspire enthusiasm; the greater number deserved the contempt in which they were generally held. They were exiles whom persecution had made persecutors; their principles were lax and their standards low. Some were openly scandalous. Sandys, Archbishop of York, was found *in flagrante delicto* with the wife of a tavern-keeper; Middleton, who was subsequently deprived for incontinence, was what has been euphemistically described as “a Christian with two wives”; Aylmer was “a brawler, greedy of filthy lucre”; Barlow, Parker’s consecrator, a bishop of *opera bouffe*. The epitaph on Mrs. Barlow, whose five daughters married respectively an Archbishop of York, and the Bishops of Winchester, Hereford, Lincoln, and Lichfield, is worth quoting:

Hic Agathae tumulus; Barlo praesulis, inde  
Exulis, inde iterum praesulis uxor erat.  
Prole beata fuit: plena annis quinque suarum  
Praesulibus vidit, praesulis ipsa, datas.

One could not take such an episcopate seriously; it was a thing for a shrug or a sneer. No one knew this better than Elizabeth. Her support of the bishops was political; they were useful tools. Her opposition to Puritanism, as to Popery, was not religious. To suppose her zealous for episcopacy or for the liturgy is to misread her: a child of the Renaissance, she “cared for none of these things.” Her anti-Puritan policy was matter of hard, cold calculation. The Reformation had gone to the outside limit of safety; a little, a very little, more and the nation would have been estranged. Elizabeth was better aware of this than her advisers; of all our sovereigns she was the most purely English and gauged most accurately the English mind. It was not till the half-French Stuarts associated Puritanism with Parliamentary as opposed to personal government that Puritanism became temporarily popular. In the Queen’s time it was an eccentricity; and there was less patience then than now with

eccentricities, particularly when they were, or might easily become, sources of public danger. Had Elizabeth broken openly and completely with the old religious order, the unity of the nation would have been destroyed. Her necessarily tentative and conservative policy has had lasting consequences, and has left as its legacy not a few of the controversies which divide the Church of our own time.

The Catholic question was as urgent as the Puritan. Professor Klein's parallel between this problem and that presented by anarchism today is ingenious:

"Perhaps no closer comparison of the English governmental attitude towards Catholics can be made than with the attitude of established government towards anarchistic opinion in our own time. The attitude is distinctly one of suspicion and supervision, but also one of tolerance and abstinence from active interference, except when the expression of opinion becomes clearly destructive of existing institutions or manifests itself in acts of violence" (p. 50).

It is probable that this expresses the Queen's intention. It was certainly that of Bancroft. But circumstances were too much for both Queen and Bishop; on each side passion and prejudice ran too high. The English Catholics were divided into two sections. The verdict of the majority of them on the Reformation was, *Fieri non debuit; factum valet*. All they asked for was to stand outside. But there was a minority, small but restlessly energetic and backed by Spain and Rome, which, regarding Catholicism primarily as a polity, would be content with nothing short of its forcible restoration, and held all means to this end lawful — rebellion, assassination, the calling in of foreign armies, the subjection of their country to alien rule. The *Letters and Memorials of Cardinal Allen* showed the extent to which the highest authorities in the Church were committed to plots whose objects were treasonable and whose methods were murderous.<sup>1</sup> This was the case for the Penal Laws. Some such legislation, Lingard admits, was a necessity.<sup>2</sup> Like the Coercion Acts of a later day, they were a hateful necessity. All exceptional legislation is hateful. But there are circumstances under which it becomes imperative in self-defence.

The Government, whatever its intentions, failed to a greater extent than Professor Klein admits, to distinguish between the moderate or religious, and the extreme or political, Catholics. Cuthbert Mayne was a type of the first, Robert Parsons of the

<sup>1</sup> Edinburgh Review, October, 1883.

<sup>2</sup> History of England, viii, 150. Life, by Haile and Bonney, 27.

second; and Mayne suffered while Parsons went free. Bancroft's merit was that he made a real attempt at discrimination, and that he would have put the former class within the law. In this, for a bishop, he was greatly in advance of his time. Nor, if his immediate motive was political, is it unreasonable to see also in his action a higher statesmanship, an endeavor to make the better and more reasonable elements in Catholicism prevail. At some personal risk he intervened in the domestic dissensions of the Catholic body, supporting the secular clergy against the Jesuits and their creature the arch-priest Blackwell, and facilitating the appeal of the former to Rome. Could the question have been settled in England, it might have been brought to a satisfactory issue. But Rome was the key to the position; and Rome, as always, took not the religious but the political—and the wrong political—side. Clement VIII trusted to schemers who plotted treason, to conspirators who hatched murder, to visionaries who dreamed dreams. The unfortunate English Catholics paid the penalty. The Pope did not, he said, desire toleration for them; toleration would destroy their faith. At home the Jesuits controlled the funds, and the ecclesiastical machine was at their disposal. The Appellants had not the courage to resist them; and though no more than a fraction of the laity was with the extreme party, the stronger wills carried the day. The Concordat controversy in France under Pius X is a modern parallel. In England it was not, however, till the Gunpowder Plot had shocked the conscience and shaken the nerve of the country, that the prospect of accommodation finally disappeared. *Delicta majorum immeritus lues.* The world-war may be as disastrous for French Catholicism as the Plot was for English; the wise and moderate Benedict XV may pay the penalty for his predecessor's sin.

Bancroft was a link between the Elizabethan and the Stuart periods, dying Nov. 10, 1610. Whitgift's last words had been "*Pro Ecclesia Dei!*" None such are reported of his successor, nor would they have been in keeping with his temper. He was neither a saint nor saintly. But, so far as human judgment can measure it, the best service to the Church and to religion has not been done by saints, nor even by distinctly religious-minded men. Saints have, as a rule, left behind them a legacy of questions, to which those who were not saints have been hard pressed to find a solution, and have seldom succeeded in finding one on purely religious ground or by purely religious means. And at critical times the quiet virtues which we associate, perhaps too exclusively, with religion,

fall into the background. There is not time to cultivate them. The rough work of the world, the cutting and carving of its raw material into shape, is done by rough instruments; not by pietists but by elemental men. No idealizing will transform Bancroft into any clerical type with which we are familiar; we cannot place him in the world of modern religious party—with its shibboleths, its abstractions, its symbols. A man of action, he concerned himself neither with names nor notions, but with concrete interests and tangible things. His work was taken over by men of narrower outlook and less moderate temper—and spoiled in the taking. He had learned to be “supple in things immaterial”; had he stood in Laud's place at Charles' elbow, the royal blood would not have stained the scaffold of Whitehall. He left a tradition at Lambeth which is not extinct, and whose extinction would be a misfortune. It is the voice not of Laud but of Bancroft that speaks to this day from St. Augustine's chair. Hence the ill-disguised irritation of enthusiasts, the dissatisfaction of men of curious and speculative temper, and the general assent of that average, if neither very spiritual, very enlightened, nor very interesting, opinion which is the strength of Churches, and on which, in the last resort, society, religious and secular, as we know it, rests.

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LA CONTROVERSE DE MARTIN MARPRELATE, 1588-1590: ÉPISODE DE L'HISTOIRE LITTÉRAIRE DU PURITANISME SOUS ELIZABETH. G. BONNARD, Docteur ès Lettres. Genève. A. Julien. 1916. Pp. xv, 237. 4 fr.

The religious life of England under Elizabeth has received much recent illumination. The careful studies of Roman Catholic conditions, some of which have been reviewed in these pages, have enlarged, through the work of Catholic and Protestant scholars alike, our knowledge of the fate of the Roman obedience and of its adherents. An American student, Roland G. Usher, has discussed the Presbyterian Movement under Elizabeth, the Reconstruction, chiefly by Richard Bancroft, of the English Church, and the work of the High Commission. Another American scholar, Champlin Burrage, has thrown much light on the early English Dissenters. W. H. Frere has made accessible a number of rare Puritan manifestos. We are getting to know the facts, the persons, and the influences of religious England in the significant Elizabethan age more minutely and more accurately.

No episode of this epoch is more picturesque, and none has been subjected to more careful recent study, than that of the Martin Marprelate controversy. In a sense, its latest investigator, M. Bonnard, has little that is new to offer. He has not been able to add materially to the sources already at disposal, or to do more than confirm the attribution of the authorship of these lively Puritan tracts to Job Throckmorton—a conclusion generally accepted at present, in spite of the recent dissent of that excellent English scholar, Mr. J. D. Wilson.

If M. Bonnard has been able to make no startling discoveries, however, his work has been none the less worth doing. He has gone over the whole field in most painstaking fashion. No study of the Marprelate dispute gives the reader so careful an analysis of its publications or of those of Martin's opponents, or so successfully puts them into relation to their time. None gives so clear an impression of the significance of the whole dispute and of its importance, both for the later development of Puritanism and in arousing in the defenders of the Church of England an assertion of the *jure divino* nature of Episcopacy over against the *jure divino* claims of Puritan Presbyterianism. M. Bonnard's careful treatise is therefore a welcome contribution to the growing literature of an important period. It may be hoped that leisure may be his to write that larger history of the origins and growth of Puritanism which has been his ideal, but which he fears may never be realized. If one may judge by the excellence of the present monograph, that more ambitious undertaking would be very much worth the doing.

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LES PROTESTANTS ANGLAIS, RÉFUGIÉS À GENÈVE AU TEMPS DE CALVIN, 1555-1560. CHARLES MARTIN, Docteur en théologie, Ancien pasteur à Genève. Genève. A. Julien, Éditeur. 1915. Pp. xiv, 354. 7 fr. 50c.

A single paragraph in Macaulay, a few sentences in Green, and scanty references in Froude, comprise the attention our leading historians have given to one of the most important episodes, from a political and religious point of view, in the Reformation period.

On the death of Edward VI and the accession of his half-sister, Mary, about eight hundred English Protestants fled from England to escape the persecution which was imminent under a Roman Catholic queen. Every one knows of the little band of Protestant leaders who remained in England to perish at the stake—Latimer

and Ridley and Cranmer and the rest. But some brave men, like John Knox himself, did not think it their duty to remain. They reasoned like Athanasius in similar circumstances. It is plain that Cranmer himself would have fled and that the authorities were willing to make it easy for him to do so, but that he felt that his great post compelled him to stay and take what might come. The captain must be the last to leave the ship.

These refugees scattered on the Continent—principally to Embden, Frankfort, Zürich, Basel, and Geneva. In this interesting monograph Dr. Martin has given us a careful account of those who found a home at Geneva. He has investigated their careers before they came to Geneva, their occupations there, especially their literary labors, and has devoted much attention to their work in translating the Bible into English—the Geneva Bible, a version so dear to Puritan New England. And the whole is supplemented by a satisfactory bibliography. We could wish that Dr. Martin had enlarged the scope of his work to render a similar service to the refugees at Frankfort. The controversies at Frankfort were highly interesting. Here the question of an authoritative liturgy split the little congregation into warring parties, and at Frankfort the issue of the democratic constitution of the church was raised and settled as it could not be at Geneva under the dominating influence of Calvin.

It would have been well if Dr. Martin had contemplated more definitely the writing of *l'histoire* rather than giving us *memoirs pour servir*. The main significance of the Marian Exiles is vastly more important than the details of their tasks, or even their work itself at Geneva or anywhere else. When they returned to England, after having sat for five years at the feet of Calvin and of the great Protestant doctors of Basel, Zürich, and Frankfort, they were thoroughly imbued with Protestant ideas. When they reached England, all the great places at the universities and all the bishoprics, with one exception, were vacant. Education in England was at its lowest ebb, and Elizabeth was determined to have an educated leadership in the English Church. There was no single group of men in England so thoroughly well-educated as the Protestant Exiles who came trooping back from the Continent. From this group Elizabeth at once chose the heads of the colleges and filled up the bench of bishops. That is why English theology at once became so strongly Calvinistic, and remained so up to the days of Archbishop Laud; and that is why there was implanted in the Church of England those tendencies which were soon to manifest themselves in

the Presbyterianism of Cartwright and the Independency of Robert Browne.

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CONVERSATIONS WITH LUTHER, translated and edited by PRESERVED SMITH, Ph.D., and H. P. GALLINGER, Ph.D. The Pilgrim Press. 1915. Pp. xxviii, 260. \$1.00.

This little book of selections from Luther's *Table-Talk* has the merits and the defects of most books of selections. Such books represent the editor's idea of what is most significant in the work of the author, and this idea is never quite the same as that of any reader. Nor can selections ever be quite just to the author's intention. If these reflections are true of such attempts in general, they are doubly true in the case of a man like Luther, whose tongue and pen were uncontrollably active, seeming at times to have wills of their own, independent of their master's volition. Furthermore, any modern editor can in this case do no more than make a selection from several previous selections.

It is safe to say that no man ever lived whose scattered utterances could be more variously interpreted than those of Luther can be and have been. He can be praised or blamed as heartily as any one pleases, and both praise and blame can be justified out of his own mouth. And while this may be said of all his writing and speaking it is especially true of the so-called *Table-Talk*, at once the most popular and the least trustworthy of his published utterances. The method—or lack of method—by which this compilation was thrown together is briefly described in the editors' Introduction and in one short chapter. Nothing could well be more casual. First one and then another, sometimes several at a time, of Luther's younger table companions jotted down as they were spoken as many of his words as they could catch, and these random notes were then recast into something like literary form. They are of interest as showing the immense variety of subjects on which a great man's mind was working and his mental attitude at different moments toward the problems which his restless activity forced upon him. On the other hand, they are as dangerous a source as can well be imagined for any serious judgment of the Reformer's character or his permanent and constructive opinions.

It is one of the merits of the present volume that it reproduces fairly well this casual effect. Its chapters are topically arranged,

so that one gains at a glance a certain view of Luther's passing thoughts about any given subject. The choice of topics is judicious, and the comparative space allotted to them is in reasonable proportion. As to the qualification of the editors there can be no question, especially Dr. Smith's previous work in the Luther material being a sufficient guarantee of his care and accuracy.

**FRANCIS ASBURY, THE PROPHET OF THE LONG ROAD.** EZRA SQUIER TIPPLE, D.D., President of Drew Theological Seminary. The Methodist Book Concern. 1916. Pp. 333. \$1.50.

It is a noteworthy fact that while Washington, Franklin, the Adamses, and Thomas Jefferson, with their patriot contemporaries, were laying the foundations of our Republic, and great political ideals were shaping the destiny of a new nation in this new world, there were men of lofty spiritual vision, whose eyes were fixed upon the Kingdom of God, who believed that the new nation must be a part of that Kingdom if it was to be strong and enduring. They wanted the victories of righteousness even more than they desired triumph for the Revolutionary armies.

Francis Asbury was a conspicuous representative of that class of men who did great service to the cause of American nation-building, a service entirely aside from the political and military fields. President Tipple has made this man stand forth in clear and impressive traits in the fascinating chapters of his biography. Asbury was born of humble English parentage and had no such advantages of education as did John and Charles Wesley; but he caught from them and from George Whitefield the fire of evangelizing purpose which moved him to his great work in the new American States. He arrived in Philadelphia (1771), having responded to John Wesley's call for men to go to America, while the Colonies were still under British power, and the muttering of revolutionary sentiments was beginning to be heard. But Asbury took no part in political debate. A man of one book, the Bible, zealous for one great cause — the spread of Gospel truth and light — he devoted himself without diversion and with unresting energy to his one work. In 1766 New York City had a population of only 12,000. A few warm-hearted persons — like Barbara Heck, Philip Embury, Captain Thomas Webb — had established the nucleus of a Methodist congregation and built a meeting-house in 1768. Asbury's first sermon in New York was preached in this building in 1771. Two purposes dominated him in his preaching and in his

administration of religious affairs. His supreme motive was to be a herald of the Gospel far and wide in this great domain of the new world. He had begun preaching in England at the age of seventeen. He had a passion for the work of evangelism. He never faltered; but hardships and obstacles of every kind, as he pioneered his way through the Long Road of a wilderness country, only increased his zeal and intensified his earnestness in proclaiming the Glad Tidings at every possible opportunity. He preached in rude cabins, in rough meeting-houses, in "rigging lofts," in great open-air gatherings; wherever there was a chance he was ready. His *Journal*, as finally published in three volumes, is one of the best sources in which to study the early social and religious conditions in America in the eighteenth century. It is also rich in the portrayal of the beginnings of the Methodist Episcopal denomination. He was a man after Wesley's own heart in his diligent habits—in private devotions, in reading good books on theology, history, poetry, and biography, in his "care of all the churches" that sprang into life along his missionary journeying, and in a large correspondence, which at one time he mentioned as amounting to a thousand letters in a year; no stenographer or typewriter to lighten the burden!

The second great purpose in Asbury's life was to lay broadly and firmly the foundations of Methodism in America. He was made a Bishop in 1784. From that time till his death (1816) he was the chief itinerant of the denomination—travelling an average of six thousand miles a year on horseback. But before his episcopal labors began he spent thirteen years on the great circuits—one of which measured two hundred miles—and had twenty-four preaching appointments that he met every three weeks. Asbury was a somewhat strict disciplinarian. Even as John Wesley was a commanding power in the ecclesiastical affairs of the Wesleyan Revival in England, so was Asbury the ruling spirit for his time and for early Methodism in America.

At the very Conference by which Asbury was made a bishop in 1784, the Methodist Episcopal Church in America was organized and named, and the Bishop began immediately his absorbing superintendency. His first tour, starting from Baltimore, took him as far South as Charleston, and back again to Mt. Vernon, where he called upon George Washington.

The strong mind of Asbury was thus felt in the first stages of the organic life of Methodism in this nation. Wesley had not contemplated an independent denomination when he sent Coke and Asbury hither as missionaries. But Asbury and the men who worked with

him felt the necessity of a church-order just as independent of the mother-church in England as the American Colonies became independent of Great Britain by the Declaration of Independence and the subsequent adoption of the Constitution. President Tipple points out the fact that there were two Revolutions effected in that stirring period: one political, by force of arms; the other ecclesiastical, by force of circumstances, which Asbury and his fellow-laborers were wise enough to make the ground of their action. "If any, with haughty air and the vain conceit of a crushing logic, still demand where the Methodists got their episcopacy, the true and sufficient answer is, by the good will of God they got it from themselves. This they did; and no church has a better or more valid episcopacy" (John Miley, at the Centennial Methodist Conference in Baltimore in 1884).

Asbury was a tireless itinerant. In his annual or semi-annual episcopal journeys, he visited every new State of the Union. He went into New York more than fifty times; New Jersey, over sixty; Pennsylvania, seventy-eight; Maryland, eighty; North Carolina, sixty-three; South Carolina, forty-six; Virginia, eighty-four; Tennessee and Georgia, each twenty; Massachusetts, twenty-three times after his visit there in 1791. His *Journal* has few complaints; and yet, from the sheer suffering of a sensitive soul, he does sometimes break through his heroic reserve. At one time he wrote, "To be three months upon the frontiers, where, generally, you have but one room and fire-place, and half a dozen folks about you, where you *may* meditate if you can, and where you *must* preach, read, write, pray, sing, talk, eat, drink, and sleep — or fly into the woods! . . . Six months in the year I have had for thirty-two years to submit, occasionally, to what will never be agreeable to me. The people are among the kindest souls in the world. But kindness will not make a crowded cabin, twelve feet by ten, agreeable."

Dangers lurked in many of his roads. "Wolves follow him; his horse falls; he is lost in the swamps of South Carolina; through another's carelessness he is nearly burnt; his startled horse throws him into a mill-race; a whirl-wind with hail nearly overcomes him; ruffians seek his life, a bullet grazing his head as he rides through the forest." The list of his adventures and hardships reads like a chapter from the experience of an apostle of the early church.

Forty-five years Asbury was the foremost preacher in American Methodism. About seventeen thousand sermons, it is estimated, were delivered by this modern apostle, and comparatively few of them in comfortable, churchly conditions. He preached because

he had a passion for proclaiming the Gospel; and his evangelistic appeals were constantly made to men, even in casual social intercourse. He not only "prayed without ceasing," often spending three or four hours a day in prayer, but he preached Good Tidings incessantly, by making use of every opportunity to urge men to become the disciples of Christ. His greatness in the pulpit was his burning intensity. He had not the graces and the skill of an orator, but his earnestness made him eloquent. He was a stern critic of his own preaching, and made such comments upon some of his sermons as these: "I roared out wonderfully"; "I had no power to speak to the people"; "bore a feeble testimony for nearly an hour"; "I preached and stormed a great deal." But the testimony of many thousands of his hearers was that this man reached the consciences of multitudes, spoke with spiritual authority, and never faltered in his purpose to spread Scriptural religion over this new land.

President Tipple's masterly analysis that portrays Asbury's powers as a preacher, an administrator, and a man of remarkable traits of character, has made to the literature of American history a choice contribution. Bishop Asbury's devotion and tireless labors gave him a distinctive right to be named a modern "Prophet." The "Road" he travelled was made illustrious by the wayside testimony he bore, at every turn, and in every stopping-place, that the "faith once delivered" is the "power of God unto salvation."

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THE HOLY QUR'ĀN, WITH ENGLISH TRANSLATION AND EXPLANATORY NOTES.

Part I. Pp. viii, 117. [Through Sura 2, verse 142.] Published by the Anjuman-i-Taraqqi-i-Islam, Qādiān, Punjab, India. 1915.

About forty years ago there appeared in the town of Qādiān, near Lahore in the Punjab, a religious leader, Mirzā Ghulām Ahmad, who before his death, which occurred in 1908, was hailed by his numerous followers as the Messiah promised by all the great prophets of antiquity. The Ahmadiya sect called by his name has continued to spread, chiefly in the Far East but also to some extent in the West, even gaining adherents in England. It is Mohammedan in its origin, and claims to represent the true Islam, the one universal religion; by orthodox Moslems, however, the Ahmadiya movement is looked upon as heretical. The sacred book of the new sect is the Qur'ān, and the commentary before us is being prepared as

its authoritative interpretation. It is an ambitious undertaking, and one in which scholars the world over would be keenly interested if it were in competent hands. Unfortunately, this is not the case.

The appearance of the quarto page is very attractive. At the top is the Arabic text, reproducing in large characters a masterpiece of calligraphy. Below this is a transliteration in Roman letters, followed by the English translation in large type. The principal part of the page is usually taken up with the commentary. Below, in finer print, are running notes of a more general — often controversial — character; and at the bottom of the page are references to parallel passages.

In regard to previous English translations of the Qur'ān the author says (Foreword, p. 5) that they "have been done either by those who were swayed by nothing but religious prejudice and whose object was . . . the presentation of a ghastly picture of the Holy Qur'ān before the world; or by those who had no acquaintance worth the name with the Holy Qur'ān and the Arabic language." He claims to have followed a new and original method, by which the chance of error has been practically removed. "We have not based the translation and notes, and in fact every other matter connected therewith, on current stories and popular tales; but, on the other hand, our procedure has been to base the meaning of every word first on the corroborative testimony of the Holy Qur'ān, and secondly on the context. The same golden rule has been observed in the preparation of notes." Examination of the rendering shows that it is in the main correct and good, but decidedly inferior in point of trustworthiness to those of Sale, Rodwell, and Palmer, to which it is of course very greatly indebted.

The nature and extent of the author's equipment for a work of scholarly research will be apparent from the following examples. Under transliteration (Foreword, pp. 6 f.): "Alif at the beginning of a word, pronounced as *a*, *i*, *u*, preceded by a very slight aspiration, like *h* in the English word 'honour'; *dhāl*, pronounced like the English *th* in 'that'; *dād*, similar to the English *th* in 'this'; *hamza*, a sort of catch in the voice." In matters of etymology: The word *shaiṭān* (p. 16) "comes either from the root *shīn* or *shyt*." In fact, he decides, it comes from *both* roots (why should it not?). "The former means 'straying away from truth,' and therefore *Shaiṭān* means 'one who has gone astray from the right path.' Taking the latter root, which means 'burning,' the word *Shaiṭān* signifies 'one burnt or doomed to perish.' Thus, *Shayāṭīn* signifies 'those men . . . who were burning with jealousy and hate to see the Muslims prosper,

and who had gone astray from the truth.” This same liberality in the recognition of Arabic roots and the combination of various meanings appears in many places. Thus, as to the meaning of the word *sūra* (p. 22): “Literally, a piece, a portion. Here it means a chapter, a section that has been set apart. *Sūrat* also means ‘height.’ In keeping with this sense, the chapters of the Qur’ān are called *Sūrahs* because they contain each a discourse on a lofty subject.” In commenting on 2:36 [33 in Flügel], the account of Adam’s temptation and fall in the Garden of Eden, our interpreter explains the meaning of the two principal words in the clause: “Approach not this *shajara*, lest ye be among the *zālimīn*.” *Shajara* means “tree,” but in the Qur’ān it “is also used to mean a quarrel, as in the verse . . . 4:66 [68 in Flügel]. The Qur’ān also mentions elsewhere both a ‘pure tree’ and an ‘evil tree.’ In the light of these Quranic explanations, the verse means, (1) that Adam was forbidden to quarrel; (2) that Adam was warned against evil things.” “As for the other word, *zālim*, the root means, first, ‘putting a thing in a wrong place or in a place not its own.’ Secondly, . . . etc. The phrase would thus mean that the result of approaching the *Shajarah* would be that he (Adam) would become one of those who do not observe the propriety of time and place in their actions.” What this kind of learning can accomplish in the way of etymologies is also well illustrated in the case of Gabriel (p. 80); the angels Hārūt and Mārūt, the former from *harata* “to tear” and the latter from *marata* “to break” (p. 85); the borrowed words — here of course regarded as genuine Arabic — *hanīf* and *sabt* (p. 113 f.). The following lexical and grammatical notes are characteristic: “It is a rule in Arabic grammar that whenever somebody is required to be induced to do a thing, the verb is omitted and only the object is mentioned” (p. 116). “The Hebrew word Elohim, which originally meant ‘to be strong’ has come to mean ‘the strong one’” (p. 80). On page 115 there is a (somewhat misleading) reference to the Robinson-Gesenius Hebrew Lexicon of the year 1836.

The intolerance and courtesy of the author, illustrated above in his treatment of the previous translators, are unfortunately characteristic of the whole work. This makes it the more difficult to be patient with the very meagre, thinly spread observations which occupy the place of a commentary. The great bulk of the material in this department is either homiletical or controversial. Leaving this out of account, there is very little remaining that could help any one understand the Qur’ān, and nothing with which a trained scholar — of any land or religious belief — could be satisfied.

One or two illustrations must suffice. Sūra 2:73 f. [67 f.], the story of the Red Heifer, where the text reads: "Ye (Israelites) killed a man (*qataltum nafsan*); . . . then We said, 'Strike him (the dead man) with a part of her (the heifer)'; thus Allāh gives life to the dead," etc. Our translator renders: "Ye almost killed a person. . . . Then We said, 'Smite it (margin: i.e., the class responsible for the sufferings of the man whose murder was attempted) for a part of its (sin).'" Then follows the explanation: The word *nafsan* is undetermined, "which often denotes a sense of grandeur. So the wording of the verse itself points to the inference that the person killed is a remarkably grand personality. . . . Such a one can be no other than a prophet. . . . Our investigation has so far enabled us to affirm with absolute certainty that he was a prophet. The verse also enlightens us on another important fact. It shows that the Israelites entertained doubts as to his death. . . . So the person spoken of in this verse can be no other than Jesus Christ." This, he affirms (p. 61), explains the last clause of verse 73 [67]: "And Allāh would bring to light what ye concealed." "With the appearance of the Promised Messiah [Mirzā Ghulām Ahmād], the mask which had been so long hanging over the incident has at last been thrown off." With this may be compared certain comments on the First Sūra, pages 2 and 3. Its title, *Fātiḥa*, "occurs in a prophecy in the [New Testament] Revelation, chapter 10, which also contains a reference to the number of verses in this Sūrah. The name occurs in the second verse . . . where it is translated as *open*. The original Hebrew word is *Fatoah* [sic]. . . . The seven thunders in the prophecy represent the seven verses of this chapter. The Christian writers agree in holding that the prophecy refers to the second advent of Jesus and they are right in their opinion. [It should be remarked here, that the Messiah of the Punjab claims to embody the returning Jesus, as well as the Mahdi of the Moslems.] The little book *Fatoah* or *Fātiḥah* was constantly in the hands of the Promised Messiah, who wrote many commentaries on this chapter." He adds, that the inspired Interpreter revealed in the chapter many great truths which no one had found there before, since it had hitherto remained a "sealed book" (Rev. 10 4). It is one of these unsuspected truths, doubtless, which our commentator presents in his interpretation of the closing verse, the text of which he renders as follows: "[Guide us in] the path of those on whom Thou hast bestowed Thy blessings; excepting those on whom Thy wrath has descended and those who have gone astray." On this he remarks: "The last verse of this chapter embodies a mighty prophecy. . . . [It] contains a promise

for the advent of a Messiah, for whose rejection the Muslims are threatened to be reckoned among the Jews and whose advent was to be preceded by the ascendancy of the Christian religion. The Messiah referred to in this verse has already appeared, and his name is Mirzā Ghulām Ahmād of Qādiān (Punjab, India)."

It is quite plain from these last examples especially, that the main purpose of this translation and commentary is not to inquire into the meaning of the Qur'ān, but to present a religious leader. How much of the exegesis offered here is derived from the latter, is an interesting question. Near the beginning of the commentary (p. 5) our author names 'Abdallah Ibn 'Abbās and the Promised Messiah as his two chief authorities. Those who hold the view of Ibn 'Abbās' trustworthiness which is held by all competent occidental scholars will feel that this lays a great weight of responsibility on the Messiah. And in fact, belief in the infallibility of this divine emissary — and his lesser representatives — will be found indispensable to acceptance of the views contained in this volume. The claims of the Promised One and the proofs in support of them are set forth in some detail on the cover of this First Part of the work, as well as in accompanying circulars. The last Imām in the great succession of twelve disappeared from human sight in the Mohammedan year 266 (879 A.D.), since which time his reappearance has been eagerly awaited by a large part of the Moslem world. After the lapse of just 1000 (solar) years, in 1879 A.D., the leader stands forth at Qādiān. Again, the Prophet Daniel prophesied [12 11] that "1290 years after the breaking of idols in Mecca" the Messenger would appear. The breaking of idols took place in the Mohammedan year 8; the addition of 1290 (lunar) years gives the equivalent of the Christian year 1881. Moreover, "just as the Israelite Messiah appeared 1300 years after Moses, similarly the Promised Messiah made his appearance 1300 years after the Holy Prophet." In fact, Moses appeared 1300 (solar) years B.C., and 1300 (lunar) years after the Hijra brings us to 1882 A.D. This is all interesting as illustrating the credentials which can be obtained from chronology. "The Holy Prophet of Islam . . . even named the very place where the promised Mahdi was to appear. He called it Kad'a, a name which is quite like the name *Kadi* or *Kadian*." This is certainly striking; and it is remarkable that the fact of this prediction should have remained so long unknown to the learned world, and especially to Mohammedan scholars. The Punjab Messiah has also himself foretold many events, it would seem. "He published hundreds of prophecies, many of which have already come true (such as his

prophecy regarding the Partition of Bengal, the defeat of Russia and the annexation of Korea by Japan, the Persian Revolution, the outbreak of plague in India, . . . the downfall and death of Dr. Dowie, the false prophet of America, etc., etc.), and many still await fulfilment."

With all the blind prejudice of the book, the extravagance of its exegesis, and the preponderance of unpleasant controversy, it contains much genuine and deep religious feeling. The movement of which it is the outgrowth can certainly command our sympathy, and we can only wish it success in its greater aims. The conviction, expressed again and again in these pages, that the world is in sore need of a spiritual awakening will find its echo everywhere, perhaps not less in the West than in the East. But the interpreter of such a marvellous monument as the Qur'ān has need of an exceptional equipment if his work is to be widely useful. He must be thoroughly acquainted with the Arabic tongue in its historical development; with the ideas and customs prevailing in Mecca and Medina in the seventh century; with the languages and faiths from which Mohammed appropriated so much; with the peculiar personality of the great Prophet himself; with the literary and especially rhetorical considerations which explain so much that is otherwise inexplicable. He must take fair account of the voluminous literature in the field, including not only the learned native commentators but also the widely scattered modern investigations. He will need both critical acumen, in examining the work of the interpreters and the sacred book itself, and also a breadth of view that can take some adequate account of the evolution of the great faiths of the world. The author of the present work is plainly unable to meet any one of these requirements. His commentary may serve a useful purpose as a text-book for the adherents of the Ahmadiya faith, but as an interpretation it can hardly have value for others.

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THE MYSTICS OF ISLAM. REYNOLD A. NICHOLSON, M.A., Litt.D., LL.D. G. Bell & Sons. 1914.

No living scholar is more competent to treat this subject than Nicholson. He is one of a small circle of English scholars who have in recent times added so much to the materials for a knowledge of Sufism by the publication and interpretation of Arabic and Persian texts, and we hope some day to have from his hand a comprehensive history of Moslem mysticism, to the study of which he has given

a large part of his life. In the present volume he has naturally made no attempt to treat the subject historically, but only to make plain to the reader, so far as such things can be made plain, the nature and methods of this mysticism. After an introduction on the origin and development of Sufism in its relation to Islam, and the external influences which affected it (Christianity, Neoplatonism, Gnosticism, and Buddhism), the author devotes a chapter each to The Path, Illumination and Ecstasy, The Gnosis, Divine Love, Saints and Miracles, The Unitive State. A selected bibliography of writings on Sufism and of English translations of Sufi authors, with an index, completes the volume, the interest and worth of which are much enhanced by the abundant translations, chiefly by the author himself, in which the mystics are allowed to tell in their own way of the Path, and the Goal, and the Experience that makes the speaker dumb.

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PHASES OF EARLY CHRISTIANITY 100 A.D.—250 A.D. J. ESTLIN CARPENTER, D.Litt. G. P. Putnam's Sons. 1916. Pp. xvi, 449. \$2.00.

The ex-Principal of Manchester College, Oxford, is well qualified to figure among the lecturers in the American inter-collegiate course on the History of Religions. He is an authority in the history and literature of Buddhism as well as in the early history of Christianity, and the lectures as now published show such mastery of the field of study that the reader is conscious that the high standard of former years suffers no diminution.

Principal Carpenter is the first in the series of lecturers to deal with the history of Christianity. His survey covers the period from 100—250 A.D., and his method is to reproduce in condensed outline the principal literary monuments of Christian thought.

Recent inquiry into the interaction of the oriental religions, which in the period of the early empire overflowed Western paganism and rivalled nascent Christianity in proclaiming ways of personal redemption and salvation of the soul by participation in the divine nature, has paved the way for Principal Carpenter's discussions of "Christianity as Personal Salvation" and "The Person and Work of the Saviour," and furnished much of his material. The lectures which follow these two opening discussions are on "The Church as the Sphere of Salvation," "The Sacraments as the Means of Salvation," "Salvation by Gnosis," and "Christianity at the Parting of the Ways"; by which is meant the beginnings of Roman hierarchy.

Seldom can the student of the development of Christian doctrine and Christian institutions find a more competent and more unbiased guide. It was time a restatement should come having regard to the better knowledge so recently acquired of conditions and modes of religious thought in the pagan world. Both scholars and the reading public will be grateful that Principal Carpenter has given his attention to this subject, as well as for the thoroughness with which he has performed the task.

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THE MYTHOLOGY OF ALL RACES. Vol. IX, Oceanic. ROLAND B. DIXON, Ph.D., Professor of Anthropology, Harvard University. Marshall Jones Co. 1917. Pp. xv, 364; 1 map, 24 plates, 3 figures.

The lack of convenient summaries of up-to-date information has been painfully manifest in the field of anthropology for a number of years. On practically every topic the older synthetic work, while often significant and still valuable, requires amplification and revision, while the more recent attempts are almost uniformly deficient in both trustworthiness of data and progressiveness of viewpoint. In condensing the vast and scattered material on Oceanian mythology into a single volume Professor Dixon has thus rendered a great service both to his colleagues and that ever widening circle of lay readers who take an interest in the ways and thoughts of primitive man.

The subject-matter is treated under the obvious geographical headings. In the apportionment of space the very unequal character of the available sources was the main determinant, the meagre discussion of Micronesia being the inevitable result of inadequate raw data. It seems especially lamentable that we are wholly without knowledge of the mythology of the most primitive peoples of the region, viz., the Tasmanians and Negrito populations. In all the sections the ethnologist would have preferred fuller treatment of what the author calls "miscellaneous tales"; but here he was obviously obliged to conform to the general editorial scheme of the series.

In his account of Polynesian mythology Professor Dixon establishes a point of primary importance. It had been commonly assumed that Polynesian cosmogony was fashioned on a single pattern of the so-called genealogical or evolutionary type, "the successive stages in the development of the cosmos being individualized and personified and each being regarded as the offspring of the next

preceding." Thus, in one Maori version we find the primeval Void giving rise to the First Void, which is successively superseded by the Second Void, the Vast Void, and so forth through a considerable number of generations (p. 6). But however interesting these accounts may be as revealing the power of abstraction and metaphysical speculation of which the natives are capable, there are other Polynesian tales in which the universe does not evolve but is created by pre-existing deities. The evidence for this conclusion is convincingly set forth by the author. The only doubt that occurs to the reviewer is whether the elaborate genealogies may not be due to individual (or for that matter esoteric group) speculation rather than be characteristic of the belief of the people at large. This possibility would not in any way detract from the historical significance of the distribution data as outlined by Professor Dixon. On the other hand, it does not seem necessary to assume (p. 9) that where, as in New Zealand, both types of cosmogony coexist, each has a distinct geographical centre of dispersal and that the association is due to a contact of two distinct tribes. Such may be the case, but some weight should be given to the alternative hypothesis. In North America, where several versions of the same myth have often been recorded in the same locality, a considerable influence of the narrator's personality, whether as regards philosophical power or æsthetic taste, is undeniable, and a parallel condition of affairs may plausibly be inferred to hold for Oceania.

By comparison with Polynesia the cosmogonic instinct is but poorly developed among the natives of Melanesia, but a difference is noticeable between the Papuan and the properly Melanesian layer of mythology, the latter exhibiting much greater elaboration of this feature. Other peculiarities distinguish the tales of these two racial divisions. In Papuan lore ghosts loom prominently, while the tales of the Melanesians abound in cannibalistic episodes, and display a tendency toward dualism in the opposition of a wise and benevolent hero to his foolish and malicious brother.

The investigation of Indonesian mythology required a sifting of Islamic and Buddhistic influences, both of which the author has fully taken into account. His extensive use of Dutch sources, mostly unavailable for the majority of his readers, deserves special recognition.

In Australia Professor Dixon finds evidence of two distinct types of mythologies—the southeastern, which shows a greater development of the cosmogonic theme, and the northern and central type, in which totemic tales predominate. Some of the facts of distri-

bution are very perplexing indeed, such as the appearance of Melanesian motives in the southeastern regions. As the author realizes, a satisfactory interpretation of the data is rendered difficult by the absence of Tasmanian and West Australian data.

Throughout the volume Professor Dixon pays attention to the problem of historical connection, offering tentative but for the most part sane and stimulating suggestions as to the contact of the several Oceanian populations. It seems a great pity, and is probably the only serious deficiency of his work, that he has not been equally generous in his treatment of American parallels. To be sure, a fair number of these are mentioned, but their theoretical treatment is casual and in the conclusion entirely too summary. These resemblances are so remarkable that Tylor in his *Researches into the Early History of Mankind*, in spite of his bias in favor of independent development of cultural features, was constrained to suggest an historical connection between the New and the Old World. This general problem has become a perennial one in ethnological circles, and a table setting forth all the significant similarities between Oceanian and American lore would have been of the greatest service.

In conclusion, a tribute should be paid to the literary deftness with which Professor Dixon has handled his subject. Even to the professional ethnologist a volume of primitive tales generally forebodes a considerable measure of boredom, but the author's method of treatment has very successfully overcome this difficulty, so that the book makes decidedly interesting reading.

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NEW YORK.

THE INDIVIDUAL DELINQUENT. WILLIAM HEALY. Little, Brown, & Co.  
1915. Pp. xviii, 830.

Criminological literature since the days of Lombroso has been characterized by the lavish production of one-sided theories concerning the origin of crime. A few notable text-book writers (e.g., Aschaffenburg, Ferri, Bonger, De Quiros) have synthesized the findings of the monographists and have suggested that each criminal act is to be traced to a variety of factors, both constitutional and environmental. Few studies of all of the important causative factors of crime have been written covering large numbers of individual criminals. Recently, however, two very significant contributions have been made to this literature, both of which are more valuable in many respects than any preceding studies in this field.

These two are Goring's *The English Convict* and Healy's *The Individual Delinquent*. The former, prepared by an associate of Karl Pearson, is a biometrical study of 3000 adult males "guilty of grave and repeated offences" and imprisoned in the Parkhurst Prison in England. The latter is a study made in Chicago of 1000 juvenile delinquents, mostly repeaters.

The cases covered in *The Individual Delinquent* were selected from those brought before the Psychopathic Institute of the Juvenile Court of Chicago. The study was confined to the "formative period, for the sake of learning the structural growth of whole delinquent careers." "Just because the delinquent's character is the result of a long-continued process of growth, one needs to regard him as the product of forces, as well as the sum of his present constituent parts; one must study him dynamically as well as statically, genetically as well as a finished result."

The aim of Dr. Healy's work is stated to be "to ascertain from the actualities of life the basic factors of disordered social conduct," and its field is termed "characterology," for "as students of character we are dealing with the motives and driving forces of human conduct, and, since conduct is directly a product of mental life, we immediately become involved in individual and differential psychology." Dr. Healy's book, though it may not be criticised fairly as unilateral, stresses the psychological factors of crime.

The first chapters are on Orientations and the Mental Bases of Delinquency. These are followed by three chapters on Working Methods, submitting a schedule used for recording case-histories, and showing the order and the form of examination of each case, and by a long chapter on the mental tests, which includes a description of some new tests devised by Dr. Healy. These are followed by a chapter on Statistics, which classifies and enumerates certain of the causes of crime, by a chapter on methodological conclusions, and by another on conclusions as to treatment of cases.

The chapter on Statistics of the cases is a summary of Dr. Healy's findings. The Statistical analysis of home-conditions, of mental conflicts, of sex-experiences, of physical conditions, of "unsatisfied interests," of early developmental conditions, has the appearance of precision. It is unfortunately not well explained nor is the basis of the differentiation of cases well shown. Nevertheless, the chapter, as it stands, is an important contribution to criminological literature.

The cautiousness of the writer is displayed at several points in the statistical chapter. Avoiding the present tendency to blame criminality upon heredity, he lists defects of heredity as a minor causative

factor of criminality in 502 out of 823 cases, and never as a main factor. (We wonder if heredity played no appreciable part in the production of the remaining cases of criminality.) "Feeble-mindedness" is listed as a major factor in 92 cases, and "mental sub-normality" in 66 cases, but 455 are listed as showing "mental abnormality" or "peculiar mental characteristics." This is a cautious attempt to sub-divide narrowly the mental peculiarities of cases. Other specialists would probably have classified a larger fraction of cases under "feeble-mindedness." One may wonder also what may be the significance of listing 455 out of 823 cases as possessing "mental peculiarities." How large a percentage of the general population would he have discovered by the same tests to suffer from "mental peculiarities"?

Dr. Healy's findings concerning the stigmata of degeneracy are of interest, because like Goring he discovers no support for the theory of the origin of crime in atavism, as broached by Lombroso. Well-marked stigmata were found in 133 of the 1000 cases. Those structural anomalies "which could be found by careful examination on almost every human body have altogether been left out of count." The presence of the stigmata is considered in its relation to mental peculiarities, and Healy concludes, "If the cases of mental abnormality were taken out of our series, the proportion of marked stigmata would be little, if any, larger than in the general population."

Book II treats of "Cases, Types, Causative Factors," and deals in considerable detail with cases illustrating factors of heredity, physical ailments and abnormalities, the use of stimulants. Environmental factors are treated briefly, but psychological factors are discussed through twenty chapters. The chapter-headings indicate satisfactorily the classification: Professional Criminalism, Deliberate Choice of Criminalism, Mental Imagery, Mental Habit, Mental Conflict and Repressions, Abnormal Sexualism, Epilepsy, Mental Abnormality in General, Mental Defect (four chapters), Mental Dullness from Physical Conditions, Psychic Constitutional Inferiority, Mental Aberrations (three chapters), Mental Peculiarities (four chapters), Pathological Stealing, etc. This second book constitutes Dr. Healy's major contribution to criminological literature. 176 case-histories are placed in turn before the reader, with comments which indicate fairly well the method of interpretation and classification.

It is impossible in a book of 830 pages to treat cases of criminality in sufficient detail to convince the reader of the correctness of

diagnosis. That is a difficulty inherent in the production of this type of book. An elaborate monograph concerning each case would still leave important questions unanswered. The author has, however, provided us with a good outline of his method, and has shown us in a large number of cases how that method was applied and what his findings were. These cannot fail to be in a high degree valuable to any reader, layman or specialist, and out of the inevitable disagreement as to interpretation will come improvement of method of analysis of character.

On its psychological side, this work makes its major claim to respect. The newer psychoanalysis is but slightly applied, and Freud, Jung, and the mass of recent psychoanalytical literature are seldom mentioned. It is questionable whether any one individual could do what Dr. Healy has done and yet offer at the same time that psychoanalytic treatment of cases which is now urgently needed by penologists. It is to be hoped that some day in the not distant future we may have a collaborated study of a 1000 individual delinquents comprising correlated studies of each individual case by a physician, a social scientist, a psychologist, and a psychoanalyst, each highly trained and competent. Dr. Healy's admirable book is frankly submitted as a preliminary study of a large question. It is a notable volume, a unique contribution to criminology, and should be utilized not only by specialists in criminology, sociology, and psychology, but by ministers, teachers, social workers, physicians—all persons whose function it is to guide youth in the process of character building.

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**A GUIDE TO THE STUDY OF THE CHRISTIAN RELIGION.** Edited by G. B. SMITH. The University of Chicago Press. 1916. Pp. x, 759. \$3.00.

**THE BELIEF IN GOD AND IMMORTALITY.** JAMES H. LEUBA. Sherman, French, & Co. 1916. Pp. xx, 340. \$2.00.

**THE FOUNDATION OF MODERN RELIGION.** The Cole Lectures for 1916. HERBERT B. WORKMAN, D.D., LL.D. Fleming H. Revell Co. 1916. Pp. 249. \$1.25.

**IS CHRISTIANITY PRACTICABLE?** WILLIAM ADAMS BROWN. Chas. Scribner's Sons. 1916. Pp. xviii, 246. \$1.25.

In the making of sermons, a text may be either a point of departure or a point of arrival. It may be taken as a statement of revealed truth calling for explication and enforcement, or, by an approach from ordinary human experience, it may be discovered as

a law of the spiritual life. Broadly speaking, behind the former method lies the old theology; behind the latter, the new. This first volume, an *Encyklopädie* of theological science, prepared by a baker's dozen of contributors, nearly all of whom are on the Theological Faculty of the University of Chicago, is decidedly a book of the new theology, and its treatment of the various theological disciplines is thoroughly modern and refreshingly frank. No book is anywhere near so good for a young student seeking a preliminary survey of the whole field of theological learning, or for older clergymen wishing to see how the different departments look, singly and in correlation, from the new point of view. Appropriately, therefore, what may be regarded as its text appears in its very last paragraph, at the close of an admirable article by G. B. Foster entitled "The Contribution of Critical Scholarship to Ministerial Efficiency": "With reference to this whole question, it may be said that usually the candidate for the ministry—young though he may sometimes be—enters the divinity school as a finished religious and theological product, but that, in consequence of his studies there, he departs unfinished, growing aware that his personality, with its religion and its theology, are alike in the making. A divinity school that achieves such a result has fulfilled its function in the life of the human spirit." And this because, as the same writer has previously said, "It is not simply truth but the truthful *man*, tried in the fires of critical theological research, that can win the confidence of our bewildered and discouraged religious life."

Dr. Leuba's book breaks cleanly into two parts: the first discusses historically and argumentatively the doctrine of immortality; the second presents the statistical results of an inquiry into the prevalence among educated persons of belief in a personal God and individual immortality. The earlier idea of immortality, arising from the exteriorization of vivid memory-images, the "sense of presence," visions and dreams, is sharply distinguished from the modern idea, which is born of moral sentiment, and which differs from the former not only in origin but also in that it conceives a future life as an object of desire instead of dread and aversion. Perhaps, however, the independence of the two ideas is exaggerated, since it is not clear that the later could have arisen except upon prepared soil, that is, unless the earlier had previously given the notion of survival which was capable of transformation. The so-called metaphysical arguments, based upon idealism and the simplicity of the soul, are summarily dismissed. The moral arguments,

derived from the thought of God and the conservation of values, are pronounced invalid save upon an *a priori* assumption that the world will satisfy the demands which human ideals make upon it. This may be granted, but surely it may be argued that there is ground for such a faith in the essential reasonableness of the world and its ability to meet the demands itself has created.

The statistical results are undoubtedly interesting and valuable, although it may be doubted whether they are quite so significant as the author supposes and are not susceptible of other interpretations than his. It may be true that college students cease to hold the beliefs in question as they advance from the Freshman to the Senior class because of growing intelligence and independence, and that the more eminent men of science, historians, sociologists, and psychologists have, for the same reason, abandoned them in larger proportion than the less eminent; but it may also be that absorbing devotion to a particular field of study inhibits interest and thought in other directions. Dr. Leuba's tables have already been used to prove the demoralizing influence of "unbelieving" teachers upon the minds of their students, quite unjustly, of course; but the argument suggests the different conclusions which may be drawn from these laboriously collected figures. It would be interesting to know the reasons which have led to disbelief, for reasons there should be if Dr. Leuba's explanation is correct; and yet he himself remarks that "the ground for their unbelief is rarely clearly formulated in their own minds" (p. 297). To answer that the change is due more to a difference in mental temper and attitude than to specific reasons suggests the rejoinder that possibly a mental attitude determined by intellectual interests alone may be less truly appreciative of reality than one influenced also by other and more broadly human considerations. But whether one agrees with the conclusions of the book or not, it is a noteworthy contribution to the literature of the subject and will richly repay prolonged and thoughtful study.

George Inness, the artist, used to make merry over his boyish chagrin at discovering, when he undertook to sketch a broad landscape, that he had not taken a sufficiently large sheet of paper. An author who tries to put the history of the Middle Ages, considered as supplying the foundation of modern religion, into six lectures needs altogether exceptional power of selection, proportion, and perspective. That Dr. Workman has not fully succeeded in so arduous an attempt is not surprising; the marvel is that he did not

fail completely. The book is replete with information, but lacking in structure as a whole. Typographical errors are numerous and there is neither index nor table of contents.

All of Dr. Brown's work shows a remarkable combination of the idealist and the man of affairs; he seeks remote ends, but is keenly aware of the practical difficulties in the way and the means which must be employed for successful advance. In theology this sort of mind exposes one to the suspicion of trying to run with the hare and hunt with the hounds, because it easily becomes a habit of masking an intellectual advance by a specious use of antiquated terminology; but in treating such a subject as Dr. Brown here proposes it appears to the best advantage. His firm grasp upon the actual and the equally firm grasp of the ideal upon him make this book notable. The ideal is that of human brotherhood, represented as the Christian principle, outlined against nationalism on the one hand and individualistic otherworldliness on the other. The obsolescent individualism of what has been deemed the Christian ideal is vigorously criticised and its defect emphasized, although its value as a partial view is adequately acknowledged. The present war is regarded as a denial of the Christian principle, which denial constitutes, in the speech of theology, sin; and salvation must consist in its sincere whole-hearted acceptance as the law of social as well as individual life. So stated, the thesis of the book is commonplace enough, but it is in the considerations of its last three chapters entitled "The Christian Programme for Humanity," "The Duty for Tomorrow," "What the Church can do," that its chief and great value lies.

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THE SOCIAL SURVEY. CAROL ARONOVICI, Ph.D., Director of the Bureau for Social Research of the Seybert Institution, Philadelphia. The Harper Press. 1916. Pp. 255.

Unwittingly most of us who are not engaged professionally in social service might from its title pass by this little book as too technical to be of general interest and value. "Social survey" is still new enough in common terminology to need definition. The latter may well be given in the words of the author: "The social survey is a process of qualitative and quantitative analysis of our social environment both in the past and in the present in order to make possible the visualizing and the actual creation of practical Utopias."

Primarily the book is intended by its author as a manual for the guidance of the actual workers who are to make an inventory, as it were, of the social assets and liabilities of a given community concerning which more accurate knowledge is sought. As such it is eminently practical. Chapter by chapter, the author takes up the activities and institutions of our common life which affect the welfare of the individual, states their significance, and defines their possibilities for good or for evil. He follows each chapter by a series of masterly questions by which the usefulness of the institution under observation may be accurately and scientifically measured. In the methods of approach suggested, such as the intensive study of the locality to get its particular point of vantage from which to work, enlisting the services of the influential members of the community able to give expert knowledge along various lines, and the use of the press to mould an effective public opinion, we see the hand, not of the impractical enthusiast, but of the trained worker who fully realizes both the power and the delicacy of social forces.

But the book is far more than a manual for the professional investigator. As a series of brilliant commentaries touching the high points of reform along many lines it is a stimulus to community thinking. A few illustrations will suffice to show its originality of outlook.

The sections on Americanization and on Leisure are particularly striking. It is not citizenship alone that the foreigner most needs, but assimilation—socially, industrially, intellectually. The menace at present is due to lack of the latter, not the former. Many forces may be used to bring about assimilation. One of the most neglected is the right use of leisure, not on its negative side, that of recruiting depleted energy, but on its positive, dynamic side as a creative force, a means of self-expression. In this connection the author defines art as the "highest expression of creative socialized leisure," and pleads for more of the art-forms that find their creation and expression in the people themselves. The reader is made keenly aware of the tremendous waste of splendid human material through our present system of commercialized non-social exploitation of leisure time.

Renewed emphasis is also laid on the potentialities of the churches as socializing influences, not from any particular religious standpoint, but on the basis of their already accepted ethical codes. The questions here are those which every live church-worker might well ask himself. They suggest many lines of useful activity. "Are the churches located at strategic points in relation to their membership?"

"Are church activities sufficiently diversified and attractive to hold the interest of the average mind?" "Are the ministers fearless, intelligent, progressive leaders?" "Are the churches used as forums for the discussion of specific public questions?"

Education, the author acknowledges, is "the most powerful agency in modern democracy." He pays tribute to the public school as "the purest example of a democratic institution which is ready to rise to heights that so far have not been fully appreciated." Present dissatisfaction with many aspects of school conditions he interprets as full of promise for a new era of really American education that will "coördinate the national and racial elements of the people by conserving and utilizing native abilities as an asset to industrial efficiency and American democracy."

The author also raises points of deep interest to the legislator. He condemns the tendency of laws to deal with effects rather than with causes. He emphasizes the fact that "the social function of law is not control alone": "To create a stimulus toward right action rather than the prohibition of wrong-doing is the positive task of the law."

The effect of the whole book is to socialize our thinking. It makes us see where we are going. Changes already in progress take on a new significance, and the possibilities of others about to be made become evident. We feel after reading it that we at least begin to have some of that clearness of vision which is a prerequisite for making Utopias real—the ultimate aim of a social survey.

NANCY E. SCOTT.

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The Harvard theological  
review

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